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ABSTRACT
The thesis is concerned with the impact of population ageing on the 
future trends of male employment and unemployment in Japan, since 
it is thought that rising unemployment amongst older people will 
increase the dependency rate, leading to a reduction in capital 
accumulation and slower economic growth. The study is based on 
material and data obtained while researching in Japan for one year 
and draws heavily on Japanese-language sources. First, the role of 
rapidly falling fertility in stimulating economic growth in Japan 
is examined, followed by a detailed analysis of employment practices 
across different sizes of company in Japan that draws on surveys 
published by government and private institutions. It is found that 
existing analyses of Japanese employment practices ignore the 
importance of workforce age structure in internal labour markets. 
An efficiency age structure hypothesis that stresses labour demand 
rigidities is formulated: it is hypothesised that large firms with 
internal labour markets attempt to maintain a given internal age 
structure to maximise workforce efficiency. This behaviour implies 
that as the population ages, the unemployment rate of older men will 
rise. The implications of this hypothesis are examined at a micro 
level through an analysis of the adjustments firms have made to 
employment practices; and at the macro level through an analysis of 
the macro labour market. The absorptive capacity of small companies 
and self-employment for older men was examined using cohort 
analysis. Finally the impact of government policy on the labour 
market for older men is examined and assessed. Government policy is 
divided into two main categories: labour market intervention and
public pension reform. The thesis indicates that raising the pension 
eligibility age will not reduce dependency unless employment 
practices that generate unemployment of older people are changed.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS
Si
Section 1 Introduction to the subject of the thesis
Population ageing refers to the increase in the proportion of older 
people in a population. It is generally caused by a marked decline 
in childbearing and an decrease in mortality rates in the older age 
groups. The decline in childbearing is usually the primary cause and 
the fall in mortality adds to the effect. In the 1920s and 1930s, 
population ageing became a topic of concern in European countries, 
particularly in France and Britain. It was feared that population 
ageing would lead to a general stagnation of the economy and a 
decline in the vitality of the population (Reddaway 1934) . In recent 
years interest in the social and economic implications of population 
ageing has increased dramatically in developed countries and in some 
developing countries such as China and Hongkong. Influential reports 
by respected bodies such as the OECD (OECD 1988) have focused 
primarily on the social security implications, although labour 
market implications are not ignored. In Japan there has been a 
noticeable and growing awareness of population ageing: articles in 
newspapers have discussed the implications of population ageing for 
the provision of croquet grounds where the elderly can while away 
their free time; and population ageing has been used as one 
justification for the costly fifth generation computer project 
(Motooka and Kitsuregawa 1985 pp 23-25). If the proportion of the 
population above the age of 65 is taken as an indicator of ageing, 
population projections in Japan show that the proportion will rise 
from just over 10% in 1985 to a peak of approximately 24% in 2040 
(Koseisho Jinko Mondai Kenkyujo 19 88). Until about 1995, Japan will 
still have a younger population age structure than many developed 
countries such as Germany, France and Sweden. By 2 040, however, 
Japan will have one of the 'oldest' population age structures,
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equalled only by Sweden and Germany. This comparison with other 
countries shows that not only will the population age structure be 
relatively 'old', but that the population ageing process in Japan 
will occur relatively rapidly: it is estimated that it will take 25 
years for the proportion of the population above 65 to rise from 7% 
to 14% in Japan, compared with 70 years for the USA, 85 years for the 
UK and 13 0 years for France. The possible implications for the 
economies in these countries are extremely wide ranging.
The work of economists studying the impact of population ageing has 
been concentrated on the burgeoning public pension and health care 
costs that an ageing population implies; and the effects of these 
growing transfers to older dependents on the productive capacity of 
the economy (Spengler and Clark 1980). Feldstein's famous paper 
(Feldstein 1974) purported to show that the existence of public 
pensions funded by transfers from the economically active part of 
the population reduced the macro savings rate. Transfers that would 
have been saved to meet consumption expenditure after retirement 
would be spent by the current generation of old age pensioners. The 
implication of this finding was that increases in taxation to pay 
for social security programmes would further reduce the aggregate 
savings rate. It is clear, however, that older people in receipt of 
public pensions need not, and do not, draw on their own accumulated 
wealth to meet current consumption. Thus, a fall in saving of the 
supporting generation can lead to a decrease in dissaving of older 
dependents. Barro (1974) argued that inter-generational transfers 
would counteract the impact of pay-as-you-go social security 
schemes. The impact of ageing on savings is still a controversial 
topic. Public pension provision is also felt to reduce the labour 
supply of older people: as public pensions have become more
generous, labour force participation of older people has declined
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in most countries (OECD 19 88) . This fact supports the view, but it iff 
also possible that public pensions have had to become more generous 
since older people are unable to find alternative means of support. 
As stated earlier, growing transfers imply higher taxation rates. 
Other economists have claimed that higher taxation will reduce the 
incentives for work of the active population. At the extreme, this 
negative incentive effect has been included in elegant, but 
misleading, general equilibrium simulations that give pessimistic 
results (Motoma et al. 19 87). General equilibrium models compound 
the effects of an erroneous assumption: empirical studies of
taxation and labour supply have not reached a consensus on the 
effects of taxation - some studies show that labour supply increases 
and Brown (19 81) concludes that the effects are at best 
indeterminate.
The effects of population ageing on the labour market have been 
accorded secondary importance. The effect of public pension 
provision on the labour supply of the elderly has already been 
mentioned above. Some studies have attempted to gauge the falls in 
productivity that are felt to occur with individual ageing, but the 
results have been inconclusive (Schulz 1988). Thus, the effects on 
the efficiency of the aggregate labour force of an increasing 
proportion of older people are indeterminate. Others have attempted 
to gauge the effect of population ageing on the average worker's 
lifetime earnings profile (Martin and Ogawa 1988, Ermisch 1988, 
Freeman 1989). These studies show that there will be some flattening 
of the wage curve, but that non-demographic factors, such as the 
pace of economic growth tend be more important in determining wage 
profiles. The policy implications of such studies are not clear. In 
Japan, there has been concern over a growing labour shortage that 
may occur with population ageing (Nihon Kaihatsu GinkS 1992) . There
15
has been some attention paid to the unemployment problems of older 
people (OECD 1988, 1990, 1992) , but in recent years, it has been the 
unemployment problem of young people that has attracted the 
attention of labour economists (Layard et al. 1991).
Section 2 The contribution of this research
The inspiration for this thesis came from a concern over the impact 
of population ageing in Japan and economic growth; and the following 
facts: a) the Japanese government has been attempting to raise the 
pension eligibility age of one of the main public pension schemes 
because of fears of escalating contribution rates; b) in Japan, 
there has been a concern about labour shortages and immigration 
while the unemployment rates of older men have been rising; and c) 
European governments have introduced early retirement incentives, 
apparently to improve the chances of employment for younger 
unemployed people. It seemed paradoxical that there were fears of 
labour shortage when older people were unemployed. This paradox 
indicated that the labour market in Japan is segmented by age and 
that even in times of labour shortage there was a reluctance to hire 
older workers . It also seemed paradoxical that governments in Europe 
were encouraging early retirement, in spite of burgeoning public 
pension expenditure, until it became clear that early pension 
receipt reduced the number of older unemployed people who tended to 
experience long-term unemployment, by encouraging such people to 
leave the labour force. It appeared that the Japanese government was 
attempting to reduce dependency rates merely by raising the pension 
eligibility age, whereas the European experience in reverse implied 
that the unemployment rate of older people would rise. Even if 
public pension contribution rates were to be reduced by the 
government's policy, the unemployed older workers would need to be 
supported by other public transfer schemes (eg unemployment benefit)
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or private transfers. In other words, the dependency problem could 
not be reduced simply by changing the law. To understand why 
dependency could not be easily reduced by this method, it is 
necessary to show why dependency occurs. It seemed that a supply- 
side based explanation was not adequate for explaining the 
unemployment problems of older workers. From a supply-side point of 
view, older workers tend to remain unemployed because they are less 
willing to move or retrain, since they have fewer years over which 
to earn a return on such investments. Alternatively older people 
would leave the labour market because they had alternative means of 
income support (pensions). In both of these cases the older worker 
remains out of work voluntarily and need not be dependent on external 
financial support. Mandatory retirement is particularly prevalent 
in Japan and it seemed unbelievable that a person's capabilities in 
work could disappear from one day to the next merely because of a 
particular employment practice. Therefore, it was necessary to 
provide a demand-side explanation of the age segmentation of the 
Japanese labour market and the relatively high unemployment rate of 
older people. A model of labour demand was developed with an 
appreciation of the prevalence of internal labour markets and the 
incentive efficiency of Japanese employment practices. This model 
I have called the efficiency age structure model - it is similar to 
efficiency wage models (Yellen and Akerlof 1986) in approach, but 
also includes the workforce age structure as a determinant in labour 
demand. This model implies that, with internal labour markets, firms 
will find a particular age structure the most efficient for 
motivating the workforce and improving labour productivity. 
Consequently large firms will attempt to maintain a given age 
structure and there will be little attempt to substitute older 
workers for younger workers, even if the older workers are 
relatively cheap. Older workers will find themselves cast into the
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external labour market and find employment in smaller firms where 
job security is low. In an ageing population age structure, the 
consequence is that unemployment of older people will increase, as 
will the macro unemployment rate. An examination of the Japanese 
labour market confirms this result. Cohort analysis also shows that 
the absorption capacity of smaller firms and self-employment has 
been over-estimated and it seems that absorbers of older people are 
reaching the limits to absorption capacity. Governments generally 
intervene to some degree in labour markets because of the high 
social costs associated with unemployment. Thus, the thesis includes 
a description and assessment of Japanese government labour market 
policies that are targeted at older men. The only noticeable effect 
of these policies has been the changes in employment practices that 
mitigate to some extent the rigidity of the efficiency age 
structure. The reforms of the public pension schemes are also 
examined since the pension eligibility age and the level of pension 
benefits will determine whether older men will leave the labour 
market or will remain unemployed or at risk of unemployment. It 
should be noted that the thesis relates to the labour market for 
men only, since women face different employment practices and the 
inclusion of a study on the impact of population ageing on women 
would require another thesis.
Section 3 The organisation of the thesis
The thesis is divided into four parts. Part I is essentially an 
introduction to the main body of the thesis and comprises this 
chapter and Chapter Two. The first half of Chapter Two represents 
a survey of the economics literature pertinent to analysing the 
relationships between demographic change and economic growth, some 
of which have been mentioned in this introduction briefly. The last 
half comprises an attempt to assess the effects of initial
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population ageing on economic growth in Japan after the Second World 
War. The main, but tentative, finding is that the increasing 
proportion of the population that was economically active boosted 
growth.
Part II contains the micro labour market analysis that is necessary 
for understanding the behaviour of -Hie. macro labour market as it 
responds to population ageing. This Part contains Chapters Three to 
Six. Chapters Three and Four combine to give a detailed examination 
of firms' employment practices, with an emphasis on the differences 
and similarities of the practices of different-sized firms. This 
examination indicates that large firms operate internal labour 
markets and confirms the existence of a dual labour market. Chapter 
Five is the pivotal chapter of the thesis: it is a survey of the
rationales that have been given for Japanese employment practices; 
and more importantly, it contains the development of the efficiency 
age structure model. The efficiency age structure model has 
implications for the impact of population ageing on employment 
practices and the state of the macro labour market, and so provides 
the framework for the remainder of the thesis. Chapter Six examines 
the adjustments in employment practices that firms have made in 
response to the ageing structure of the labour force. This 
examination shows that while large firms have attempted to reduce 
the degree of complementarity between older and young male workers, 
they have also devised means to regulate the internal workforce age 
structure.
Part III provides an analysis of the influence of population ageing 
on the macro labour market, and a detailed description of government 
policies that will affect the work and unemployment experience of 
older men. This Part comprises Chapters Seven to Nine. Chapter Seven
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examines the behaviour of labour force participation rates and 
unemployment rates of men, both in the aggregate and disaggregated 
by age group. The main finding is that unemployment of older men has 
accounted for the majority of the rise in the aggregate unemployment 
rate despite a noticeable fall in the labour force participation 
rates of older men. The chapter also includes a study of the future 
variables that may affect the unemployment rate of older men: namely 
provision of public pensions; absorption by small firms; and self- 
employment. Chapter Eight describes government labour market 
policies aimed at improving the employment chances of older men 
through intervention in the labour market. It seems that the only 
successful policy has been that of encouraging a particular change 
in employment practices: namely a raising of the mandatory
retirement age. Chapter Nine describes public pension reform and 
also includes an attempt to assess the impact of pension reform on 
post-retirement income levels.
Part IV represents the conclusion of the thesis, comprising Chapter 
Ten only. Chapter Ten summarises the findings of the thesis, which 
are described briefly in Section 2 of this chapter, and suggests 
areas for future research.
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CHAPTER 2 POPULATION AGEING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN JAPAN
Section 1 The Significance of this chapter
This chapter provides a background to the analysis of the effects 
of population ageing on the Japanese labour market that forms the 
main body of this thesis. In Section 2 stable population theory is 
used to show how changing fertility and mortality rates affect the 
growth rate of the population and its age structure. The section 
also includes a brief discussion of the transition from one stable 
population to another. Section 3 comprises a survey of analysis that 
relates to the effects of population ageing on economic growth. The 
survey is by no means exhaustive, since a full survey would require 
a large amount of space. It does, however, show how population 
ageing can affect the main factors of growth, namely labour supply, 
capital formation and the use and creation of new technology. 
Section 3 also represents an attempt to show how the effects on one 
growth factor can lead to changes in the other factors, but without 
using a full general equilibrium model. It should be noted that 
models that can be used to analyse explicitly the of changes
in population age structure on economic growth are scarce; and that 
empirical tests are generally inconclusive, since there are many 
factors outside demographic change that can affect the main 
variables (eg the macro savings rate). Nonetheless, such a survey 
is useful for giving insight into the effects of population ageing, 
even if the insight is incomplete. Section 4 is a summary of the 
Japanese experience of demographic change and economic growth. 
Section 5 represents an attempt to show that initial ageing of the 
population after 1947 contributed to economic growth. It is 
concluded that the rise in the proportion of the population 
gainfully employed positively aided growth. This conclusion is the
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stimulus for analysing the effects of population ageing on the 
labour market.
Section 2 Population growth and population age structure
The aim of this section is to analyse which demographic changes can 
cause population ageing and to show that the growth rate of the 
population and its age structure are linked. Such an explanation is 
important since the impact on the economy of population ageing will 
be felt in two ways: one is through the change in the age structure; 
the other is -Hrrouyh HHh& slowing or even negative population growth 
rate. The analysis presented here is based on the stable population 
growth theory developed by Ansley Coale (Coale 1972) amongst others. 
Although stable population growth is never likely to be experienced, 
it provides a framework in which to observe the effects of changing 
vital rates, independently of one another.
Let the population be growing at a constant rate per annum of r. 
The rate, r, will be determined by the difference between the annual 
birth rate and death rate. The birth rate at time t, will be given 
by
b(t) = f°(a' t) da (2.1)
o
where: 
a = age;
w = highest age attainable by a human being;
c(a,t) = proportion in the population of women aged a at time t; 
m(a,t) = annual rate of bearing children at age a at time t.
The death rate at time t will be given by
W
d(t) = t)q(a, t) da (2.2)
o
where q(a,t) - annual death rate of women of age a in year t.
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The natural rate of increase will subsequently be given by 
r (t) = b(t) - d( t) (2.3)
As can be seen, the rate of growth, r, is determined by the birth 
schedules and death schedules of women and the proportion of women 
in each age group. For a stable population it is necessary for the 
birth and mortality schedules to remain unchanged and therefore the 
insertion of t in the above functions is not necessary. This 
analysis of stable population only involves women. In the stable 
population case the population is continually renewing itself. Men 
do not replace themselves by giving birth and therefore, strictly 
speaking, they cannot be included in this continuous process. It is 
possible to derive 'birth schedules' for men also, and so derive a 
stable male population. Links between male and female stable 
populations are also possible, but the resultant complexity is not 
desirable here, since the structure and increase of the female 
population can stand as a proxy for the population as a whole.
With a constant rate of growth, r, the proportion of women at any 
age will be given by
so with which are the mortality rates, unchanged, p(a) will
also be constant, as will b and r. For any given age, the proportion 
c(a) will be constant. It would now be instructive to examine the 
age structures of populations with different growth rates.
c{a) = be rap(a) (2.4)
where:
b - birth rate;
p(a) - survival rate at age a; 
p(a) is given by
(2.5)
e °
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For this we need to partially differentiate c(a) with respect to r. 
Let us rearrange; 
since,
fc(a) da = 1 (2 .6)
and
c (a) = be~rap(a) 
then
(2.7)
jc(a)da = jbe rap{a) da
and therefore, 
1b =
Je rap(a) da
So, c(a) may be written
c(a) = e rap(a)W
Je-rap (a) da
(2 .8)
(2.9)
(2 .10)
Differentiating partially with respect to r,
( w \
fae~rsp(a) dadcJa) = c(a! 
dr
je~rap(a) da 
\ o
- a (2 .11)
The first term in the brackets is the first moment of the stable 
population, or its mean age, Ar , so the above can be simplified to
dc(a]
dr
= c(a) (A -a) (2.12)
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From this last equation, it can be seen that the proportion of 
people below the average age is greater, the greater the value of 
r. If r falls, the proportions of age groups above Ar will increase: 
this effect is known as population ageing. It would also be 
interesting to examine the effect of r on Ar. Taking the derivative 
of Ar with respect to r,
The second part of this is the second moment about zero, or the 
variance of the stable population. Since the variance is positive, 
Ar falls with an increase in r. There is a double effect causing the 
population to become younger with increases in r.
A brief comment on the effects of changes in mortality and fertility 
is now due. A decline in the age-specific fertility rates, m(a), 
will reduce b and as a consequence will reduce r, which in turn will 
cause population ageing at every given death rate, d. A decrease in 
the age-specific mortality rates could be considered analogous to 
an increase in fertility, since it will decrease the death rate d 
and as a consequence lead to an increase in r. If age specific 
mortality rates decline by the same proportion across all ages, the 
proportions of the population in each age group will not be altered, 
except by the increase in r. It is possible, conceptually, that if 
mortality decline were felt only in the older age groups the
direct ageing of the population would not be counteracted by the 
increase in r. When fertility and mortality rates are declining, as 
occurs during the demographic transition, the outcome on population 
structure is less clear, since the two trends are working in 
opposite directions. Usually population ageing is caused mainly by
W
(2 .12)
o
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falls in fertility rates, but when significant improvements in child 
mortality rates have already been achieved, further improvements in 
mortality affect mainly the upper age ranges and hence will have an 
increasing role in population ageing (Coale 1972).
So far the analysis has been concentrated on the effects of declines 
in fertility and mortality on stable populations. In other words, 
it has been assumed that the rates undergo a single change and then 
the pre-change population structure and the post-change population 
age structure are compared, once the dynamic transition from one 
structure to the other has been completed. Usually, however, 
fertility rates fall continuously as population ageing progresses 
and the visible population changes are caused by the transition from 
the original state to a new state that is continually changing. I 
will confine further discussion to the dynamic effects of fertility 
decline. The initial impact of fertility decline will be to produce 
a more aged structure than is implied by a stable population. It 
will have an immediate impact in the lower age ranges, reducing the 
proportion of the young, since the generation above was produced 
when the birth rate was higher and therefore the generation above 
will be larger than it would be in a stable population with the 
newer, lower fertility rate. This initial impact means that the 
proportion of people in the middle age ranges rises. As the reduced 
young cohorts age they will proceed into the middle age groups, thus 
reducing the proportion in the middle age groups. At the same time, 
the cohorts that were produced when fertility rates were high 
progress into the older age groups, increasing the proportion of the 
population ih-H^ ose groups . To clarify this explanation, the following 
simile is useful: the age structure will appear like a snake that 
eats a rat. The rat is gradually passed through the snake as it is 
digested until the remains are ejected at the rear (at the higher
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age ranges). These dynamic aspects are important for the discussion 
of labour force size and age structure given below, since the labour 
force is composed of people in the middle age groups - the initial 
impact of ageing is to increase the proportion of people of working 
age, but as the dynamic adjustment proceeds, the proportion of the 
working age population falls.
One finding of this stable population analysis should be stressed 
before proceeding to the next section: population ageing is
characterised by both a slowing of the population growth rate {or 
even a negative growth rate) as well as an increase in the 
proportions of the population in the higher age groups.
Section 3 Demographic change and the impact oh the factors of 
growth
Sub-section 3.1 Demographic change and the size of the labour force
The percentage of a stable population in the labour force (L) is 
found by summing the multiples of the proportion of people in each 
age group by the requisite age-specific labour force participation 
rate, thus
where L is the aggregate labour force participation rate and 1 (a) 
is the labour force participation rate at age a. The' effects of 
population ageing on L are not clear, a priori: the effects will
depend on the cause of the ageing {decline in mortality or fertility 
or both) . If the ageing is caused principally by a fall in 
fertility, then initially, the proportion of people below working 
age will fall and thus the proportion of the population available 
for work will increase (as explained above). Over time however, the
(2.14)
o
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fall in fertility will decrease the proportion of younger people who 
are of working age. If age-specific labour force participation rates 
decline with age (see Chapter 7) the decline in the proportion of 
younger working-age people in the population will lead to a fall in 
the aggregate labour force participation rate. Thus, eventually, for 
a given size of population, an aged one will have a smaller labour 
force than one that is not aged. Since population ageing and a 
slowing population growth rate go hand-in-hand, the overall effect 
of ageing is to reduce the growth rate of the labour force. It could 
even lead to a negative growth rate of the labour force, depending 
on the stage of the ageing process and the size of the fertility 
decline.
So far it has been assumed that age-specific labour force 
participation rates remain static as the population ages and 
therefore the labour force size and structure is determined purely 
by vital rates. It is likely however, that age-specific labour force 
participation rates will be affected by the changes in the vital 
rates themselves. Lower fertility rates imply greater opportunity 
for women to work outside the household and therefore a rise in the 
participation rate of women, Lw. The shape of the fertility schedule 
may also affect Lw. If births are concentrated in a few consecutive 
years of a woman's life, Lw over the woman's life span may be 
increased. With a reduction in fertility rates, births are often 
concentrated in a space of five or six years, leaving the woman more 
time for outside work. "Empirical evidence on this point is mixed, 
however, with participation rates of women aged 3 0 to 45 increasing 
after fertility declined in some countries and decreasing in others" 
(Bloom and Freeman 1987). The effects of mortality declines caused 
by better health hardly need stating - more people in each age group 
will be able (and,, presumably, willing) to work. Studies of the
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determinants of retirement, for example, show that poor health is 
an important element in the decision to retire (Clark et al 197 8 pp 
935-937) .
Non-demographic changes caused by population ageing may also impinge 
on labour force participation rates. For example, a slowing growth 
of the labour force may lead to a rise in real wages, causing a rise 
in labour force participation rates, if the labour supply curve is 
upward sloping. On the other hand, population ageing could lead to 
a reduction in investment (see next section) and a subsequent fall 
in demand for labour. If young workers and older workers are 
complementary inputs, as is suggested by Ermisch's studies of the 
British labour force (Ermisch 1988) , an ageing labour force could 
lead to a-f&U i»9 wage levels, or an increase in unemployment, for 
older workers and withdrawal from the labour force. In many 
countries, the labour force participation of older men has fallen 
as the population has aged (see Appendix 7B). It is generally felt 
that the cause of this fall is the increase in generosity of 
government pension schemes that has occurred at the same time as 
ageing in many countries (Clark et al 1978 pp 931-935). As 
populations age, the level of benefits paid by the public pension 
schemes may be reduced to avoid large increases in contribution 
rates, encouraging older people to remain in the labour force and 
leading to a rise in their age-specific labour force participation 
rates.
The discussion so far shows that the effects of population ageing 
on labour force size are an empirical matter, since conceptually, 
the effects are indeterminate. Empirical studies are virtually 
impossible, since the other factors also impinge. For example, 
public provision o-j-pensions can reduce the participation rate. If,
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however, pension provision is a function of the population age 
structure (ie it is endogenous), empirical analysis becomes further 
complicated, unless an explicit link between pension provision and 
ageing can be found.
Sub-section 3.2 Demographic change and labour productivity
The sub-section above dealt with the effects of ageing on the supply 
of people available for work. The productivity of those people is 
determined by two main factors: the number of hours worked by each 
individual and the productivity of the hours supplied. This section 
covers the effects of ageing on these factors.
Let us take the case of a high fertility rate which leads to a rapid 
growth in population. The findings can then be reversed to find the 
effects of a decline in fertility. The most direct link between 
fertility levels and quantity of work per individual is the 
incentive effect of having responsibility for a family with many 
children. This effect is usually positive for the father in the 
household {Simon 1977) . The elasticity of labour hours supplied per 
child varies according to tastes, cultural factors and environment 
(resources) and thus can vary substantially between different 
countries. The effect on the mother of increased childbirth is 
usually deemed to be a decrease in the supply of labour, due to 
extra care now needed in the rearing of the child. A distinction 
is often made between labour supply effects in developing and
developed countries. It is argued that women in developing countries 
work at home and therefore the effect on her labour supply is 
indeterminate {this really means difficult to measure). An 
incremental child will nevertheless divert attention from other 
work. The labour-leisure trade off for males in developing countries 
is often held to be more important than in developed countries. This
30
may be attributable to work contracts and social contracts in a 
developed country which limit the degree of substitution between 
labour and leisure. Simon (1977) shows that in Britain the 
percentage of manual workers working overtime increased noticeably 
during child-rearing ages. The relationship may in fact run in the 
opposite direction, such that an increased desire for more leisure, 
or material goods, lowers the total fertility rate. Therefore the 
effect of decreasing fertility may be associated with a greater 
labour supply in exchange for material goods or a decreased labour 
supply in exchange for leisure. Generally the increase in male 
labour supply caused by an incremental child outstrips the negative 
effect on the woman's labour supply (Simon 1977).
Thus, in an ageing population a reduction in fertility and the
declining proportion of the population accounted for by people of 
child-bearing ages will lead to a decrease in the number of hours 
of labour supplied, if indeed it is increased family size that
stimulates labour supply, rather than a desire for material goods
or leisure leading to a fall in fertility. The causality is
indeterminate, however.
Productivity of labour may be influenced by both the change in the 
proportions of people at different ages and the slowing population 
growth that occurs with ageing. Labour productivity can be altered 
by many other factors, such as a new invention, however.
a) The effects of changes in labour force size
With a larger work force and larger economy (population), division
of labour becomes more feasible with an increasing scale of
operation for certain industries (the implication here is that 
effective demand also increases). Thus for an increasing population
31
specialisation will increase productivity and off-set diminishing 
returns to labour, should capital stock remain fixed. It should be 
noted however that for many types of divisions of labour, increased 
capitalisation of production is often also required. Thus a fall in 
the growth rate of population will diminish the chances for division 
of labour, but will possibly increase the capital per capita and 
levels of effective demand per capita.
Simon (19 86) argues that learning by doing progresses faster, the 
larger the scale of initial production. Thus the faster the growth 
rate of the population, the larger the scale of initial production 
and the faster the speed of learning by doing. To the extent that 
learning by doing may also inversely be regarded as increasing 
utilisation of latent capital embodied in a piece of machinery, the 
degree of capitalisation of the particular industry is also 
important and therefore a slowing population growth can lead to 
greater capitalisation and greater chances for learning by doing.
Both the division of labour and the learning by doing aspects 
described above are two types of economy of scale. The implicit 
assumption is that an increasing population means increasing market 
size and increasing employment. Such economies of scale are quite 
possible without a growing population. If a country is open to 
world trade, then the economy can obtain increased productivity 
through increased specialisation. Thus improved productivity may be 
enjoyed by a smaller number of people. Diseconomies of scale can 
also be a problem.
Increased population density increases the subjective return on 
social infrastructure investment and thus this type of investment 
becomes more attractive. With better communications and transport,
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efficiency should increase and specialisation of production becomes 
more possible. Increased infrastructure construction may however 
result in capital being diverted from other uses - crowding out may 
occur. Therefore effects on productivity are indeterminate, in any­
thing but a partial study. Population may also create the need for 
infrastructure which does not increase productivity, but is 
necessary to cancel out the effects caused by increased density. A 
complex sewage system is a good example.
b) The effects of changes in the population age structure.
One of the major concerns over population ageing is based on the 
view that older workers are less productive than younger workers. 
Thus if the age structure of the labour force ages, for a given size 
of work force, the labour force will become less productive. Younger 
people generally have better health, and are believed to have 
greater physical and mental stamina and greater mental adaptability 
to new ideas.
With greater morbidity at higher ages in a population, the health 
of young people will be better. Physical stamina is relatively more 
important in an economy which is mainly formed of industries 
requiring strenuous physical work, such as mining and construction. 
With increased mechanisation the physical advantages of youth are 
likely to disappear. The question of mental stamina is still much 
debated. A well-known study by Welford (1958), a psychologist, found 
that perception and response declined with age, as did the capacity 
for retaining information in the short term. Other studies found 
that the effect of age on productivity was insignificant for those 
below 60, that the capacity for reasoning was hardly impaired by age 
and that slowing of comprehension and reaction was counteracted by 
greater knowledge and experience (Clark et al 1978 pp 927-928).
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Indeed Sparrow (see Schulz 19 88 p 87) concluded that:
" . . it is apparent from a number of well-designed studies that 
age often has no real influence on performance. Wide 
individual differences exist and experience often counteracts 
any age effects. Where age differences are found, it appears 
they may be caused often by psychosocial factors, such as 
reduced work commitment because of limited career advancement 
opportunities."
The greater mental agility of younger people may be confused with 
the fact that they have been trained and educated more recently in 
new ideas and technology, whilst older workers often do not receive 
specific training after a certain age. Thus the acceptance of new 
ideas will be just as much a matter of training as inherent 
qualities. Such considerations are known as vintage effects. Denton 
and Spencer (1975) in their simulation of economic growth with 
explicit population variables, define the effective labour force as 
the summation of the workforce at each age in period, with each 
group weighted by a labour productivity weight associated with age 
and sex and a labour productivity weight associated with the 
population cohort to which they belong. This last weight "allow(s) 
for improvements in the stock of knowledge imparted to successive 
cohorts as they pass through the educational system" (Denton and 
Spencer 1975 p 18), with the assumption that this weight will be 
larger, the younger the person. This assumption implies that workers 
do not absorb knowledge while at work that would be the result of 
the introduction of new practices or specific training. In other 
words, firms do not wish to train older workers because they view 
such training as more costly than training young workers. A 1963 
study of 2,200 workers by the US Bureau of Labour Statistics quoted 
in Clark et al (197 8) found that "age, by itself, is not a reliable 
or useful criterion for determining the suitability of workers for
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training." Certainly for the individual firm, labour costs are 
reduced by recruiting staff trained in new knowledge by another 
source (ie the state education system), rather than retraining 
existing staff. It may also be argued that training of older staff 
is less profitable for a firm, since realisation of the investment 
will accrue over the fewer years an older worker has left to work. 
It is important to note, however, that in a growing economy with 
changing technology, investment in training will be amortised 
quickly regardless of age.
As can be seen, age-structure and labour force productivity is a 
fraught subject, due to the intangibility of age effects and also 
due to the indivisibility of purely technical aspects of 
productivity, the externalities accruing from education and the use 
of incentive schemes (eg promotion).
Sub-section 3.3 Population ageing and capital formation
Some of the possible links and mechanisms responsible for an 
increase in capital stock will now be examined. It is assumed in 
this section that net borrowing from abroad for capital accumulation 
is zero, to simplify the discussion.
The simplest form of savings function relates savings as a constant 
proportion of total national income, that is S = aYt. As this 
formula stands there is no explicit mechanism relating the value of 
present consumption to the value of future consumption, which is the 
essence of saving decisions. If the subjective discount rate of 
future consumption is high, then saving will be less desirable and 
the value of a will be small. It is plausible that the structure of 
the population will influence the evaluation of the discount rate. 
If the ratio of non-working age population to working age population
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(the 'dependency ratio') is large, then the proportion of income of 
the working age population which needs to be spent on dependents 
will be greater. That is, present consumption needs for the support 
of children and/or the elderly will be greater for a given level of 
earnings per worker. This increased need to consume in the present 
increases the discount rate of future consumption and makes saving 
less attractive. Savings may be more attractive if the rate of 
return on capital investment (i) is also high. The determination of 
the demand for funds for investment will be discussed below.
Since the structure of the population is determined by the growth 
rate of the population, g, and the rate of change of growth over 
time, g, the savings rate may be made a function of these two 
variables and the rate of return on capital. The savings function 
may be written as
St - a{g, g, i) Yt (2.15)
such that j>a < 0; 6a > 0 when g = 0.
5g 6 i
If g < 0, a will be greater and if g > 0, a will be smaller. This 
savings function implies that if the growth rate of the population 
is high and i is small, savings will account for a small proportion 
of national income. With a large i however, the size of a will be 
indeterminate, depending on a specific time-preference function of 
a particular population. With g < 0, that is, a slowing growth rate, 
the dependency ratio will be decreasing for a given g and i , savings 
being more attractive. This functional form captures both the 
steady-state effects of population growth and the dynamic aspects 
o f demographi c t rans i t i on.
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The theoretical results of the above savings function are opposite 
to those obtained from a simple application of the life-cycle 
hypothesis. In the life-cycle hypothesis, saving is carried out by 
young people in anticipation of a period when they are older and 
need to deplete savings due to lack of income from work. In a fast- 
growing population, the age distribution will be "younger" and 
therefore the proportion of those saving to those dissaving will be 
larger, resulting in a higher aggregate saving rate (saving rate = 
average propensity to consume). Conversely, an aged population 
structure will lead to a decrease in the aggregate saving rate, 
since the proportion of dissavers will rise. The results of the 
above specification and the life-cycle approach need reconciling. 
The above specification also offers no framework for analysing the 
effects of the growth rate of Y on savings. I shall deal with these 
two problems next.
I would now like to present a variable rate of growth model to which 
Mason (1987) has contributed. This model was originally developed 
to show the effects of high fertility on the aggregate saving rate. 
Figure 2.1 shows the consumption and earning patterns of a typical 
household over its lifetime.
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Figure 2.1 showing lifetime consumption and earning patterns
It is assumed that the savings accumulated in the younger years are 
exactly the same as the amount dissaved in later years: that is, 
there are no bequests. Lifetime earning patterns are known perfectly 
by each individual. In a population in which the proportion of each 
age-group is equal and there is no growth in income, aggregate
savings will be zero. In a growing population, the imbalance of
young to old households will lead to a positive savings rate. If
income levels are also growing at the same time as population grows, 
the savings rate will be greater than when income growth is
stationary, since the young households will have a greater lifetime 
income and will be saving more than the older households during 
their own previous period of saving {ie when they were young). The 
increase in aggregate savings is known as the rate of growth effect. 
In Figure 2.1, AY shows the average earnings age and Ac shows the 
average consumption age. The difference between these two ages is 
known as the consumption lag. The longer the delay between the 
average earning and consumption ages, the greater will be the effect 
of a growth in income, since at a given moment, saving will be 
carried out by younger generations at higher incomes and consumption 
(dissaving) will be carried out by older generations who had a lower 
life-time income. The aggregate saving rate of a population will be
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greater as average consumption at a given moment will be determined 
by the income levels of b years earlier, whilst average earnings 
will be determined by income levels for a life-span which started 
later and which therefore implies higher lifetime income brought 
about by economic growth.
It is now necessary to ask which variables may affect the earnings 
and consumption patterns of people such that AY and Ac shift. At this 
stage, we are concerned primarily with the effects of child 
dependency on consumption patterns. Old age dependency is not, 
strictly speaking, an aspect of the model, since it is assumed that 
people optimise consumption over the lifetime and therefore save for 
their own retirement. Mason divides consumption into two categories 
- activity 1 and activity 2. The first activity is child-bearing and 
the second activity is a proxy for all other consumption activities. 
The earlier in the lifespan that families have children, the earlier 
will be the average age of consumption for activity 1, Ax. The 
earlier is Ax, the greater effect it has on the overall average 
consumption age. If activity 1 accounts for a small proportion of 
the consumption budget, an earlier Ax will have little effect. Thus 
the share, as well as the timing, of activity 1 is important. The 
overall average age of consumption is given by
A c = s1A1 + s2A2 (2.16)
which is a weighted average of the average age of the two 
consumption activities weighted by the share of total income spent 
on each activity. It is important to mention that the lifetime 
pattern of consumption is not determined by price or income 
variables in this model, but by technological and cultural factors.
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If A2 occurs later in life than A1# an increase in the share of the 
budget devoted to childbearing will bring forward the average 
consumption age with respect to the average earning age: savings
decrease. With the cost of children subject to constant marginal 
cost (equivalent adult consumer cost), an increased child dependency 
rate unambiguously decreases savings. Mason conducted a cross- 
section regression over approximately 150 countries and found that 
the dependency ratio had a significant effect on savings ratios, 
particularly for countries with higher economic rates of growth - 
"Given a very high dependency ratio, say of 0.9, saving is much less 
influenced by growth: an additional percentage point in growth
yields only one half a percentage point in additional saving. By 
contrast, a very low dependency ratio of 0.3 yields a rate of growth 
effect in excess of one half additional percentage points in saving 
for each percentage point in growth. 1
Such a model is elegant and manages to combine the effect of income 
growth and dependency rates on savings. It also gives more credence 
to Mason's results, since his empirical analysis can take into 
account differing growth rates as well differing dependency rates 
when making cross-section comparisons. The model also shows that as 
dependency decreases, Ac will move further away from AY, increasing 
saving. This effect could cancel out the age structural effects that 
are stressed in the normal life-cycle saving models. Theoretically, 
however, the gross effect of population ageing on saving is 
indeterminate, but this approach does give a richer analysis than 
simple life-cycle models. There are other problems created, however. 
It is likely that under-estimation will occur in high growth 
economies, since the consumption gap may also be decreasing for 
other reasons. Rising productivity of labour (due to increases in 
physical capital, technology etc.) pushes AY closer to Ac, since the
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optimal mean age at which an individual produces life-time wealth 
will now be later relative to consumption, because human capital 
will be accumulated over a longer period. Such a situation is more 
likely in a fast-growing economy. This brings us to two other 
failings of the model. The problem is further complicated if 
children are regarded as investments rather than consumption. In 
this case it would depend on whether the return on children (old-age 
support) is greater than the return on capital investment. Another 
facet is that organisations through which to channel savings may be 
non-existent in developing countries, or certainly unstable and 
children would represent least-risk investments. Finally, crucial 
to the functioning of the life-cycle model is that an individual has 
a personal rate of time preference used to discount future 
consumption to the present. Saving will be attractive, resulting in 
a delay of the average age of consumption, if the return i, after 
discounting at the personal rate of time preference is higher than 
the present value. Thus, the rate of return on investment should 
also be a consideration.
It is instructive to examine the effects of population growth on i, 
the rate of return on physical investment capital. With a high and 
stable population growth rate, the supply of labour will also 
increase at a rapid rate, assuming labour force participation rates 
are stable. The continually increasing labour supply will exert 
downward pressure on the wage rate and keep it low. Under neo­
classical assumptions the low wage rate will lead to a substitution 
to the cheaper factor of production and capital investment will 
remain at low levels, relatively. Any capital investment that does 
occur will have a high rate of return because of the labour- 
intensive nature of production. Neo-classical theory assumes 
implicitly that the labour supply is fixed such that with capital
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accumulation and a lowering of the marginal product of capital, the 
marginal product of labour will increase and therefore the wage rate 
increases. This case is the static equilibrium case. If, however, the 
labour force increases over time, keeping the wage level constant, 
the rate of return on additional investment will continue to be 
high. There is a continual movement towards a static equilibrium at 
which the marginal product per unit cost of labour and capital are 
equal, but due to a continually increasing labour supply, static 
equilibrium is never reached and the rate of return on investment 
remains high.
As stated above, a high rate of interest will make savings more 
attractive. With a high rate of population growth, the overall 
impact on the aggregate saving rate is indeterminate. An increased 
child dependency rate increases the subjective discount rate of 
future consumption, whilst increasing labour supply raises the 
interest rate accruing on savings, making saving more attractive and 
shifting the average age of consumption to a higher age. The two 
aspects of the same phenomenon work in opposite directions. There 
is one case in which the results of the analysis are unambiguous.
As a population moves from a high rate of growth to a low one, the 
age structure changes, so that the proportion of working-age people 
increases and the dependency rate falls, if such a structure is 
caused by a fall in the birth rate. The labour force will be growing 
at a faster rate than the general population, continuing to exert 
a downward pressure on wages. The rate of return on capital will 
remain high. The subjective discount of the households composing 
that labour force will decrease, since child dependency has now 
decreased: the consumption gap will widen. In such a situation
savings should rise. If the drop in the fertility rate is
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accompanied by a drop in mortality rates, as is usually the case, 
then the labour force will be increasing at an even greater rate. 
A decrease in mortality across all ages, however, will increase the 
proportion of old age dependency Earlier it was stated
that old age dependency was not relevant to examining the effects 
of dependency, since older people were self-supporting, as they drew 
on accumulated savings. With decreased mortality, the life-cycle 
will be extended. If the decrease in mortality had been anticipated, 
then savings would still be sufficient to meet living costs. Since 
anticipation of mortality decreases is unlikely, the elderly will 
now need supporting through either public or private transfer 
payments. To the extent that the elderly have made provisions for 
at least a part of their non-working lives, the degree of dependence 
should be low. During the transition period, the proportion of 
elderly dependents should remain low (despite the decrease in 
mortality). If the assumption of a perfect knowledge of the length 
of the lifecycle is removed, elderly dependence becomes an important 
factor, but its impact should be relatively slight at the initial 
stages of ageing of the population. So, in the initial stages of 
population ageing, the analysis shows that the aggregate saving rate 
will rise.
From the above discussion, it should become clear that, at least 
theoretically, the aggregate saving rate will be greatest when the 
dependency ratio is lowest.
Sub-section 3.4 Population ageing and total factor productivity
The title of this sub-section is deliberately broad, since it 
contains the many plausible effects of demographic change on 
economic growth that cannot be easily categorised into effects on 
labour and capital. Much of this section draws on work by Simon
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(1977, 1986). Simon is concerned to show that rapid population
growth can have positive effects on economic growth. Since 
population ageing and slowing population growth occur in tandem, the 
effects of population ageing can be viewed as the opposite to the 
effects given below.
a) Creativity and technical knowledge
Simon embarks on a theoretical exposition of the potential creation 
of ideas through the combination of existing ideas and links this 
to population growth, by positing that each person on average has 
one new idea in a given period. Therefore each additional person 
has an idea resulting from the stimuli of existing ideas and this 
new idea will then provide the potential of n new ideas, when 
combined with the n existing ideas. Formally,
(2.17)
where:
Mt - ideas existing in time t 
i, 1 - ideas, i & i
Itix = new ideas created by people in time t, by combining some 
existing ideas, i and l.
A It in the previous period becomes a i in the next one (i.e. it has 
been added to the stock of knowledge). Simon is aware that people 
have a tendency to invent the same idea and therefore the Effect of 
additional people on the pool of ideas will be reduced. As the 
population grows however, the number of potential ideas becomes huge 
relative to the number of idea creators and therefore the likelihood 
of duplicated ideas recedes. Thus the production of potential ideas 
experiences increasing returns to scale to population growth at 
first, then returns become constant such that the number of new 
ideas per period will approach the number of new people. Simon 
states: "This suggests that additional people imply additional
knowledge without limits. And because an increment of technology
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has a cumulative effect in raising income through its effect on 
output and capital formation, a proportional increase in technology 
in t comes to have a more-than-proportional positive partial effect 
on income in t + x, where x = years after t".
The unit of observation is important in the above explanation. A 
country which has been isolated for various reasons from new 
development in other countries will find, if it is able, that it can 
acquire technology and apply it, at a rapid pace, without waiting 
for a new person to create a new idea. Through improved education 
and communication, a country will be able to increase productivity 
without any population growth and these factors are much more likely 
to be limiting rather than a slow growth in population. Thus, this 
theory applies to a unit such as the whole world rather than a 
particular country. Secondly, the length of time period is 
important. If people on average have two new ideas per lifetime 
(after all original ideas are hard to come by), then the period for 
an idea may be 2 5 years, during which time capital is accumulating 
year in year out - in forming an overall production function it is 
important to standardise explicitly the time period over which the 
factors contribute. Time lags are also important. In an extreme 
case, a population may be facing starvation before an increment to 
the population is producing ideas which substantially increase 
productivity.
For many countries accessibility to ideas is more important than 
their creation. Thus levels of education and communication, which 
are affected by per capita income, are more important
considerations, as is the ability to actually use potential new 
ideas.
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Simon (1986) derives a more realistic function for change in the 
stock of technology occurring in a period t
y* (2 .18)
where:
b is a constant;
L = number in labour force;
Y = aggregate production;
a, (3, \j/ and <() are constants indicating the responsiveness of a 
change in the stock of ideas to a change in the respective 
variables.
In this reduced form, technology caused by population growth is not 
such an all embracing saviour. In developing countries, per capita 
income is low, by definition, and the accessibility to existing 
technology will be accordingly low, as will be the number of ideas 
created per person. Thus it is possible that an increasing 
population will diminish the ability to create new ideas and thus 
the result of population growth is indeterminate. The elasticity of 
labour to technology creation is not independent of L itself and is 
not constant. Simon (19 86) recognises this in saying "But the 
parameters of the technical progress function clearly change as 
economic development proceeds" - if indeed it does manage to 
proceed.
Finally, Simon (1986) believes that short-run data will not show the 
positive effects of population growth since these effects, such as 
the improvement of productivity, "happen in the long-run and are 
cumulative". If such is the case, then all countries should adopt 
a policy whereby the population continues to increase at a fast rate 
forever delaying the long-run, until when finally the long-run 
arrives, there is a huge cake to divide between each and every 
person. It is also ironic that those countries which have 
experienced remarkable increases in per capita income and enjoy the 
fruits of technology in production and everyday life, such as in
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Europe, have also been experiencing slowing population growth for 
several decades.
Thus, although Simon's approach to technology creation is elegant, 
it appears that factors other than sheer numbers of people are 
important and that these factors can be functions of population 
growth: new ideas that lead to nuclear fusion can only occur once 
a large investment in human capital has been made and per capita 
human investment is likely to be high when the proportion of young 
people in a population is small or decreasing.
b) Total factor productivity and changes in industrial structure
It is possible that slow population growth leads to a rapid change 
in industrial structure - and consequently results in fast 
productivity growth {Yamaguchi 1982). This argument rests on the 
assumption that technological progress can and does occur much 
faster in the non-agricultural sector than in the agricultural 
sector. Thus any factor which hinders the movement of resources and 
effective demand from agricultural to non-agricultural goods also 
hinders the rate of technological progress and the economic growth 
rate. In a stationary population economy, any rise in income due to 
increases in productivity will be spent in greater proportion on 
non-agricultural goods, if economic development has reached a stage 
at which the income elasticity of agricultural goods is small and 
the income elasticity of non-agricultural goods is large. The 
increased demand in the non-agricultural high-productivity sector 
will result in a transfer of resources to that sector and 
industrialisation occurs. If, however, population is increasing 
with a rising income due to productivity growth, demand for 
agricultural goods will also be increasing, despite their low income 
elasticity. Industrialisation will be hindered and economic growth
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would slow. This is a little one-sided, since linkage effects are 
also important. Increased demand in the agricultural sector may 
result in increased demand for non-agricultural inputs. The 
resultant productivity gains in the non-agricultural sector cause 
an increase in the productivity in the agricultural sector. Incomes 
per capita will then rise, despite the increase in population. 
Studies of this process usually involve complex dual economy general 
equilibrium models. Yamaguchi (1982) finds that population growth 
in Japan since 1920 had a small, but negative^ impact. Such a finding 
is almost inevitable given that capital stock and technology stock 
are taken as exogenous variables in his model: any increase in
population will dilute such stocks.
Once again, an argument exists that slowing population growth will 
increase per capita economic growth rate, but refutation or support 
of the argument through etnpiric# fs extremely difficult, given the
impact that other factors may have on changes in industrial 
structures. For example, an increase in foreign trade may increase 
the demand for manufactures, regardless of the age structure of the 
domestic population.
Section 4 Demographic change and economic growth - the experience 
of Japan 1920-1980
Having introduced some of the main theoretical links between 
population and economic growth, it is useful to examine the nature 
of demographic change in Japan since 192 0 and data showing how the 
salient economic variables have changed since that time. This 
examination provides a background for the attempt made in the next 
section to explain the role initial population ageing played in 
post-war economic growth in Japan. The examination of statistics is 
made in the following order: a) vital rates, population growth, age-
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structure and share of national expenditure devoted to gross capital 
formation; b) labour supply, labour force participation rates and 
unemployment rates; c) gross domestic product growth rates; and d) 
structural change of employment.
Although crude birth rates and death rates are sufficient to explain 
the growth rate of a population, they cannot accurately describe the 
behaviour of the population, since they are dependent on the 
existing age~structure of the population. Total fertility rates 
(TFR) will be presented as a measure of fertility behaviour and life 
expectancy at birth as a simple measure of improvement or
deterioration in mortality rates. Data for Table 2.1 for the period 
1935-1945 are. somewhat incomplete because of the disruption of war. 
The trends contained in Table 2.1 are:
a) From 1925-1935 the rate of natural increase was historically 
high. The rate increased dramatically during the late 1940s 
and early 1950s and then fell quickly to a trendless level. 
Between 1975-1985 it dropped by nearly 50%.
b) The total fertility rate shows a tendency to decline slowly
from 192 5 and then increases temporarily after the war
resulting in the post-war baby-boom. It decreases rapidly
during the 1950s and then more slowly through to the 1980s.
c) Life expectancy at birth shows a continuous increase over the 
whole period, contributing to the natural increase rate during 
a period of fertility decline.
With a declining birth rate and rapidly improving mortality rate, 
the proportion of the population of working age can be expected to 
increase initially, implying a decrease in dependency rates. Table 
2.2 shows the age structural change that has occurred in the 
Japanese population since 1920.
Table 2.1 showing vital rates, total fertility, male life expectancy 
and the natural increase rate in Japan 1920-1985.
Crude
birth
rate
(per
1000)
(1)
Crude
death
rate
(per
1000)
(2)
Total
fert­
ility
rate
(3)
Life
expec­
tancy
(male)
(4)
Natural
increase
(per
1000)
(5)
1920 36.2 25.4 - 10.8
1925 34.9 20.3 5.1 42 . 0 14 . 6
1930 32.3 18 .2 4.7 44.8 14 .2
1935 31.6 16.8 - 46.9 14 . 8
1940 28.9 16 .2 4.1 - 12 .7
1945(47) 34.5 14 .7 4.5 50.1 19 .9
1950 28.3 10.9 3 . 6 59 .5 17.3
1955 19 .5 7.8 2.4 63 .6 11.7
1960 17 .3 7.6 2 . 0 63 .3 9.7
1965 18.7 7.2 2.1 67 .7 11.5
1970 18.7 6.9 2.1 69 .3 11.8
1975 17 .1 6.3 1. 9 71.7 10.8
1980 13 . 6 6.2 1.7 73 .3 7.3
1985 11.9 6.2 1.7 - 5 . 6
Source: Columns 1, 2 and 5 from Jinko Mondai Kenkyujo (1986) p
3, Table 1; column 3 from Jinko Mondai Kenkyujo (19 86) 
p 8, Table 2; column 4 from Jinko Mondai Kenkyujo 
(1985) .
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Table 2.2 showing population age structure and dependency ratios in 
Japan 1920-1980. _______________________________
Year 0 - 1 4  
years 
old (%) 
(1)
15 - 64 
years 
old (%) 
(2)
65 
years 
old and 
above 
(%)
(3)
Depen­
dency
ratio1*
(%)
(4)
Share of 
gross 
capital 
formation 
in national 
expenditure 
(%)
(5)
1920 36.5 58.3 5.3 71.7 -
1925 36.7 58 .2 5.1 71.8 -
1930 36.6 58.7 4.8 70.5 8 . 6
1935 36.9 58 .5 4.7 71.1 14.2
19402) 3) 36.1 59 .2 4.7 69 . 7 21.7
19502) 35.4 59 . 6 4.9 67 .7 16.2
19552) 33 .4 61.2 5.3 63 .3 19 .8
1960 30.2 64.1 5.7 55 . 9 30.2
1965 25.7 68 . 0 6.3 47 .1 30.6
1970 24.0 68 .9 7.1 45 .1 35 .0
197 52) 24.3 67 .7 7.9 47 . 6 32 .4
19 802) 23 . 5 67 .3 9.1 48 .4 31. 6
Source: Sorifu Tokeikyoku (1983), columns 1 to 3 from page 48,
column 4 from page 37. Column 5 up to 1970 from Ando 
(1975)p 7, Table 5b. Column 5 after 1970 from Nihon 
Tokei Kyokai (1985) p 553.
Notes: Superscript numbers: 1) Dependency ratio = Sum of
population in 0 to 14 and 65 plus age groups divided by 
total population.
2) Includes in the total population figures those 
uncertain of their age.
3) Not including people from foreign countries, apart 
from those returning from former territories.
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It should be noted that the term 'dependency ratio' used in the 
table does not necessarily correspond to the true dependency ratio 
of dependants to working population, since the latter ratio will 
depend on the work status of individuals in each of the age groups - 
the dependency ratio used in the table does give a crude measure 
of true dependency rates, however. Until 1940, the age structure 
changed little, with just below 60% of the population belonging to 
the 15-64 year old age group (the working age group) : thus the
dependency ratio also changed little and remained at a high level 
when compared with later years. After 1940, however, the proportion 
in the young age group declines noticeably and the proportion in the 
old age group (65+) rises, but less than the fall in the young age 
group: therefore the proportion in the 15-64 age group rises by
roughly 10% and the dependency ratio falls. By the mid-197 0s, the 
proportion in the 65 plus age group starts to rise more quickly as 
population ageing progresses, leading to an upturn in the dependency 
ratio. Except for the war period, which is untypical, the percentage 
of national expenditure devoted to gross capital formation has risen 
as the dependency ratio fell and then started to fall as the 
dependency ratio rose. It is impossible to show that the fall in 
dependency caused the rise in the gross capital formation share - 
it is possible that a high level of capital formation brought about 
rapid growth, which in turn stimulated the rapidly falling total 
fertility rate. It is striking, however, that there seems to be a 
strong correlation between the two.
Table 2.3 demonstrates that due to the changing age structure of the 
population, the workforce grew much faster than the population 
itself during the post-war period, despite more or less static gross 
labour force participation rates.
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Table 2.3 showing growth rates of the population and labour force; 
labour force participation rates; and unemployment rates in Japan 
1920-1980 .
Year Total 
popn. 
(%)
(1)
Popn.
over
15
(%)
(2)
Lab­
our
force
(%)
(3)
Male 
lab­
our 
force 
part- 
icip- 
at ion 
rate 
(%)
(4)
Female
labour
force
part­
icip­
ation
rate
(%)
(5)
Aggre­
gate
labour
force
part­
icip­
ation
rate
(%)
(6)
Unem­
ploy­
ment
rate
(%)
(7)
1920-30 1.42 1.41 0 . 99 91.3 51.2 71.3 1.1
1930-40 1.26 1.34 1.36 90.3 50 .8 70 . 4 -
1940-50 1.42 1. 52 - 86.7 50.6 68.2 2 . 0
1950-55 1.38 1.99 1.89 84.2 49 .6 66.3 2.5
1955-60 0.92 1.90 1.92 85 .1 50.7 67 .3 1.6
1960-65 1.02 2 .27 1.84 84 .1 50.3 66.7 1.2
1965-70 1.08 1.54 1.86 83 . 8 50.3 66.5 1.1
1970-75 1.35 1.27 0 .40 83 . 8 48 . 5 65 . 6 1.9
1975-80 0.90 1.11 1.02 82.7 46.5 64.1 2 . 0
Source: Sorifu Tokeikyoku (19 83) : columns 1, 2, 3 from page 6;
columns 4, 5, 6 from page 42. The unemployment rate for 
1930 and 1950 are from Hitotsubashi Kenkyujo (1953) p 
38, Table B-4. Unemployment rates after 19 5 0 are from 
Kurosaka (1988) p 25, Table 1-2.
Notes: The labour force participation rates show the average
rate over the period. The unemployment rates shown in 
column 7 are aggregate unemployment rates and correspond 
to the last year of the period. The unemployment figures 
for 1930 and 1950 were based on slightly different 
definitions of unemployment than the later figures - 
therefore these figures should be viewed as a crude time 
series of unemployment over the period. The figure for 
1920-30 should be viewed with extreme caution, since at 
that time much unemployment was disguised in the 
agricultural sector.
53
Table 2.4 showing real GDP (GNP)1’ growth rates 1920-1980.
Period Average growth rate of real 
GDP
1921-1930 2.4
1931-1938 4.9
1956-1960 9.5
1961-1970 10.4
1971-1976 5 . 8
1977 -198011 5.0
Source: Up to 197 6 from Minami (1981) p 80, Table 5-1. For
period 1977-1980 from Kurosaka (1988) p 21, Figure 1.1. 
Note: Note to superscript 1: the figure for the period 1977-
19 8 0 is for real GNP rather than real GDP.
Unemployment rates remained relatively low throughout the period,
but fell during the period when the dependency ratio of Table 2.3
was falling, thus reducing the true dependency rate even further.
Table 2.4 shows the average growth rate of gross domestic product.
The growth rate was faster in the post war period and tended to
accelerate as the dependency ratio fell. Again, it is impossible to
establish a direction of causality.
Finally, Table 2.5 shows the structural change that has occurred in 
Japan in terms of the percentage of total employment in each sector. 
The first sector is composed of the agricultural, forestry and 
fishery industries. The second sector accounts for mining, 
construction and manufacturing. The third sector constitutes 
transport and communications, energy and water services, retailing, 
wholesale trade, finance and insurance, real estate, service 
industries and public services. The second and third sectors have 
accounted for increasing proportions of employment, while the first 
sector has declined, concurrent with industrial development. During 
the 1950s, particularly during the first half of the decade, there 
was a decline in the industrial sector, in absolute numbers as well 
as proportionally and increases in the first and third sectors.
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Table 2.5 showing the proportion of the work force employed in the 
first, second and third sectors, and the change in employment in 
each sector since 1920.
Year First
sec­
tor
(%)
Sec­
ond
sec­
tor
(%)
Third
sec­
tor
(%)
First
sector
change
(1000)
Second
sector
change
(1000)
Third
sector
change
(1000)
Contri­
bution
of
first
sector
to
second
and
third
sectors
(%)
1920 54 . 9 25.2 19.9 - - - -
1930 49 .8 24.7 25.5 + 39 + 557 + 2220 -
1940 44 . 6 30.9 24.5 - 319 + 2665 + 368 10.5
1950 48 . 6 26.8 24.6 + 3086 - 313 + 950 -
1955 41.2 28.5 30.3 - 1187 + 1644 + 3145 24.8
1960 32 .7 34.7 32.7 - 1902 + 3969 + 2377 20 . 0
1965 24.7 38.1 37.2 - 2524 + 2989 + 3444 39.2
1970 19 .3 40.8 39.9 __ 1712 + 3175 + 3148 27 . 0
1975 13 .9 41.1 45 . 0 - 2799 + 360 + 2859 87.0
1980 11.0 40 .5 48.5 - 1243 + 807 + 3212 30.9
Source: Sorifu Tokeikyoku (1983b) p 79.
Notes: The first three columns show the percentage of
employment in each sector. The industries belonging to 
each sector are described in the text. The numbers in 
columns 4, 5 and 6 show the absolute change in numbers
employed in each sector in the time period up to that 
date: for instance, for 19 65, column 4 shows that
employment in the first sector fell by 2,524,000,
indicating that it fell by that amount between the years 
1960 and 1965. The last column is a crude measure of the 
contribution to the second and third sectors of labour 
migrating from the first sector. The rate shown is 
exaggerated since the decline in numbers in the first 
sector is a result of death and withdrawal from the 
labour force, as well as migration. The increase in the 
numbers of workers in the second and third sectors is 
the number above that needed to cancel out natural 
wastage in these two sectors.
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This reverse in the trend may be attributed to the labour intensive 
first and third sectors acting as labour absorbers during the 
economic downturn in this turbulent period. With the establishment 
of sound economic growth during the 19 60s, the preponderance of 
second and third sector employment increased steadily, but at 
different rates, absorbing labour from the primary sector. In view 
of the generally higher productivity of these two sectors compared 
with the primary sector, higher productivity growth should have 
resulted, creating increases in effective demand.
In summary, total fertility rates fell rapidly in Japan after the 
Second World War, leading to a noticeable fall in the dependency 
ratio as defined in Table 2.2. As a consequence of this initial 
stage of ageing, the labour force grew more rapidly than the total 
population, in spite of a falling aggregate labour force 
participation rate. The unemployment rate remained low so that 
numbers in employment also grew faster than the total population. 
While dependency was falling, the share of national expenditure 
devoted to gross capital formation rose.
Section 5 An examination o f Op |XpwWnon A^tinCJ On
econom ic m "Japan
There is very little written about the impact of demographic change 
on the growth of the Japanese economy. The material that does 
contain a partial study of demographic factors usually concentrates 
on the surplus agricultural labour approach of Ranis and Fei (19 61). 
Minami (1973) and Yamaguchi (1982) are examples of these studies. 
From the perspective of this chapter, these studies are not 
enlightening, because they have little to say about the changes in 
the population in all sectors: Table 2.4 shows that much of the
labour absorbed by the secondary and tertiary sectors was supplied
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by the non-agricultural population. This section contains two sub­
sections. The first contains an introduction to a growth accounting 
study by Hatai (197 5) . Although this study does not take account of 
age structural change explicitly, it provides useful results for 
gaining an understanding of the contributions of demographic change 
in Japan to economic growth. The second sub-section represents an 
attempt to interpret Hatai's results on the basis of the possible 
influences of demographic change examined in the second section of 
this chapter.
Sub-section 5.1 Hatai's growth accounting results
Hatai's paper is entitled "Capital accumulation, population and 
levels of consumption" . In this paper, he uses a simple form of 
growth accounting, formulated through the following steps.
I? = J  . w (2.19)
N N c
where:
Y = national expenditure;
Yc = consumer expenditure;
wc = average propensity to save;
N = total population.
Since the labour force = IN (I = labour force participation rate),
N = N1/lt giving
A  = y . i. „ (2.20)
N N-,
such that Y/N2 = labour productivity.
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Introducing capital stock (JC) into the above functional form, by- 
using the capital/labour ratio (K/L),
l.wn (2 .21)yc _ K YN  N2 K
Equation 2.19 is transformed into a growth equation, 
hc = h + t£c (2 .22)
where:
hc = growth rate of per capita consumer expenditure; 
h = growth in per capita expenditure;
C0c = change in the average propensity to consume.
Growth in aggregate expenditure, h, is given by 
h — G~n (2.23)
where:
G = growth rate of the economy;
n = growth rate of the population;
G is given by
G = gj+rij (2 .24)
where:
g2 - labour productivity growth rate; 
nj = growth rate of the labour force.
g being determined by 
g1 = k2 + gK (2.25)
where:
k2 = increase in capital/labour ratio; 
gK = growth in productivity of capital.
Since the elements of Equations 2.24 and 2.25 above are difficult 
to quantify, Hatai resorts to this formula:
G  = s.y'K (2.26)
where:
s = savings rate { = investment rate); 
y'K - marginal product of capital.
In Equation 2.26, no allowance is made for the effect of labour 
force growth on capital productivity. In other words, labour is not
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a limited factor, a fact which Hatai believes is correct. Data for 
1875 to 1969 are- then examined under three main headings: a)
Consumption levels, personal consumption levels and expenditure 
levels, b) per capita expenditure and population growth rates and
c) economic growth rates and savings rates. The main comparison is 
between pre-war and post-war periods, the periods being 1) 1923 to 
1946 (called the pre-war period) and 2) 1947 to 1969 (called the
post-war period). I shall give a brief summary of these headings.
a) For the pre-war period per capita consumption increased at a 
rate of 1.6% per annum whilst per capita expenditure increased 
at 3% per annum, the difference being accounted for by a 
1.3%/annum drop in the average propensity to consume (APC). 
In the post-war period per capita consumption increased by 
7.8%/annum, whilst per capita expenditure increased at a rate 
of 8.6%/annum with a 0.7%/annum drop in the APC. Thus 91% of 
the difference between the post-war and pre-war rates of per 
capita consumption growth of 6.2% is explained by the rise in 
per capita income.
b) In the pre-war period per capita expenditure grew at a rate of 
3%/annum, the economic growth rate was 4.3% and the population 
growth rate was 1.3%. In the post-war period per capita 
expenditure grew at a rate of 8.6%/annum, the economy at 10.0% 
and the population at 1.3%/annum. Therefore it is concluded 
that demographic change played no role in the differing rates 
of per capita expenditure.
c) In the pre-war period the average economic growth rate was 
4.3%/annum, labour productivity grew at 3.6% and the employed 
labour force grew at 0.72%'/annum - the rise in labour 
productivity accounting for 82.6 % of the growth rate. In the 
post-war period labour productivity grew at 7.9% and the 
labour force grew at 1.9%, with 79.2% of the 10%/annum growth
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rate being accounted for by the labour productivity 
improvements. Thus capital stock growth and technological 
factors have four times as much effect as employed labour 
force growth, on economic growth. The difference in labour 
force growth rates accounts for 1.2% of the 4.4% difference in 
economic growth rates between the post-war and pre-war 
periods: in other words the difference accounts for
approximately 27% of the difference in growth rates between 
the two periods.
So, Hatai shows that roughly a quarter of the difference between the 
pre-war and post-war growth rates is explained by the difference in 
growth rates of absolute numbers in the labour force. It is possible 
the age structural change also explains to some extent the 
contribution of the other factors of production to the difference 
in growth rates.
Sub-section 5.2 An interpretation o£ Hatai's results
Although in absolute terms the population growth rates in the pre­
war and post-war periods hardly differ and thus account for no 
difference in per capita income through dilution effects, the change 
in the labour force growth rate does actually play a substantial 
role in the differing economic growth rates between the two periods. 
It is possible to deduce that the changing age structure that caused 
the difference in labour force growth rates (but no difference in 
the total population growth rates) was partially responsible for the 
impressive rise in per capita consumption in the post-war period: 
ageing of the population led to a greater proportion of people in 
the labour force for a given size of population and hence the 
addition to labour meant higher per capita income and per capita 
consumption. Had the increase in the labour force been caused by a 
faster population growth rate without age-structural change, per
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capita income would not have increased so rapidly. Indeed, per 
capita consumption was increasing rapidly, even though there was a 
continuous fall in the APC.
On inspection of the data provided in the tables of the previous 
sections, the pre-war period in Japan for which data exist- shows 
little cause for remark, except for a gradual decrease in the total 
fertility rate and a gradual increase in average life expectancy at 
birth. The period from 1947 to 1960, however, is a period of 
remarkable demographic change, with the total fertility rate 
declining from 4.54 children to 2.00 children per woman, in a span 
of 15 years; and an average life expectancy increasing by over 13 
years during the same period. The total fertility rate increased 
slightly during the 19 60s, but was still low historically. These 
changes led to a change in the proportion of 15 to 64 year olds from 
59.6% in 1950 to its peak of 68.9% in 1970, thus causing the labour 
force to increase at a rate of 1% or 0.8 percentage points above the 
population growth rate, despite decreases in the labour force 
participation rates. It should be noted also that this period saw 
extremely high rates of growth. It might be reasonably argued that 
it was the rapid rates of economic growth which brought about the 
fall in fertility, but I am concerned with the possibility of the 
fall in fertility contributing to the rapid GNP growth rate. The 
argument is simple.
So long as there is enough initial effective demand in the economy 
to absorb the growing work force, such a demographic change as 
described above will move the economy into a virtuous circle, with 
increasing demand for new products, increasing demand for 
investment, increases in savings, improvements in productivity and 
a higher rate of acquisition and adoption of new knowledge.
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As the proportion of people gainfully employed in the economy 
increases, the dependency rates decrease, making future consumption 
more attractive than previously and thus lowering the average 
propensity to consume. At the same time, the growth in the labour 
force slows the fall of the return on capital, which stops the 
average propensity to consume from rising. Consumption per capita 
rises as a consequence of a fall in the dependency ratio, however, 
and the proportion of consumption spent on income-elastic goods also 
rises. The increasing effective demand from consumption gives rise 
to a desire to invest in modern equipment, with the supply of 
loanable funds being provided by the drop in the average propensity 
to consume. The investment itself gives rise to a multiplier effect, 
but also increases the stock of capital and hence labour efficiency, 
which in turn increases income. Since investment is used for modern 
capital equipment, the efficiency of capital also rises. This 
process describes the initial impact of a move from a higher 
population growth rate to a lower population growth rate. If the 
proportion of working age people in the population continues to 
increase, the original multiplier effect will provide employment and 
the forces described above come into play once again. Thus the 
period over which this age structural change is occurring will see 
forever increasing domestic demand without real fear of factor 
supply shortages. While the age structural change is rapid, 
economic growth will be stimulated, as the economy makes continual 
adjustments. As the transition from one population growth rate to 
a lower growth rate proceeds, however, it is probable that the 
dependency rate will start to rise again, since the proportion of 
the population accounted for by age groups with lower labour force 
participation rates will increase.
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Thus, as population ageing progresses, the virtuous cycle described
above may be reversed, unless the labour force rates of older people
can be raised (given a static unemployment rate) . This
interpretation can be expressed by a simple equation:
G = f ( (L-P) ,0) (2.27)
where L = labour force growth rate, P - population growth rate and 
O = growth rate of other factors.
That is, income growth is a function of the difference between the 
labour force growth rates and population growth rates, subject to 
the constraint of a constant unemployment rate. It should be 
stressed that if the unemployment rate rises, a rise in labour force 
participation rates may not raise growth since the dependency ratios 
would not necessarily change.
It might be felt that I have unnecessarily restricted the study of 
Japan to a period of 2 0 years (out of 60), but I have done so in the 
belief that no other period shows such a remarkable change in both 
economic and demographic factors and does not offer a clear 
possibility of establishing a link between population and economic 
growth.
Section 6 Conclusion to Chapter 2
This chapter has covered a broad range of material and demonstrates 
the difficulty of establishing clear theoretical relationships 
between demographic change and economic growth. Empirical evidence 
is not easy to produce since other factors may dominate any effects 
of a changing population. The results of Mason's study suggest that 
dependency ratios influence savings and consumption rates. The 
debate about the effects of dependency ratios on capital 
accumulation still rages (see Leff 1969, 1984; and Ram 1982) . I have 
assumed in Section 4, however, that a high dependency ratio will
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reduce saving. It is an important tautology to assert that a higher 
dependency rate means a smaller labour force for a given size of 
population. As a result, not only may the savings rate be lowered 
by a high dependency ratio, but per capita income will also be 
lowered. Thus, even if savings rates remain the same with a higher 
dependency ratio, the amount saved per capita will fall. The 
combined effects of a lower savings rate and lower savings per 
capita will reduce the speed of capital accumulation and embodiment 
of new technology. This view would appear to offer a pessimistic 
future for economic growth in Japan as old age dependency increases 
rapidly in the future with progressive population ageing. The 
increasing proportion of the population in the older age groups may 
reduce the aggregate labour force participation rate if age-specific 
labour force participation rates remain static, but it is possible 
that labour force participation rates within those groups or within 
other age groups will rise as the proportion of older people rises - 
labour force participation rates may fall, however. In this 
chapter, it was generally assumed that a rising aggregate labour 
force participation rate automatically lowered the dependency ratio, 
but such will not be the case if there is a rise in the unemployment 
rate. In the real world, unemployment does exist and it is generally 
the case older people experience longer durations of unemployment 
(OECD 1992 p 208; also see Appendix 7B). In the next few chapters 
I am concerned to show and explain the effect of population ageing 
on the aggregate unemployment rate in Japan. If unemployment rises 
as a result of population ageing in Japan, the dependency ratio will 
rise even if aggregate labour force participation rates stay the 
same. To understand the functioning of the Japanese labour market 
it is necessary to examine carefully the employment practices of 
companies. Such an examination is the subject of the next two 
chapters.
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CHAPTER 3 MICRO LABOUR MARKET FOUNDATIONS 1: WAGE CURVES, COMPANY
WORKFORCE AGE STRUCTURES AND WAGE SYSTEMS
Section 1 The significance of this chapter
In Chapter Two it was concluded that the percentage of the
population gainfully employed had a significant impact on capital 
accumulation and economic growth. Therefore the future trends in 
labour force participation and unemployment need to be examined. The 
first step in such an examination is a detailed look at the
employment practices of firms. This chapter and Chapter Four 
together represent such an examination. In the Section 2 wage curves 
over time and between different sizes of company are compared. These 
curves give an idea of the relative wages of older and younger
workers, and moreover they are important because it is felt that one
characteristic of Japanese employment practices is a steep wage 
curve (Ono 1988, Koike 1981) . A comparison of wage curves in 
different sizes of company is also useful because the Japanese 
labour market is often characterised as being a dual labour market, 
in which there are closed internal labour markets formed by large 
companies and open labour markets facing smaller companies, which 
bear the brunt of labour market adjustment to shocks (see for 
example Nakamura 1981, Chapter Six).
The next section shows how the age structure of different size 
companies has changed as the general population age structure has 
itself aged. If young workers and older workers are complementary 
inputs, an ageing labour force should lead to lower relative wages 
for older workers, other influences held constant. The section 
allows for an examination of the relationship between age structure 
and wage curves.
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Section 4 describes how wage levels are determined and how 
determination has changed over time, from an administrative point 
of view. This examination gives some insight into the role personal 
factors, such as age, and functional factors such as job-evaluation, 
have In determining wage levels.
Finally, it must the stressed that, from now on, only the employment 
practices and labour market for men will be the subject of analysis. 
Women experience different practices and different labour market 
structures to men, so an analysis of the impact of ageing on their 
labour markets is the subject of another thesis.
Section 2 Wage Curves
Conceptually, the wage curve shows the wage levels of workers over 
their working life-span. The wage curve is determined by many 
factors in the labour market, such as supply and demand conditions 
for workers of different ages, employment practices, and the quality 
and skills of the worker over time, as discussed in Chapter Five. 
The trends over time in wage curves since the 1970s will be 
discussed in this section.
There are many types of wage curve, described below.
a) The cohort wage curve. This wage curve shows the average wage 
levels of all people born in a certain period as they become 
older.
b) The cross-section wage curve. This curve shows the wage levels 
of workers in each age group at a particular moment. As labour 
productivity increases over time the cross-section wage curve 
will shift upwards because a worker in each age group will 
receive a higher wage reflecting the efficiency gains. Figure 
3.1 shows the relationship between the cohort wage curve and
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the cross-section wage curve. The cohort wage curve is steeper 
since it includes productivity gains over time. In other 
words, an individual will experience a steeper wage curve than 
that implied by cross-section wage curves.
Figure 3.1 showing the relationship between cohort and cross-section 
wage curves.
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c) Career wage curves. This type of curve shows the wage levels 
of a worker following a particular career pattern. In Japan 
there is particular emphasis on a wage curve of this type. As 
is discussed in Chapter Four, it is usually injurious for a 
worker to move companies during his career. A drop in wages 
usually accompanies the move. Thus wage curves can be 
constructed for workers who do not move over their career or 
for workers who move the average number of times. The former 
are often called model wage curves and the latter average 
wage curves. Average wage curves show the average wage levels 
of all types of worker.
67
d) Dis-aggregated wage curves. At one extreme a wage curve can 
show the average wages of all types of workers, such as male, 
female, part-timers, blue-collar and white-collar. At the 
opposite extreme, wage curves can be constructed for each 
individual. Dis-aggregation can be carried out for example on 
the basis of sex, size of the company of the employer and 
geographical region or any combination.
e) Wage curve by type of wage. Wage curves can be constructed 
using gross wages which include overtime and other types of 
non-regular pay or may be constructed for standard working 
hours under standard conditions. The wage amounts can be for 
different time units, such as months or hours.
f) Relative wage curves. These curves can be any of the types 
discussed above, but rather than showing absolute wage levels 
at each age, they show the level of wages at one age as a 
percentage of the wage level of a particular age group (the 
base age). Such wage curves do not shift if efficiency gains 
are distributed evenly across all age groups, but their shape 
will change when the wage level of one age group changes 
relative to that of another.
Figure 3.2 shows the relative cross-section average wage curves for 
all types of male employees for the years 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 
1987. The average wage of a 22 year old is used as the base wage 
level: in other words an average 22 year old's wage level is equal 
to 100%. The wages used in calculating relative wages were monthly 
cash payments to employees excluding bonuses, overtime and other 
temporary payments (see Section 4 for a fuller description of these 
wage components) . Since all the wage curves presented in this 
chapter are relative wage curves, I shall refer to them simply as 
wage curves.
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Figure 3.2 showing the average wage curves for all male employees
over time.
Average Vage Curves as Percentage of tfages of 22 year.old
Males, a 11 scales, a 11 types
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Source: Data from the Chingin Kozo Kihon Chosa Hokoku, see Rod5
Daijin Kanbo Tokei Johobu Chingin Tokeika (1971, 197 6,
1981, 1986, 1988) , Table 1, except for the 1970 data
which is from Table 2.
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It is clear that since 1975 wage differentials by age have been 
increasing. Peak relative wage age fell from the mid-50s in 1975 to 
the late 40s during the 1980s. The steep reduction in relative wage 
levels after peak age is a another noticeable feature. Partly 
because of the detailed wage data in Japan, which allows the 
analysis of wages by size of the company of the employee, much 
attention has been paid to the wage differentials by scale of 
company in Japan and to the difference in the relative wage curves 
of employees employed by different size companies. During the 19 60s 
wage differentials were decreasing, but since the 197 0s there has 
been little change (Kurosaka 1988, Minami 1973). Figure 3.3 shows 
disaggregated wage curves for employees in different sized companies 
(measured by number of employees) for the years 1970 and 1985.
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Figure 3.3 showing the average wage curves of male employees over
time in different sizes of company.
Average Wage Curves 197D (by scale of company)
maIej all types
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Source: Data from the Chingin Kozo Kihon Chosa Hokoku, see Rodo
Daijin Kanbo Tokei Johobu Chingin Tokeika (1971, 197 6, 
1981, 1986, 1988), Table 1, except for the 1970 data
which is from Table 2.
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In both years, the smaller the company, the flatter the wage curve. 
The larger the company, the steeper the drop in wages after peak 
age. Although wage curves have become steeper in all sizes of 
companies over the 15 years, sizeable differentials at each age 
remain. The major difference in the 19 85 wage curves compared with 
those in 197 0 is that the wage differentials of older people in the 
largest company category (1000+ employees) actually fall below the 
wage differentials in the medium-sized companies (100 to 999 
employees).
Figure 3.4a, 3.4b and 3.4c show the trends in average wage curves 
disaggregated by size of company. Since 1975 the wage curves in the 
10-99 employee companies and 100-999 employee companies have become 
unambiguously steeper after the age of 40. Peak wage age increased 
during the 1980s in 10-99 employee companies. A trend in the shape 
of the wage curves in the 1000+ employee companies is less 
discernible because there is more variation in the shape of the 
curve over time, with the age of peak wage differential fluctuating 
noticeably. Certainly, the percentage change in peak age has been 
noticeably larger in companies below 1000 employee size.
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Figure 3.4a showing the average wage curves of male employees in
companies with more than 1000 employees, over time.
Average Wage Curves as Percentage of 22 Year Old's Vages
Males, all types, 1000+ employees
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Source: Data from the Chingin Kozo Kihon Chosa Hokoku, see Rodo
Daijin Kanbo Tokei Johobu Chingin Tokeika (1971, 1976, 
1981, 1986, 1988), Table 1, except for the 1970 data
which is from Table 2.
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Figure 3.4b showing the average wage curves of male employees in
companies with between 100 and 999 employees, over time.
Average ¥age Carves as Percentage of 22 Year Old's Vages
Males, all types, 1D0 to 999 employees
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Source: Data from the Chingin Kozo Kihon Chosa Hokoku, see Rodo
Daijin Kanbo Tokei Johobu Chingin Tokeika (1971, 1976,
1981, 1986, 1988), Table 1, except for the 1970 data
which is from Table 2.
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Figure 3.4c showing the average wage curves of male employees in
companies with between 10 and 99 employees, over time.
Average ¥age Curve as Percentage of 22 Year O l d ’s ¥ages 
male, all types, 10 to 99 employees
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Source: Data from the Chingin Kozo Kihon Chdsa Hokoku, see Rodo
Daijin Kanbo Tokei Johobu Chingin Tokeika (1971, 197 6, 
1981, 1986, 1988), Table 1, except for the 1970 data
which is from Table 2.
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As is discussed below in Section 4 wages in Japan are believed to 
be determined personal factors such as length of service in
the present company. It is felt that average wage curves have been 
steepening because of the increasing length of service of employees 
at each age over time. Figure 3.5 shows the wage curves of employees 
who have just joined the company (ie they have no length of service) 
over the period 1970 to 1987. Certainly the wage curves of those 
with no length of service rose during the period 1970 to 1980, but 
since then a consistent trend is difficult to discern. Therefore, 
the proposition that increasing length of service is causing the 
upwards shift of the wage curves seems to have some explanatory 
power.
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Figure 3.5 showing the wage curves of employees with no length of
service for all sizes of company over time.
Wage curves for employees with no seniority
Male, all scales
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Source: Data from the Chingin Kozo Kihon Chosa Hokoku, see Rodo
Daijin Kanbo Tokei Jbhbbu Chingin Tokeika (1971, 197 6,
1981, 1986, 1988), Table 1, except for the 1970 data
which is from Table 2.
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The wages of workers with no accumulated length of service can be
compared with the wages of workers of average length of service, to
show the disadvantage in moving company. Taking the wages of workers
of average length of service as 100, Figure 3.6 shows the
differential between the wages of workers who have just moved
company and the wages of average length of service workers.
Figure 3.6 showing the wages of employees with zero length of 
service compared with those with average length of service.
Sagas of employeas with no seniority cnmpaiDd with eaployaes Df average seniority 
Male, all scales of firms
Source: Data from the Chingin Kozo Kihon Chosa Hokoku, see Rodo
Daijin Kanbo Tokei Johobu Chingin Tokeika (1971, 197 6,
1981, 1986, 1988), Table 1, except for the 1970 data
which is from Table 2.
Figure 3.6 shows that it is detrimental to move company and becomes
progressively more so as people age and average length of service
increases in tandem. Moreover it shows that length of service is an
important factor in wage determination.
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Section 3 The age structure of employees
The concern of this thesis is the ageing population of Japan. 
Although the aggregate population is ageing, it is not inevitable 
that the age structure of employees in general or of specific groups 
of employees will be the same as that of the general population. 
Employees only account for a proportion of the population and 
different groups of employees are formed under different 
circumstances. For example, during the 1960s, as Japan's economy 
grew rapidly and a labour shortage developed, larger companies 
adopted a policy of making their employee age structures younger 
(wakageari). Until the 19 6 0s smaller companies tended to have a 
younger age structure, but due the policy of larger firms who were 
able to offer better conditions, this situation became reversed 
(Tsutsumi 19 86). Figure 3.7 shows the age composition of all male 
employees for the years 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1987. Table 3.1 
shows the average age of employees for the same years. The age 
structure of employees is ageing unambiguously, with average age 
increasing from 34.5 in 1970 to 39 in 1987. In 1970 the age 
distribution of employees was positively skewed, but the degree of 
skew has gradually decreased during the 17 years.
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Figure 3.7 showing the age composition of male employees over time.
Age composition of full-time employees
male, all scales, a I I types
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Source: Data from the Chingin Kozo Kihon Chosa. Hokoku, see Rodo
Daijin Kanbo Tokei Johobu Chingin Tokeika (1971, 197 6, 
1981, 1986, 1988), Table 1, except for the 1970 data
which is from Table 2.
Table 3.1 showing age composition of employees in different sizes 
of company.
Scale 1970 1975 1980 1985 1987
1000 + 34.5 36.2 37 .1 38.0 38.4
100-999 33 .5 35 . 5 37.0 38.0 38.3
10-99 35.5 37 . 6 39 . 0 39.8 40.1
All scales 34.5 36.4 37.8 38 . 6 39.0
Source: Data from the Chingin Kozo Kihon Chosa Hokoku, see Rodo
Daijin Kanbo Tokei Johobu Chingin Tokeika (1971, 197 6, 
1981, 1986, 1988), Table 1, except for the 1970 data
which is from Table 2.
Figure 3.8a, 3.8b and 3.8c show the age structure of employees in
different sizes of companies over time. The employee age structure
in the 10-99 and 100-999 employee companies can be seen to be ageing
in a similar fashion to that of all employees, although the age
structure in 10-99 employee companies is ageing more rapidly than
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in 100-999 employee companies. The age structure in large companies 
(1000+ employees) is generally ageing, but a clear trend is 
difficult to discern. So long as the data reliable, this would 
imply that larger companies have a greater ability to maintain an 
internal age structure divergent from that of the population as a 
whole.
Figure 3.8a showing the employee age structure in companies with 
more than 1000 employees, over time.
Age composition of full-time employees
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Figure 3. 8b showing the employee age structure in companies with 
between 100 and 999 employees, over time.
Age composition of full-time employees
male, -100 999 employee companies, a I I types
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Figure 3.8c showing the employee age structure in companies with 
between 10 and 9 9 employees, over time.
Age composition of full-time employees
male, "10 99 employee companies, all types
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Source: Data from the Chingin Kozo Kihon Chosa Hokoku, see Rodo
Daijin Kanbo Tokei Johobu Chingin Tokeika (1971, 197 6, 
1981, 1986, 1988), Table 1, except for the 1970 data
which is from Table 2.
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It would be useful to see whether the employee age structure in 
large companies has diverged significantly from that in the smaller 
companies. Figure 3.9a, 3.9b and 3.9c show the employee age
structure for different sizes of company for the years 1970, 1980 
and 1985 and Table 3.1 shows the average age of the employees. The 
smallest size of company consistently has an older age structure 
than the other two sizes of companies. Whether the age structure in 
the 1000+ employee company is significantly different from that in 
the 100-999 employee company is difficult to tell. Certainly the 
large company (1000+) has a far smaller proportion of employees over 
55 than the medium and small companies.
Figure 3.9a showing employee age structure in different sizes of 
companies in 197 0.
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Figure 3.9b showing employee age structure in different sizes of
companies in 1980.
Age coapDSition of full-tine employees of different scales of firms, 19B0
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Figure 3.9c showing employee age structure in different sizes of
companies in 1985.
Age composition of full time employees in different scales of firm, 19B5
male, all types
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Source: Data from the Chingin Kozo Kihon Chosa Hokoku, see Rodo
Daijin Kanbo Tokei Johobu Chingin Tokeika (1971, 1976, 
1981, 1986, 1988), Table 1, except for the 1970 data
which is from Table 2.
Section 4 Wage determination and wage systems 
Sub-section 4.1 Wage systems
This sub-section deals with the systems which are used to decide the 
wage of a regular worker in the company. Pay is generally split into 
two groups, these being 'basic pay' (kihonkyu) and then bonuses, 
overtime pay and various allowances, which tend to be more variable 
than basic pay. Basic pay accounts for approximately 80% (according 
to statistics shown in Hanaoka 1975 p 31) of the average pay 
received by workers and generally consists of two elements, although 
wages are sometimes decided using only one element. These two main
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elements are: 1) personal wages, based on the personal
characteristics of the worker, which would remain unchanged even 
after a move to a new job, such as age, sex, familial circumstances 
and number of years length of service within the company and 2) 
functional (or work-related) pay, which is based on criteria such 
as type of work, level of skills and managerial position, which 
change with a change in job or promotion. The relative weights of 
the two elements used in wage determination are important in 
determining the life-cycle wage profile of a worker. If personal 
wages are prevalent, then there will be an extremely close 
relationship between age of the worker and the level of wages, 
whereas functional systems would tend to result in greater 
variability in wages for a given age group. It is the high weight 
of personal wages based on age or length of service in Japan that 
has been stressed in academic writings (Koike 1981) and such a 
pattern of wage determination is known as nenko joretsu. These two 
wage systems cannot be separated easily on a basis of one being age 
determined and the other not, for the simple reason that promotion, 
experience and skills are strongly linked to age.
It is generally held that wages with a strong personal element 
became widely established during the Second World War with the 
passing of wage control orders in order to suppress inflation. In 
particular the second wage control order of 1940 required firms to 
present wage systems for the approval of the Ministry of Welfare, 
which had even stipulated starting salaries according to sex, 
schooling, age, experience, type of work and area (Showa Dojinkai 
1963) . Following the war, in the latter half of the 1950s Japan 
experienced high inflation, with wages only at subsistence level and 
in 1946, the Japanese Electricity Industry Labour Union Association 
introduced a wage system which ensured the livelihood of workers
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according to their age, known as seikatsu hosho wages (Ono 1989 p 
80, Nihon Koyo Shogu Kenkyu Senta Teisho Mondai ni kansuru linkai 
1985 p 48) . This type of wage system became known as the Densan-gata 
(electricity industry type) wage system and basic pay comprised 63% 
living costs (i.e. personal type) and 34% functional pay (Ono 1989 
p 80). This type of system spread to other industries such as the 
steel, chemicals and trading industries. By the 19 60s, however, 
there was a move on the part of managers to introduce functional pay 
under the influence of American management theory. The electric 
power industry introduced an explicit shokumukyu (job-related) wage 
system in 1961 and by the mid-19 60s, shokumukyu had permeated all 
the large chemical companies (Yamada 1983 p 196). However, 
functional pay did not replace personal pay, but was introduced 
alongside. Odaka (19 84 p 249) estimates that in the manufacturing 
industries in 19 66 work related pay amounted to 9% of basic pay, 
whereas by 1972 it had increased to 30%. Table 3.2 shows the 
composition of wages in 1973.
Table 3.2 showing the composition of the average monthly wage in 
1973 .
Size of 
company 
(employees)
Standard
Pay
Basic
Pay
Func­
tional
Pay
Personal
Pay
Com­
bined
Pay
1000+ 100 85 .1 37.1 17 , 6 30.5
100-999 100 83 .7 29 .2 19 .3 35.2
30-99 100 84.3 33.7 11.5 39.1
All scales 100 84.4 33.3 17 .2 33.9
Source: Hanaoka (1975) p 31.
Notes: Standard pay {shoteinai chingin) does not include
bonuses and overtime pay. Elements of standard pay not
included in basic pay are various allowances and
payments by results.
Table 3.3 shows the extent of different wage systems since 1970 (see 
notes to table for definitions of system categories).
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Table 3.3 showing the percentage of firms using the different types
of common wage systems over time.
Work type Composite
Type
Combina­
tion
Personal
Type
Year
1000+ employees
14.3 17.7 40.61970 27 .5
15 .11975 13 .1 39.3 32.5
1980 40.4 44.5
1984 44.5
100-999 employees
17 .4 19.71970 48 .3 14.6
14.127 .11975 45. 12 .9
1980 59.2 23 .
1984 62 . 0 22.3
30-99 employees
1970 17 .4
1975 32 . 4 10 .2
1980 15 . 9 63 .6 14.0
1984 18.2 68.1
All sizes
19 . 61970 18.1 53 .6
11.41975 48 .
13 .1980 61.9 17 .4
15.21984 66.0 13 .2
Source: Rodo Daijin Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu (1988).
Notes: A composite type wage system is one having elements of
work related and personal pay as a single system, 
whereas combined type is a system in which personal type 
elements and work-related type elements are applied in 
tandem. Work related type includes ability related wage 
systems as well as ordinary work related type systems or 
a combination of the two. The work type and personal 
type categories are for firms which only operate one of
the two systems and no other system alongside. There is
a slight change in the categories after 1979.
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Although care needs to he taken in drawing conclusions from these 
figures since definitions changed in 1979, there has been a general 
shift from singular systems to composite systems amongst firms, with 
a particularly large drop in the use of pure personal wage systems.
A system in which the proportion of personal pay is high requires 
that wages are revised frequently, so that workers receive the wage 
corresponding to their age and other characteristics, even when 
there is no productivity increase or inflation. This gives rise to 
the practice of teiki shokyu which entails revision of wages and 
promotion at a fixed time each year. Wage increases for an 
individual can thus be split into two parts. One is the increase due 
to inflation or productivity increase and the other is due to 
promotion, gaining another year of length of service, or other 
personal changes. These two parts are known as base-up and teisho 
(short for teiki shokyu respectively). A system which places 
emphasis on personal wages should have high teisho rates, whereas 
they will be low for heavily functional pay schemes.
Table 3.4 showing the extent of the teisho system over time in 
different sizes of company.
Scale of firm 
(number of 
employees)
1973 1980 1982
Carry out 
teisho (%)
Have a teisho 
system (%)
Have a teisho 
system (%)
1000 + 96.3 87 .2 88. 6
100-999 94 .4 88.6 89 . 8
30-99 93 .0 86.2 85.7
All Scales 93 .8 86.9 86.9
Source: Nihon Koyo Shogu Kenkyu Senta (1985) .
Note: Figures are percentages of companies surveyed.
Table 3.4 shows the extent of the use of a teisho system across 
different sizes of company from 1973 to 1982. There was little 
change in usage rates over this short period and the teisho system
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is firmly rooted in all sizes of company. This does not mean, 
however, that companies have a highly length of service-based system 
or that the system is rigid, since the majority of firms do not 
raise the salary of an individual automatically according to a 
predetermined set of parameters such as age and years of service, 
but also add an element of appraisal (jinji koka). The appraisal 
allows the company to vary wages to some extent according to ability 
or job content and is strongly linked to functional pay schemes 
which are operated in tandem with the personal pay. Table 3.5 shows 
the extent of the different methods used in the determination of 
teisho for 1983.
Table 3 .5 showing the percentage of firms using various methods for 
determining amount of teisho.
Scale of 
firm
(number o f 
people)
Only
koka
Only
auto­
matic
teisho
Only
koka-
aut-
omatic
Koka & 
auto­
matic 
combined
Other
1000+ 17 .3 15.4 35.9 11.5 2 . 8
100-999 22 .3 13 .9 46.3 17 .2 0.4
30-99 32 .1 13 .7 42 .5 28 . 6 0.2
All scales 28.9 13 .8 43 .4 13 . 6 0.3
Source: Nihon Koyo Shogu Kenkyu Senta (1985).
Notes: Koka-automatic teisho is the case when a fixed raise is
guaranteed for an element of basic pay and any raise 
above the fixed amount is determined through appraisal. 
Koka & automatic combined is the case when some raises 
in basic pay are determined by appraisal and some 
automatically. Automatically means there is a 
predetermined schedule for raising pay.
The majority of companies have a combined type of wage 
determination, allowing a degree of flexibility, although it is 
noticeable that smaller firms are more likely to rely purely on 
appraisal, perhaps implying that small firms practising teisho do 
not have a well-defined wage system. The use of automatic 
determination is low and does not differ noticeably across company
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size. According to analysis in Nihon Koyo Shogu Kenkyii Senta (1985), 
the yearly rise in wages due to teisho has dropped slowly from 4.2% 
in 1965 to 2.2% in 1983. This decrease is partly due to an ageing 
population. Older people generally experience a smaller teisho and 
so a greater proportion of older people in the work force will 
naturally result in a declining teisho rate. The yearly proportion 
of rising wages accounted for by teisho has been increasing since 
197 0 from 17% to 47% in 19 83, although this is probably due to 
slower rises in productivity during the early 1980s which in turn 
reduced the base-up proportion of pay rises. Thus, even when 
productivity gains have been low, the individual will experience 
higher wage increases than the increase in labour productivity.
Thus, the most common wage systems in Japan combine a fixed or rigid 
element which provides stability for the worker, with a 
discretionary element which allows flexibility for the company to 
attenuate wage differentials according to labour market conditions 
(internal or external). Although both these elements have certainly 
been present since the late 1940s, their relative weight has changed 
gradually, with the discretionary element gaining importance 
(Uchida 1989 p 131), along with the growing use of functional pay 
systems. For a given age of worker, wages should then show 
increasing variation. The deviation of the wages for male employees 
in different age groups in the years 1970/75/80/85 for different 
size companies are shown in Table 3.6 below.
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Table 3.6 showing deviation of wages for different age groups in
different sizes of company over time.
Age 1970 1975 1980 1985
All scales
20-24 0.37 0.25 0.25 0.24
45-49 0.48 0 .43 0.55 0 .51
50-54 - 0 .55 0.58 0 .58
1000+ employees
20-24 0.36 0 .22 0.21 0.20
45-49 0 . 42 0.35 0.51 0 .45
50-54 - 0 .45 0.55 0 .51
100-999 employees
20-24 0 .35 0.26 0.24 0.22
45-49 0.43 0 .48 0.48 0.46
50-54 - 0 . 53 0.53 0 . 54
10-99 employees
20-24 0.41 0.33 0.31 0.29
45-49 0 .51 0.5 0.47 0 .45
50-54 - 0 .53 0.5 0 .49
Source: Rodo Daijin Kanbo Tokei Johobu Chingin Tokeika (1971,
1976, 1981, 1986} , Volume 1, Table 3 except for 1970
which is Volume 1, Table 5.
Notes: The data for the 45-49 age group for 1970 is for the age
group 40-49 and so there is some discontinuity between 
the 1970 data and the later data. The variance is 
calculated as follows (9th decile-lst decile)/(2 x 
median).
As can be seen from Table 3.6, deviation of wages increases the 
older the age group, showing that the functional element of wage 
determination increases with age.
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Sub-section 4.2 Other forms of pay
Having discussed basic pay, I would like to mention three 
supplementary types of pay. These are a) allowances b) bonuses and 
c) severance pay.
a) Allowances
Allowances (teate) are usually payments for changes in circumstances 
which are not considered permanent or payments which cannot be 
standardised across the majority of workers. Family allowances can 
be finely adjusted for the number of children and other dependents 
and age of the children. Thus the amount of the allowance increases 
with age, by its very nature. Other allowances may be for commuting, 
subsidising housing expenses for those not living in company 
accommodation, for unpleasant work or for managerial positions 
(often to compensate for losing overtime pay).
b) Bonuses
Bonuses are usually paid twice yearly and account for between two 
and four months' pay (Oki 1989). There has been much discussion in 
economics literature over the flexibility variable bonuses give 
companies in adjusting labour costs over the business cycle, but in 
recent years variability has decreased (Kurosaka 1988 pp 171 - 173). 
The amount of yearly pay accounted for by bonuses has risen over 
time and it is claimed that this trend is the result of businesses 
trying to decrease the proportion of basic pay, which is used for 
calculating contributions to the state and for company welfare such 
as pensions. Bonuses are distributed according to the amount of 
basic pay and so maintain wage differentials.
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c) Severance pay
Severance pay (taishokukin) may be considered a form of delayed pay. 
It is generally calculated as a multiple of severance base pay, 
which is a set percentage of monthly basic pay, although is 
sometimes calculated using a points system based on length of 
service (Romu Gyosei Kenkyujo 1987 p 19). The multiple varies non- 
linearly with length of service and also according to the 
circumstances of severance. Retirement gives the most favourable 
multiple and quitting the least favourable. Figure 3.10 below shows 
how severance pay varies over length of service and for different 
types of severance as multiples of the severance pay received after 
three years service. Severance pay multiples rise steeply at first, 
encouraging workers to remain in the company, but then the increment 
in the multiple begins to decline with an incremental year's service 
as retirement age is reached. The multiples for severance pay 
receivable upon quitting rise more steeply, but this is a reflection 
of the low levels of severance pay received when quitting with short 
length of service.
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Figure 3 .10 showing rising severance pay as length of service 
increases.
S e v e r a n c e  p a y  m u l t i p l e s
50
4D
30
2D
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Seniority Cyears]) 
m  retirement multiple quit multiple
Figure 16
Source: Chuo Rodo linkai Jimukyoku (19 88).
Notes: Multiples are multiples of the severance pay received by
an employee with 3 years service (seniority) to the
company. The multiples shown are average multiples for 
employees of both sexes who left the company during 
1986. The multiples shown for the total amount
receivable in either lump sum or pension form.
Table 3.7 below shows quitting severance pay as a percentage of
retirement severance pay. The table demonstrates that quitting
results in much less favourable severance pay compared with
retirement particularly when length of service is short, again
encouraging employees to stay within the company for a long period.
It is more difficult to show trends in the amount received in
severance over time. Data of monthly pay multiples exist for people
up to age 55 over times, but since retirement age has been raised
in many companies, this would give a false picture of the trends in
size of retirement severance pay. Certainly for those aged 55,
severance pay has been decreasing as a multiple of monthly pay (Chuo
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Rodo Iinkai Jimukyoku 1979) In recent years companies have been 
converting the severance pay system into a company pension scheme, 
usually leaving the choice of a pension or lump sum payment to the 
individual.
Table 3.7 showing quit severance pay as a percentage of retirement 
severance pay.
Sen­
iority
3
years
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Ratio
(%)
49 .9 56.0 65.2 74. 6 83 .3 88.3 90.8 91.7
Source: Chuo Rodo Iinkai Jimukyoku (1988).
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Section 5 Conclusion to this chapter
Section 2 shows that the relative wages of older workers have risen 
noticeably since 1970 in companies with fewer than 1000 employees. 
Wage curves have also steepened in companies with more than 10 00 
employees, but to a lesser extent than in smaller companies - also 
there is a less consistent trend in the changes of the wage curve 
in large companies. While wage curves have generally been 
steepening, the age structure of the workforce within companies has 
been ageing. This ageing is seen in both the lessening skew of age 
distributions and in the rising average age of employees. The age 
structure in companies with fewer than 1000 employees has aged more 
than in larger firms and has shown a consistent pattern. There is 
more variability in the age structure of employees in firms with 
more than 1000 employees. The fact that the age structure of 
employees in large firms has aged less noticeably than in small 
firms and that there is a less discernible pattern over time 
suggest that large firms are tending to make their age structures 
diverge from that of the general labour force.
Since the Second World War, wages in Japan have been determined 
largely by personal factors such as age. Such wages are known as 
nenko wages. Section 2 shows that length of service seems to be 
important in determining wage levels, since the wage differential 
between those with no length of service and those with average 
length of service increases with age (average length of service 
increases with age). Section 4 also shows, however, that a certain 
proportion of wages is determined by functional factors such as type 
of job performed and managerial position. Moreover, the proportion 
of wages determined by personal factors has been declining and the 
use of appraisal has increased over time. It was shown that the 
proportion of wages accounted for by functional factors increased
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with age and this was confirmed by the increasing dispersion of 
wages as age increased. Fewer small firms tended to rely on 
appraisal than large firms, implying that personal elements in wage 
determination were less important for small firms.
Types of pay other than monthly cash payments were examined briefly. 
Bonus payments are clearly an important component of labour income, 
but the amount of bonus payment is related to monthly cash payments, 
so bonus payments were not examined in detail, since they should not 
affect the shape of the wage curves.
Severance pay is a form of postponed payment. The determination of 
severance pay is strongly related to the length of service and 
moreover, the relation is not linear. Severance pay rises slowly at 
first, then rapidly until retirement age (long length of service), 
when it stops rising. It seems that such a means of determination 
is designed to retain workers, since it implies that moving mid­
career will mean giving up a rapidly accumulating severance pay.
The next chapter covers other employment practices such as hiring 
and promotion. This chapter and Chapter Four form the basis of the 
discussion of the rationality of these employment practices that is 
given in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4 MICRO LABOUR MARKET FOUNDATIONS 2: HIRING, MANDATORY
RETIREMENT, PROMOTION AND EMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT 
Section 1 The significance of this chapter
This chapter continues that examination of employment practices that 
was started in Chapter Three. Hiring and retirement policies 
directly affect the age structure of a firm's workforce. If 
promotion is based on managerial (ie supervisory) posts, then the 
age structure of the company is likely to affect promotion. Thus, 
these three aspects are important for understanding the demand for 
labour and the impact of ageing on the state of the labour market. 
It was noted in the previous chapter that the Japanese labour market 
is often classified as a dual one. As this chapter progresses, the 
existence of a dual market seems to be confirmed. Therefore, the 
last two sections deal with labour market mobility and flexible 
forms of employment.
Section 2 The hiring behaviour of companies
The labour market for many people in Japan is often described as 
being internal (Koike 1981 and Ono 1981) . In an internalised market, 
workers join the company as raw labour with very little or with no 
experience. They stay in the company for a long time, accumulating 
skills and enjoying salary and promotional rises. Adjustment to 
market conditions is carried out by transfers within the company or 
company group to new and related jobs. This type of internal labour 
market implies that there is little scope for hiring new staff who 
are in mid-career ('mid-termers').
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Ujihara (1985) stresses two main aspects of the recruitment 
behaviour of Japanese companies:
a) Teiki Saiyo. Companies hire school leavers, graduates and 
people with very little experience at one period in the year, 
namely in April. Little consideration is paid to any 
specialist education or work preparation the candidates may 
have experienced, with the companies being more interested in 
health and a good general range of aptitude. Character and the 
ability to fit in with the character of the company org. 
important.
b) During the 1960s, with a rapid increase in demand for workers, 
hiring of experienced workers became more common and was 
stimulated by the decreasing supply of young people during the 
197 0s, particularly in the case of small and medium-sized 
enterprises. The desire for raw labour is still strong 
however.
A survey by the Noristu Zoshin Kenkyu Kaihatsu Senta (19 88) was 
performed in 1987 to study the changes in the lifetime employment 
system used by companies by observing the situation for the 
recruitment of mid-termers and the attitudes involved. The companies 
surveyed were all listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange and 280 out of 800 companies responded, giving a response 
rate of 35%. Companies with than 1000 employees accounted for
only 16.4% of responders and thus, this survey is a large company 
survey. Experienced workers were divided into four groups 
comprising: a) office staff; b) operations staff; c) technical staff 
A (computer software and information processing); and c) technical 
staff B (general technicians) . It was found that 86% of the 
companies had taken on mid-termers staff over the 5 years preceding 
the survey. The most popular type of mid-termer was technical staff 
B, with 60% of companies hiring in the last 5 years, followed by
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office staff at 49%, business staff at 47% and technical staff A 
with 23%. However, as Table 4.1 below shows, the percentage of new 
staff accounted for by mid-termers is generally extremely small.
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Table 4.1 above also shows that on the whole, the larger the 
company, the lower the proportion of mid-term workers. This 
reinforces the general perception that larger companies rely more 
on the internal labour market. These results are not
supported totally by the personnel management survey of the Ministry 
of Labour (Rodo Daijin Kanbo 1988) which asks companies whether they 
view the recruitment of mid-term workers as important or not. The 
percentage of companies viewing this type of labour as important 
decreases gradually until the 100-299 employee establishments 
category is reached, when it jumps significantly and continues to 
increase for the 3 0-99 employee company to show the highest 
percentage rate for all sizes. There is a polarisation of mid-term 
recruitment behaviour. It is possible that the higher percentage of 
larger firms making use of experienced workers can be explained by 
people entering the company from smaller companies with strong ties 
with a parent company. The larger companies are much more likely to 
have developed such links. On inspection of the reasons for mid-term 
recruiting, however, the percentage of firms doing so because of 
relations with another company is small (around 6%) , but it does 
tend to increase the larger the company.
Although the role of mid-term recruits in overall recruitment is not 
important, it is necessary to know the type of person the company 
prefers and the reasons for wanting to hire a mid-termer. In 
answering a question about the main considerations when hiring mid­
term workers, the three most popular objects of concern were 1) 
specialist knowledge and experience, 2) the contents of previous 
work experience and 3) age of the person, in order of popularity 
(Noritsu Zoshin Kenkyu Kaihatsu Senta 1988 p 85) . In order to 
clarify the preferences in terms of age, Figure 4.1 below shows the 
age distribution of mid-termers hired in 1986. It is striking that
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the age of these recruits is heavily skewed towards the younger 
ages, even for those with technical skills. (Noritsu Zoshin Kenkyu 
Kaihatsu Senta 1988 p 91). There is a clear adversion to taking on 
older mid-termers, regardless of their accumulated experience. The 
most popular reason for hiring is 'meeting new needs' (56%) followed 
by 'filling a place left by a retiree' (50%) and 'using experience 
and information gained by the person in another company' (45%). Mid­
term hiring would seem to be for unplanned circumstances and 
strategical reasons and so is bound to be limited.
Figure 4.1 showing the ages for mid-term hiring.
Main Ages for Mid-term Hiring
50
30
20
-1Q
0
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Age
_^_office operat i ons
A tec hn i caI A —^— technical B
Source: Noritsu Zoshin Kenkyu Kaihatsu Senta (1988) p 91.
Treatment of mid-termers is often said to be inferior, further 
hindering such recruitment by reducing the supply of willing
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applicants. Table 4.2 shows whether companies believe they treat the 
mid-termers in the same way as 'normal' staff, both in terms of 
salary and promotion. The majority believe that the treatment is the 
same. In terms of salary, the larger the company, the more likely 
it is to be the same, whereas the smaller the company, the greater 
equality in promotion opportunities. Also upon inspection of 
problems encountered when dealing with mid-term staff, the most 
frequent problem is 'difficulties in personnel and promotion 
management', implying that equal treatment is an ideal, not reality. 
This conclusion is supported by the wage curves given in Chapter 
Three, which show that in comparing two people of the same age, the 
person with no length of service has a much lower wage than an 
person with an average length of service. According to Chingin Seido 
Seninon Iinkai (197 8) , wages in the past have been decided by adding 
a given differential on top of the starting salaries of raw recruits 
with no experience - this is called ' ageha.ba ka.nri' .
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Table 4.2 showing the treatment of mid-termers with respect to pay 
and promotion.
All Scale of Company (people)
scales
1000
&
less
1000
to
2000
3000
to
4999
5000
to
9999
10000
plus
Number of Firms 242 34 94 40 42 32
Wages (percentage of firms which)
Pay lower wages 
than in general
27.7 38.2 33 .0 17.5 26.2 15 . 6
Pay the same as 
in general
61.2 47 .1 55.3 75,0 64 .3 71.9
Pay more 
favourably 
according to 
type of work
10.3 14.7 10.6 7.5 7.1 12 .5
Pay more 
favourably than 
in general
0.4 - 1.1 - - -
Not known 0.4 - - - 2.4 _
Promotion
Treated less 
favourably than 
in general
3.7 2.9 4.3 2.5 4.8 3.1
Treated the same 
as in general
90.1 94.1 87 .2 97.5 90.5 84.4
Treated more 
favourably 
according to job
5.0 2.9 7.4 - 2.4 9.4
Treated more 
favourably than 
in general
0.4 - 1.1 - - -
Not known 0.8 - - - 2.4 3.1
Source: Noritsu Zoshin Kenkyu Senta (1988) p 92.
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This type of personnel management seems to imply that the wages are 
distributed to the workers according to their relative position to 
each other, rather than on their specific abilities. Such a wage 
system makes it difficult for firms to calculate the wages of 
someone entering in midstream with other work experience, since it 
is difficult to assess their relative position. The next most 
frequent problem encountered was 'the difficulty in finding high 
quality people with ability' suggesting poor supply. 'High 
recruitment costs' came third with a much lower frequency than the 
other two.
Companies were asked whether recruitment of mid-termers had 
increased or decreased over the five years previous to the survey 
(1981-1986). The results are shown in Figure 4.2 which shows the 
distribution of answers: the majority stated that there was little 
change in the numbers of such hirings.
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Figure 4.2 showing trends in mid-term hiring.
Trends in Mid-term Hiring
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Source: Noritsu Zoshin Kenkyu Senta (1988) p 98.
In summary, this survey shows that large firms tend to recruit few 
mid-termers and usually do so to meet unexpected personnel needs, 
either for technological or strategic reasons. Younger mid-term 
recruits are preferred, with the majority being under thirty. 
Although in theory most of the firms would like to treat these mid­
termers equally with the normal staff, in practice they have 
problems in placing the new staff within the existing management 
structure. The firms also have difficulties in recruiting able 
staff, implying that the supply of mid-termers is restricted, since 
moving company appears disadvantageous in terms of career 
development as well as salary. During the first half of the 1980s 
there has been little increase in the practice of hiring mid­
termers .
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The results from the survey above are also supported by Ono (1989 
pp 145-158) who describes the concept of kogai or child-rearing. 
Firms take on young people and 'bring them up' in accordance with 
the company's wishes and promoting them as they mature (haenuki 
toyo) : the company managers are home-grown and are called haenuki. 
The practice of kogai is strong and reinforces the need for an 
employee to stay in the same company from a young age. New people 
entering the company in midstream cannot be given equal rank without 
destroying the motivation of those below. Ono (1989 pp 145 -158) 
believes that haenuki is essential to the understanding of lifetime 
employment, that many management posts are occupied by haenukis and 
that this encourages highly motivated people to remain in the same 
company for a long time. He uses data from Dayamondosha (1984) to 
show that about 75% of all non-director managerial posts are held 
by haenukis. If people holding managerial posts with only one or two 
years' experience in another workplace are included, the proportion 
rises to over 80%. (This is for companies which are listed on the 
8 stock markets in Japan).
It is difficult however to establish any cause and effect 
relationship here, since internal promotion would just seem a part 
of the same phenomenon - there is little mobility between firms and 
therefore promotion is bound to take place from within, although Ono 
believes it is the orignator of low mobility. He even derives a 
graph that demonstrates the negative relationship between the labour 
turnover rates and haenuki rate for various industrial sectors. 
Firms which were set up before the Second World War have a greater 
percentage of haenukis for all sectors than for newer firms 
established after the war. Looking at differences in promotion 
behaviour by size of company (measured by no. of employees), the 
larger the company, the higher the haenuki rate for non-director
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managerial posts, although it is still high in small companies. 
Smaller companies tend to rely on directors recruited from outside 
the company.
Inspection of more aggregate data would tend to refute the lack of 
mid-term hiring. Figure 4.3 shows the percentage of new employment 
positions filled by mid-termers in the economy as a whole for each 
year from 1964 to 1986. The ratio of new positions accounted for by 
mid-termers has been roughly 50% on average over the whole period 
and in particular this rate increased noticeably over the 197 0 to 
197 6 period, which was a period of economic unrest. These rates, 
which are in effect the same as mid-term hiring rates, appear to 
contradict the very low rates given by companies in the Noritsu 
Zoshin Kenkyu Kaihatsu Senta (19 88) survey described above. These 
rates are however for all sizes of firms. It would appear that 
smaller firms do not have such an '.version to mid-termers since 
their recruitment behaviour must be the reason for such high rates . 
This supposition is borne out by the Koyo Kanri Chosa (Rodo Daijin 
Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu Sangyo Rodo Chosaka 1988), which shows that 
a much higher percentage of small firms intended to take on mid­
termers in 1987, and in particular the firms with 30-99 employees. 
It is also important to note that the Noritsu Zoshin Kenkyu Kaihatsu 
Senta (1988) survey only applied to male 'regular employees, which 
would imply that hiring decisions for women and "temporary' staff 
are different and less rigid.
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Figure 4.3 showing percentage of mid-term hirings in all hirings for 
the economy as a whole.__________
Percentage of Mid-termers amongst New Hirings
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Year C1964-19863
Source: Rodo Daijin Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu (1988) p 327.
Another indirect indicator of the behaviour of firms in the 
recruitment of mid-termers is the length of service of an employee. 
Table 4.3 shows the average length of service of male employees for 
different scale companies, adjusted crudely for age structure of the 
company. The smaller the company, the lower the average length of 
service, implying again that smaller companies hire mid-termers much 
more than large companies. Ono (1989 pp 5 6-58) analyses the 
proportion of male employees in various sizes of company which have 
the same number of years of work experience (for a particular type 
of work) as their length of service in 1980. The proportion of 
employees with no length of service (i.e. new intake) and no work 
experience is 90% in companies with 1000 or more employees out of 
all employees with no length of service. For 100-999 employee firms 
this percentage falls to 74.9%, dropping to 56% for firms with 10-99
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employees, the smallest size in the survey he uses. This again shows 
that larger companies do not take on many 'regular' male mid­
termers, but that smaller companies do.
Table 4.3 showing length of service ratios in different scales of 
companies.
Scale of 
firm
(employees)
Year
1975 1980 1985 1987
1000+ 36.5 37.5 40 . 0 40.9
100 - 999 24.5 27 .6 29.7 13 .1
10 - 99 19.9 21.8 23 .4 24.2
Source: Rodo Daijin Kanbo Tokei Johobu Chingin Tokeika (197 6,
1981, 1986, 1988) Table One.
Note: The seniority ratio is calculated using the following
formula - average seniority (years) x 100 
average age of employees 
The ratio is calculated to compensate for the different
age compositions in different sizes of companies and
multiplied by 100 in order to make the figures easier to 
read.
Section 2 Mandatory retirement
The prevalence of automatic retirement (teinen taishoku) in Japan 
has often been quoted as another noticeable characteristic of 
Japanese employment practices, particularly since until recently the 
set retirement age has been low and is still low internationally. 
It is important to note that teinen taishoku does not usually result 
in withdrawal from the labour 45 in many industrialised countries. 
Retired workers may be reinstated or become self-employed, as 
discussed below. Table 4.4 shows the extent of mandatory retirement 
schemes. This includes those companies with any one of the three 
types of scheme classified by the Koyo Kanri Chosa (Rodo Daijin 
Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu Sangyb Rodo Chosaka 1988):
a) Ittsu. The retirement age is the same for all employees
regardless of type of work or sex.
b) Danjobetsu. The retirement age is set differently according to 
sex.
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c) Shokugyobetsu. The age is set according to type of work.
The extent of these three types of system and change over time is 
shown in Table 4.5
Table 4.4 The percentage of companies with a retirement system by 
size of company.
Size of 
firm 
(employees)
1967 1978 1980 1982 1984 1985 1988
5000 + 93 .7 99 . 6 99 .5 99 . 6 99 . 6 99 . 6 99 .1
1000-4999 95.3 99.3 99 .9 99 .1 99.5 99 . 6 99 .9
300-999 94.4 97 . 5 98.3 99 . 0 98.5 99 .1 99 . 0
100-299 81.5 90.5 93 .7 95.2 94.8 95.9 97 .2
30-90 51. 0 70.6 76.5 81.1 83 .9 83 .4 84.3
All 69 . 0 77 .3 82 .2 85 . 6 87 .4 87 .3 88.3
Source: Data for 19 67 is taken from Rodo Dai j in Kanbo Seisaku
Chosabu (1988) p 342 and was originally compiled from 
the Rodo Daijin Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu SangyS Rodo Choka 
Koyo Kanri Chosa for 1967. Data for the other years is 
taken directly from the Rodo Daijin Kanbo Seisaku 
Chosabu Sangyo Rodo Choka Koyo Kanri Chosa.
As can be seen from Tables 4.4 and 4.5, there has been a general
increase in the extent of retirement systems amongst the small and
medium-sized companies, with little change for large companies
during the last ten years. Moreover, there has been a move towards
the ittsu system across all company sizes, with the proportion of
the danjobetsu systems decreasing to a similar extent. These figures
show a trend to increasing uniformity, with smaller companies
following large companies with a time lag. The most noticeable
change, however; has occurred in the age at which retirement is set,
as shown in Table 4.6. Table 4.6 shows only the retirement age for
ittsu retirement schemes, but coupled with the increasing use of
ittsu schemes, it is sufficient for showing the majority trend to
raising the retirement age.
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Table 4.6 showing age of mandatory retirement over time.
Scale 59 60 + 61+55 56 6057
1968
52 .75000 + 15 . 011. 5 17 .3
1000-4999 59.9 14. 12 .1
10.4300-999 68 .3
100-299 65.9 24
66.0 29 .730-99
All
197
5000 + 11.1 14.3 13 . 21.2
1000-4999 41. 19 .718.0
300-999 47 . 6 12 .9 23 .1
100-299 42 . 0 10.1
30-99 40 .3
All 41.3 33 .7
1988
500 0 + 82.4
1000-4999 12 . 6 71.1
300-999 18.1 59.1
100-299 23 .7 52 .7
30-99 24.5 54.9
All 23 . 6 55.0
Source: Sumiya (1983) for 1968.
Rodo Daijin Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu Sangyo Rodo Chosaka 
Koyo Kanri Chosa for 1978 and 1988.
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From Table 4.6, there has been a steady raising of retirement age 
across all scales of company since 1968, when the most common 
retirement age was overwhelmingly 55. This raising of the retirement 
age is known as teinen encho (literally, postponement of retirement 
age) . In 19 68 the percentage of companies which did have a 
retirement age of 60 tended to increase the smaller the size of 
company. During the 197 0s the retirement age in large companies 
(5000+ and 1000-4999 employees) was much more evenly spread over the 
given age range, demonstrating that raising of the retirement age 
was a gradual adjustment process for these companies. Over the same 
period, however, small companies showed a tendency towards 
polarisation to ages 55 and 60+, with many more companies having the 
higher retirement age. Through to 1988, the medium-sized companies 
(300-999 employees) seem to have been slowest in revising their 
retirement age upwards, although there was rapid progress between 
1985 and 1988 (see Chapter Eight on government labour market 
policy). By 1988, the pattern of retirement ages across company 
sizes had virtually reversed itself, with small companies more 
likely to have their retirement age set at 55 and larger companies 
at 60. Since 1978, there has been little progress in raising the 
retirement age above 60. In general terms, in 1978 an average of 33% 
of all firms had a retirement age of 60, whereas by 1988 the halfway 
mark had been passed, with an average of 55% of companies in this 
category.
As mentioned above the word retirement (teinen taishoku) does not 
imply retirement from the labour force in Japan, or even necessarily 
leaving the company. It generally describes a time in the employee's 
career when the company can revise the pay and position of the 
worker, but can still employ the person for some time under these 
revised conditions, or at its discretion weed out those older
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workers it deems no longer necessary or useful. Those who do 
actually leave the company very often move to another company, or 
become self-employed. This last case is discussed in Section 5 
below.
There are two main schemes used by companies when retaining workers 
after retirement age:
a) Saikoyo Seido or re-employment. Broadly and simply defined as 
in the Koyo Kanri Chosa (Rodo Daijin Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu 
Sangyo Rodo Ch5ka) it is the practice of re-employment at the 
same company after retirement age having terminated the 
original contract. As is shown by the data below, re­
employment usually means re-hiring under a new short-term 
contract and under inferior pay and conditions.
b) Kinmu Encho or work extension. This is the practice of 
continued employment without terminating the original contract 
after retirement age, which according to Ujihara (1985) means 
that the workers should continue to be treated the same as 
pre-retirement workers. There do tend to be differences in pay 
and promotional aspects, but not as pronounced as in the case 
of saikoyo.
These both differ from raising the retirement age because it is 
easier for the company to select those who stay on and gives it more 
flexibility in their treatment. Table 4.7a-d shows the changes in 
treatment under the two schemes after retirement age for the years 
197 8 and 198 8 with regard to status, work contents, wages and hours; 
and the years 1978 and 19 82 with regard to base-up, teisho and 
bonuses and across company sizes.
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The most noticeable difference between re-employment and employment 
extension is that employment extension is much more favourable than 
re-employment. There is less likelihood of a change in status; most 
companies tend not to change work content; and although quite a 
sizeable percentage still reduce wages in the case of employment 
extension, the majority keep wages the same, whereas most companies 
reduce wages in the case of re-employment. Hours worked seem to be
the same in both cases. In terms of differences between sizes and
over time, the following trends are visible for-
a) re-employment.
i) Fewer small firms change post/status and work contents
or drop wages, base-up, teisho and bonus than large
firms.
ii) On the whole there has been little change over the short 
time span of the two sets of figures, except that change 
in post/status has become less determined (i.e. less 
systematic), fewer smaller companies dropped wages in 
1988 and there was a higher percentage of companies 
reducing hours worked, although they were still low in 
number.
b) Employment extension.
i) There does not appear to be any particular trend across 
size of company except that generally fewer small 
companies seeem to have determined systems for status, 
work contents or wages. Also more smaller companies tend 
to reduce base-up, teisho and bonus than large 
companies, but again there is a higher percentage of 
small firms with non-determined systems.
i) In 198 8 more firms were likely to change the status of 
workers and drop wages. There has been a noticeable 
increase in firms having an undetermined response.
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Generalising from the above, fewer small companies have well-defined 
systems and in the case of re-employment few small companies carry 
out changes in wages and conditions. In fact the differences in re­
employment and employment extension are less clear at the small 
company level. Re-employment implies re-employment under less 
favourable conditions and work extension does usually entail 
continuity in conditions status and pay. Table 4.8 shows the 
percentage of firms adopting the two systems for 1978 and 1988. 
Unsurprisingly re-employment is by far the most common.
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Table 4.8 showing the extent of employment types after teinen.
Scale of
firm
(people)
Have
tei­
nen
sys­
tem
Have employment after 
teinen
No emp
after
teinen
Teinen 
age at 
60+
All Re-
emp
Emp
Ext
Comb
5000 + 99 . 6 78 . 5 75.3 9.8 14 .9 21.5 21.2
1000-4999 99 .3 80.9 73 .7 8.7 17 .7 19 .1 21
300-999 97 .3 83 .5 73 .7 12 .3 14.0 16. 5 25.6
100-299 90 . 5 85.1 65.9 21.3 12 .8 14.9 33.2
30-99 70 . 6 75.8 52 .3 31.6 16 .1 24.2 42 .8
All
scales
77 .3 79.0 58.6 26.4 15.0 21.0 38.5
5000 + 99 .1 39.9 32 .9 3.8 3.2 60.1 82 .8
1000-4999 99 .9 59.9 45 . 0 6.1 8.8 40.1 72 .1
300-999 99 . 0 70.4 48.7 11.3 10 .4 29.6 61.5
100-299 97 .2 76.2 46.3 16.7 13 .2 23.8 55 .5
30-99 84 .3 73 .5 39 .1 25.4 8.9 26.5 59 .1
All
scales
88 .3 73 . 5 41. 6 21.9 10.0 26.5 58.8
Source: Rodo Daijin Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu Sangyo Rddo Chosaka
Koyo Kanri Chosa, 197 8 survey year pp 10, 11 and 20; and 
19 88 survey year pp 6 and 9.
Notes: Comb = combination of re-employment and employment
extension. 60+ in last column includes teinen at 60. Top 
half of table is for 1978 and bottom half for 1988.
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Table 4.9a and b shows how companies determine which workers are 
eligible for further employment after official retirement age.
Table 4.9a showinng determination of those eligible for further 
employment after retirement for 1978.
Scale In prin­
ciple 
for all 
who wish
For 
those 
who cor­
respond 
to stan­
dards 
set by 
firm
Limited 
to those 
who the 
firm 
sees as 
particu­
larly 
neces­
sary
Other No
response
Re - emp 1 oyment
5000 + 26.5 24.1 45.7 3.1 0.6
1000-4999 19 .8 20.8 55.8 3.4 0.2
300-999 25.7 20 .9 51.4 1.8 0.2
100-299 26.7 20.0 51.3 2.0
30-99 28.6 15 .0 53 . 6 1.3 1.6
All
scales
27.5 17 .2 52 . 7 1.6 1.0
Work Extension
5000+ 16.7 25 . 0 50.0 8.3 -
1000-4999 18.4 17.0 59 .9 4.3 0.4
300-999 20. 6 21.2 55.8 1.9 0.5
100-299 31.5 18.4 46.7 2.8 0 . 6
30-99 32.5 12.5 52 .1 1.0 1.8
All
scales
31.5 14 .4 51.1 1.5 1.4
Source: Rodo Daijin Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu Sangyo Rodo Chosaka
Koyo Kanri Chosa, 197 8 survey year
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Table 4.9b showing determination of those eligible for further
employment after retirement for 1988.
Scale In
prin­
ciple 
for all 
who 
wish
For 
those 
who cor­
respond 
to stan­
dards 
set by 
firm
For those 
who the 
firm sees 
as
particu­
larly
neces­
sary
Other No
response
Re-employment
5000 + 14 .2 22 .1 55 . 8 4.4 3.5
1000-4999 18.6 15 .3 60.3 0 . 6 5.1
300-999 22 .0 17 .1 55.2 0.5 5.2
100-299 24.3 17 .5 48.2 1.2 8 . 8
30-99 21.5 20.4 47 . 6 1.4 9.1
All scales 22 .3 19 .2 48.6 1.3 8 . 6
Work Extension
5000 + 9.1 36.4 54 .5 _ -
1000-4999 14 . 0 15 . 8 62 .2 0.9 7.2
300-999 24.9 17 .5 53 .3 1.0 3.4
100-299 26.5 17.5 47 .2 0.2 8 . 6
30-99 33.2 14.7 43 .9 1.2 7.1
All scales 31.1 15 .5 45 .2 0.9 7.2
Source: Rodo Daijin Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu Sangyo Rodo Chosaka
(19 88) Koyo Kanri Chosa.
Although the majority of firms use some form of re-employment 
system, usually at their own discretion, we cannot determine the 
proportion of workers who actually experience such treatment. The 
Konenreisha Shugyo Jittai Chosa (Rodo Daijin Kanbo Seisaku Chosaka 
Tokei Chosa Dai Ikka 1985) surveyed individuals and gives data for 
the work and employment experience of male employees after 
retirement (teinen) age. Table 4.10 shows that roughly 40% of 
employees experienced some form of further employment in the same 
company, although it is impossible to tell which out of re­
employment (saikoyo) and work extension (kinmu encho) was the most
126
common,.
Table 4.10 showing the percentage of workers experiencing further 
employment in the same company after retirement.
Age Have
expe­
rien­
ced
tei-
nen
(%)
Were
em­
ploy­
ed
after
tei-
nen
(%)
Had
expe­
rien­
ced
kinmu
or
sai­
koyo
{%)
Are
em­
ploy­
ed
under
kinmu
or
sai­
koyo
(%)
Col 4 
plus 
col 5 
(%)
Col 6 x 
col 3 
(total 
%age 
expe­
rienced 
work 
exten­
sion 
(%)
Aver­
age
years
of
exten­
sion
55-59 26.4 77 .0 14.2 37.0 51.2 39.4 2
60-64 49.2 69 .1 31. 6 23 . 8 57 .4 39.7 3
65-69 52 . 4 70.1 46.9 10 . 8 57 .7 40 .4 4
55- 39.5 71.9 30.8 23 .9 54.7 39.3 3
Source: Data is from the individual statistics section of Rodo
Dai j in Kanbo Tokei Johobu Konenreisha. Shugyo Jittai 
Chosa (1985) p 28-29: Col 2 and 3 from p 28, Table 20; 
Col 4, 5 and 8 from p 29, Table 22.
Note: The figures are for men who were employees at the age of
55.
Section 4 Promotion systems
Promotional systems play an important role in the incentives offered 
to workers. In Japan there are three main promotion systems which 
I shall describe below.
a) The managerial promotion system
The yakushoku or managerial promotion system gives increased 
managerial responsibility in reward for good work and service to the 
company. This means that promotion involves a clearly visible rise 
in status. This system allows promotion only when there is an open 
managerial post and hence if the growth of the company slows or 
turnover of managerial positions slows for any other reason, 
promotion becomes inflexible and difficult to administer as an award 
system. Table 4.11 below shows that the average ages of standard 
posts have been increasing over the years along with the ageing of
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employees in all scales of companies. It is also noticeable from 
inspection of the table that the smaller the company, the earlier 
the promotion age, although differences in promotion age by scale 
of company have been decreasing since 1970.
Table 4.11 showing increasing average age of post holders
Bucho Kacho Kakaricho
A B C A B C A B C
70 48.1 47 .3 45 .5 43 .2 41. 0 39.3 39.7 35.7 34 .7
75 48.7 48 .5 46.2 43 .7 41. 0 40.8 40.2 3 6.6 35 .7
80 49. 6 49 .4 48 . 6 44 .1 43 .5 43 .0 40.2 38.6 38.1
85 50.3 49 .9 49 .1 45 .2 44.7 44.1 41.3 40 .1 39 . 8
Source: Rodo Daijin Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu Chingin Kozo Kihon
Tokei Chosa Hokoku for the survey years shown in the 
table.
Notes: A, B and C represent sizes of companies by number of
employees such that A = 1000+ employees, B = 500-999 
employees and C = 100-499 employees. Bucho = department 
head, kacho = section chief and kakaricho = chief clerk. 
Years are Western calendar.
b) The grade promotion system
The shikaku or grade system is a system of grades and classes 
strongly linked to the work-related and ability pay systems 
described above. Under the shokumukyu system, jobs are classified 
according to the value of the work. Under the shokunokyu system 
grades are determined by ability in carrying work, either in the 
past or the future. Furthermore, since it does not involve 
managerial promotion it is much more flexible to use as a reward 
system. In the case of shokumukyu, classes represent the complexity 
and value of the work and within that class it is also possible to 
have a grade ladder up which a worker can progress as skill and 
experience progresses {Uchida p 125). In a pure shokumukyu system, 
pay is determined only by job classification, but if entry to a 
particular job classification is determined by experience and hence 
age, there should be a strong link between pay, promotion to a
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higher classification of job and age. Since the number of classes 
and grades within a class is limited, older workers may reach the 
upper limit and since pay is linked to the job, there will also be 
a limit in increases in pay with age. Under the shokunokyu system, 
the grades are determined by level of ability in carrying out work. 
This allows workers to change jobs within the company, without 
having their pay altered as might occur under a shokumukyu system. 
Assessment of ability is more subjective than assessment of work 
value and thus allows even more discretion in promotion through the 
grades and hence wage differentials within the company. Often the 
ability grades are linked in some way, either directly through the 
setting of minimum grades for a certain age, or indirectly through 
age of the person affecting the management's assessment of ability 
(Uchida 1989 p 131) . A certain level of class or grade is often 
necessary to acheive a particular managerial post (Ujihara 1985 p 
3 58) , so although the systems can be managed independently in 
parallel, there may also be explicit links.
c) Specialist grade systems
The senmonshoku system was developed in response to the increasing 
need for technical specialists, particularly in research and 
development. It is in essence a specialist grade system and removes 
technical staff from the managerial promotion path, which generally 
requires more general training.
Section 5 Periphery workers
The practices described above would appear to imply little 
flexibility for labour management in response to changing economic 
conditions. The 'regular' male worker is employed for a substantial 
part of his life by a firm where dismissal is anathema. A certain 
level of living wages is guaranteed to the worker regardless of
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ability. It is for these reasons that many Japanese economists have 
expected to find another pool of labour which are less privileged 
and less stable and so would compensate for the rigidities of 
Japanese employment practices. They have notneeded to look very far. 
As in most labour markets there are many types of these less stable 
types of employment for periphery workers. They range from contract 
work (shitauke), temporary work with rolling contracts (rinj iko), 
part-time work, work at home (naishoku) and work in small and very 
small companies which cannot offer much security. The majority of 
women workers are on the periphery.
A look at some of these periphery groups and their history would be 
useful before giving the more general trends in numbers and 
proportions.
a) Rinjiko
These are temporary workers with short-term contracts which can be 
and often are renewed. The majority of rinjiko work alongside a 
regular worker doing the same work, but at much lower levels of pay 
ranging between 30% and 60% of a regular worker's wage (Yamashita 
1986). During the 1950s large companies' reliance on temporary 
workers increased noticeably. Yamashita (1986) gives an example of 
four large ball-bearing companies. In 1953, temporary workers 
accounted for 7.5% of total employees of all four companies, but by 
1961 the percentage had risen to over 60%. Thus during the up-turn 
in the economy firms had expanded output by recruiting temporary 
labour. The figures also show greater variability in numbers of 
temporary workers when compared with regulars. During the 1960s, the 
labour market began to tighten with the continuing economic growth 
and many of the larger companies started a policy of converting 
temporary workers into regular workers (a process known as honkoka) 
in order to ensure sufficient labour (Tsutsumi 1986). At the same
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time/ however, more reliance was placed on contracting out work on 
site to employees in small companies, a practice known as shagaiko. 
Much of the production work was also contracted out to be undertaken 
by small companies (shitauke) . This also explains the large 
percentage of employees employed in small enterprises when compared 
with other industrialised countries.
Table 4.12 shows the division of employees into regulars and 
temporaries. During the 19 60s, the percentage of temporary employees 
dropped slowly until 1975, after which there have been noticeable 
increases. Composition by sex has shown a steady trend, with the 
proportion of female temporaries increasing continually. This is a 
result of the rapid increase in women part-time employees from the 
mid-1970s onwards.
Table 4.12 Proportion of temporary and regular workers
Year Full-time Temporary\Daily
All men women All men women
1960 90.5 63 .5 27 .0 9.5 5.7 3.8
1965 91.0 63.6 27 .4 9.0 4.7 4.3
1970 91.7 63 .1 28 . 6 8,3 3.7 4.6
1975 92.0 64 . 6 27.4 8 . 0 3.4 4.6
1980 90.5 62 .4 28.1 9.5 3.4 6.1
1984 89 .8 61.1 28.7 10 .2 3.3 6.9
Source: Sorifu Tokeikyoku Rodoryoku Chosa for the survey years
shown.
b) Women employees
The percentage of all employees accounted for by women has been 
rising steadily since 1960, when it was just over 31% to nearly 37% 
in 1988 (Rodosho Fujinkyoku 1989 Appendix p 14). Women workers do 
not face the same wage curves as men, demonstrated by the virtual 
flatness of their wage curves after the age of 25 (Rodo Daijin Kanbo
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Seisaku Chosabu 1986 p 92). This is in part due to a lower average 
length of service than men. Length of service tends to be markably 
lower than for men for all age groups, implying higher mobility. 
(Rodosho Fujinkyoku 1989 Appendix p 19). This is supported by the 
percentage of women leaving their job each year compared with men, 
which is usually 8% more than that of men (Rodosho Fujinkyoku 1989 
Appendix p 45) . Finally, a much higher percentage of women employees 
engage in part-time work and moreover this figure has risen from 
12.2% of women employees in 1970 to 23.6% in 1988, along with the 
rise in the proportion of women employees (RodSsho Fujinkyoku 1989). 
Thus women are increasingly providing a flexible pool of labour 
outside the scope of Japanese employment practices.
c) Employees of small and medium-sized companies
There is a vast literature (eg Odaka 1984) on the dual nature of the 
labour market in Japan and I do not wish do discuss this in detail 
here. When discussing periphery and core employment however, the 
role of small enterprises in providing periphery employment cannot 
be overlooked. The proliferation of employment in small enterprises 
has often been noted, when Japan is compared with other developed 
countries. In 1982 the proportion of people employed in 
manufacturing establishments with less than 100 employees in Japan 
was 55.6%. The similar figure for the U.S.A. was 28.5% (1982), the 
U.K. 2 6.14% (19 83) and West Germany (company base) 18.4% (1985). As 
a further check, the proportion of workers employed by companies 
with 10 to 99 employees can be obtained from the Chingin Kozo Kihon 
Tokei Chosa Hokoku (Rodo Daijin Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu 1971, 197 6, 
1981, 1986, 1988) . The figures show a percentage of roughly 36%
since 1980. This also shows that a high percentage of people are 
employed in small companies even though it is a company base 
statistic and does not include the many companies which employ less
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than 10 people. The proportion of employees employed in companies 
of fewer than 100 people over time is shown below in Figure 4.4 
below. The most noticeable change occurs in the first half of the 
197 0s after which the proportion remain relatively stable, except 
for the figures for 10 to 99 employee companies not including 
services.
Figure 4.4 showing proportion of workers employed in companies with 
less than 100 employees 1970-1987.
Proportion of employees in small establishments/companies
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Source: Rodo Daijin Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu (1971, 1976, 1981,
1986, 1988) Chingin Kozo Kihon Tokei Chosa Hokoku for
the 10-99 employee figures; and Chusho Kigyocho Chusho 
Kigyo Hakusho for the survey years shown for the other 
data.
Note: The figures for percentage employed in 4-100 person
establishments for 197 0 and 197 5 are for proportion 
employed in 1-100 person establishments. The figures for 
10-99 employees are for companies, whereas the figures 
for 4-100 (and 1-100) are for establishments.
This high proportion of people employed in small companies can be
explained partly by the practice of larger Japanese firms of
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contracting out work to smaller companies and partly by the 
proliferation of small retailers in Japan (Chusho Kigyocho 1980). 
According to the 1980 Chusho Kigyo Hakusho (Chusho Kigyocho 1980 p 
155) just over 60% of all small and medium-sized manufacturing 
establishments were carrying out contract work. Moreover the 
proportion of small and medium-sized establishments on contracts 
rose during the 1970s. Table 4.13 shows the contracting proportion 
for different sizes of establishments for the years 1971 and 1976.
Table 4.13 showing contracting proportions for different sizes of 
company.
Size of establish­
ment
(No. of employees)
Contracting Proportion
1971 1976
1 -19 59 .2 61.9
20 - 299 53 .2 50.8
20 - 49 56.9 50.4
50 - 299 47 .1 51.4
All 58.7 60.7
Source: Chusho Kigyocho (1980).
Note: Contracting proportion is given.by the following:
No. of small & medium-sized co.s carrying out contracts 
Total number of small & medium-sized companies
By 1987 however, the overall contracting proportion had fallen to 
56.6% (Chusho Kigyocho 1989 p 102). During the same period (1971 - 
1976), the overall proportion of companies of over 3 00 employees 
using outside contractors rose from 82.2 to 84.2%. For large 
companies this was particularly noticeable. For example for 
companies with 1000 employees or more the percentage rose from 83.7 
to 89.4%. On the other hand the category of companies with 500 
employees or more saw a decline in contracting out and also reduced 
the number of outside contractors, whereas the 3 00-499 employee 
category actually showed an increase in the proportion contracting
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out and increased the number of contractors. Table 4.14 shows the 
trend between 1971 and 197 6.
Table 4.14 showing trends in contracting out during the 1970s
Size 
(no. of 
employ­
ees )
Contract­
ing out 
%age
CO% CO% no. of 
contractors 
(average)15 - 30% 30% +
1971 1976 1971 1976 1971 1976 1971 1976
300+ 82.2 84.2 19.2 19 .1 13 .7 11.0 88 71
300-499 80.5 80 .2 19 .9 22 .4 10.2 10 .2 36 39
500+ 83.6 87 .2 18.7 16. 8 11.6 11. 6 127 93
1000 + 83 .7 89 .4 18 .2 15 .2 12 .5 12 .5 162 130
Source: Chusho Kigyocho (1980).
Note: Column 2 shows the percentage of companies contracting
out. Columns 3 & 4 show the percentage of work
contracted out.
As discussed in Chapter Three, workers in the smaller enterprises 
face less steeply rising wage curves. They also tend to move much 
more frequently, as shown by average length of service. These are 
just a few indicators that workers in this group provide a more 
flexible pool of labour than those in large companies and tend not 
to enjoy the same security or personnel management. This pool of 
workers increased during the 197 0s and has remained large and 
relatively stable during the consistent economic growth of the 
1980s. It is thus an important and enduring characteristic of the 
Japanese labour market.
Section 6 Labour mobility
In this section I am primarily concerned with only two types of 
labour mobility, namely the employee mobility of different age 
groups and mobility between different scales of company. Whether 
these types of mobility also result in structural mobility, 
providing extra flexibility for a changing economy is regarded as 
a separate question. In Section 2 it was apparent that large
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companies are much less likely to take on mid-termers than small 
companies. Such behaviour is likely to result in greater mobility 
between small firms than between large firms and more mobility from 
large to small than from small to large companies. Ono (1989 pp 162 
- 166) undertakes an analysis to investigate such an hypothesis 
using data spanning the period 19 62 to 19 87, by constructing 
matrices of movement rates between different sizes of companies in 
the non-agricultural and non-forestry sector. Over the whole period 
mobility from small to small company is much greater than between 
large and large. The rate varies between 2.63% and 3.2 8% for 
movement between 1-29 employee companies over the period, whereas 
for companies of 1000 plus employees, the rate ranged between 0.42% 
and 0.77%. Also mobility rates decreased after the 1974 oil shock 
as shown by the data for 197 9, but were then increasing again by 
1987 .
From 19 62 to 1968, during the rapid economic growth period, mobility 
rates from small to large companies were on the whole greater than 
the mobility rates in the opposite direction. Since 1974, however 
downward mobility has been much greater than upward mobility. In 
1987, the 1-29 employee to 1000+ employee company rate was less than 
1/3 of the movement in the opposite direction.
Ono (1989 pp 165-166) also calculates the number and rates of all 
downward movement (from any size company to a smaller company) and 
upward movement between 1962 and 1987. Ever since 1968, both the 
number and rate of downward movers has been larger than those moving 
upwards.
Figure 4.5 shows the rate of job changes over one year for different 
age groups for men in 1974. These rates are not only for employees
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but for all types of workers. Unsurprisingly the rates for the 
younger age groups are high and then rates decrease noticeably after 
the age of 40 until the 55 -64 age bracket is reached. This jump in 
job changing is due to employees reaching retirement age and then 
looking for a new job. Indeed, if the age bracket were 55-59, this 
rate would probably be even higher. Thus early retirement provides 
flexibility in two ways. Firstly, 'retiring' employees move to other 
companies, taking skills with them and secondly, they leave spaces 
which can then be allotted to different functions. The second is 
particularly important when the larger companies rely on 
inexperienced recruits when hiring new labour.
Figure 4.5 showing percentages changing jobs in different age groups
Labour Turnover Rates for different Age G-roups 
All Ma I e Workers
10 20 30 10 50 B0 70 B0
Age
Source: Tomoto 1978 p 129.
Matsushima (1983 p 111) gives data showing the scale of company
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before and after retirement for those retirees who changed company- 
after retirement. For the 55-59 age group, 91.7% of retirees moved 
to a smaller company and for the 60-64 year age group this rate was 
87.5%. From data given in Sumiya (1983), 88.2% of retirees who
changed companies moved to a smaller company and indeed in the 
sample, 57.6% of employees were working in companies of more than 
5000 employees before retirement (1.9% still worked in the same size 
of company after retirement (teinen)). Nearly 65% of those who had 
worked in companies of 5000 plus employees worked in companies of 
fewer than 300 employees after retirement. From the same data, just 
under 50 % of retirees remained employed and changed employee. The 
survey used by Matsushima (Rodosho Teinen Totatsusha Chosa for 1979) 
is biased towards employees of larger companies and the downward 
movement is corroborated by age composition of employees in 
different size companies show in Chapter Three.
Section 7 Conclusion to this chapter
A survey of large companies on the attitudes regarding the hiring 
of mid-termers showed that large companies prefer to hire young, 
inexperienced workers. Even when large companies do take on mid­
termers, the majority of companies prefer the mid-termers to be 
below the age of 35. An examination of macro labour market turnover 
rates showed that around half of hirings were of mid-termers, 
implying that smaller companies do take on mid-termers. This 
supposition is supported by the fact that average length of service 
is lower in smaller companies. It was also clear that treatment of 
mid-termers tended to be inferior to 4hed'o^ -R'ic>5£. wotrk&rS who sfaiij lb 
same company. In particular, promotion was hindered in large firms 
by changing employer, since large firms tend to promote workers who 
have worked all their working life in that company. These facts 
indicate that large firms operate internal labour markets. This
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indication is supported by the lack of mobility from small to large 
companies and between large companies. There is some mobility from 
large to small companies, particularly for older workers or those 
at retirement age.
There are two main promotion systems in use: i) grade systems and
ii) managerial post systems. The average age of managerial post­
holders has been increasing. Most companies operate mandatory 
retirement. The practice has become more widespread and more uniform 
since the 197 0s. Also, the average age of retirement has risen and 
by 19 88, the majority of companies had a retirement age of 60 or 
above. Many companies offer the chance of further employment after 
retirement, although the conditions of employment are inferior to 
pre-retirement conditions. Kinmu encho is more favourable than 
saikoyo to the worker, but the practice of saikoyo is more 
widespread. The number of employees experiencing either of these re­
employments is approximately 40%.
With internal labour markets, some workers become fixed factors of 
production, but other workers are employed under flexible terms. It 
was shown that there is a pool of flexible workers provided by women 
and temporary workers in Japan, although the second type has become 
less important. It should be noted that retirees who are re-employed 
by the same company also become a pool of flexible workers, since 
the are employed on short-term contracts. Their job-security is 
clearly lessened. The smaller companies also offer flexibility since 
their employees are not employed under such a rigid system and are 
less secure. Thus large firms contract out work to smaller firms and 
this gives larger firms the ability to adjust labour input, but 
indirectly.
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Although the description of employment practices has been divided 
into two chapters, the practices described form an interactive set
length of service and hence wage levels, when wages are to some 
extent determined by length of service, as has been shown. Internal 
promotion can only work with an internal labour market, but also 
contributes to the creation of an internal labour market. It has 
become apparent from this chapter and the previous one, that large 
firms operate an internal labour market. Smaller companies also have 
practices that imply an internal labour market (for example, 
mandatory retirement), and so it is not easy to distinguish firms 
with internal labour markets from other firms purely on the basis 
of size. The extent of internal labour markets is difficult to 
determine, but in further discussion, it will be assumed that it is 
firms with more than 1000 employees that form internal labour 
markets.
The next chapter introduces the existing explanations of the 
employment practices described in Chapter Three and Four, and 
develops the explanations further to show why the age structure of 
the firm's workforce influences hiring and employee disposal 
decisions.
of practices. For instance, h' ’ &nc| retirement practices affect
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CHAPTER 5 EXISTING EXPLANATIONS OF JAPANESE EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 
AND A NEW DEMOGRAPHIC APPROACH
Section 1 Significance of this chapter
This chapter plays a pivotal role in the thesis. By introducing 
a new demographic approach to explaining Japanese employment 
practices, it provides an explanation of the relationships 
between population ageing, employment practices and macro labour 
market variables such as unemployment. The implications furnished 
by this approach are examined in the next two chapters.
A detailed description of Japanese employment practices was 
provided in the previous two chapters. The nature of Japanese 
employment practices can be summarised by the following: firms
prefer to hire younger workers at the beginning of their career; 
wages rise steeply with age and length of service; other forms 
of pay, such as severance pay rise exponentially with length of 
service; wages are determined by a mixture of personal and 
functional factors; most firms have a mandatory retirement age; 
and some retirees are re-employed by the same firm after 
retirement under inferior conditions. One other finding is 
important: the Japanese employment practices described above
tended to be more prevalent in larger companies than smaller 
ones, although they did exist to a certain extent in smaller 
companies. Over time, there appears to have been a less 
discernible change in the steepness of average wage curves of 
employees in large companies than in smaller companies: 
certainly, the wage curves in smaller companies have steepened 
more than in large companies. On the other hand, the age 
structure of employees has aged in all sizes of firms, although 
the work force in larger firms has aged less compared to that in
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smaller firms. The next section of this chapter represents a 
survey of the theories that have been used to explain the 
employment practices of Japanese firms. The third section gives 
an overview of the benefits that the practices provide without 
adherence to any given theory, in preparation for section four. 
Finally, Section Four provides a. new approach to understanding 
the nature of Japanese employment practices and more importantly 
provides insights into the impact of population ageing on the 
labour market for old and young people. The implications drawn 
from the new approach are then examined in Chapters Six and 
Seven.
Section 2 Theories used to explain Japanese employment practices
There have been two main approaches to analysing employment 
practices and more specifically the steep wage curves in Japan: 
a) human capital theory and b) living expenses wage theory. These 
can be broken down into further subsets and I will give an 
account below and a discussion of the efficacy of these theories.
Sub-section 2.1 A survey of human capital theories
Human capital theory regards workers not as undifferentiated 
people with the same levels of skills and ability, but as people 
of differing quality. Although part of the quality of an 
individual can be assigned to innate ability, background and 
personality, quality is also enhanced by acquiring skills and 
knowledge, otherwise known as human capital. In the narrow sense, 
human capital embodies skills acquired through formal education 
and work experience, whilst in a broader sense it may include 
information networks and trust relations built up by an employee 
over time. The main purpose of human capital theory is to explain 
wage differentials under the neo-classical assumption of the
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marginal worker receiving wages equal to his marginal product. 
Thus two workers similar in all aspects (eg innate ability) may 
receive different wages due to different levels of accumulated 
human capital. In the Japanese context, human capital theory 
needs to explain rising wages with age; falling wages after peak 
age; mandatory retirement; and steeper wage curves in large 
companies than in small companies
a) The skilling hypothesis
This was one of the earlier human capital type of hypotheses used 
by economists such as Ujihara (19 66). Due to a skills shortage, 
particularly in a rapidly modernising economy, companies needed 
to foster skills within the company rather than raising the 
requisite labour inputs from the open labour market. Inside the 
company, skills were passed on as a craft and tended to be 
company specific, hence years of service reflected the skill or 
human capital level of the employee. If there were little 
mobility, then seniority and age would be strongly correlated and 
hence under this condition, wages would rise with age. Moreover, 
since seniority would be negligible for a worker in a second job 
after retirement, wages should drop to reflect short service and 
loss of specific human capital in the new company. So falling 
wages after peak age are also explained by this hypothesis if 
"retirement" coincides with peak age. Finally, if employees in 
larger companies display less mobility than employees in small 
companies, average age-wage curves will be steeper in large 
companies due to the greater average length of service at the 
same age for large company employees. Greater mobility of workers 
in small companies is not explained, however, and needs to be 
taken as given. Alternatively, workers are applying skills to 
more capital in larger companies and thus the return is higher.
143
Thus, the three main characteristics of the average wage curve 
in Japan seem well explained, by this hypothesis, so long as the 
skills acquired by the worker are almost totally company specific 
and so long as the requisite skills can only be acquired fully 
over a long number of years. With the new technology that was 
introduced rapidly after the Second World War, the age-wage 
differentials were expected to decrease since skill formation 
over a long number of years would not be necessary and older 
workers would find that their skills depreciated rapidly. 
Certainly wage differentials by age peaked in 1958 (Ono 1989 p 
21), but they still remain large and have in fact been widening 
during the 1980's as shown in Chapter Three, Section Two. The 
implication of the weight assigned to length of service in wage 
determination is examined statistically by Ono (1989, Chapter 
Two) and his results will be summarised below, since they 
appertain to all of the human capital theories.
b) Job rotation and career formation
Koike (Koike 1981 and Koike 1988 for example) stresses that 
workers are moved through a series of jobs, widening their skills 
and understanding of the whole manufacturing process in which 
they are involved. The longer the person remains in the company, 
the higher the wages since the quality of the employee is
constantly improving. Ono (1989 p 183) criticises this by
remarking that this approach cannot explain why length of service 
should be long (ie why there is little mobility between firms). 
The theory does not need to. It is sufficient that length of
service is long and hence skills increase with age and so do
wages. A worker will only move elsewhere if pay and opportunities 
are better. There is a long-standing myth that firm-specific 
human capital is necessary to keep a person in the same company,
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but it is merely one sufficient condition. If the acquired skills 
are general, then it is often held that the worker will bear the 
cost of training through lower wages since he will be able to use 
the skills in another company (Elliott 1991). While the worker 
is training he will not be able to move elsewhere, since he will 
not have sufficient skills to offer another employer. Once his 
skills are sufficient, then the company which currently employs 
him will raise the wages to meet his improved productivity 
(Elliott 1991). Thus there is no incentive for the employee to 
leave. Koike's skill formation scenario is quite adequate for 
explaining rising wages with age, but it is not sufficient in 
explaining a decrease in wages after peak age. Certainly, wages 
may stop rising as the period for recouping the costs of 
investment in human capital is short for older people and 
investment thus ceases (Sano 1981 p 153) , but they need not fall. 
The approach cannot explain mandatory retirement either. A more 
steeply rising wage curve in larger companies may be explained 
by greater opportunities given for rotational training and 
greater job stability allowing for faster acquisition of skills.
c) Internal labour markets and firm-specific human capital
Doeringer and Piore's (1971) approach is based on the internal 
labour market within a company. The market becomes internal 
because the company requires firm-specific skills and therefore 
hires raw recruits and then trains them. The recruits are not 
happy to bear the full costs of their training since their new 
skills will not be useful in another company. The worker and the 
company share the costs of training. The longer the worker 
remains, the more firm-specific skills he acquires and wages 
rise. If the worker leaves the company, wages will drop, as would
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be the case on retirement. Compulsory retirement cannot be 
explained. If firm-specific training has higher returns and 
training in larger companies is highly firm specific, the wage 
curve may be steeper in large companies than in small companies. 
See Figure 5.1 below.
Figure 5.1 showing conceptual wage curves under the assumptions 
of firm-specific human capital and general human capital.
Figure 5.1 shows that if the increments in productivity resulting 
from the accumulated human capital with age were the same in both 
large and small firms, the wage curve would be steeper in small 
firms since employees would bear all the costs of training (the 
training is non-firm specific in small firms). If, however the 
skills accumulated in a large company lead to greater increments 
in productivity than in the small companies, the wage curve in 
the large company would be steeper, even though the company bears 
some of the training costs.
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A further implication of the existence of firm-specific human 
capital should be noted. Since the wages of an employee would 
fall if he moved to another company, mobility is reduced. This 
means that the firm can set wages at levels that are not 
necessarily determined by the present productivity of the 
employee. It does not mean that the employees' lifetime pay can 
be less than marginal productivity, since if it were, employees 
would not join that company when young - other companies would 
be prepared to pay higher lifetime wages. As a consequence of the 
ability to pay wages that are not equal to marginal productivity, 
it is possible for the wages of young people to be suppressed 
below, and the wages for older workers to be raised above 
marginal product levels. If the internal age structure were 
young, such a bureaucratic wage structure would reduce total 
labour costs. See Figure 5.2 below.
Figure 5.2 showing steep wage curves when wages diverge from 
marginal productivity
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w(t) is the wage curve achieved when training costs are being 
shared at a fixed proportion during the length of service of the 
employee; wr(t) is the revised wage schedule with younger workers 
bearing a higher proportion of training costs than older workers. 
tk represents retirement age and the areas a and b will be the 
same, such that lifetime earnings are the same under the two wage 
schedules. Thus wage curves may be steeper in the Doeringer and 
Piore case with a high preponderance of firm-specific human 
capital and an internal labour market, such as those created by 
large firms. This approach will be discussed in more detail in 
the next section.
d) The trust-building and loyalty approach
This approach is, strictly speaking, a subset of the firm- 
specific human capital theory of Doeringer and Piore. It is 
described separately since trust and loyalty are not normally 
regarded as firm-specific skills, but they certainly are one 
element of human capital. Loyalty and trust may be viewed as 
ethereal entities which belong to the company as whole, but it 
is apparent that should an individual leave the company, some 
trust and loyalty will also leave and will need to be built up 
in a new recruit. Ono (1989 pp 141 - 146) uses the trust-building 
hypothesis to explain why it is necessary to stay at one company 
for a long time rather than for explaining rising wage curves but 
states clearly the basic proposition (Ono 1989 p 142, my 
translation):
"In order that the firm as an organisation is able to 
perform decision-making efficiently and then act on those 
decisions, it is important to establish an informal network 
based on the trust-relationships between the people who 
form that organisation."
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In other words, mutual trust relations give the chance to express 
sincere opinions and thus reduce the time and effort needed for 
adjustment and compromise. As the length of service increases, 
relationships become rooted more firmly and the employee comes 
to understand the characters of other workers more clearly. The 
employee thus becomes more productive with the passing of years 
in the same company and wages rise with length of service and if 
length of service is correlated with age, wages will rise with 
age. Wages will fall if the person moves to another company after 
retirement, but compulsory retirement cannot be explained. Since 
employees of a larger company will have a longer length of 
service than those in small companies for a given age, wages will 
rise more steeply in larger companies.
e) A short critique of the human capital theories
One of the general results of human capital theory is that wage 
profiles are not affected by supply and demand conditions in the 
labour market. The productivity of the worker is determined 
solely by innate ability and the amount of human capital he or 
she possesses, so that the worker will receive a wage 
commensurate to that productivity. This implies that with an 
increase in the proportion of young workers, for example, the 
employee age structure will change and the input mix of different 
age groups into production will change. Productivity of the 
individual worker is not determined by combination with other 
types of worker and therefore a lower productivity worker (with 
a lower level of accumulated human capital) is perfectly 
substitutable with a higher productivity worker, although 
obviously not on a one-to-one basis.
An indirect method of testing the general human capital theory
149
is to test the effects of demographic changes (supply) and growth 
(demand) on average wage curves. Freeman (1989, Chapter 4) 
studies the American labour market and finds that in the 1960's 
and 1970's when the number of young workers increased rapidly, 
the wage profiles of male employees steepened noticeably, 
bringing into question the human capital approach. Martin and 
Ogawa (1988) carried out a similar study on the average wage 
curves of male employees in Japan and also found that change in 
the population structure affected the steepness of the average 
wage curves, but that economic cycles also had strong effects.
The results are not conclusive. There may have been technological 
effects changing the profiles during economic cycles or training 
profiles may have changed, but these results do give reasonable 
grounds for doubt. The ability to determine the wage structure 
institutionally in an internal labour market with specific human 
capital would appear to be a special case, particularly since 
both papers use data for employees in all scales of company.
Ono's (1989) examination of various factors in wage determination 
also question the specific human capital theories and his results 
will be given after a description of the living expenses 
hypothesis, since Ono compares the explanatory power of the two 
approaches described here.
Sub-section 2.2 Living expenses wages
a) The living expenses wages approach
The belief in living expenses wages is essentially based on the 
historical development of wage systems during the interwar period 
the Second World War and the reconstruction period afterwards. 
During the period of preparation for war and during the war,
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standards of living fell and wages came under bureaucratic 
supervision in order to suppress inflation. Examples of wage 
systems given in Showa Dojinkai (19 63) show explicit links 
between age of a worker and the necessity of ensuring a 
sufficient wage to meet living expenses. After the war, again 
under conditions of inflation, the Densa.n~ga.ta. wage system was 
established in the electricity industry: it guaranteed a living 
wage fixed according to age and also with allowances for 
dependants (Ono 19 89 p 80) . This type of wage system became 
popular in other types of industries,
Ujihara (19 66) and Funabashi (19 67) advocate the living expenses 
hypothesis. Funabashi assumes that the labour market in large 
firms is segmented (internal). Therefore with a surplus 
population such as existed after the Second World War, starting 
salaries would be low, since it is only at the entry stage that 
wages are determined by supply and demand in the labour market. 
In order to ensure reproduction of the labour force, wages needed 
to rise with age, so that a family could be supported. As Japan 
entered the period of high speed growth and a labour shortage 
appeared however, starting wages rose and age-wage differentials 
decreased. Ono (1989 p 24) suggests that by the period of high 
speed growth, this sort of wage determination had become an 
established practice and thus continued to exist even though the 
initial conditions which had brought about this way of thinking 
had disappeared. There are also other approaches which view 
living expenses wages as a reflection of the paternalism of 
Japanese companies (Sano 1981).
Ono (1989 p 45) feels that living cost wages can be interpreted 
as the outcome of an efficiently operating labour market, since
151
such wages reflect supply and demand factors. Workers with 
families have to supply their labour at a higher price than a 
young person without familial commitments or than an older worker 
whose children have become independent. This explanation would 
appear to assume that a worker with a family is able to withdraw 
labour if wages are not high enough, whereas the opposite case 
is more likely to hold, with a growing pressure to supply labour 
at any wage with increasing familial commitments. Ono is 
implicitly assuming that firms are willing to pay a higher wage 
for higher age groups: the argument then returns to questions of 
the productivity of different age groups or behaviour based on 
habit or paternal concepts, rather than purely the function of 
different types of labour. The rationale for living expenses 
wages can be found in the motivational aspects of such a system 
and thus the most appropriate way to explain the living expenses 
wage system would be as a type of efficiency wage system. A sense 
of security would increase morale and loyalty, resulting in 
greater work efforts. Such an approach is similar to the theories 
of gift exchange expounded by some proponents of efficiency wages 
(Akerlof 1984).
b) A short critique of the living expenses wages approach
There are various types of evidence which are produced to support 
the living expenses claim. Ono (1989 p 25) notes that wage 
profiles in Japan peak later than in other countries and that 
this fact helps to support Funabashi's claim that wages are 
maintained to support living expenses even once accumulation of 
skills has stagnated. The noticeable flatness of women's wage 
curves is another element in the support for living expenses 
wages (Ono 1989 p 25). Since women are not the main providers in 
a household, it is not necessary to pay them wages that guarantee
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living expenses, as it is with men. There are other studies 
(Sumiya 1973 for example) which compare wage profiles with life­
cycle living expenses and find that the two profiles have very 
similar shapes {Ono 1989 p 31) , This similarity is used to 
further support the existence of living expenses wages, 
regardless of the fact that the main limit to expenditure is 
income, even when capital markets are efficient.
It is difficult to establish why the average wage curves of 
workers employed by different size companies should differ as 
shown in Chapter Three, since it seems highly unlikely that an 
employee in a small firm would have a lesser requirement for 
income to support a family than the employee of a large firm. 
Furthermore, if an explicit living expenses wage were in 
operation in large companies, there would be little need to 
retire workers at a mandatory and often early age: reduction in 
wages would suffice.
Concrete evidence is hard to find, either in support or denial 
of the living expenses hypothesis. Ono (1989, Chapter Two) 
carries out a statistical examination of the two major approaches 
described above. His results are given next.
Sub-section 2.3 Ono's statistical examination of the human 
capital and living expenses wages approaches
Ono uses data gathered on magnetic tape for the Basic Wage 
Structure Survey (Chingin Kozo Kihon Tokei Chosa) which allows 
for combinations of data not available in the tables published 
for public consumption. The public data gives years of 
occupational experience and age for each type of work, whereas 
Ono is able to use the individual responses of those surveyed to
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find out the wages of each individual categorised by years of 
occupational experience, age and length of service. This enables 
him to estimate the contribution to wage levels of company size 
(SZ) ; years of schooling (age of leaving school, ED); years of 
experience in present company, which is a proxy for internal 
experience (IE); years of occupational experience (OE); and age 
(AGE). Since age of leaving school is included, he could not run 
a regression using all the variables, since AGE = ED+EE+IE (where 
EE is external experience) and thus he uses two regression 
models, one in which ED, EE, IE and OE are the explanatory 
variables (called the IE*EE model) and the other in which ED, IE, 
OE and AGE (the IE*AGE model) are explanatory variables. Ono then 
runs two estimations for each model, one which excludes OE as a 
variable (estimation A) and one which includes OE (estimation B) .
a) The results of testing the IE*EE model
The IE*EE model can be used to examine the human capital 
hypotheses (both general and firm-specific types). The general 
results of Ono's OLS regression for this model are as follows:
1) with estimation A it is not possible to derive the 
weight of firm-specific human capital in the length of 
service variable. The length of service variable (IE) 
contains elements of both general human capital and 
firm-specific human capital. If the total contribution 
to wages of IE is taken to be the contribution of 
firm-specific human capital, then it is likely to be 
an over-estimation. With estimation type B, 
occupational experience (OE) is included as a variable 
and thus the general human capital element in IE is 
taken out of IE, turning IE into an explanatory 
variable which represents only the firm-specific human
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capital element in the determination of wages. Ono 
finds that the contribution of IE to wages falls 
dramatically for all sizes of company when regression 
type B is used as opposed to regression type A. This 
result implies that it often seems that length of 
service is highly explanatory in wage determination 
only because general skills are being absorbed during 
service in the company.
2) The contribution to explaining wages of external 
experience, EE, also drops when occupational 
experience is included in the regression, particularly 
for small companies where the average employee has 
more years of occupational experience than length of 
service (Ono 1989).
3) Both the wages accruing from internal experience and 
external experience are greater in larger companies. 
If rising wages with length of service represents the 
return to increasing firm-specific human capital, 
external experience would not contribute to the level 
of wages. As Ono points out, from his results, 
external experience increases with shorter length of 
service (internal experience) by definition and since 
external experience has explanatory power, low wages 
due to short length of service can be compensated to 
some extent by external experience.
The general conclusions from the IE*EE model are as follows. 
Explanations of wage curves which rise with length of service and 
particularly those of employees in large companies, which stress
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firm-specific human capital lose their significance. Theories 
based on the accumulation of general human capital over the life­
span are well supported by the effects that the inclusion of 
occupational experience has on the regression results.
b) The results of testing the IE*AGE model
The IE*AGE model can be used to investigate the living expenses
hypothesis represented by AGE versus the human capital 
hypothesis. The result's of Ono's estimation are as follows:
1) The IE*AGE model has greater explanatory power than 
the IE*EE model. The power of the first model (type B) 
which split AGE into internal experience and external 
experience is inferior to the model in which AGE is 
left unsplit (IE*AGE, type B). Thus the contribution 
to wages given by adding IE and EE together is still 
less than the contribution of AGE, which implies that 
AGE contains elements other than human capital which 
contribute to the level of wages. The contribution to 
wages of IE and EE does not change much over the life­
cycle, whereas the contribution of AGE does. Since the 
type B regression for the IE*AGE model removes the 
effects of occupational experience that increases with 
age from the AGE variable, it is difficult to argue 
that the AGE variable is acting in this regression a 
proxy for total human capital, other than a type of
human capital variable broader still than occupational
skills (eg ability to understand other people's 
behaviour and form working relationships with them; 
authority).
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2) Ono gives data for 1980 across all scales showing the 
contribution to wages of the various variables. See 
Table 5.1 below.
Table 5.1 showing the results of Ono's empirical analysis
Factor of wage 
determination
Contribution to wage levels (%)
with fixed 
coefficent
no fixed 
coefficient
fixed coefficient 27 .0 -
education 2.1 2.9
internal exp. 3.8 5.2
occupational exp. 5.7 7.8
age 51.8 84.0
Source: Ono (1989) p 41, for all categories of male employees.
Since it is difficult to attach a specific meaning to the fixed 
coefficient term, Ono uses his results to calculate the 
contribution of the factors to the difference in wages between 
a raw middle-school leaver on starting wages and a worker with 
average attributes, designated as someone having graduated from 
high school or old middle school, with a length of service of ten 
years, occupational experience of over ten years and forty years 
of age. The results are shown in Table 5.2 below.
Table 5.2 showing Ono's estimates of the contribution to the 
difference in wages of a school-leaver and an average employee 
of various factors
Factor of wage 
determination
Contribution to wages (%) by size of 
company (no. of employees)
10 - 99 1000 +
education 10 .0 9.5
internal exp. 5.4 12 .1
occupational exp. 23 .8 15 .6
age 60 . 8 62 .8
Source: Ono (1989) p 42.
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Age is the main explanatory variable although length of service 
does carry a much heavier weight in wage determination in large 
companies, showing that firm-specific human capital is more 
important in large companies.
Ono's overall conclusion from this detailed and unique analysis 
is that the AGE variable represents living expenses and thus the 
living expenses hypothesis for wage determination is more 
powerful than the human capital hypotheses, although human 
capital does undoubtedly play a role in wage determination.
Ono continues to provide a rationale for the nenko system (the 
embodiment of the living expenses hypothesis) by describing two 
main benefits of the nenko system. One is the role it plays in 
smoothing the introduction of new technology as described 
later in this chapter. The other is an argument based on the 
necessity of fairness in a group setting. Ability pay is 
difficult to administer, since it is very difficult to establish 
an objective evaluation scheme. Evaluation of a person's ability 
and potential is inevitably subjective and therefore it is 
necessary in a group setting to choose some general measure of 
evaluation which is not affected by favouritism and other 
behaviour which causes indignation amongst workers. Ono stresses 
that the most objective meter of ability is age - therefore wages 
based on age are the best for maintaining fairness. This is 
really a reinstatement of the human capital hypothesis that age 
reflects skills and that is why wages rise with age.
Sub-section 2.4 Conclusion to Section 2
It is clear from Ono's analysis that the human capital approaches 
have some power in explaining the rising average wage curves in
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Japan. Each of the human capital approaches provided only a 
partial explanation of the observed phenomena, however. Two 
results of Ono's analysis are particularly important: the first 
is that the age of the employee determines more of the wage level 
than do the individual components that add up to give the age of 
the employee; the second is that firm-specific human capital was 
more important in the case of large firms. The second result 
implies that large firms are more likely to embody internal 
labour markets, the importance of which will become clear later. 
Ono believes that the first result is a vindication of the living 
expenses wage approach. As explained above, Ono's explanation of 
living wages expenses reduces to nothing more than a 
sophisticated (and useful) version of human capital theory. The 
result itself, however, seems to suggest that the productivity 
of workers is not purely a function of their skills and 
accumulated human capital (in whatever form), but also of 
incentives and motivation created by a wage determination scheme 
that leads to a steeply rising average wage curve. In other 
words, rising wages with age engender increases in productivity 
that are not associated with increased skills, but increased 
efficiency emanating from other sources. The next section 
explains the motivational aspects of Japanese employment 
practices.
Section 3 Japanese employment practices as incentive schemes and 
allocative devices
Firms attempt to devise employment practices that gain the 
maximum efficiency from the workforce. Many of the practices aim 
to increase the efficiency of the workforce as a whole rather 
than the efficiency of an individual. Below I shall survey 
theories that show how wages that rise with age provide
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incentives and information that could improve efficiency. It is 
usually difficult to test these theories because the effects of 
incentives are often impossible to measure.
Sub-section 3.1 Skill, knowledge diffusion and technology 
absorption
The use of wage curves that rise with age and the explicit use 
of personal wage systems imply that workers of different age 
groups are essentially non-competing or, alternatively non- 
substitutable. If younger workers are not competing with older 
workers, then the older workers will not be constrained in 
passing on their accumulated skills and knowledge to younger 
workers, since their wages are strongly determined by age rather 
than any direct comparison with the productivity of younger age 
groups. The relationship is also symmetrical. Younger age groups 
are able to pass on specific knowledge to older workers without 
jeopardising their own chances of promotion in the future, or of 
lowering their wages. There is competition engendered by the 
promotion system (discussed in detail below) within age groups, 
which is sufficient in providing incentive for effort. The smooth 
transmission and diffusion of knowledge ensures greater 
efficiency in the use of inputs and the continuity of production. 
Knowledge becomes embodied in the company as a whole rather than 
in specific individuals (Imai and Komiya 1989). Although 
competition within age groups may hinder horizontal communication 
and integration, age-vertical integration increases efficiency 
compared with a situation in which all workers are potential 
competitors.
There is another important technological aspect to a wage system 
in which the emphasis is placed on personal factors and potential
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rather than on job-evaluation. In an environment in which 
technology is changing rapidly, under a functional wage system 
a worker may find that his assigned job classification becomes 
downgraded or redundant upon the introduction of new technology. 
He may remain in the job classification but at lower wages since 
part of his skills have become useless, or he may be moved to a 
new job for which new skill accumulation is required and 
therefore he will start at a low grade and at lower wages. With 
such considerations, the worker will naturally be opposed to the 
introduction of new technology and the ensuing resistance results 
in inefficiency and industrial relations problems. Under a 
personal wage system or one based on potential, a worker can be 
re-allocated to a new job without a concomitant drop in wages or 
status. In the personal wage system a given level of wages will 
be guaranteed by age and under a potential ability system, 
attention will be paid to accumulated general skills and ability 
in previous work, again resulting in a maintained level of wages. 
If there is a tendency, as Ujihara (1985) claims, towards judging 
potential by reference to personal characteristics, such as age 
and educational background, there is little difference in the two 
systems other than in name. They both aid the introduction of new 
technology, which retains the competivity of the company and the 
prosperity of the individual worker.
It should be noted here that the adoption of new technology would 
seem to require a different set of conditions to that necessary 
for the creation of new technology. Incentive is necessary for 
the individual to allow the company to use the new technology 
which she or he has created. That is, there is need for a reward 
to be given for the fruition of a specific piece of new 
technology. This implies that whatever the age or personal
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characteristics of the creator, there needs to be a recognised 
reward to the individual in terms of pay and/or status.
Sub-section 3.2 Resolution of the agency problem and the 
reduction in labour turnover costs
This approach is used to show how wage payments can increase the 
efforts of workers in situations where it is difficult to measure 
individual productivity. The approach also explains how labour 
turnover costs can be reduced and why there is a need for 
mandatory retirement. Strictly speaking it is assumed in this 
approach that wages rise with length of service rather than with 
age; and moreover that wages rise steeply. It is argued that 
young workers are paid a wage that is less than their marginal 
productivity, while older workers are paid a wage greater than 
their marginal productivity (Elliott 1991 pp 368-9). Such a 
practice means that quitting will be reduced since younger 
workers will want to stay on to enjoy higher real wages. It also 
means that workers will make more effort than otherwise, since 
they will wish to reduce the chances of sacking before they are 
able to enjoy higher wages. This wage system will be particularly 
effective if other firms also use the same system, in which case 
a move to another firm will lead to a substantial reduction in 
wages and a postponement of future high earnings. This phenomenon 
of reduced wages with a change in job has been shown to exist in 
Japan in Chapter Three.
The effect of this wage system is to produce a wage curve that 
is rising, and moreover rising steeply, as shown in Figure 5.3 
below. The shallow upward-sloping line shows the marginal 
productivity of a worker with the length of service shown on the 
x-axis. It is upward-sioping because it assumed that the worker
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accumulates more human capital as length of service increases. 
The steep upward-sloping line shows the wages paid. The dotted 
line shows the wage that would be received if such a wage system 
were not in use. It is lower than the marginal productivity, 
because the wage system itself increases overall efficiency of 
the work force by reducing turnover costs and encouraging 
employees to work harder: if the system were not used, the
marginal productivity of all workers would be lower. The extra 
product created by the system could be distributed according to 
length of service, since such a distribution would enhance the 
incentives of the system.
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Figure 5.3 showing how wages can be used to increase worker 
efficiency and decrease labour turnover.
(lZ=
One aspect of this wage system is important. It would be 
profitable for the firm to sack older workers before they enjoy 
the full benefits of their investment made when young (the 
difference between productivity and wage). Therefore, for the 
system to be effective, firms must guarantee employment up to a 
certain length of service. The firm, on the other hand, will be 
harmed if workers continue to work for too long: therefore a
mandatory retirement age is agreed (Lazear 197 9). Workers must 
be guaranteed employment up to retirement and firms must be 
assured that they can discharge workers at that age. Implicit in 
this argument is that length of service and age will be closely 
correlated. Such a correlation will exist, because it is 
implicitly assumed that workers are hired at a young age: once 
they are hired they will not leave the company, because of the
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wage system and because of the guaranteed employment until 
mandatory retirement.
Thus, although this theory is used to show why wages rise steeply 
with length of service, it does in fact show why wages rise 
steeply with age, because of the correlation between the two. Age 
will have a particularly important role in the determination of 
wage level if efficiency gains are distributed by age. The 
retirement severance payment in Japan reinforces the effects of 
this wage system. Although severance pay is payable at any 
age, there is a large addition made for mandatory retirees. Also, 
severance pay rises slowly with the first few years of service, 
then rises rapidly towards mandatory retirement age and flattens 
at that age. This schedule for severance pay means that a large 
reward is paid for staying on until retirement.
Finally two further aspects should be noted: the first is that 
total labour costs will be lower when the internal work force has 
a young age structure; the second is that the benefits accruing 
from a reduction in labour turnover are likely to be largest for 
firms that require the accumulation of firm-specific human 
capital.
Sub-section 3.3 Gift exchange and morale
Wages that rise with length of service mean that with each year 
in the company, a worker will receive a pay rise, whether or not 
there has been an increase in labour productivity in the company 
(leaving aside questions of inflation). There are psychological 
benefits to a raise in pay each year. Disputes are less likely 
over wage settlements, particularly when an individual's raise 
cannot be split into productivity and length of service elements,
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as is often the case in Japan (Chingin Seido Senmon Iinkai 1978 
p 35) . The individual worker has received a raise in pay and 
feels rewarded for effort over the previous year. It is 
reasonable to assume that the larger the rise in pay each year 
the greater the satisfaction of the employee. Employee 
satisfaction results in greater commitment to the company and 
stimulates effort. This explanation differs from the agency 
problem resolution described above, since it is not necessary for 
wages to diverge from marginal product. Certainly commitment 
receives much attention in Japanese literature on labour 
management and is felt to be important. Table 5.3 shows the 
attitudes of management to the nenko wage system. The two most 
popular reasons for regarding nenko wages as important are a) 
people are able to work without worry; and b) they are a reward 
for loyalty and past service. Suffice us to assume that in terms 
of morale, a rising wage curve is more attractive than a flat 
one. This is intuitive, but then so is much in management 
decision-making.
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Table 5.3 showing the reasons for using nenko wages.
Scale of 
firm (no. 
of
employ­
ees )
Abil­
ity
increa
ses
with
senior
ity
Re­
wards
loy­
alty
and
past
ser­
vice
Al­
lows 
peop­
le to 
work 
with­
out 
worry
Labour
unions
demand
nenko
wages
Helps
firm
organ­
isa­
tion
to
work
well
Suits
Jap­
anese
cust­
oms
5000 + 33 .3 48 .1 75.9 20.4 28.9 53 .7
3000-5000 6.3 31.3 62 .5 18.8 43 .8 37.5
1000-3000 11. 4 34.3 74.3 21.4 35.7 44 .3
300-1000 23 .4 41.1 71 15 29 40 .2
-300 23 . 6 50 74.6 10 .7 27 .1 32 .1
All
scales
21.8 43 . 6 73 .3 15 . 6 31.5 39.7
Note: Figures show the choices of firms which had previously-
answered that they viewed nenko wages as important.
The number of firms in the 3000-5000 employee category
is small (16) . The number of firms responding in other 
categories is above 30.
Source: Rbdo Daijin Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu (1987) Nihonteki
Koyo Kanko no Henka to Tenbo, Tokyo: Okurasho
Insatsukyoku, p 12 6.
Sub-section 3.4 Security, competition and promotion
So far the wage systems have been required to ensure that wages 
rise with age to create efficiency gains. Such wage systems may 
appear to lack incentives for engendering competition amongst 
workers. Why should an individual worker make an effort to 
produce better work when it would not be reflected in individual 
pay differentials? Liebenstein (1984) appeals in part to 
anthropological characteristics of the Japanese such as a sense 
of obligation to the peer group, but more visible sources of 
competitive pressure exist. First it was shown in Chapter Three 
that personal wages only account for a certain proportion of 
wages and the remainder of the wages are determined by assessment
of the employee's performance and future performance. So long as
relative pay levels are more important to the employee than 
absolute pay levels, worker assessment will stimulate
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competition. Furthermore promotion may be used as an incentive 
system. Indeed, much of the results of performance assessment may 
not be directly reflected through a raise in pay without change 
in status, but through promotion and consequently through higher 
pay. Ono (1989 p 83) contends that since assessment includes 
future performance, a strong personal element such as age enters 
into the standards used for assessment. In other words assessment 
is not scientific, but subjective and thus leads to the reliance 
on personal factors. The implication is that although wages are 
split into personal and job-evaluation elements, both elements 
are in fact of a personal nature. Although it is true that many 
grade (shikaku) systems specify a particular class for someone 
of a particular age, there are usually grades within that class 
which reflect ability. It is difficult to maintain^ however, that 
managerial promotion (yakushoku seido) is based purely on age. 
Again, the attainment of a certain age may be a prerequisite, but 
only a percentage within the specified age groups become bucho 
or kacho. This is reflected in the widening dispersion of wages 
for higher age groups of workers (see Chapter Three) . Thus 
managerial promotion provides strong incentives for competition.
Internal promotion also creates further labour efficiency since 
it enables the firm to have a good knowledge of the people who 
are chosen for promotion. In other words, internal promotion is 
an efficient means of minimising information costs and the risk 
of hiring a poor manager. Thus, those who are promoted internally 
should receive a higher wage than someone hired from outside the 
firm, because their productivity will be higher (this is similar 
to the case of 'lemons' (Akerlof 1970), where the price of 
secondhand cars is suppressed because buyers have less 
information about the cars than the sellers and therefore they
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discount the price by the probability that the car is of poor 
quality). Since workers have to acquire skills before they are 
promoted, it will be older workers who are promoted and their 
wage will rise accordingly. Thus because of internal promotion, 
wages will rise on average with age and, moreover, will rise more 
steeply than when management and supervisor roles are filled by 
outsiders.
For a hierarchical managerial promotion system to work 
effectively however, two conditions are necessary: the first is 
that managerial posts are on the whole filled by employees of the 
company through internal promotion; the second is that the 
internal work force has a young age structure. The emphasis on 
kogai in promotion as described in Chapter Four certainly ensures 
the first condition. Moreover kogai is felt to create a sense of 
unity between all classes of workers and thus avoid many 
adversarial problems (Imai and Komiya 1989) The first condition 
is only possible if the second condition is also held. With an 
age distribution skewed towards the higher ages, open posts 
become scarce and thus a consistent link between individual 
performance and promotion becomes difficult to maintain without 
creating mock managerial positions. Early retirement is one 
method of maintaining a flow of employees through managerial 
positions (see Chapter Six for early retirement provisions in 
Japan) . Finally, it should be noted that as long as it is 
possible for a high percentage of employees in the higher age 
groups to hold managerial posts, steeply rising average wage 
curves will be maintained, since pay is not only determined by 
age, but by job-evaluation.
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Sub-section 3.5 Conclusion to Section 3
This section represents a survey of explanations for the 
efficiency increases that may be gained from using wages that 
rise steeply with age. It also included an attempt to correlate 
Japanese employment practices with these explanations. Strictly- 
speaking, it is only the first explanation based on technology 
diffusion arguments that establishes a link between age, wages 
and efficiency gains. The other explanations do show . such a 
relationship when labour markets are internal and length of 
servie and age become highly correlated, however. Promotion is 
also important in engendering competition and the promotion must 
be internal, otherwise there will not be an explicit link between 
performance and reward. In several places it was noted that a 
younger internal population age structure would lower the cost 
of maintaining the motivational system or would actually be 
necessary for the system to act effectively.
Finally, it should be noted that most of the practices required 
an internal labour market or created an internal labour market. 
In some cases the company benefited if it had an internal labour 
market more than otherwise. For example, reduced labour turnover 
benefits those firms with firm-specific human capital and f-J- jj 
precisely these firms that will have an internal labour market. 
The conditions necessary for internal labour markets to be formed 
are:
1) The firm needs to be large in terms of number of personnel,
so that it has a choice of allocation of the right person
to the right function. It also needs to be large enough to 
have a hierarchical managerial structure, such that 
promotion can be used as a reward system.
2) The firm needs to be able to guarantee long-term stability.
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Stability of company is usually related to market power in 
its particular industry and other factors such as stability 
in financing. These factors tend to require that the 
company is large.
3) The company needs some means of regulating inputs according 
to market conditions during business cycles, including the 
ability to adjust labour input. There are two main ways in 
which it can maintain flexibility:
a) As well as a core of long-term, internalised 
employees, it may also hire temporary workers or use 
other types of less stable employment, such as part- 
timers, whose numbers can be easily adjusted to 
cycles. Such behaviour results in the splitting of the 
work force into two main groups requiring different 
management structures.
b) The firm may contract out much of the processes of 
production to other smaller companies which will then 
bear the brunt of any cyclical downturn. The firm only 
needs to maintain a highly-skilled workforce to 
perform functions not possible for a small company, 
such as operation of capital equipment not used by 
small companies, product development, marketing and 
co-ordination {Komiya 1989).
In other words the firms generally need to be large and need to 
have some form of flexible labour inputs. Thus the explanations 
of motivational effects above apply to large Japanese firms 
(generally over 1000 employees). A new approach which builds on 
the explanations given in this section, and includes demographic 
aspects, is developed in the next section; and like these 
approaches, it applies to large firms in the main. It should be 
remembered that many smaller firms (less than 10 00 employees)
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also have the same employment practices as large firms, and
therefore it appears that many smaller firms will also have an 
internal labour market.
Section 4 Demographic factors and efficient employment 
practices: a synthesis 
Sub-section 4.1 The efficiency age structure
Much of the thought in this part is based on a paper by Keyfitz 
(1973). The paper by Keyfitz analyses the effect different 
stable populations will have on the speed of promotion when there 
are fixed proportions of people in two grades, one junior, the 
other senior. The following exposition is based on the following 
assumptions:
1) There are internal labour markets within each firm. Only
young people are recruited and enter the company at the 
bottom of the company hierarchy. Wage levels for new 
recruits are determined by labour market conditions of 
supply and demand, and higher managerial posts are given to 
those already working for the company (internal promotion). 
The decision to promote someone is based on two main 
factors: a) the experience, knowledge and authority of the 
person in question and b) the number of people under the 
promotee's control.
2} Younger workers and older workers are not totally
substitutable. This is another way of saying that human 
capital is not a homogeneous putty-like substance, but that 
older people possess skills, knowledge and qualities (eg 
authority) that can only be acquired over time as they age.
172
Thus certain combinations are required for production.
P = f(lQ, ly, k, x) (5.1)
10 - number of older workers 
ly = number of younger workers 
k = capital 
x = all other factors
Such a production function, together with the assumption of 
diminishing marginal returns, leads to the supposition that 
given a fixed number of older workers, an increase in the 
supply of younger workers due to demographic factors will 
reduce the marginal productivity of younger workers and 
thus reduce their wages relative to older workers. 
Conversely, the marginal productivity of an older worker 
will be greater the larger the number of less experienced 
and younger employees working with him. A good example of 
this is the following: an older employee is promoted to a 
supervisory role since over the years he has acquired the 
knowledge and experience to guide less experienced 
(younger) people. His knowledge and experience applied to 
several people has greater productivity than when it is 
applied to one person. Indeed, a set number of people to be 
supervised is often needed before a person is promoted to 
a supervisory role.
3) Pay is not only determined by age butqlsoby function of the 
employee. This ensures that if two people belong to the 
same age group and one person holds a managerial position, 
but the other does not, then the manager will receive a 
higher wage. It is important to note that the higher the 
percentage of a particular age group holding managerial 
posts, the higher the average wage of that age group.
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In the preceding sections, the motivational aspects of the 
Japanese Employment Practices were discussed mainly in terms of 
wage levels and status (promotion). Under the three assumptions 
listed above, it becomes clear that the internal population 
structure of a company is important in deciding promotion and in 
the determination of wage profiles. When the age structure is 
young, promotion of an individual is more likely to progress with 
age than in an ageing population structure and average wage 
curves will also be steeper. Thus the two main motivational 
factors operate smoothly in tandem. Shown below are two 
simplified cases of an age structure within a company with one 
level of promotion. The corresponding hypothetical average wage 
curves are also shown alongside.
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Figure 5.4 showing hypothetical work force age structures and 
corresponding average wage curves
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In example a) the average wage curve is steeper and people in the 
experienced age group are more likely to be promoted than in 
example b). Thus promotion as a reward is easier to operate and 
the average worker experiences a steeply rising wage curve. A 
higher average wage for the older age group clearly does not mean 
that all workers in that age group will receive a high wage, but 
it does mean that the probability of receiving a high wage is 
greater and therefore the incentive effects of a steeply rising 
wage curve are maintained.
Keyfitz derives a more formal framework for determining the 
promotion possibilities with different internal age structures. 
Since only young people are recruited at or near the beginning 
of their career, the age structure of a company workforce can be 
analysed in terms of stable population theory, with the age 
structure being determined by "births" (new recruits) and 
"deaths" (retirement, death, quits etc.). There are two career 
stages as shown in Figure 5.4 and the ratio of those in stage one 
(k) to those in stage two (u) is fixed at k. Everyone passes to 
the upper stage at the age of x and survival probability is a 
function of a (age) given by 1(a) . The population of the company 
is growing at a constant rate r. b represents the proportion of 
births (new recruits) in the population. Thus the proportion of 
births a years ago is given by
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let P be the retirement age and a the age at joining the company 
P
u = bje^3! (a) da (5.3)
v = bje ral (a) da (5.4
therefore
P
je“ral (a) da
k = ^---------  (5.5)
|e“ral (a) da
Keyfitz then lets r, the growth rate vary in order to see the 
effect on x (promotion age) given a fixed promotion rule (k). He 
finds, using different populations, that a faster company 
population growth rate reduces the promotion age noticeably, 
although the smaller the ratio of upper grade to lower grade, the 
smaller the effect of a faster growing population and draws the 
conclusion that "promotion at the top is not as much affected by 
population growth at middle ranks". Keyfitz then analyses the 
effects of different mortality schedules. Let us define the death 
probability function as
1 (a) =1 (a) e“(s“a)v (5.6)
which is saying that the number of people after ageing (a-a) 
years is the number there was at age alpha multiplied by the 
cumulative death rate. The integrand of equation 4 becomes e_(ti+r)a. 
Thus since ]f and r enter the integrand as a sum shows that they
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have the same effects - an increase in the mortality rate 
advances promotion age as does an increase in the natural rate 
of increase.
Thus, for a company with an internal labour market and internal 
promotion, there are two main factors determining careers of the 
personnel: a) population structure determined by births and
deaths and b) the setting of promotion ages which is the same as 
fixing the ratios of those in the upper grade (supervisors) to 
those in the lower grade (supervised). The company can control 
the age structure by controlling the number of births (new 
recruits), but if it wishes to maintain a young age structure, 
it will need to increase the new intake each year. It is only 
possible to support a growing number of recruits if the company 
is growing. The other means of controlling the age structure is 
by controlling mortality and this is the only means if the 
company is not showing any growth. Thus there is a direct link 
between the growth of the company and employment practices, such 
as recruitment behaviour and mandatory retirement. If a company 
wishes to use promotion as a motivational system (rather than 
purely functional) with an ageing employee structure it will need 
to maintain a fixed proportion of managerial posts for a certain 
age group and this will require a falling ratio of managerial 
posts to non-managerial posts and a widening gap between wages 
and productivity unless the wage differential for managers is 
reduced and thus the average wage curve is made less steep. 
Alternatively, the company could maintain the ratios, but this 
will result in a later age of promotion or less chance of 
promotion. The wage of the manager will remain the same, but 
because promotion age is later or fewer people are promoted, the 
average wage curve will still flatten out.
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I would like to clarify the above discussion under the title of 
efficiency age structures. The concept of the efficiency age 
structure is similar to the concept of efficiency wages, a 
concept that became popular amongst economists during the 1980s 
(Yellen and Akerlof 1986). With efficiency wages, the 
productivity of the worker is no longer uncorrelated with the 
wage paid to the worker. With higher wages the worker is less 
likely to shirk, morale will increase and labour turnover costs 
fall. In other words, as the wage level is increased, the 
productivity of workers increases. Thus, although labour costs 
rise with a rise in wages, labour costs per unit of production 
may fall. After wages have risen beyond a certain level, however, 
the increment to productivity is outweighed by the increase in 
labour costs and therefore unit labour costs rise. Consequently, 
there is an optimal wage level that firms wish to maintain. Firms 
will not lower the wages offered even when there is a pool of 
unemployed people wishing to work for lower wages. With 
efficiency age structures, there is an optimal ratio of older to 
younger workers at which the labour input is the most efficient, 
in terms of labour costs. This can be represented by the figure 
below.
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Figure 5.5 showing the hypothetical relationship between age 
structure and work force efficiency
Crucial to the explanation that follows is the assumption that 
a steeply rising average wage curve improves the efficiency of 
a firm's workforce in the ways discussed earlier: a flattening 
of the wage curve reduces the efficiency of the workforce as a 
whole* I will explain the shape of the figure first based on the 
assumption of workers in each age group being paid their marginal 
product* As the old worker to young worker ratio rises from a low 
level, efficiency rises. This rise is caused by an improved 
supervisor to supervisee ratio, which means that more experience 
is combined with the work of younger workers and therefore their 
productivity rises. At the same time the average wage curve 
flattens since the productivity of younger workers rises relative 
to that of older workers. The increase in efficiency accruing 
from the improved supervisor to supervisee ratio outweighs the 
effects of a flattening wage curve, however. After maximum
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efficiency is reached, the rising older worker to younger worker 
ratio leads to a further flattening of the wage curve. Since 
there are only small marginal gains to applying more experience 
to younger workers, the disincentive effects of a flattening wage 
curve outweigh the effect from the rise in average skill and the 
efficiency of labour falls. In other words, as the proportion of 
older workers increases, wage differentials contract, and 
although each worker is paid his marginal product, overall 
productivity falls.
It is possible that the firm will try to mitigate the effect of 
changing wage curves by maintaining a certain wage differential 
between young and old workers, whatever the internal age 
structure. In other words, the firm could allow for a divergence 
of wages from marginal productivity as the age structure aged. 
This would imply, however, that as the age structure passed the 
optimum ratio shown in Figure 5.5 above, older workers are paid 
more than their productivity and so the labour costs per unit of 
production would rise.
In both the case where the wage level reflects productivity and 
the case where wage levels are allowed to diverge from 
productivity, once the optimum ratio is surpassed, unit labour 
costs rise. Strictly speaking, such an efficiency age structure 
means that firms will try to maintain an optimal age structure 
within the firm, whatever the age structure of the macro labour 
market. The next few pages examine the effects of growth and 
stagnation on a single firm, ignoring external constraints on 
hiring and firing.
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Sub-section 4.2 The implications of the efficiency age structure
a) Growth and stagnation, hiring and firing
With rapid growth, the firm will be increasing its intake each 
year. If the growing yearly intake led to a fall below the 
optimal older worker to younger worker ratio, the firm would 
either attempt to hire more older workers or would attempt to 
reduce the 'mortality' of older workers by relaxing retirement 
rules or by increasing re-employment after retirement. It might 
alternatively age its employees more rapidly by increasing the 
intensity of training, but this measure would lead to a diversion 
of resources away from production.
If the firm was stagnating, it would be reducing its intake and 
thus the internal age structure would be ageing, leading to a 
reduction in labour efficiency. The firm would then attempt to 
increase the mortality of its older workers through taking such 
measures as early retirement provisions or straight-forward 
sacking.
The above discussion suggests that firms will attempt to maintain 
a given age structure within the firm, whatever its growth rate 
and the growth rate of other firms. It is possible that the 
optimal age structure could change over time with the 
introduction of new technology, the nature of the business or the 
creation of other incentive systems. These aspects will be 
discussed in more depth later in the chapter. The next sub­
section analyses the implications of efficiency wage structures 
for the macro labour market.
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b) Efficiency age structures, population ageing and the macro 
labour market
The following discussion is based on the rather limiting 
assumption that all firms are identical. The implications of 
relaxing such an assumption will be discussed later. Let us first 
take the case where aggregate demand is growing at a constant 
rate, but the general population is ageing, leading to a slowing 
growth rate of the intake age group. In such a case firms would 
attempt to reduce their older work force rather than bid up the 
wages of the intake group, since flattening the wage curve would 
decrease labour efficiency. As a consequence, output growth would 
slow and the price level in the economy would rise. Older workers 
would find themselves retired or unemployed. Even if the 
reservation wage of the unemployed older workers were low, firms 
would not hire the older workers at much lower wages since the 
incentive effects of the steeply rising average wage curve would 
be lost. Thus, an ageing labour force will lead to the increase 
in unemployment or the withdrawal from the labour force of older 
workers. A decrease in the growth rate of aggregate demand with 
a constant age structure and constant population growth would 
have a similar effect, except that younger workers would also 
find themselves unable to find a job.
c) Caveats to the effects of efficiency age structure on the 
macro labour market
The first important caveat is that firms need not be, and are 
highly unlikely to be identical. For example, many small firms 
will not have the capital-intensity or complex organisational 
structure that lead to the existence of firm-specific human 
capital that takes years to accumulate. As a consequence, a high 
labour turnover does not increase costs significantly, and
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therefore, it is not necessary to maintain an efficiency age 
structure. In an economy where there are many small firms, 
workers will find themselves displaced to smaller firms as the 
larger firms attempt to adjust to fluctuations in demand and 
labour force age structure. An increasing supply of older workers 
to the smaller firms will reduce the wages of older workers, 
leading to a flattening of the economy-wide average wage curves, 
in spite of the attempt of large companies to maintain a given 
age structure and hence a given wage curve. To put this in more 
general terms, a dual labour market will exist, because of the 
difference in production techniques between firms and workers 
will move from the core to the periphery when the population age 
structure changes.
A second caveat is that firms with an internal age structure may 
find alternative forms of incentive that are not reliant on 
changing pay structures. It is possible that satisfaction derives 
from a rise in status without a rise in pay. Therefore, the 
creation of a new status system that is not linked to pay will 
alleviate the need to maintain a given wage curve and hence the 
need to maintain a given age structure. Alternatively forms of 
work for older people could be found that reduce the fall in 
their efficiency, even though the older worker to younger worker 
ratio has increased.
A third caveat is that a change in the nature of business may 
change the optimal age structure at the same time as the 
population age structure is changing. As was noted earlier, a 
move to creating technology rather than adopting technology will 
alter the incentives required from employment practices. If the 
ability to create new technology becomes more important thaft the
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firm's ability to introduce new technology, the benefits of a 
rising wage curve are reduced, since rewards must be paid to 
whoever is able to create, regardless of their length of service 
or company-wide experience (this claim is based on the assumption 
that creativity is not related to age).
Section 5 Conclusion to this chapter
This chapter provided a survey of existing theories that are used 
to explain Japanese employment practices in general and steeply 
rising average wage curves in particular. The two main sets of 
theories were human capital and living expenses wages theories. 
It was argued that these theories tended to ignore the 
motivational element of employment practices, as well as other 
efficiency considerations. Section 3 outlined these motivational 
and efficiency aspects. The first three sections indicated that 
demographic factors are important and Section Four represents a 
new theoretical approach that includes aspects of internal age 
structure. This new approach suggests that large firms will 
attempt to maintain an efficient (and invariant) age structure 
and that, as a consequence, average wage curves will tend to 
remain invariant to age structural changes in the macro labour 
force. These two phenomena imply that a stagnating large firm 
will reduce its (young) intake and will also rid itself of some 
older workers. They also imply that when all large firms are 
expanding they will face constraints if the young population is 
not also expanding at a similar rate. Thus, with population 
ageing, large firms will be more likely to raise prices than 
output when demand increases. It also became clear that the dual 
nature of the labour market in Japan was important: workers cast 
off from the large firms would find employment in smaller firms 
whose nature did not lead to strict complementarity between
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different age groups. This transfer to smaller companies implies 
that aggregate wage curves for all workers in the economy would 
change with economic cycles. For example, older workers would 
find themselves cast off by large firms during a slow-down, 
increasing the supply of older workers to the small firms and so 
depressing the wage level of older workers. The rather rigid 
implications of the new approach were softened to some extent by 
a few caveats, the principal one being that a move to technology 
creation, rather than technology absorption might change the 
efficient wage structure.
The trends in wage curves and the labour market analysed in 
Chapters Three and Four tend to support to some extent the 
predictions uncovered by the new approach: the steepness of
average wage curves of employees in large firms did not show any 
consistent trend, whereas it increased in the smaller firms 
during the slow-down that started in the late 197 0s; it was older 
workers who were laid off during the economic downturns in the 
1970s and early 1980s; and the age structure of employees in 
small firms has aged more than that in large firms. The age 
structure of employees in large firms was not invariant as the 
theory predicted, however.
To gain more insight of the applicability of this approach, it 
is necessary to study the effects of an ageing labour force on 
companies at a micro level: the next chapter comprises such a
study. Given that jobs in smaller firms tend to be more unstable 
(see Chapter Three) than in large firms, it can be expected that 
unemployment of older men will rise in periods during and after 
large firms are ridding themselves of these workers. Indeed, even 
though many large firms re-hire older men once they have retired,
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these older men are no longer part of the core work force, since 
they only hold short-term contracts. The rise in unemployment 
will be more severe if smaller firms also have limits to their 
capacity to absorb low-wage older workers. Unemployment will not 
necessarily rise, however, if income supports (pensions) are 
available for older men so that they can leave the labour force 
upon becoming jobless. The past trends in the unemployment and 
labour force participation of older workers, and an assessment 
of important factors behind future trends c\rt. given in Chapter 
Seven.
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CHAPTER 6 AGEING INTERNAL WORKFORCE AGE STRUCTURES AND CHANGES IN 
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
Section 1 The significance of this chapter
In the previous chapter I examined the theories relating to Japanese 
employment practices. The main aspect? of employment practices 
covered were the average wage curves of employees and promotion 
practices. I then developed a demographic model of the firm's age 
structure which linked the shape of the average wage curves with 
promotion prospects. With this demographic model I concluded that 
wages could be explained using the concept of the wage being equal 
to the marginal product of the worker. Workers of a young age and 
workers of an older age were complementary inputs so that the age 
structure within the company affected the productivity of each age 
group and, thus, the average wage curves. The steepness of the 
average wage curves in turn affected the efficiency of the work 
force as a whole. As a consequence, large firms would attempt to 
maintain an efficiency age structure. It was shown in Chapter Three 
that large companies with internal labour markets appear able to 
control the age structure of the internal work force. Nonetheless, 
there has been a degree of ageing of the work force in larger 
companies. With an ageing work force, the relative productivities 
of younger and older workers will change, leading to a flattening 
of the wage curve. In this chapter I aim to examine in detail how 
firms have been adjusting their employment practices with the ageing 
of their work forces. This examination will show whether the 
efficiency age structure hypothesis is useful for understanding how 
firms will adjust to an ageing labour force structure and cyclical 
downturns in the economy.
It should be noted that recently the ability of companies to
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attenuate their internal age structure has been curtailed to some 
extent by Government policy. Recent Government policy has been 
geared to ensuring the employment of older workers and will be 
discussed in Chapter Eight. One result of such a policy is that 
control of the age structure has become much more complex than the 
simple measure of laying off older workers.
From the discussion above it is clear that the examination of 
changes in employment practices falls into two main categories. The 
first category consists of changes in wage determination and 
promotional systems that would produce a flattening of the wage 
curve. The second category consists of practices used to attenuate 
the age structure. These two categories provide the subject for the 
next two sections. The final section will examine the response of 
Japanese firms to the downturns in economic growth caused by the oil 
shocks in the 1970s.
It is necessary to mention an important caveat to the contents of 
this chapter. In recent years, Japanese firms have been altering 
their employment practices for a variety of reasons (see for example 
Rodosho 1988) . Many of the changes have been introduced to deal with 
more than one problem. Most of the changes described here are of 
this nature. For example, the introduction and strengthening of 
ability pay systems have been carried out in order to deal with 
slower economic growth and a higher level of technology as well as 
to deal with an ageing employee age structure. The fact that these 
changes have been discussed in the specific context of ageing, 
however, c/oCS- indicate that one of the major motivations for the 
changes has been preparation for an ageing labour force.
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Section 2 The flattening of average wage curves
There are two categories of changes in the wage systems with which 
it is possible to bring about a flattening of the wage curve. The 
first is the introduction or strengthening of a wage system which 
is not based on length of service. In other words the nenko element 
in wages can be reduced. The primary system which has been 
introduced to this end is ability pay (noryokukyu) . Although the 
introduction of ability pay does not necessarily lead to lower wages 
for older workers, it should become clear through a description of 
its implementation that lower wages are likely to be the result on 
average. The second category of changes is the explicit lowering or 
stabilisation of wages after the worker has reached a certain age 
through various measures. I shall describe these changes in detail 
in the following sub-section. The sub-section describes how firms 
are changing the methods used for calculating severance and 
retirement payments.
Sub-section 2.1 Ability pay
The concept of ability pay was introduced into Japan from America 
in the late 1960s (Yamada 1989) and provided the basis for a more 
rational and scientific approach to personnel management. During the 
197 0s the adoption of ability pay systems increased with the need 
to increase efficiency during and after the oil shocks by providing 
a clearly defined incentive system for workers. It was also during 
the 197 0s that companies started to become aware of the problem of 
ageing employee structures, particularly since they had reduced the 
intake of new young workers during the economic stagnation. Ability 
pay systems were viewed as a means to deal with the burgeoning 
labour costs that would result from ageing under the nenko wage 
system (Umino 19 89; Takahashi 19 89). There are few explicit 
statements of the reasons for the adoption of ability pay systems
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and the reasons given are often vague, but they seem to be generally 
to increase the ability and efficiency of workers and to deal with 
more aged workers. Certainly there is a strong perception that older 
workers have been paid wage levels above their contribution to 
productivity (Nihon Seisan Honbu 1981; Rod5 Daijin Kanbo Seisaku 
Chosabu 1988 p 8). Ability pay systems apparently present a means 
of equating the productivity of older workers with their wage levels 
by explicitly stating their contribution to output. I am not able 
to produce data which explicitly show that ability pay is being 
used for these reasons, but a study of the appendix to this chapter 
shows they are one set of perceived reasons. Certainly in academic 
and government literature it is stated that ability pay was 
introduced and strengthened for this reason (see Takahashi 19 89 p 
24; Umino 19 89 p 162; Rodo Daijin Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu 19 86 p 163; 
Nihon Koyo Shogu Kenkyu Senta 1985 pp 21, 23).
Ability pay can be implemented in various forms. For example, 
ability pay can be determined in an informal way through subjective 
appraisal of each worker by superiors. Alternatively, an explicit 
grade system can be created: as the worker progresses up the grade 
ladder with promotion, wage levels rise accordingly. Objectives and 
prerequisites are established which are necessary for the attainment 
of each grade. Thus, the level of ability pay is determined using 
a clearly defined framework. It is this grading system which is used 
most frequently in large companies in Japan for the determination 
of ability pay and it is known as the shokuno shikaku seido or 
ability grading system. The ability grading system has been created 
in Japan not only for the purpose of wage determination, but also 
as a means of devising a promotional system which can be used 
alongside or as a substitute for managerial promotion systems 
(Hanaoka 1983). I will discuss this aspect in Sub-section 2.4.
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The grades are established through the following process. First, job 
areas are defined. A range of ability grades are then assigned to 
each job area (Yamada 19 89). If, for example there are ten grades 
overall, the full range of grades will not necessarily be assigned 
to each job area. Some jobs might have a range of 2 to 6 and others 
a range from 6 to 10, depending on the complexity and responsibility 
required for the job. In many cases, increments are also established 
within each grade. The ability grade system in its pure form implies 
that pay is purely determined by the type of job in which the worker 
is engaged and the ability of that worker in performing the job, 
regardless of age or length of service of the worker. The grade 
position of a worker in Japan is, however, determined to some extent 
by age and length of service. Within each grade, the worker moves 
up one increment with each additional year to length of service. 
Moreover grades often have age limits (Ujihara 1985; Funabashi 19 83 
p 18) . When the worker has proceeded through the full number of 
increments in each grade, it is then possible for him to proceed to 
the next grade. It is quite feasible, however, for the worker to 
stay at the top of a certain grade and remain there if it is felt 
that he has reached the peak of his abilities (Yamada 1989 p 131). 
Thus, for people in the higher grades it is quite possible for the 
company to stop wage increases with an increase in age or length of 
service. Only those workers with particular ability will be able to 
proceed to the very top grades. Through the use of such a grade 
system, it becomes possible to equate the perceived contribution of 
older workers with the wage received. The complexity of the system 
also gives management the chance to redefine grades and job spheres 
in a situation of technological change (Hanaoka 1989 p 105; Yamada 
1989) .
As was noted in Chapter Three, functional wages generally account
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for only a proportion of basic pay, with the other element being 
personal pay based on age and schooling etc. The proportion of these 
elements does not remain static across all age groups. In younger 
age groups, the proportion of personal pay is high, whereas it 
becomes lower in the older age groups, with ability pay becoming 
more important. This type of structure is often supported with two 
main arguments. The first is that differences in ability only emerge 
from the mid-30s onwards. The second is based on the concept of 
living expenses wages. In the younger age groups it is necessary to 
take account of living costs which are rising with age, but after 
a certain age, wage levels are so high that it is not necessary to 
take into account living costs.
With the advent of population ageing and the raising of mandatory 
retirement age (teinen encho) , there has also been a move to 
increase the average proportion of ability pay in wage determination 
in order to move further away from the nenko type of wage 
determination. Yamada {1989 p 162) quotes the example of four major 
steel companies strengthening the ability pay system in 1988. 
Previously the average proportion {over all age groups) of personal 
wage to functional wage (ability pay and job-evaluation pay) had 
been 50:50. It was changed to 40:60 and the personal wage level was 
frozen after the age of 50. These changes were implemented to " 
lessen the natural increase in labour costs which would result from 
the ageing of the employee age structure over the medium and long 
term". Further examples are given in the appendix to this chapter. 
The freezing of wages is also discussed in sub-section 2.2.
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Sub-section 2.2 The attenuation of average wage curves to maintain 
falling wages after peak wage age
This sub-section relates primarily to the partial revision of the 
wage system under the process of teinen encho. Teinen encho is the 
process of raising the mandatory retirement age as described in 
Chapter Three and implies that all workers will continue to work 
until a later age under the same wage system and personnel 
management system, but such is not the case. Many large companies 
have established employment extension systems (saikoyo and kinmu 
encho - see Chapter Three) which came into effect after the old 
retirement age of 55. Under these systems, wages and conditions were 
usually changed so that wages fell, as did status. The result can 
be seen in the wage profiles which slope downwards after the mid- 
50s. The workers also worked under short-term contracts renewable 
yearly. Certainly, under teinen encho, the insecurity of a short­
term contract has been removed, but changes in other conditions have 
remained, despite the older person remaining a regular worker. In 
other words, many companies are attempting to maintain the previous 
practices relating to older workers which were the result of saikoyo 
and kinmu encho systems. In this sub-section I am primarily 
concerned with the effect on wage levels, although changes in status 
and grade must also be considered, since these indirectly affect 
wage levels.
Usually a target reduction in total wages or a freezing of wages is 
set to come into effect after the previous retirement age has been 
reached by the worker. If the previous retirement age was 55 and the 
new retirement age is 60, then these measures are adopted between 
the ages of 55 and 60. The principle means of reducing wages are the 
following:
a) A straight forward reduction in wages to a specified
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percentage of previous wages, regardless of job, grade 
or position held.
b) Downgrading within the ability grade system, removal to 
a new and lower paid job or removal from managerial 
post. With a portion of wages determined by job- 
evaluation and ability pay, these measures will result 
in an automatic fall in pay.
c) A freezing of the personal element of pay so that there 
is no increase in wages resulting from the natural 
increase in length of service.
d) A reduction in the base-up rate. Wages for those over 55 
will thus fall relative to those below 55, since workers 
over 55 will not be compensated for inflation or 
increases in productivity to the same extent as those 
under the age of 55.
From the case studies given in the appendix, it would appear that 
generally a percentage reduction is set and then methods b, c and 
d are used to achieve that reduction. For example, the reduction in 
pay is not a result of revised ability ratings, rather the change 
in ability rating is a result of the need to lower wages. Whatever 
wage system or combination of wage systems is used for all the 
workers, wages are set arbitrarily after previous retirement age. 
The system provides a useful framework in which to achieve those 
reductions.
Table 6.1 shows the results of a 1977 survey of large electronics 
companies which were published in table form in Nihon Seisansei 
Honbu (197 8) . The survey inquired into the changes in personnel 
management after the raising of the mandatory retirement age to 60. 
All of the firms have initiated a reduction in wages for workers 
past the previous retirement age. Many of the electronics companies
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do not distinguish between base-up and teisho, so in Mcintj cases the 
two columns are combined. It is clear, however, that yearly rises 
in pay are much lower than for those age groups younger than the 
previous retirement age. There is some heterogeneity regarding the 
treatment of managerial posts and grades. This is partly a result 
of the use of different management systems and the financial state 
of the company (Nihon Seisansei Honbu 197 8 p 2 07) .
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Table 6.1 A summary of results of a survey into the personnel 
management of workers after previous retirement age, following the 
raising of the retirement age to 60 in 9 large electronics 
companies.
Name of 
firm
lose
mana­
gerial
post
lose
grade
wage
target
base
up
teisho age
when
these
come
into
effect
Hitachi yes no
grade
85% of 
5 6 yr
85% of 55 yr 
raise. Wage gtd 
not to fall 
below that of 
40 yr
56
Toshiba yes no
grade
freeze 
at 5 6 
yr
Raise of 50% of 
average 40 year 
work-related 
pay. Level gtd 
40 year +
56
f
Fuj iden yes normal freeze 
at 5 6 
yr
60% of 
normal 
base 
up
no 56
Nippon
Denki
no normal 56-58 normal 
pay rise, 58-59 
90% of 58 yr 
rise
56
Fuj itsu no freeze 
at 5 6 
yr
no no 56
Oki Denki yes 56-58 
freeze 
at 56 
yr
level, 
59 + 
=90%
Up to 57 pay 
50% of average 
salary rise
56
Matsushita no normal Up to 58 normal 
pay rise. 58+ 
rise in pay at 
least 25 yr 
rise in pay gtd
58
Sanyo no Same as 
Matsushita
58
Nippon
Gakki
no 10%
less
than
57 yr
after
57
57
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Table 8.1 (cont.)
Source: Nihon Seisansei Honbu (1978).
Notes: yr denotes those of 00 years of age. Normal denotes the
same treatment as for employees below the age of 55.
Tables 6.2 through to 6 . 4 show the results from the Koyo Kauri Chosa 
(Rodo Daijin 197 8, 1985} regarding the changes in personnel
management carried out by companies consequent to raising the age 
of retirement These results allow some comparison of trends over 
time and over scale of company. There is some discontinuity in the 
question asked with respect to managerial post, grade and position 
in the company. The 1978 survey askedwhc+her the managerial post or 
status changed after the previous retirement age and did not ask 
about grade. The 1985 survey made a distinction between grade and 
managerial post. The 1978 results can probably be thought of as 
combining the two questions of the 1985 survey.
For both years it is difficult to find a trend in the treatment of 
position across company scale, except that in 19 85, large companies 
were less likely to change the grade of the worker after reaching 
the old retirement age. In 1985, however, more companies were likely 
to change position of the worker than in 1978, although roughly a 
half maintained the previous position.
A trend in the treatment of wages is not distinguishable over 
company scales. In 1985, fewer companies maintained the same wage 
level and more reduced wages. Fewer companies in 198 5 allowed wages 
to rise after reaching the old retirement age. Moreover, the modal 
percentage decrease in wages for those companies which reduced wages 
rose from 10% to 20% from 1978 to 1985.
A trend in use of teisho and base-up is also not clear across 
company scales. Compared with 1978, the proportion of companies in 
1985 that reduced the teisho amount increased. It is striking that
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the proportion of companies not carrying out teisho after the old 
retirement age is large, compared with the proportion of companies 
which generally use teisho (see Chapter Three; approximately 8 6% of 
all companies in 1982 undertook teisho). The proportion of companies 
which institute base-up for this age group has increased over time, 
although a higher proportion also reduce the base-up rate.
In summary, about half the companies change managerial post and 
roughly one third change the job or ability grade. About one third 
of companies stop teisho and out of the two-thirds which maintain 
teisho, roughly half reduce the amount. Between 80 and 90% of firms 
maintained base-up in 1985 with about a half of those reducing the 
base-up rate. In 1985 approximately half of firms maintained the 
same level of wages in contrast to firms in 1978, when 80% 
maintained the same level. Moreover, out of firms which reduced wage 
levels, more firms in 1985 reduced the amount by 2 0% than in 197 8. 
Generally, firms which raised the mandatory retirement age in 19 85, 
were more likely to change the employment conditions of those 
workers who had passed the old retirement age. This trend might be 
explained by the fact that those firms which found it more difficult 
to raise the retirement age, did so later and thus the later firms 
also tended to offer inferior conditions to those firms which 
carried out teinen encho earlier. The slower and more stable growth 
of the economy in the 19 80s may also have had an impact on the 
conditions under which older workers could be employed.
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Sub-section 2.3 Changes in severance pay systems
Severance pay has traditionally been calculated using multiples of 
severance base pay, as described in Chapter Three. Severance base 
pay is often composed of some, but not necessarily all, of the 
elements of basic pay. Alternatively, severance base pay is a set 
percentage of total basic pay. The multiples are usually based on 
length of service to the company. With a high percentage of base pay 
determined by personal factors and in particular, length of service, 
an increasing average length of service brought about by extending 
the employment period of an employee by five years would mean a 
large natural increase in labour costs devoted to severance pay. A 
simple formulation of the severance pay calculation is shown below.
SP = SBP(BP(LS) ) . M(LS)
where: SP - severance pay, SBP - severance base pay, BP = basic pay, 
LS = length of service and M = severance pay multiple; brackets 
denote 'function of'.
The increase in payments would be exacerbated by the increasing 
numbers of retirees from the company brought about by ageing of the 
employee age structure. Companies have devised various methods of 
suppressing the increase in payment amounts. The most common are the 
following:
a) Reducing the amount of severance base pay relative to 
the amount of basic pay by reducing the calculation 
percentage rate or by reducing the amount of base-up and 
teisho of basic pay which feeds into severance base pay.
b) Only using elements of basic pay which are not based on 
length of service, such as ability pay, for the 
calculation of severance base pay. This may be in the 
form of a points system.
c) Freezing severance pay at the previous retirement age. 
In other words setting the marginal increase in M to
203
zero after a certain age point, regardless of the length 
of service of the individual.
In the past many companies have met severance payments from current 
expenditure. With the increasing number of retirees, many companies 
have also set up company pensions to smooth out the payment costs 
through actuarial funding (see Chapter Nine). This section 
concentrates on lump sum severance payments, however. When a company 
pension scheme is established, the pension provided is based on the 
level of severance pay the retiree would have received as a lump 
sum. Retirees are able to choose whether they take their severance 
pay in the form of a lump sum or in the form of a pension: most take 
it in the form of a lump sum (see Chapter Nine) . The changes to 
severance pay systems can be divided into two categories. The first 
category consists of changes to the whole system which affect 
workers of all age groups. The second category covers changes in the 
system which only apply. to older workers and which come into force 
after a set age, usually around 55. Table 6.5 shows the amount of 
basic pay which is used in the calculation of severance base pay and 
the trend in the various options over time.
Table 6.5 showing the extent that basic pay is used in the 
calculation of severance base pay over time.
Year All of basic 
pay is used 
(%)
Part of basic pay 
is excluded from 
severance base 
pay (%)
A points system 
or a fixed 
amount system is 
used (%)
1980 41.4 47 .9 10 .7
1982 28.9 55 .3 15 . 8
1984 32.6 49 .5 17 .9
1986 31.9 50 . 0 18 .1
Source: Romu Gyosei Kenkyujo (19 87) p 20.
Note: Data is for all sizes of company.
The proportion of firms using the whole of basic pay has decreased 
during the 1980s. The clearest trend however, is the increase in the 
use of a points system and other systems which remove the direct
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link between basic pay and severance base pay. Chuo Rodo linkai 
Jimukyoku surveys (1978, 1988) also show an increase in these
systems, with 7.3% of companies using them in 1977, increasing 
monotonically to 22.8% by 1987. Severance pay systems which are 
independent of basic pay are varied, but the majority of the systems 
use a combination of points for length of service and points for 
ability or job grade to which the worker belongs (Romu Gyosei 
Kenkyujo 1987 pp 22, 23). Table 6.6 shows the use of each type of 
severance base pay across different scales of firms for 1986.
Table 6.6 showing the use of various types of severance base pay 
across scale of company (1986).
Scale (no. 
of
employees)
All of basic 
pay is used 
(%)
Part of basic 
pay is
excluded from 
severance base 
pay (%)
A points 
system or a 
fixed amount 
system is 
used (%)
3000 + 19 .5 60 .9 19 .5
1000-2999 28.3 50.4 21.2
<1000 45 .2 40 .4 13 .5
Source: Romu Gyosei Kenkyujo (1987) p 20.
Note: Data is for all sizes of company, the numbers of each
size for 198 6 are as follows: 3 0 00 employees and above 
87, 1000-2999 employees 113 and less than 1000 employees 
104.
The larger the company, the more likely it is to exclude a portion 
of base pay from severance base pay and also the more likely it is 
to use an independent system for calculation of base pay. The Romu 
Gyosei Kenkyujo (1987 p 21) survey inquired in detail which method
was used for deciding the proportion of basic pay to be used. The
three most popular methods were a) basic pay less specific elements 
of basic pay (28.5%), b) basic pay multiplied by a set rate (23.2%) 
and c) basic pay plus only a fixed proportion or amount of wage 
increases (12.6%; 12.6%). The average amount of basic pay used was 
67.2%. Finally, Table 6.7 shows the use of each type of severance
base pay according to the average age of employees.
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Table 6.7 showing the use of various types of severance base pay 
according to the average age of employees in the company (1986).
Average 
age of 
employ- 
©© s
All of basic 
pay is used 
(%)
Part of basic pay 
is excluded from 
severance base 
pay (%)
A points system 
or a fixed 
amount system is 
used (%)
<30 38.9 33.3 27.8
30-34.9 30.6 46.3 23 .1
35-39.5 25.9 58.5 15 . 6
40 + 42 .1 44.7 13 .2
Source: Romu Gyosei Kenkyujo (1987) p 20.
Note: Data is for all sizes of company, the number of each
size for 1986 are as follows: 3 000 employees and above 
87, 1000-2999 employees 113 and less than 1000 employees 
104.
Until the average age of 40 plus is reached, the proportion of 
companies which use all of basic pay decreases and the proportion 
using only a part of basic pay increases. The proportion using 
points systems decreases with average age of the employees. These 
results perhaps demonstrate that firms will generally try to 
suppress the level of severance base pay, the older the average age 
of employees, but in companies with a very high average age, it is 
not possible to change the system, since the majority of the workers 
have worked under the old system for most of their working lives. 
In other words, it is too late to change. The increase in the use 
of other systems the younger the average age may in part be 
explained by the fact that larger companies generally have a younger 
age structure (see Chapter Three) and larger companies also use 
these other systems to a greater extent,
Severance base pay is only one element in calculating severance pay. 
The other main element is the multiplier. The Romu Gyosei Kenkyujo 
(19 87 p 28) shows that there is an inverse relationship between the 
amount of basic pay which feeds into severance base pay and the 
multiplier (see Figure 6.1). Thus, it is difficult to show that
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reducing the severance base pay through the methods described above 
will necessarily lead to a reduction in severance pay itself. It 
should be noted, however, that over time the level of severance pay 
relative to basic pay has been decreasing (see Chapter Three).
Figure 6.1 showing the relationship between the multiplier and ratio 
of severance base pay to w a g e s . ______________________________
The Relationship between Multiplier and the Ratio of SBP to ¥ages
120
100
0)
90
a
70
60
30 500 10 40 60 70 B0 90
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Source: Romu Gyosei Kenkyujo (19 87) p 28.
Notes: The wages used for the calculation of the severance base
pay ratio are regular wages (shoteinai chingin). The 
severance base pay ratio gives a rough estimate of the 
extent to which basic pay feeds into severance base pay. 
Only three companies out of 137 had a ratio of 100%, 
indicating that regular pay is based on a broader 
definition than is basic pay.
I
The other category of changes to severance pay calculation l.J’ 
changes that only relate to people above the old retirement age that 
was in force before the mandatory retirement age was raised. Table 
6.8 shows the results of two Chu5 Romu Iinkai Jimukyoku surveys 
(1984, 1986) for 1983 and 1985.
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Table 6 . 8 showing the policies adopted with respect to severance pay 
following teinen encho.
Severance pay policy 1983 1985
Revised severance pay system 79.35% (=100) 75% (=100)
Freeze severance pay amount 31.7 44 .4
Freeze multiplier 15.4 11.1
Reduce multiplier 12 .2 22 .2
Other (freeze SBP etc) 37.4 37 . 8
Freeze SBP (15.5)
Other (22 .2)
Source: Chuo Rodo linkai Jimukyoku (1984, 1986): data for 19 83
came from p 14 (1984) and pp 15 and 16 (1986).
Notes: SBP = severance base pay.
The category "other" included freezing of SBP in the 
19 84 survey, whereas freezing of SBP was separated for 
the 19 86 survey. Therefore, the data on "other" for the 
19 85 results covers the same category as for the 19 84
survey, but it is also broken down into the separate
components used in the 1986 survey (figures in 
brackets). All companies questioned in the survey have 
over 1000 employees.
The most popular measure is a straightforward freezing of severance
pay once the employee has reached the old retirement age, followed
by reducing the multiplier and other.
Sub-section 2.4 Changes to deal with stagnation of managerial 
promotion systems
As was mentioned above, companies view the problems of an ageing
workforce in two lights. One is the increase in labour costs and the
measures to reduce these costs have been described above. The other 
is the problem of a dearth of management posts, which hinders the 
use of managerial promotion as a reward and also may lead to a 
divergence between wages and the productivity of older workers. This 
problem will be referred to as the managerial stagnation problem 
henceforward. Expelling older workers from the company in some way 
is one means to solving this management problem, but this route is 
described in Section Three. This section deals with practices which
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have been introduced to facilitate a smooth turnover of managerial 
posts without expelling the worker in question from the company. It 
should be noted here that these practices imply a lower proportion 
of workers of each age belonging to managerial posts and therefore 
average productivity of older workers will decline, leading to a 
relative decline in average wages if the company wishes to maintain 
a balance between wages and productivity. In other words, changes 
in promotion practices and wage systems have been separated in this 
chapter for ease of exposition, but in fact they are inextricably 
linked.
a) Grade systems
The main characteristics of grade systems were described in Sub­
section 2.1 above. In the past, when these systems were introduced, 
there were strong links between grade and managerial post (Ujihara 
19 85 p 3 58) . Belonging to a high grade would also mean holding a 
managerial post. Companies have often reformed the system to 
separate these two systems (yakushoku to shika.ku no hunri) , so that 
an individual can still achieve grade promotion, but not managerial 
promotion. Effectively such a policy would lead to a split in the 
treatment of older workers. In order to make such a policy more 
palatable, the grade system was conceived as a specialist grade 
system (senmonshoku seido) which was to be run as a parallel 
promotion system for workers specialising in research and technology 
development (for example Rodo Daijin Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu 19 87 p 
9) . Thus, the system was not only introduced to deal with managerial 
promotion stagnation, but also to develop specialised staff. In many 
cases the primary aim was to deal with promotion problems, leading 
to dissatisfaction (Rodo Daijin Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu 1987 p 9; 
Yamada 1983 p 205). Despite these problems, many large firms still 
plan to use such a system (see Section 4, Table 6.22).
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b) Manager retirement practices
A straightforward means of maintaining a managerial turnover is to 
remove the incumbent from a managerial position at a set age or 
establish a set period for holding a managerial post. These two 
practices are known as kanrishoku teinensei and kanrishoku ninkisei 
respectively. Tables 6.9 through to 6.11 below show the extent of 
such practices in large companies (over 1000 employees) in 1987 and 
position and wages of the ex-manager after retirement from the post. 
The average age for retirement is also shown.
Table 6.9 showing the extent of managerial post retirement and 
average age of retirement.
Percentage
of
companies
with
manage-ment 
retire-ment 
practice
By
regu­
lation
By
custom
According
to
individual
Average 
age for 
bucho
Average 
age for 
kacho
52% (=100%) 71% 29% 4.6% 55.9 55 . 5
Source: Chuo Rodo Iinkai Jimukyoku (1988) p 75, Table 20.
Notes: By regulation means that the practice is stipulated
whereas by custom means that it is not stipulated, but 
occurs as a matter of accustomed practices. Figures are 
only for companies with a set retirement age of 60.
Table 6.10 showing treatment of manager after retirement from post.
Stay on until 
retirement age as a 
general worker
Shukko Retirement
77 .1% 9.2% 13 .7
Source: Chuo Rodo Iinkai Jimukyoku (1988) p 75, Table 20.
Notes: Shukko is the practice of transfer to another company
whilst still recognised as a member of the original 
company.
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Table 6.11 showing the changes in wages after retirement from 
managerial post. ____ ___  ______
Same level as 
when held 
managerial 
post
Reduced by 
managerial 
post
allowance
Reduced in 
other ways 
apart from 
deducting 
managerial post 
allowance
Reduce wages 
by changing 
wage system
15 .3% 28.2% 11.4% 22.1%
Source: Chuo Rodo Iinkai Jimukyoku (1988) p 75, Table 20.
Notes: A managerial post allowance is often paid, since
managers cannot claim for overtime and also to 
compensate for increased responsibility (Kawano 197 5 p 
43) .
Around one half of the companies practice managerial post 
retirement. It is noticeable that the average age for post 
retirement is approximately 55, which is the most common age of 
retirement before teinen encho became common from the mid-197 0s (see 
Chapter Three). A large majority of the retirees face reductions in 
wages. The proportion of companies planning to use such practices 
in 1989 is shown in Section 4, Table 6.23.
Section 3 Control of the work force age structure
In the previous section, the means of attenuating wage levels and 
changes in promotion practices were discussed. In this section 
practices introduced to control the internal population structure 
will be discussed. It should be made clear that controlling the work 
force age structure has a direct impact on promotional systems and 
that often the company views such control as a means to alleviating 
some of the problems arising in the adopted promotion system. One 
of the most common reasons for using the practices that will be 
described is that they are a means of lessening the problem of 
posuto fusoku (a dearth of available promotion positions) . The three 
main means of altering the internal population structure are the 
following:
1) Shukko. This is the practice of sending employees to
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other companies with which the present employer has some 
connection.
2) The establishment of new subsidiary companies 
specifically for employing older employees sent from the 
original parent company.
3 ) The implementation of early retirement schemes.
The significance and extent of these practices will be discussed in 
the next three sub-sections.
Sub-section 3.1 Shukko
Shukko is the practice of releasing an employee to work in a company 
with connections with the employer company. The transferred worker 
maintains his status as an employee of the original company and 
various aspects of pay and employment conditions are still met by 
the original company (Nagano 1989 p 3) . There is also a related form 
of transfer in Japan, known as tenseki. In this case, the employee 
is transferred to the pay-roll of the receiving company (Nagano 1989 
p 4) . This sub-section will deal mainly with aspects of shukko, but 
tenseki will sometimes be included. According to Nagano (1989 p 5) , 
the practice of shukko first started to draw attention during the 
first oil shock of the early 197 0s, when companies used shukko 
extensively to maintain the employment of workers. Shukko drew 
further attention in the late 197 0s when it was used to deal with 
the problem of an ageing workforce and the raising of the mandatory 
retirement age (teinen encho) in many large companies, which 
occurred during that period. During the 1980s, the mechanism for 
shukko became more complex. Companies started diversifying and 
establishing new subsidiaries in order to develop new lines of 
business (betsukaishaka or bunshaka Nagano 1989 pp 42-44, 73).
Shukko was also used for labour adjustment along with structural 
adjustment in the economy and continued to be used to deal with
212
promotion stagnation problems.
Table 6.12 shows the results of several surveys inquiring into the 
use of shukko carried out during the 1980s.
Table 6.12 showing the extent of the use of shukko by scale of 
company (no. of employees).
Scale of 
firm
Koyo Kanri
Chosa
(1981)
Konen Koyo
Chosa
(1983)
Shokken
Chosa
(1986)
Koyo Kanri
Chosa
(1987)
All Scales 16.4% 70% 83 .7% 14.2%
5000 + 94.5
91
97 .1 91. 6
3000-4999
76 . 6
96.0
49 .4
1000-2999 92 .7
300-999 46.0 78 73 .6 49 .4
100-299 24 .5
42 48.8
missing
30-99 9.5 7.8
Source: Nagano (19 89) p 45.
Notes: The Shokken Chosa refers to Koyo Shokugyo Sogo Kenkyujo
(1987) Kigyo Gurupunai Jinzai Katsuyo ni kansuru Chosa 
Kenkyu Hokusho. Koyo Kanri Chosa refers to Rodo Daijin 
Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu Sangyd Rodo Chosaka (1981, 1987) 
Koyo Kanri Chosa Hokoku, Tokyo: Rodo Dai j in Kanbo
Seisaku Chosabu. The Konen Koyo Chosa refers to 
Konenreisha Koyo Kaihatsu Kyokai (1985) Koreika Shakai 
ni okeru Jinji Kanri no Tenbo.
The Rodo Daijin Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu Sangyo Rodo Chosaka surveys
differ from the other two surveys in the average results, since the
weighting of smaller companies in the survey is much higher. The
other two surveys are essentially large company surveys and the
results point to the fact that shukko is a large-company practice.
It is quite clear that nearly all of the large companies had
transferred workers to other companies under shukko arrangements.
The Konenreisha Koyo Kaihatsu Kyokai (Koreikyo) survey (1985)
results recorded in Nagano (1989 pp 45-46) also show the type of
company to which employees were transferred. On average 7 0% of the
companies which received a transferee were either subsidiaries or
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related companies (a subsidiary is defined as a company in which the 
parent holds more than 50% of the paid up capital and related 
company is one in which the parent company holds 2 0% - 50% of the 
capital). In terms of the proportions of transferees to each type 
of company, 57% went to subsidiaries, 22% to related companies and 
21% to other companies. These figures demonstrate that the practice 
of shukko is operated as a means of achieving labour mobility within 
the keiretsu groups. The extent of shukko in terms of the percentage 
of the total number of employees is shown in Table 6.13 for all 
scales of companies.
Table 6.13 showing percentage of employees experiencing shukko by 
scale of company {no. of employees).
Scale of firm Shokken Survey Koyo Kanri Survey
All 6.5 5.9
5000 + 8.2 7.6
3000-4999 6.2
5.4
1000-2999 6.0
300-999 6.1 4.2
1000-299
4.9
4.1
30-99 7 . 6
Source: Nagano (1989) p 47.
Notes: The Shokken Survey refers to Koyo Shokugyo Sogo Kenkyujo
(19 87) Kigyo Gurupunai Jinzai Katsuyo ni kansuru Chosa 
Kenkyu Hokusho, Koyo Kanri Chosa refers to Rodo Daijin 
Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu Sangyo Rodo Chosaka (1987) Koyo 
Kanri Chosa Hokoku, Tokyo: Rodo Daijin Kanbo Seisaku 
Chosabu. Figures are for 1987.
The proportion of employees being transferred declines with the size
of the company, but the average is surprisingly high. Just under
seventy percent of the transferees were under 50 years of age and
the rest were over 5 0 (Nagano 1989 pp 48, 49). These figures have
not been normalised for the age structure within the companies. The
proportion of all employees over 5 0 years of age who experienced
shukko in 1987 was 13.6% whilst the figure calculated on the same
basis for employees under the age of 50 was 6.5% (Nagano 1989 p 49) .
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Thus, older workers are more likely to be transferred under a shukko 
arrangement.
Nagano also gives the composition of jobs held by the transferees 
before transfer: directors accounted for 0.5%; managers 29.4%;
office and operations staff 25%; technical workers 16.9%; and 
skilled workers 2 8.2%. From these figures, it can be concluded that 
shukko is more likely to be experienced by white-collar staff. 
Figures (including transfer by tenseki) are also given for the job 
held at the receiving company. Generally, the higher the position 
in the receiving company, the more likely the person holding the 
position has been transferred from another company under shukko 
arrangements. This trend is more likely in companies the more 
recently they have been established, suggesting that shukko is often 
used to help the company in its early days. The older the company, 
the more likely it is that managerial posts are filled by internal 
promotion (Nagano 1989 p 51).
According to the results of a survey by the Koyo Shokugyo Sogo 
Kenkyujo (1986) reported in Nagano (1989 p 53) in 7.2% of cases, the 
total wages of the transferee were borne by the original employer. 
In 3 9.4% of the cases, the receiving company paid the normal wage 
level for that company and the difference between that wage and the 
wage that would be paid by the original company was met by the 
original company. Finally, in 3 6.1% of the cases, the wages were 
paid by the receiving company (the remainder used other means of 
determining pay or did not answer) . Thus, through shukko the 
original employer is often able to ensure the continued employment 
of the employee in question but at a reduced cost.
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During 1982, the Koyo Shokugyo Sogo Kenkyujo surveyed firms on the 
reasons for using shukko. Table 6.14 shows the results for different 
scales of company.
Table 6.14 showing reasons for shukko by scale of company.
Size
of
firm
(no
of
emp-
ploy-
ees)
To
avoid
prom­
otion
prob­
lems
To
ad­
just
age
stru­
cture
For
train­
ing
For
intro
of
manage
ment
tech­
niques
and
tech­
nology
Be­
cause
of
sur­
plus
labour
To
en­
sure
re-
em-
pioy-
ment
of
staff
Other
3000 + 41.9 7.5 41.9 79 . 6 7 . 5 42 . 5 11.8
1000
to
2000
35.6 10 .2 31.4 64.4 23 . 7 30 . 5 20.3
300
to
999
29 . 5 8 . 6 31.1 65 . 6 15.9 15.2 19 .2
100
to
299
32 .5 7.8 28.6 62 .3 15. 6 13 .0 16.9
3 0 to 
99
19.4 3.2 41.9 48.4 16.1 9.7 19 .4
Source: Koyo Shokugyo Sogo Kenkyujo Koyo Sokushin Jigyodan
(1982) p 102.
Notes: Respondents were asked to choose the three most apposite
reasons.
It is clear that the foremost reason for shukko is to introduce new 
management techniques and technology. This primary role can be 
fulfilled in conjunction with a secondary role. There seem to be 
three secondary roles. The three are to avoid promotion problems; 
to train staff; and to re-employ staff. The third and first reasons 
seem to be closely linked. In the third case the employee is leaving 
the company, probably due to retirement, but the company wishes to 
ensure that the employee has a chance for re-employment. Workers are 
retired at a mandatory age in order to ensure that there is no 
stagnation in the promotion ladder. The same survey also inquired 
into which age groups were targeted for shukko (Koyo Shokugyo Sogo
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Kenkyujo Koyo Sokushin Jigyodan 1982 pp 84-88) . For companies with 
more than 1000 employees, a higher number of companies had 
transferred employees over 40 years of age than the number of 
companies which had transferred people under 40. For companies with 
less than 1000 employees more companies had transferred people under 
40. These results are supported by the results in Table 6.14 which 
show that large companies are much more likely to use shukko to stop 
managerial stagnation and to ensure re-employment opportunities.
Nagano (1989 pp 76-81) presents the results of a later survey by the 
Koyo Shokugyo Sogo Kenkyujo (19 87) which asked about the reasons for 
shukko for age groups below 50 years of age and for age groups over 
50 years of age. The results show clearly that reasons vary 
according to the age of the employee in question. The survey also 
asked the sales growth performance of the company over five years 
preceding the survey. This enables an inspection of the reasons for 
shukko categorised not only by age but also by the growth of the
company. In Chapter Three, it was concluded that growth was an
important variable in determining the employment policies of 
companies. It was noted that if the company was stagnating, there 
would be an ageing of the employee age structure, since the 
recruitment of young staff would either be reduced or remain at the 
same level. The company would then try to prevent the ageing of the 
workforce by expelling older workers from amongst the core 
employees. The survey results offer an opportunity to examine if the 
second option has been followed, to the extent that shukko is one
means of casting off older workers. Tables 6.15 and 6.16 show the
results of the survey.
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Table 6.15 shows that regardless of age, the two most popular 
objectives of shukko are for providing skills necessary for the 
establishment of a new company and for introducing management 
techniques and new technology. The third most popular for those over 
50 is for providing employment opportunities after retirement, 
whereas it is for improving the workers’ ability for those under 50. 
It is striking that older workers are more likely than younger 
workers to experience shukko for the following reasons: a) to
prevent managerial stagnation b) to reduce labour costs c) for 
labour adjustment during recession. In terms of variation over size 
of company for these three reasons, there seems to be no noticeable 
trend accept for labour adjustment, in which case, the smaller the 
firm, the more likely shukko will be used for this reason. For those 
over 50, the faster growing the company, the more likely they are 
to be transferred in order to meet personnel shortages. The faster 
growing the company is, the less likely it is to use shukko in order 
to avoid managerial stagnation. The same pattern applies to shukko 
which is used to reduce labour costs or for labour adjustment 
reasons. Using shukko as a means of providing an employment 
opportunity after retirement does not seem to be related to the 
growth performance of the company.
The survey also questioned which company asked for shukko to take 
place. Nagano (1989 p 88) breaks up the possible answers into two 
categories - push type and pull type. Push-type shukko occurs when 
the original employer makes the request, whereas pull-type shukko 
takes place when the receiving company ctSlkS. Table 6.17 shows the 
incidence of these two types of shukko for the two age groups (those 
below 50 and those above 50 years of age) . The older the transferee, 
the smaller the company and the lower the growth rate of the 
company, the more likely push type shukko is to occur.
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Table 6.17 showing the extent of push and pull-type shukko by age 
group, scale of company and growth performance of company.
Below 50 years of 
age
Above 50 years of age
Push Pull NA Push Pull NA
All scales 30.7 66.6 2.7 51.6 45.2 3.2
5000 + 18.0 77 .5 4.5 43 .7 51.8 4.5
3000-4999 25.0 75.0 - 46.8 53 .2 -
1000-2999 30.0 65.5 4.5 50.5 43 .9 5.6
300-999 43 .7 56.3 - 61.8 3 8.2 -
less 100 42 . 0 58.0 - 63 .6 36.4 -
100-125 25.2 73 .9 0.9 51.9 45 .3 2.8
125-150 32 .6 61.8 5 . 6 54 .2 41.0 4.8
150 + 29 .5 66.7 3.8 40.0 55 .7 4.3
Source: Nagano (1989) p 88.
Notes: The top half of the graph shows type of shukko by scale
of company (number of employees) and the bottom half is 
by growth performance (index:100 is equal to total sales 
five years previously). Push-type figures are derived by 
adding the percentage answering a) shukko is mainly
necessary for the original company and b) shukko is more 
or less necessary for the original company. Pull-type 
figures are derived by adding the percentage answering
a) shukko is mainly a result of a request from the 
receiving company and b) shukko is more or less the
result of a request from the receiving company. The 
total number of respondents was 32 9 and the number of 
respondents for each category always exceeded 30.
Companies were also asked about the particular problems resulting 
from the use of shukko. For transferees below the age of 50, the 
most common problem faced by the companies was the adjustment of 
conditions of employment, followed by a tendency to view shukko as 
a demotion. For transferees over the 50, the most common problem 
faced by the companies was the limit to absorption of transferees 
followed by the adjustment of conditions of employment (Nagano 1989 
pp 84-85).
In summary, older workers are more likely to experience shukko as 
a form of expulsion from the original employers and this is
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particularly so the slower the growth rate of the original company. 
This expulsion-type image is reinforced by the fact that older 
workers are more likely to experience push-type shukko, particularly 
when the growth rate of the company is slow. The characteristics of 
shukko seem to support the supposition made in Chapter Five that 
stagnating companies will attempt to prevent the ageing of their 
internal work force that is a consequence of a fall or freeze in 
employee recruitment. The percentage of older workers experiencing 
shukko is significant in demonstrating the ability of companies to
alter the age structure, but will need to increase with ageing of
the workforce. It is questionable that shukko for older workers can 
be increased due to the problem of limited absorption ability of 
receiving companies. The age structure in the receiving companies
will be more aged than in the original company. The receiving
company is likely to be small, since it is usually a subsidiary or 
has contractual ties with the original company. It was shown in 
Chapter Three that workers in smaller companies have shallower 
average wage curves than in large companies. Thus, it would appear 
that employment practices in small companies allow for an older age 
structure and so the small company can use the older transferees and 
at the same time this allows the larger companies to continue using 
employment practices which require a younger age structure.
Sub-section 3.2 Old people companies
Large companies have also taken the expedient of setting up 
subsidiary companies primarily for the absorption of older workers 
from the parent company (Rodo Daijin Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu Sangyo 
Rodo Chosaka 1981). These companies are known as koreisha kaisha 
which translates literally as old people companies. Old people 
companies started flourishing in the mid 1970s as companies adjusted
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to the recession caused by the oil shock and also raised the 
mandatory retirement age (Ujihara 1985). Information on the extent 
of the use of old age companies is scanty. According to the Koyo 
Kanri Chosa Hokoku of 1985 (Rodo Daijin Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu Sangyo 
Rodo Chosaka 1985), the percentage of companies having an old age 
company subsidiary in 1985 amounted to 2.2%. This figure is for all 
scales of company, however. For companies with more than 5000 
employees the figure was 21.0% and for companies with between 1000 
and 4999 employees the figure was 11.7%. Compared with the Koyo 
Kanri Chosa Hokoku of 19 81, the proportion of firms with old people 
companies has fallen over four years. The overall percentage in 1981 
was 2.4% and the percentage of firms with over 5000 employees with 
these companies amounted to 2 6.4%. The use of old age companies 
increases with the size of the company, which is not surprising, 
since small companies are much less likely to have subsidiaries and 
many small companies are themselves subsidiaries of the larger 
companies in question.
The types of business in which these companies are involved are 
diverse, but they are generally work which previously would have 
been carried out in the parent company itself. Thus, old people 
companies can be considered one element of the bestukaishaka 
described in Sub-section 3.1. The main categories of business are 
the following (Ujihara 1985 p 407):
1) Employee welfare services such as the supervision of 
dormitories and company housing and the management of 
dining rooms and sales kiosks (59.5%).
2) Work involving care of the work environment and company 
instalments such as cleaning, gardening and building 
maintenance (57.1%).
3) Secondary work for the parent company such as packing
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and transport of products and the maintenance of plant 
and equipment (53.6%).
4) Printing of packaging, translation, interpreting and
information and technological surveys (45.2%).
5) Sales (11.9%).
6) Work which constitutes one part of the main operations
of the parent company (53.6%).
7) Work in new areas of business of the parent company
(40.5%).
The figures in brackets show the results of a survey undertaken by 
the Tokyoto Rodo Keizaikyoku, published in 19 83 and presented by 
Ujihara (1985 p 408). The companies were asked which type of work 
they carried out and were allowed multiple answers. The figures show
the percentage of firms carrying out each type of work. It is
striking that many of the types of work performed by old people 
companies are akin to work that would have been carried out by 
rinjiko during the 1960s (see Chapter Four).
Although the companies are called old people companies, the
employees are not all of old age. This is for two main reasons. The 
first reason is that the companies hire workers independently of the 
parent company and tend to hire younger workers. According to the 
Tokyoto Rodo Keizaikyoku survey approximately 53% of the workers in 
old age companies were hired externally (Ujihara 19 85 p 410). The 
second reason is that workers are often transferred (often through 
shukko) to the old age companies before retirement. Out of all the 
workers originating from the parent company, only 23% have been 
transferred after retirement. The remainder are accounted for by 
transfer of pay roll before retirement ( - tenseki) (36%) , and 
shukko (41%) (Ujihara 19 85 p 413) . Figure 6.2 shows the age 
structure of workers originating from the parent company and of
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workers who were hired externally. The modal age for workers 
originating from the parent company is 55-60 years of age after 
which the proportion of workers drops noticeably. The young age 
structure of the externally hired workers complements the aged 
structure of the workers originating from the parent company. Even 
though the companies are set up specifically to employ older people, 
it appears that they still find it necessary to maintain a much 
younger age structure than their name would imply. Consequently the 
absorptive capacity for older workers is limited. Regardless of the 
ability to attenuate the naturally aged structure through hiring 
external staff, the most often cited problem facing the old age 
companies was that "it is difficult to maintain the vitality of the 
company since there are so many older employees" with 42.9% of 
companies indicating such (Ujihara 1985 p 416) . The next most 
commonly cited problem was "placement and management of personnel 
is difficult since there are so many older workers" (39.3%).
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Figure 6.2 age composition of workers in old people companies 
according to origin
Source: Ujihara (1985) p 414
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Finally, it is noted by Ujihara (1985 pp 407, 409) that these
companies are not operated as charities. They are required to make 
a profit and compete with many other companies which carry out the 
same work, but which are not forced to have an aged employee 
structure. According to the 1981 Tokyoto survey, the average profit 
rate on sales only amounted to 1.9% (Ujihara 1985 p 409). Thus the 
scope for an increasing use of old people companies to absorb older 
workers from the ageing employee structure of the parent company 
would appear limited. Unfortunately there do not seem to be any 
figures showing the proportion of older workers (55 years and above) 
being sent to old people companies, but a large proportion are sent 
through shukko and would be included in the shukko figures given in 
Sub-section 3.1 above. Ujihara (1985 p 405) gives figures for the 
number of people undergoing transfer and the place of transfer. 
Approximately 16% were transferred to old people companies. If this 
figure is multiplied by the percentage of older people transferred 
under shukko arrangements given above, the proportion going to old 
people companies is around 2%, but this an extremely rough estimate.
In summary, the use of old age companies can be considered a special 
case of shukko. The scope for using these companies for hiving off 
older workers seems limited. The concept of an old age company does, 
however, demonstrate the diversity of methods that are used to 
regulate the age structure of the core, parent company.
Sub-section. 3.3 Early retirement provisions
Another option for altering the internal age structure of a company 
is to provide incentives for early retirement. The percentage of 
large firms with early retirement provisions increased rapidly 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s, concomitant with a move 
towards a retirement age of 60 (teinen encho) . Figure 6.3 shows when
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early retirement provisions were started and the percentage of firms
with a retirement age of 60.
Figure 6.3 showing the cumulative distribution over time of the 
introduction of early retirement practices; and the percentage of
companies having a retirement age of 60 and above over time.______
The Establishment of Early Retirment Provisions by Date
110
100
70
BO
19851965 1970 1990
Year
— SB—  Accuma111ve Distribution of Early Retirment Provisions Set-up 
Proportion of Firms with Retirment Age of 60 and above
Source: For the accumulative distribution of early retirement
provisions over time, the data came from Romu Gyosei 
Kenkyujo (19 87) p 47. Data for the percentage of firms 
with a retirement age of 60 and above came from Rodo 
Daijin Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu Sangyo Rodo Chosaka (1988) 
Koyo Kanri Chosa Hokoku.
In terms of scale, the larger the company, the more likely it is to
have early retirement provisions. The survey by the Romu Gyosei
Kenkyujo (1987 p 46) shows that in 1976, out of all companies with
over 3 000 employees, 58.6% had early retirement provisions. The
proportion for companies with 1000 to 2999 employees was 45.5% and
for companies with less than 1000 employees amounted to 33.7%. Data
from the survey also enable an examination of the extent of early
retirement provisions according to the average age of company
employees and the retirement age set by the company. Table 6.18
shows the results.
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Table 6.18 showing the percentage of companies with early retirement 
according to average age of employees and mandatory retirement age.
Age groups or 
retirement age
No of Responses Percentage of firms 
with early ret prov's.
less than 3 0 18 16 .7
30 - 34.9 108 44 .4
35-39.9 135 51.9
above 4 0 38 39.5
55 25 12 .0
56 6 16 .7
57 18 22 .2
58-59 19 42 .1
60 and above 234 51.3
Source: Romu Gyosei Kenkyujo (1987) p 46.
Note: Some of the categories only have very small numbers of
respondents . The part of the table below the dotted line 
shows figures according to the mandatory retirement age.
It is clear from the table above that the older the age structure
of the employees, the more firms have early retirement provisions.
This trend does not extend to firms with an average age of over 40,
however. Also, the higher the retirement age, the higher the
percentage of firms with early retirement provisions. Both these
results point to the conclusion that firms are using early
retirement to attenuate the age structure within the company.
The most commonly used term in Japanese for early retirement 
provisions is soki taishoku yugu seido. The Japanese term contains 
an element of preferential treatment. The preferential treatment 
manifests itself in the calculation of severance pay. Most companies 
(approximately 80% - Romu Gyosei Kenkyujo (1987) p 48) calculate the 
amount on a retirement severance pay basis: that is they chose a
retirement multiplier. Moreover, approximately 90% of firms use the
length of service the employee would have had at the normal 
retirement age in calculations. Approximately three-quarters of
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firms also add a further payment amounting to between 40 and 60% of 
the normal retirement severance pay. The larger the firm, the more 
likely it is to pay this additional payment. Firms clearly feel that 
the costs of providing early retirement provisions are outweighed 
by the benefits accruing to the management of the company through 
attenuating the age structure. The modal age in 19 8 6 for the start 
of eligibility for early retirement provisions was 5 0 according to 
the Romu Gyosei Kenkyujo survey (1987 p 49) , although 45 and 55 were 
also popular ages. These results are confirmed by the Chuo Rodo 
Iinkai Jimukyoku surveys (1984, 1886 and 1988).
As in the case of the old people companies, it is difficult to 
determine the number or proportion of people who experience early 
retirement. Ujihara (1985 pp 371-372)^ on this matter, presents the 
results of two surveys. The Konenreisha Koyo Kaihatsu Kyokai survey
(1983) concludes that when the provisions were first introduced, 
there were a few who took advantage of early retirement, but since 
then numbers have dwindled almost to nothing. The Tokyoto Romu 
Keizaikyoku survey (19 83) shows that out of all male, regular 
workers over 50 who left before retirement or left at retirement, 
only 6.6% took advantage of the early retirement provisions. The 
1989 labour white paper (Rodosho 1989 pp 159-160) gives figures for 
people who left work in the year previous to the survey. The 
composition of the leavers can be broken down into the percentage 
of non -retirement company leavers who left under early retirement 
provisions. For the 50-54 year old age group, 7 0% of workers who 
left a company left before retirement age. Out of those, 
approximately 15% left under early retirement provisions. For the 
age group 50-59 leavers before retirement accounted for 40%, out of 
which 30% left under early retirement provisions. The percentages 
of early retirees for large companies are higher. For both these age
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groups, the proportion of early retirees is greater than the 6.6% 
given by the Tokyoto survey above (roughly double). From these 
results it is difficult to draw firm conclusions as to the extent 
of early retirement. Certainly, the practice would appear to 
encourage quitting the company before the official retirement age, 
but it is impossible to know how many of the early retirees would 
have left the company, regardless of beneficial provisions.
Section 4 Problems in raising the mandatory retirement age and 
future policies for the management of older workers
This section covers the information gathered from Koyo Kanri Chosa 
(Rodo Daijin Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu Sangyo Rodo Chosaka 1985) survey 
regarding the reasons for companies not raising the mandatory 
retirement age, and management policies towards middle-aged people 
that the firms are likely to follow in the future. Thus, this 
section serves to summarise many of the problems and policies of 
companies as they deal with ageing of their work 
forces.
Table 6.19 through to 6.21 show the reasons why companies had not 
raised the retirement age in 1985.
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Table 6.19 showing the reasons for not raising retirement age that
are related to wages determination problems.
Retir
e-
ment
age
All Adjust­
ments to 
the wage 
system 
for 
older 
people 
are not 
complete
The 
intro­
duction 
of job- 
related 
and
ability 
pay has 
been 
delayed
Reform 
of the 
sever­
ance 
pay 
system 
is not 
com­
plete
Manage­
ment- 
labour 
discuss­
ions are 
not
progres­
sing
Other
All 31.1 15 .3 3.9 10.4 2.4 6.2
<55 44.5 22 . 8 5 . 9 15 . 8 4.7 7.3
56-59 33.8 19 .3 4.9 12 .6 6.0 2.2
60 24.2 10 .3 2.8 7.4 0.1 7.1
60 + 11.0 6.4 - - - 4.5
Source: Rodo Daijin Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu Sangyo Rodo Chosaka
(19 85) Koyo Kanri Chosa Hokoku p 10.
Notes: The figures are for companies with the same retirement
age for all groups of workers (ittsu teinen) . The 
companies were allowed multiple answers.
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The most common reasons given for not raising the retirement age 
come in the category entitled "other", followed by reasons relating 
to personnel management and promotion problems. The most common 
response in the other category is because the company has kinmu 
encho and saikoyo systems instead. This appears to be an inadequate 
explanation, however, since it still begs the question as to why the 
relevant companies prefer to continue using these systems instead 
of instituting a rise in the retirement age. The next most popular 
answer is that the companies have a young age structure and 
therefore raising the retirement age is not necessary. This answer 
is particularly popular amongst firms with a retirement age under 
55, which in itself would seem to result in those companies having 
a young age structure. In the other two categories, the most common 
reasons are because adjustment to the wage system to accommodate 
older workers is not yet complete and because the types of jobs and 
environment are not suitable for older workers. The implications of 
the latter reason are vague, since it is not clear whether suitable 
jobs implies managerial and higher paid jobs or jobs which have 
physical requirements suitable for older workers. Upon examination 
of the sectors which favoured this answer the most, the wholesale 
and retail, transport and communications and service industries show 
the highest response rates (Rod5 Daijin Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu Sangyo 
Rodo Chosaka 19 85 p 44) . These industries traditionally use low wage 
labour. The higher the retirement age, the greater the proportion 
of firms that felt it was not necessary to answer the question. 
Discounting the answers to the "other" category, because of their 
inability to throw light on the problems involved in raising the 
retirement age, wage systems and lack of suitable jobs appear to be 
the greatest restraints to instituting teinen encho. The results on 
the question of future management policy give more useful insights 
to the problems involved.
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The answers to questions regarding future management policy in 
general are given in Table 6.22. The three most numerous answers 
relate to the increasing use of ability appraisal and ability grade 
systems. It appears that the larger the company, the greater the 
desire to split managerial posts from ability grades and to 
introduce or strengthen specialist grade systems. It is dangerous 
to draw conclusions about these policies over scale of company, 
however, since multiple answers were allowed and smaller companies 
tend to choose fewer answers per question. This can lead to the 
proportions of larger companies choosing a particular answer 
appearing larger.
Answers on management policy for middle-aged workers are shown in 
Table 6.23. The most popular answer in general is to maintain 
promotion by length of service, although the proportion of larger 
companies choosing this option is negligible. Larger companies 
favour policies such as introducing management retirement, early 
retirement practices and shukko or transfer. It is striking that the 
smaller the company, the greater the proportion that are satisfied 
with present practices for dealing with middle-aged workers. This 
last observation appears to support the supposition that smaller 
firms tend to have employment practices which do not rely on a young 
age structure and therefore smaller firms have an older age 
structure than larger firms and flatter wage curves.
Section 5 Labour input adjustment practices
In Chapter Five it was noted that the growth rate of firms is 
important in determining the treatment of older workers. In a 
climate of slower economic growth, hiring of younger workers is 
reduced and companies would also attempt to reduce the number of 
older workers in the work force, to an efficiency age structure. In
238
this section, the reaction of Japanese firms to cyclical downturns 
and the implications for employment of older people are examined.
Table 6.24 shows the percentage of firms making labour input 
adjustment measures and the percentage of those firms taking each 
type of measure over the period 1975 to 1986. This period contains 
three cyclical downturns. The first two downturns originate from the 
oil shocks in the 197 0s and the third stems from the appreciation 
of the yen in 1985. The main concern here is the policy of voluntary 
redundancy and involuntary redundancy. It is clear that this policy 
is the least popular means of dealing with labour adjustment. The 
use of this policy increases noticeably during recession periods. 
Figure 6.4 shows the percentage of employees who left companies at 
the request of the company (keiei no tsugo), over time. Again, the 
rise in the percentage over cyclical downturns is noticeable. In 
Japanese writings on these
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periods of labour adjustment, it is often stated (Namie 1986 p 189; 
Yamada 1983 p 2 05) that it is the older and middle-aged workers who 
bear the brunt of redundancies and consequently are also likely to 
become unemployed. Direct indicators which can demonstrate these 
claims are difficult to find.
Figure 6.4 showing the percentage of all workers leaving the company 
at the request of management.
Percentage of employees leaving the company at request of management
Cmen and womerQ
12
11
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75 B5B5 70 BO 30 35
Year
Source: Rodo Daijin Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu (ed.) (19 88) p 328.
The 1979 labour white paper (Rodosho 197 9) does, however, give a 
detailed analysis of the state of employment and unemployment during 
the economic downturn induced by the first oil shock. Table 6.25 
shows the proportions of each age group who left companies over the 
period 197 6 to 1988, according to the reason for leaving. The older 
the age group, the larger the proportion who have been made 
redundant due to a management decision (ie. involuntary redundancy).
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Table 6.2 5 showing the reasons for leaving previous employment by
age group (197 6-78) .______________________________________________
Age group On
request 
of firm
Contract
ending
Manage- 
ment
decision
Retire­
ment
Own
accord
All ages 21.6 6.3 9 . 6 5 . 6 78.4
<20 7 . 8 5 . 7 2.0 - 92 .2
20-29 9.3 4.3 5.0 - 90.7
30-44 15 .2 5.8 9.5 - 84. 8
45-54 32 .9 14.2 18 .7 - 67.1
55 + 57 .9 7.3 17 .8 32 .9 42.1
Source: Rodosho (1979), Appendix, p 112.
Notes: These percentages are based on figures for the period
1976 to 1978 inclusive.
Thus it is clear that older workers were more likely to lose their
job through redundancy during the downturn. Not only were older
workers more likely to lose their job, they were also less likely
to find another. Over the period 1974-1978, 80-85% of male workers
who lost their job in the age group 25-44 found another job. Only
7 6% in the 45-54 age group succeeded in finding a job and the
proportion for men over 55 years of age only amounted to 63%
(Rodosho 1979 p 64) . The white paper also gives staying-on rates for
each age group over the period 1973-197 8 and compares them with
those for the period 19 69-1972 (a high economic growth period). The
staying-on rates for male middle-aged and older workers were lower
in the later period, indicating, together with their greater
propensity to lose their job, that this age group bears the brunt
in periods of depressed economic growth. Staying-on rates for older
workers drop further in large companies, when compared with staying
on rates for younger age groups, than in small companies (Rodosho
1979 p 63) .
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Section 6 Conclusion to this chapter
This chapter has described the changes in employment practices which 
companies have undertaken to deal with ageing work forces. The 
chapter also examines future policies for changing employment 
practices and finally gives an account of labour input adjustments 
carried out by companies during the turbulent period of the 1970s. 
The structure of the chapter is based on hypotheses derived from the 
demographic model of employment practices given in Chapter Four. In 
Chapter Four it was hypothesised that ageing of the labour force 
would lead to the expulsion of older workers, so that large firms 
could maintain an internal efficiency age structure. If it were not 
possible to maintain the efficiency age structure, it was asserted 
that the relative wage levels of younger and older workers would 
change. Changes in employment practices that may lead to an 
alteration in average wage curves can be summarised under the 
following points:
1) A large proportion of large firms have either introduced or 
furthered the use of ability grade systems. The ability grade 
systems are used to reduce the nenko element in wage 
determination. Increment points within grades are often 
established, so that with each additional year of length of 
service, the pay of a worker rises. There are, however, limits 
to the number of increments in each grade. Thus after a 
certain length of service wages stop rising automatically. 
Further increases in pay are only paid to the worker if the 
worker is promoted to a higher grade. Promotion to a higher 
grade is dependent on appraisal of ability. It is not clear 
how the use of ability grade systems will affect the wage 
curve of employees. If there is a strong element of age and 
length of service factors used in the appraisal of ability, 
then promotion through the grades will be linked to age and
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wages will continue to rise steeply. The effects of increment 
limits and appraisal are more likely to be felt by older 
workers, who have experienced more slowly rising wages in the 
past. Over the 1980s wage curves have been steepening with the 
increasing use of ability grade systems and this would appear 
to demonstrate that wage attenuation is not the result of 
using ability grade systems. Hence conceptually, the use of 
ability grades would appear to lead to a flattening of wage 
curves, but in practice this is not yet visible.
2) A large percentage of firms have introduced parallel promotion 
systems. Some older workers continue to hold managerial posts, 
whereas others, who might have held managerial posts had the 
age structure within the company been younger, are promoted 
through specialist grade systems. Thus, in spite of a lack of 
managerial posts, workers may still be rewarded with 
promotion. The implication for wages is important. As was 
postulated in Chapter Four, the productivity of older workers 
is dependent on the number of younger workers they supervise. 
Promotion through specialist grades implies promotion to 
higher levels of specialist work, but does not lead to control 
of large number of younger workers. Thus, promotion along 
specialist grades does not lead to as great an increase in 
productivity with age as promotion to a managerial post. 
Therefore wages for those on specialist grades can be expected 
to be lower than for those in managerial posts. With ageing of 
the work force, the proportion of managers within each age 
group inevitably declines and thus the average wage curve will 
flatten. While introduction of specialist grade systems does 
allow promotion to be used effectively as a reward, it does 
not enable the maintenance of a steeply rising wage profile 
with age.
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3) A large proportion of firms have introduced changes to 
employment practices which only affect employees in the higher 
age groups. These practices include the reduction or freezing 
of wages after a certain age point and the relinquishing of 
grades and managerial posts. These changes only have an impact 
on the wage curve after the age at which these adjustments 
come in to force and seem to have been instituted in order to 
maintain the steep falls in the wage curve that occur after 
peak wage age. Even with an ageing workforce structure, it is 
possible for firms to keep the rising portion of the wage 
curve rising steeply, if at the same time firms can increase 
the steepness of wage falls for older workers correspondingly. 
Such a practice would entail an income transfer from older to 
younger workers and may reduce the incentive effects of 
steeply rising wage curves at younger ages.
Changes to employment practices that allow control of the internal 
age structure of the firm have also been described. The use of 
shukko and old people companies appear to have limitations in the 
future and unfortunately the extent of early retirement is difficult 
to quantify. It is clear, however, that it is the larger firms which 
use these practices. This leads to the supposition that employment 
practices in large firms require a young age structure, whereas a 
young age structure is not so necessary for smaller firms.
The final section of the chapter, showed that with downturns in 
growth, it is older workers who are made redundant, regardless of 
practices used for their expulsion. Moreover, it is large firms that 
are more likely to sack older workers. In Chapter Four it was 
postulated that slower growth leads to an ageing of the internal 
labour force and so large firms, which need to maintain a younger 
age structure, would respond by expelling older workers. This
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postulate is borne out by the experience of older workers and the 
lower average age of workers in large companies. The ability of 
companies to control the age structure of their employees also has 
an impact on the wage curve. There are also important implications 
for the working of the macro labour market and unemployment as the 
population ages in Japan. It should be noted that the major factor 
that led to changes in employment practices to deal with ageing was 
the government policy of encouraging raising of the retirement age. 
It was this policy which led to the rapid ageing of workforces in 
large companies. Thus, the ability to control the internal age 
structure has been curtailed by government policy.
The behaviour of the macro labour market under population ageing 
will be examined in the next chapter, now that firms' labour demand 
behaviour has been examined. Government policy will be described in 
Chapter Eight and Chapter Nine.
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APPENDIX 6A CASE STUDIES OP FIRMS' RESPONSES TO AGEING
WORKFORCES
The data given in Chapter Six gave a clear picture of the general 
changes in personnel management and wage systems that have occurred 
with ageing of the workforce. The data are of an aggregate nature 
and therefore tend to obscure the variety and detail of changes that 
have been made. To clarify the picture of changes that have been 
made, this appendix provides descriptions of actual changes that 
have been made by three large companies. These case studies come 
from a collection of sixteen case studies made by the Nihon 
Seisansei Honbu (1981). A knowledgeable person in each company 
involved was asked to describe the changes made in employment 
practices subsequent to raising the mandatory retirement age. The 
descriptions were expected to include four main points: a)
introduction to the company, b) the history surrounding the raising 
of the retirement age (union discussions and demands etc), c) the 
revisions made to each system and d) problems and future topics for 
consideration. I will emphasise point c) . The company names were not 
given and each company was assigned a letter of the alphabet. The 
nature of the survey also means that the descriptions are not 
necessarily comprehensive and the reforms which are described were 
chosen according to the subjective evaluation of the person giving 
the description. The companies given here were chosen on the basis 
of clarity and comprehensiveness. These descriptions are not direct 
translations and have been edited to illuminate points which are 
relevant to this chapter.
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COMPANY M
Business of Company
Car industry.
Date of raising retirement age and new retirement age
1977, retirement age = 60.
Revisions to wage and promotion systems after the previous 
retirement age.
In this company the revisions differed according to whether the 
worker was a member of the managerial staff or not. In fact, the 
managerial staff did not have their retirement age extended. 
Furthermore non-managerial staff are divided into two groups - a) 
general workers (probably non-skilled) and b) workers belonging to 
the grade system (skilled and supervisory).
After the previous retirement age (55) , general workers continue to 
do the same job and receive the same wages. Graded workers loose 
their grade and become general workers at the age of 55. They also 
lose their grade allowance (ie. wages are reduced). Both groups 
have teisho stopped. Base-up for both groups is 5 0 percent of the 
level for general workers who are below 55, if they are 55 or 56. 
After 57 years of age, base-up is also stopped. The severance pay 
multiplier is extended for another five years. If the worker quits 
the company after 55, retirement severance pay is paid. In other 
words, there are early retirement provisions.
At 55, managers undergo a re-appraisal exercise. Each manager is 
given an appraisal rank and the employment contract is renewed 
(saikoyo) on terms depending on the allocated appraisal rank. The 
top rank continue to do the same job and receive a salary amounting
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to 90-100% of their pre-55 salary. The next rank down stay on the 
same grade but lose the managerial position. The salary ranges from 
7 0 to 80% of previous salary. The third rank manager becomes a 
general worker (ie. loses grade and managerial position) and 
receives 60% of previous salary. The lowest ranking manager receives 
the same treatment as a third rank manager, but only receives 50% 
of previous salary. Reasons given for not raising the retirement age 
of managers are the following: a) a higher retirement age will
hinder the practice of shukko, which this company uses extensively; 
and b) the company has not revised its practices enough to avoid 
managerial stagnation. It is intended to push up the retirement age 
of managers in the future, by allowing early retirement which would 
facilitate shukko and by increasing the amount of ability pay in 
managers' pay before the age of 55.
General revisions to personnel and wage systems
The perceived goals of reform and problems which need solving are 
shown below. These are described in a vague and repetitive manner 
in the original case study, but give some idea of the comprehensive 
nature of the problems.
1) The business environment and technology facing the firm is
changing rapidly and, therefore, the firm must have a flexible 
organisation.
2) The employee age structure, organisation of the company and 
work categories have all been pyramidal structures. With the 
ageing of the employee structure, these pyramidal structures 
will lead to contradictions in the concepts and reality of 
personnel management, which will result in a loss of morale. 
Disaffected middle-aged workers might emerge.
3) The economy has moved into an era of low growth (compared with
the high-speed growth era) and therefore decisions regarding
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not just quantity expansion, but the development of new areas 
of business and new technology are needed. Therefore 
specialist knowledge needs to be used to the full.
4) The ageing of the workforce and the higher levels of education
of the workers means that the amount of ability extant within 
the company will increase.
5) The company needs to have a flexible organisation which allows
the use of high ability people to the full.
6) Managerial posts and promotion need to be separated for the 
reason given in 5 above and promotion needs to be flexible.
The policies adopted to solve these problems are as follows (not 
necessarily in the same order):
1) The organisation will not be based purely on a pyramidal 
structure. Topics and problems will be solved by groups made 
up of specialists from several departments and fields. The 
work assigned to these groups will be called topic work. 
Operations will be run by a general works department (ie. a 
specialist operations management section).
2) The policy of weakening the nenko nature of promotion will be
clarified through the increasing use of ability appraisal for
personnel management purposes. This will be achieved by
establishing an independent ability grade system. A parallel 
grade system for supervisory and specialised staff will also 
be set up. Promotion to posts and grades will be decided on 
the basis of performance appraisal.
3) Introduce an ability development system which is linked to the
ability levels mentioned in 3).
I shall not describe the topic groups in any more detail. They are 
essentially a form of senmonshoku seido which enables promotion 
through grades without promotion to a specific managerial post. In 
other words, a specialist management system and a parallel grade
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system have been established. The supervisory grade system was 
established in order to "give a ranking of positions within the 
company to workers which have the ability to perform work of a 
managerial kind" (p 140), but are not promoted to managerial 
positions, because there is a dearth of such positions. This avoids 
the problems with the general managerial promotion system which 
would occur with ageing. A select few will become managers in the 
old sense and other older employees will be assigned to specialist 
grades and can become supervisors of topic groups.
The ability promotion system is based on promotion through set 
levels. Each type of work is assigned ability levels. General 
workers are assigned to levels and are moved up one level each 2 or 
3 years. Workers on the supervisory grade system (ie. graded 
workers) progress up an ability level every 4 or 5 years and 
promotion to another ability level occurs automatically with a grade 
promotion. Generally, promotion through the ability levels is not 
automatic, however. The worker must fulfil certain conditions before 
promotion is allowed. Thus, it is possible for a worker to remain 
on the same ability level regardless of the number of years already 
spent on that level. After the age of 55 there is no ability level 
promotion.
The introduction of an ability promotion system allows the use of 
ability pay. This would mean that if ability falls then wages should 
fall. The company cannot avoid a strong nenko element in wage 
determination, however, since it is required by Japanese society in 
general (p 141) . Wages are composed of basic pay, additional ability 
pay and a grade allowance. The following describe the methods for 
determining each component of pay.
1) Basic pay is determined by ability and length of service. The
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calculation of the length of service includes years for 
schooling. For example, a university graduate with ten years 
of work in the company is given a length of service of 18 
years, 8 of which are given for being a university graduate. 
Each ability level is represented by a number of points. The 
lowest possible number of ability points is 5 0 and the highest 
100. The amount of pay for a person who never acquires more 
than 50 points then rises according to length of service. 
After 29 years of service (age of standard employee = 43) , the 
marginal increase declines and then stops after 40 years of 
service (age of standard employee = 55). Thus, wages stop 
rising when ability points are equal to 10 0 and length of 
service is equal to 40.
2) Additional ability pay is determined according to ability 
level. At age 55 and 56, the increase in additional ability 
pay that occurs with the pay round discussions each year (ie. 
base-up) is reduced to half the amount of that of a person of 
less than 55 years of age. After the age of 56, there is no 
increase in additional ability pay.
3) A grade allowance is paid according to supervisory grade. 
Supervisory grades are dropped at the age of 55 and the grade 
allowance is no longer paid.
At special times, an adjustment amount is also paid on top of basic 
pay (possibly performance related, although it is not clear from the 
case study) . The adjustment pay amount is calculated by multiplying 
basic pay by a multiplier. The multiplier is decreased with each 
marginal year of age over 55. In the example given, the multiplier 
for those below 55 was 0.22597 and was 0.04475 for workers of 59 
years of age.
Retirement severance pay is calculated by multiplying monthly pay
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at the point of retirement by a multiplier based on the length of 
service and by a fixed coefficient. The length of service multiplier 
stops rising after 3 5 years of service and between 31 and 3 5 years 
of service rises very little. A university graduate entering the 
company at 22 would find that, after the age of 55, the multiplier
would stop rising. Also wages after 55 decline if the worker is
graded (since he loses his grade allowance). Wages for general 
workers also stop rising after 55 and in real terms fall, since 
base-up is not maintained at full levels.
In summary, the company has attempted to solve managerial stagnation 
through the introduction of a non-managerial grade system with 
promotion decided through appraisal. Early retirement provisions 
have been provided and shukko of managers has been practised for a 
long time. The problem of natural increases in wages has been
lessened through the use of pay based on ability as well as length
of service.
COMPANY 0
This company is of particular interest, because it carried out 
teinen encho very early. The terms of extending the retirement were 
very generous compared with the revisions which other companies 
carried out. With the oil shocks and recession during the 1970s, 
however, the company had to revise the employment practices for 
older workers.
Business of Company
Textile industry.
Date of raising retirement age and new retirement age
1966, retirement age = 60.
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Revisions to wage and promotion systems after the previous 
retirement age.
At age 55 the job category and grade of the employee were re­
evaluated. The re-evaluation was not automatic, according to the 
case study. This appears to mean that the job and grade of a worker 
was only re-evaluated if the worker was not able to continue with 
the previous job. Wages were equal to the average wages for the 
grade to which the worker was assigned after re-evaluation, which 
would amount, on average, to 80% of wages before reaching 55, but 
with a range of between 70 and 100%. The worker only received teisho 
after 55 with promotion. Nenko type teisho was stopped. Base-up was 
80% of the base-up given to workers under 55. Retirement severance 
pay was paid at age 55. In 1973, after requests from the union, the 
company abolished the re-evaluation of work grade, so that there was 
no adjustment of wages after the age of 55. The employees faced a 
continuous wage system up to the retirement age of 60.
With the oil shock in 1973 and the rise in the value of the yen, the 
company had to resort to emergency measures which included selling 
land and securities, stopping new hiring of workers and transferring 
employees to other companies. After making losses in 1975 and 1977, 
the company adopted survival plans. One of the plans consisted of 
reforms in practices to deal with ageing. The reforms to deal with 
ageing consisted of the following:
1) Set up a subsidiary company (a service company) which carries 
out suitable work for older workers. Employment conditions 
were to be independent of conditions in the parent company.
2) Treatment of workers over 55 was to be the same as in other
companies belonging to the same industry.
3) Early retirement provisions to be available for those over 45
years of age and help provided for changing jobs.
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Wage and personnel adjustments for workers over 55 were re­
introduced. Appraisal was made of the ability, performance, health 
and desire to work of the employee and transfer to another job was 
carried out if necessary. Wages were reduced to between 7 0 and 7 8% 
of the wages paid before the employee reached 55, depending on the 
individual. Another re-appraisal before reaching 60 was possible, 
but wages could only be reduced to 90% of the wages before the 
second appraisal occurred. Grade re-appraisal was also re-instituted 
and could be performed more than once. In principal, managers were 
expected to relinquish their post on reaching the age of 55. Base-up 
was to be 80% of the amount that corresponded to basic wages and 
grade of the worker. No retirement severance pay was to be paid for 
the period of work after the age of 55.
General revisions to personnel and wage systems
The company introduced a grade system in 1966 along with teinen 
enchOf but it was not introduced to deal with the problem of an 
ageing employee structure which was a consequence of teinen encho. 
Concurrent with the reform of employment practices for older workers 
described above, however, the grade system was also revised to deal 
with the middle-aged workers. The revision was based on the 
"necessity of maintaining a balance between jobs and wages, achieved 
through weakening the nenko elements in conditions of employment" 
(p 158).
There are five job levels. Seven grades are instituted and linked 
to job level. Promotion through the grades is dependent on the 
number of people already assigned to the grade in question and is 
dependent on the proportions of people in each grade. For people who 
were re-allocated or transferred to another company (shukko), the 
present grade is maintained for a fixed period of two years. After
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two years the worker is treated according to his newly assigned 
grade.
In order to dampen the rise in wages with age, there is an upper 
limit to the wage level for each grade. The upper limit is set with 
living costs in mind and it is guaranteed that wages greater than 
minimum living costs would be maintained. The company believes that 
living costs peak between the age of 45 and 49, so in order to stop 
wages rising continuously after peak age, grades and wages are 
managed according to the age group to which the worker belongs. For 
those under 50, there is one type of basic pay, with an upper limit. 
For those between 50 and 55, there are three types of pay - two 
basic pay amounts and adjustment pay. The first basic pay has an 
upper limit corresponding to the wage for the job within the textile 
industry. The limit on wages when the two basic pays were combined 
is the same as the limit for workers under 50. It is not clear from 
the case study exactly what the second basic pay amount is for, 
though it is possibly paid only to workers assigned to the higher 
grades. Adjustment pay seems to be wages paid to maintain the wages 
of a worker who was on wages above the upper limit for the 50-55 age 
group before reaching 50. Adjustment pay is paid for a fixed period. 
After the age of 55, there is one basic pay, the upper limit of 
which is the same as the upper limit on the first type of basic pay 
for those between 50 and 55 - see Figure 6A.1 below.
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Figure 6A.1 showing the determination of pay for different age 
groups
pay
k  50 5o~5t >50
If the worker has not proceeded to the higher grades by the age of 
50, then wages are limited to point B, whereas they would be limited 
to the higher amount at point A if they were below the age of 50. 
After the age of 55, regardless of grade, wages are limited to point 
C (= B) .
In 19 66 a company pension was set up. Workers would be paid a lump­
sum payment and a pension. The payment amount was calculated by 
multiplying the wage at retirement by a multiplier based on length 
of service.
In summary, this company was initially ambitious in treating workers 
over 55 in the same way as those under 55. With slower growth and 
a rapidly ageing work force, which itself was a consequence of a
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slow-down in hiring, the company had to introduce measures to limit 
the wages of older workers and weaken the nenko nature of employment 
practices. This was achieved primarily by placing direct limits on 
wage levels for each grade according to age. It is not clear, 
however, whether promotion through grades was determined by the 
length of service of the employee. If such were the case, then nenko 
elements would not have been substantially reduced. Promotion to a 
higher grade was considered only when the proportions in each grade 
was deemed to be suitable. In view of the fact that the workforce 
age structure was ageing, however, promotion under these conditions 
could not have been wholly determined by length of service.
COMPANY J
This company totally revised its wage and personnel management 
systems at the same time as raising the retirement age. Teinen encho 
was viewed as one part of, and inseparable from, the other 
revisions, although the revisions were not carried out solely to 
cope with an ageing workforce. It was felt that, with the advent of 
slower, more stable economic growth and population ageing, the best 
way to support the standard of living for workers was to improve 
productivity. Improvements in productivity would be achieved through 
clarifying the contents of jobs, developing workers' ability and 
paying workers in proportion to their ability. The company had not 
previously had a clearly-defined wage and promotion system. Wages 
were determined by age, irrespective of the job the worker was 
doing. The general revisions, and revisions made that apply only to 
older workers, will not be described separately in this case.
Business of Company
Precision instruments.
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Date of raising retirement age and new retirement age
1979, retirement age - 60.
General revisions to wage and promotion systems and revisions to 
these systems for workers past the previous retirement age.
The five goals of the revisions were the following:
1) establish systems to reward ability;
2) reduce the burden of labour costs through the introduction of
a new wage system;
3) support life-time employment and Japanese values as far as is 
possible;
4) establish a work plan system; and
5) revise customs.
The revisions that were carried out to deal with these goals were:
1) An ability development system. This comprises training and
education policies, job rotation and the laying down of
requirements for promotion through the grades. Courses were
set up specifically for older workers (over 50 years of age) 
to help them retrain or gain new qualifications which would be 
necessary for finding a new job after retirement from the 
company. Fees for attending approved courses are paid.
2) The establishment of a grade system. Pre-requisites for 
progression to each grade were established. The shortest 
number of years for staying in one grade is fixed and a limit 
is set on the number of years in each grade over which wages 
rise (in other words, limits are set on the level of wages for 
each grade). Standards necessary for each grade relating to 
performance and ability are clarified. As well as the orthodox 
management posts, there are also positions such as (topic) 
group leaders. These positions are graded rather than given a 
managerial post name. After transfer to another job, the new
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grade is decided according to job evaluation and the age of 
the transferee.
3) A revision of the worker appraisal (jinji koka) system. 
Appraisal is used for determining bonus, pay raises and grade 
promotion. The company plans its operations each year. Workers 
then are assigned specific goals that need to be achieved and 
are appraised on the results. Workers are also appraised on 
attitudes and ability. The results of appraisal are given as 
a number of appraisal points. The appraisal also throws light 
on development needs of the individual worker.
4) The establishment of a job evaluation system.
5) A new wage system. Prior to overhaul, total wages consisted of
basic pay and various allowances. The determination of basic 
pay was not clear and depended largely on age and length of 
service. Under the new system, basic pay comprises three types 
of pay: a) personal pay; b) job pay; and c) ability pay. 
Personal pay is based on living expenses, which are determined 
by reference to standardised living expenses tables. These 
tables show that the peak age for living expenses is around
50, so the company wished to reduce the absolute amount of
personal pay after this age. The unions strongly objected 
however, so the company started negative teisho after the age 
of 57. Negative teisho was not introduced to suppress the 
wages of middle-aged workers. Rather, it was introduced to be 
consistent with the concept of personal pay providing a high 
enough level of wages to meet living expenses.
Job pay is determined by job evaluation. Each job is assigned 
a job grade. Within each job grade, there are increments 
through which the worker rises as length of service increases. 
If a worker is moved to another job and the job grade is
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lower, the company will make up the difference in pay for one 
year. This transfer subsidy does not apply to workers over 55. 
The company has a managerial post retirement scheme. When a 
manager loses his post, his job grade is lowered and wages 
fall accordingly. Other workers are re-appraised at age 57 and 
if the new job grade is lower, again job pay is reduced.
Ability pay is paid according to ability grade. Within each 
grade there are yearly increments. For a set number of years, 
pay rises steeply as the worker progresses through each 
increment within the grade. After the set number of years, the 
incremental pay rises are reduced to 60% of the previous 
level. After five years of reduced increments, incremental pay 
rises are stopped. If the worker progresses to a higher 
ability grade, yearly increments are started again. Ability 
pay is reduced each year for people over 57. For 57 year olds, 
ability pay falls to 7 6% of previous level. For 5 8 year olds, 
ability pay falls to 94% of the level that it was when the 
person was 57 and so on. These pay reductions were felt to be 
a better way of reducing wages than by forcing older workers 
into a lower grade, since demotion might be viewed as a 
punishment and hence be bad for morale.
The drop in personal pay after 57, along with a drop in job 
grade, managerial post retirement and drops in ability pay are 
calculated so that under model conditions, the wages of 
workers between the ages of 57 and 59 will amount to 75% of 
the highest level of wages paid to them. The intention is to 
give the following weights to each component of basic pay: a) 
personal pay = 50%; b) job pay = 2 5%; and c) ability pay = 
2 5%.
261
6) The raising of retirement age. Early retirement provisions are 
available for workers between the age of 50 and 57 with more 
than 15 years of service to the company. The amount of 
retirement severance pay is equal to the amount that would 
have been paid if the worker had left the company at age 57. 
The multiplier for severance base pay continues to increase 
after the age of 57, but because wages fall after the age of 
57, the severance base pay amount is frozen at the 57 year old 
point. Managers relinquish their post at age 57 for a bucho 
and 55 for lower managerial positions.
7) A re-employment system for retirees. For retirees with special
skills, there is contract renewable yearly. Wages are equal to
80% of the state pension that the worker would be able to
receive.
8) The distribution of bonus by results.
9) The establishment of a company pension scheme. One 
quarter of retirement severance pay has been transformed 
into a pension, payable for 15 years.
In summary, it appears that this company has introduced grade
systems in order to increase efficiency and still relies on
qualifying the system for workers over a set age in order to reduce 
wages and stop managerial stagnation. This case study also 
demonstrates that is often difficult to disentangle changes in 
employment practices made because of ageing and those made for other 
reasons.
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CHAPTER 7 JAPANESE EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES, POPULATION AGEING AND THE 
MACRO LABOUR MARKET
Section 1 Significance of this chapter
In Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 I examined the employment practices of 
Japanese companies, the rationale behind the adoption of such 
employment practices and the response of Japanese companies in 
relation to their employment practices to the advent of population 
ageing, respectively. I concluded that firms have adopted these 
employment practices because they are the most efficient practices 
for motivating employees. I also proposed that these efficient 
practices required a young population age structure within the 
company and that companies would attempt to control the age 
structure rather than change employment practices. Although 
companies have moved to new wage and promotion systems to some 
extent, I also showed in Chapter Six that companies have instituted 
schemes for regulating the age structure of employees. Evidence of 
firms' desire to maintain a young age structure was given in the 
form of a description of firms' response to the cyclical downturns 
following the first oil shock.
It is my intention in this chapter to analyse the effect of the 
combination of Japanese employment practices and population ageing 
on the macro labour market. Primarily, I am concerned with the 
behaviour of the rate of unemployment, which I believe will rise as 
a consequence of population ageing. A rise in unemployment reflects 
an inefficient use of resources and a rise in the dependency rate: 
it can be expected to have in impact on future economic growth, as 
well as on the role of government. It is ironic that large 
companies' pursuit of efficiency may lead to the inefficient use of 
labour resources, from a macroeconomic perspective. Chapter Eight
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will describe the Japanese government's attempt to improve the 
workings of the labour market through various intervention policies.
Before more specific analysis, I would like to quote the following 
from Creedy (19 81 p 18):
In addition to their influence on the stock of unemployed 
through the scale of hiring and firing, firms will affect the 
composition of the stock because of preferences for the 
particular sorts of workers that they hire and fire.
Another quote from Creedy (1981 p 26) is also enlightening:
How far the stock of unemployed rises when there are 
redundancies depends on the overall state of the labour market 
and on the composition of redundant workers. Some workers, 
such as older persons and married women may withdraw from the 
labour force. Furthermore, the skill composition of those 
joining the unemployed will influence the duration patterns. 
With respect to the first quote, it is useful in that it states 
quite clearly just how important it is to analyse firms' behaviour 
in order to have an understanding of the causes of unemployment and 
also to derive a clear picture of the composition of the unemployed. 
In this chapter, however, I am primarily concerned with the 
behaviour of unemployment in relation to changes of labour supply 
under conditions of static product demand, although I will attempt 
to discuss the impact of changes in aggregate demand as well. The 
second quote asserts that the -composition of the unemployed will 
also be important in determining the aggregate unemployment rate. 
Thus, if the number of older workers becoming unemployed grows and 
that of other age groups declines, we might expect the unemployment 
rate to fall since older workers tend to leave the labour force. On 
the other hand, older workers tend to have a longer duration of 
unemployment, leading to a net increase in the stock of unemployed.
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These factors are discussed in detail in the following sections.
Section 2 The search for an analytical framework
Sub-section 2.1 A discussion of common approaches used to explain 
unemployment and an explanation of the methodology 
adopted in this chapter
In recent years, following the rise of unemployment rates in most 
industrialised countries including Japan, economists have tended to 
stress two main approaches for reaching a satisfactory explanation 
of this trend. The first approach stresses the rise in the
natural rate of unemployment. The natural rate of unemployment is 
a theoretical construct and cannot be measured. It refers to the 
rate of unemployment that will occur when the labour market is in 
equilibrium. It is assumed that unemployment exists even when labour 
market equilibrium is reached because information is imperfect and 
because individuals will take time to acquire new skills or to move 
from one geographical area to another. In a dynamic economy, there 
will be a constant flux of employees between different companies, 
sectors and regions. With imperfect information, this transfer 
process takes time, resulting in unemployment. The second approach 
stresses nominal wage and price rigidities that are a result of 
rational economic decisions. An example of such an approach is the 
efficiency wage hypothesis that asserts that firms do not adjust 
nominal wage levels following an aggregate demand shock for fear of 
reducing the average productivity of their workers (through loss of 
morale or increased staff turnover). Such nominal wage rigidity 
leads to demand-deficient unemployment which can be reduced through 
government policies to stimulate aggregate demand. In contrast to 
this approach, the natural rate of unemployment approach denies the 
effectiveness of aggregate demand policy and results in the policy 
prescription of increasing the efficiency of labour transfer through
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the provision of more information in the labour market and 
subsidised retraining. Finally, a more eclectic approach also 
exists, known as U-V analysis. This approach allows for the 
existence of both a natural rate of unemployment and demand- 
deficient unemployment - it can be used to disaggregate unemployment 
figures into the two main types of unemployment.
As regards the impact of population ageing on the macro unemployment 
rate, there is very little material. The usual approach is to 
calculate the effect of population ageing on the size of the labour 
force. Labour force participation rates are taken as given and the 
projected numbers in each age group are then multiplied by the 
participation rates to yield an aggregate level of labour supply. 
Future labour demand is calculated using an empirical estimation 
function. Net labour demand is calculated by subtracting the labour 
supply estimate from the labour demand estimate. Such a study was 
carried out by the Japan Development Bank {Nihon Kaihatsu Ginko 
1992). This study used an estimated Cobb-Douglas function for the 
whole economy, taking the GDP growth rate, factor productivity, the 
capital stock growth rate and the average hours worked per person 
as given. Labour force participation rates were fixed at the 1990 
level. It was estimated that excess labour demand would reach 
3,430,000 (approximately 5% of estimated labour force) people by the 
year 2000. Clearly, such an estimate is very sensitive to the 
assumptions made with respect to the GDP growth rate. The study also 
included other estimates based on differing scenarios, all of which 
gave an unemployment rate of approximately 2%.
It is not necessary to discuss the merit of the various scenarios, 
since the approach is flawed. Such an approach assumes that labour 
of different age groups are perfectly substitutable, so that the
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productivity of an older person is the same on average as that of 
a younger person. I have already discussed the hiring decisions of 
Japanese firms, which show clearly that workers of different age 
groups are not substitutable in the eyes of company personnel 
managers. Furthermore, the study assumes that labour force 
participation rates are invariant with respect to the population age 
structure. Once the assumption that workers of different age groups 
are not perfectly substitutable is accepted, it becomes feasible to 
separate the labour market into several labour markets corresponding 
to different age groups. With such segmentation of the labour 
market, it is possible for there to be a situation of excess demand 
in one labour market and excess supply in another, as supply in the 
different age groups changes. Excess demand in one segment will lead 
to an increasing labour force participation rate and to a falling 
participation rate in the segments that experience a rise in supply 
(the discouraged worker effect). It is quite feasible that a fall 
in unemployment in the excess demand market will be outweighed by 
the rise in unemployment in the excess supply market. Thus, even in 
times of a macro labour shortage, the macro unemployment rate can 
rise. It might be asserted at this point that each segmented labour 
market will clear through adjustment in the wage levels received by 
each age group. Because of the efficiency age structure hypothesis 
explained in Chapter Five, however, wages and age structure in 
internal labour markets will tend to remain within certain limits, 
whilst wages will adjust in secondary labour markets. Employment in 
secondary labour markets is less secure, however, so the natural 
rate of unemployment can be expected to change. As the general 
population ages, for a given level of aggregate demand, excess 
demand in the 'young' labour market will increase, as will excess 
supply in the 'old' labour market. Excess supply in the 'old' labour 
market will lead to a fall in relative wages throughout the whole
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of the 'old' labour market, but older workers will also find 
themselves in jobs with less security and,hence, will tend to become 
unemployed more often than if they had been able to remain in the 
internal labour market from which they were cast.
The above paragraph describes how unemployment will rise concomitant 
with population ageing. Other developments may soften the rise in 
unemployment. For example, rising old age pension levels and early 
retirement provisions may lead to reductions in labour force 
participation rates for older workers. A rising unemployment rate 
amongst older workers may also reduce the participation rate through 
the discouraged worker effect, as was mentioned above in the second 
of the quotes from Creedy. It is also possible that older workers 
will tend to become self-employed if conditions in their segment of 
the macro labour market worsens. Self-employment may become more 
likely if there is a growing proportion of older people with 
sufficient assets to enable them to secure loans for business 
development. In other words, because of the behaviour of Japanese 
firms it is expected that the flow into unemployment will increase 
amongst older workers, but it is also feasible for the flow out of 
unemployment to rise. In fact, some older workers may leave the 
labour force when they leave their job. So, in attempting to 
estimate the impact of population ageing on unemployment, it is 
necessary to consider the factors affecting the flows out of, as 
well as into, the unemployment pool.
It is clear from the above discussion that a more formal approach 
is required to analyse the future impact of population ageing on the 
macro unemployment rate in terms of flows into and out of the pool 
of unemployment. The following presents a more formal framework and 
is based mainly on a paper by Marston (197 6) , but also relies on
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Ehrenberg and Smith (1988) and Mizuno (1982). This formal framework 
is independent of the type of unemployment that is thought to exist.
Section 3 The unemployment flow approach
The stock of unemployed at any time is given by multiplying the 
number of people entering the unemployment pool in one particular 
period by the duration of unemployment. This calculation is 
analogous to multiplying the number of first year students by the 
length of the degree course to derive the total number of students 
in the university. Thus, U, the stock of unemployed, is given by
U = D{NU + EU) (7 .1)
where: D = duration (measured in a particular unit of time, often
months); NU = the number of people flowing from outside the labour 
force (non-labour force participation) into the unemployment pool; 
and EU - the number of people flowing from employment into the 
unemployment pool.
Clearly, if the flows remain the same, but the duration rises, so 
will the stock of unemployed. The duration of unemployment will 
depend on the probability of leaving the unemployment pool. If 20% 
of the unemployed leave the unemployment pool per period of time, 
the probability of leaving the unemployment pool will be 2 0%. 
Therefore, it will take five periods for all the new entrants to 
leave the unemployment pool. Thus the duration of unemployment is 
given by
D =  1--- (7.2)
(ue + un)
where: ue - the probability of finding employment and un - the
probability of deciding not to leave the labour force. Both ue and 
un are also called transition rates, because they show the rate at
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which people change from one state to another {eg ue is the rate 
at which unemployed people find employment - the meaning of these 
rates is described in detail in the notes to Table 7.1 below). It 
would now be possible to analyse the effects of population ageing 
on the unemployment rate, by examining the likely future behaviour 
of EU, NU, ue and un, but other flows and transition rates cannot 
be ignored. For example, the transition rate of flowing from 
employment to non-participation will affect the transition rate 
flowing into unemployment, rather than finding a job immediately. 
The higher is this transition rate, the lower will be the number of 
people entering the unemployment pool. Thus, we need to derive a 
more comprehensive means for determining the unemployment rate.
First, a summary of all possible flows is necessary. Table 7.1 shows 
all the possible transition rates. Figure 7.1 that follows is a 
diagrammatical representation of the transition rates.
Table 7.1 showing possible transition rates.
Et ut Nt
Et_i ee eu en
Ut-i ue uu un
Nt-x ne nu nn
Notes: E = the stock of the employed, U = the stock of
unemployed and N = non-participants in the labour force. 
The transition rates are given by dividing the number 
flowing from one state to another by the number in the 
original state before the flow occurred. For example, ue 
= UE/Ut.-L, where UE is the number of unemployed, U, in 
period t-1 who became employed by time t. The direction 
of flow is from the first letter of the transition rate 
to the second. For example, ue is the transition rate 
from U to E, that is from unemployment to employment. 
The rate nu is the rate of transition from N to U, that 
is, the rate of transition from non-labour force 
participation to unemployment.
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Figure 7.1 showing all possible labour market transition rates
Note: The transition rates enclosed by a circle are the
transition rates of not chan. labour market status.
Marston (1979) developed the tool for examining the effect of 
changes in the transition rates shown in Table 7.1 on the rate of 
unemployment by first making the assumption that the unemployment 
rate is static. In other words, the numbers flowing into 
unemployment are equal to the number flowing out of unemployment, 
and the size of the labour force is static. Such an analysis is 
analogous to the stable population analysis described in Chapter 
Two. This enables us to write the following identity:
eu. E + nu. N = (ue + un) U (7.3)
which shows that the number who become unemployed is equal to the 
number leaving unemployment. The converse of this situation in the 
unemployment pool is that the number entering employment will be 
equal to the number leaving employment, given the assumption of a 
constant labour force participation rate. Thus, the following will 
also hold:
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ue.U + ne.N = (eu + en) E (7.4)
With these two equations, it is possible to derive an expression for 
the rate of unemployment, which is given by
(7-5>
where E = the stock of employed people.
We can use Equation 7.3 to find an expression for N and then 
substitute N into the Equation 7.4. This gives the following 
equation:
ue.nu.U~ eu. ne. E = (eu + en) nu. E - (ue + un) ne .U (7.6)
which can be rearranged to give:
[ue.nu + ne(ue + un) ] U = [eu.ne + nu(eu + en) ] E (7.7)
If the Equation 7.7 is rearranged, an expression for E is given by 
the following:
E = U t ^ne +nu'i ue + ne- un1 (7.8)
[ (ne + nu) eu + nu. en]
This Equation 7.8 can now be substituted into the expression for u 
(Equation 7.5) and simplified to give:
u =
1 + (ne + nu) ue + ne. un
(7.9)
(ne + nu) eu + nu. en 
This equation shows that, ceteris paribus, an increase in eu, en and 
nu will lead to increases in the unemployment rate while decreases 
in ue, un and ne also will lead to increases in the unemployment 
rate. Increased departure rates from firms will increase eu and en, 
although it is difficult to say which transition rate will be 
affected the most. The higher pension benefits are, the more likely 
retiring older workers will move from employment to non­
participation, rather than into the unemployment pool. Increased
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possibility of employment is likely to increase the nu transition 
rate. It is possible, however, that the nu transition rate will not 
change and that a more favourable labour market for older people 
will result purely in increase in the ne rate. In either case, the 
unemployment rate will fall. If eu is rising, ue is likely to be 
falling, unless the rise in eu purely reflects an increase in labour 
turnover amongst the older age groups. An increase in the rate of 
becoming self-employed amongst older workers would raise ue. 
Finally, un can be expected to rise if finding a job becomes more 
difficult (discouraged worker effect) or non-work income (pension 
benefits) rises, but the latter factor is more likely to affect en 
than lAJt\ «
With this formal framework it is possible to make statements 
regarding the future unemployment rate for older workers. Anything 
that is likely to affect the transition rates will affect the 
unemployment rate of older workers. If the unemployment rate for 
older workers is rising whilst the proportion of the labour force 
represented by older workers is also rising due to population ageing 
then the aggregate unemployment rate will also be increasing. It is 
necessary now to investigate in more detail the factors that affect 
the various transition rates to ascertain whether they will conspire 
to increase the unemployment rate of older workers or not. First, 
however, a survey of the trends in unemployment rates in Japan and 
other labour market indicators will prove useful.
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Section 4 Unemployment and labour market conditions in Japan since 
1965
Sub-section 4.1 A general description
Table 7.2 below gives a summary of important macro labour market 
statistics. It is clear from the table that although labour force 
participation rates have been declining gradually over twenty years, 
there has been a concomitant rise in the aggregate unemployment 
rate. Compared with rates in other OECD countries the aggregate 
unemployment rate is still low (Table 7B.4 in Appendix 7B gives some 
indication of unemployment rates in OECD countries). There has been 
some controversy over the comparability of unemployment rates 
between countries and several studies have attempted to provide 
comparable statistics by adjusting published figures to provide 
numbers calculated on a common basis (Sorrentino 1984, Taira 1983), 
but Kurosaka surveys these studies and concludes that the low 
unemployment rates are not a statistical artefact (Kurosaka 1988 pp 
49 - 61) . Appendix 7A to this chapter explains the definition of 
unemployment used in this chapter in detail and also surveys the 
studies that have attempted to compare Japanese unemployment rates 
with the rates in other countries. In this chapter, an unemployed 
person is anyone who wishes to work, is capable of work, is 
available for work, has looked for a job in the week before the 
labour force survey and has not worked even one hour in the week of 
the survey. Thus, a person who does not receive unemployment 
benefits but fulfils the above criteria is unemployed. This 
definition is the one used in the labour force survey (Rodbryoku 
Chosa) and the population census (Kokusei Chosa) in Japan.
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Table 7.2 showing macro labour market statistics.
Year Labour
force
partici­
pation
rate
Unemploy­
ment rate 
(1)
Unemploy­
ment rate 
(2)
Vacancy/j ob
search
ratio
1965 65 .7 1.19 1.94 0.64
1966 65 .8 1.33 2 .12 0,73
1967 65 .9 1.26 2 . 01 1.00
1968 65.9 1.17 1.84 1.12
1969 65.5 1.12 1.75 1.30
1970 65.4 1.14 1.75 1.41
1971 65 . 0 1.23 1. 84 1.12
1972 64.4 1.40 2.06 1.16
1973 64.7 1.28 1.85 1.76
1974 63 .7 1.37 1.97 1.20
1975 63 .0 1. 88 2 .67 0.61
1976 63 .0 2 .01 2 .83 0 . 64
1977 63 .2 2 . 02 2 . 84 0.56
1978 63 .4 2.24 3 .16 0.56
1979 63 .4 2 .09 2 .93 0.71
1980 63 .3 2 . 02 2 .79 0.75
1981 63 .3 2.21 3 . 03 0.68
1982 63 .3 2.36 3.21 0.61
1983 63 . 8 2 .65 3 . 66 0 . 60
1984 63 .4 2 .72 3 .64 0.65
1985 63 .0 2 .62 3 .49 0 . 68
1986 62 .8 2 .77 3 . 67 0 . 62
Source: Kurosaka (1988) p 27, Table 1.2 and p 28, Table 1.3.
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Table 7.2 (cont.):
Notes: Unemployment rate (1) corresponds to the kanzen
shitsugyoritsu and gives the macro unemployment rate
calculated by dividing the number of unemployed by the 
number in the labour force, including the self-employed 
and family employees.
Unemployment rate (2) corresponds to the koyo
shitsugyoritsu and gives the unemployment rate
calculated by dividing the number of unemployed by the 
labour force, excluding the self-employed and family 
workers. This second rate is calculated because it is 
assumed that the self-employed tend to represent surplus 
labour.
The vacancy-job search ratio corresponds to the yuko 
kyujin bairitsu and shows the ratio of vacancies to job 
searchers recorded by the Labour Exchanges in Japan.
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This ratio also indicates the development of a looser labour market, 
particularly after the first oil shock in 1974. It is also striking 
that the labour market indicators do not improve during the next 12 
years after the oil shock. These developments in the macro labour 
market are no different from those in many other OECD labour markets 
following the first oil shock, but before attempting to put forward 
any explanations, a more disaggregated examination of the labour 
market will throw light on the subject. In accordance with the 
nature of this chapter, special emphasis will be placed on the 
labour market conditions for different demographic groups, in 
particular the older age groups.
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Sub-section 4.2 Disaggregating the macro labour market statistics 
according to gender and age. 
a) Labour force participation rates and unemployment rates 
disaggregated by gender
Table 7.3 shows the labour force participation rates and 
unemployment rates disaggregated by gender. The female labour force 
participation rates and unemployment rates rise and fall together. 
This can partly be explained by the propensity for women to leave 
the labour force rather than register as unemployed (Eguchi 1988; 
Ono 19 81, 19 89) in cyclical downturns. Thus, labour force
participation rates and unemployment rates become strongly 
correlated because of the common link of macro-economic cycles. 
Recent attempts in explaining the behaviour of the aggregate 
unemployment rate have also cited the secular rise in female labour 
force participation rates as one of the major factors, particularly 
since female labour force participation rates seem to have become 
less affected by conditions in the labour market (Eguchi 1988; 
Kurosaka 1988 p 42). The male unemployment rate has risen in spite 
of a secular decline in labour force participation of almost 4%, 
although it is possible that participation rates have fallen because 
of the rise in unemployment.
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Table 7.3 Labour force participation rates and unemployment rates 
disaggregated by gender
Year Male LF 
Partici­
pation Rate
Male Unem­
ployment 
Rate
Female LF 
Partici­
pation Rate
Female 
Unemploy­
ment Rate
1965 81.7 1.11 50 . 6 1.31
1966 81.7 1.26 50.9 1.44
1967 81. 6 1.17 51.2 1.41
1968 82 .1 1.21 50.7 1.15
1969 81.9 1.16 50 .1 1.10
1970 81. 8 1.21 49 .9 1. 04
1971 82 .2 1.29 48.8 1.15
1972 82 .1 1.49 47 .7 1.26
1973 82 .1 1.32 48 .2 1.18
1974 81.8 1.42 46.5 1.30
1975 81.4 1.98 45 .7 1.71
1976 81.2 2.20 45.8 1.69
1977 80.6 2 .13 46 . 6 1.84
1978 80 .3 2.38 47 .4 2 .02
1979 80.2 2 .15 47 . 6 1.99
1980 79 .8 2 .05 47 . 6 1.97
1981 79.8 2.26 47 .7 2.13
1982 79 .5 2.39 48 . 0 2.31
1983 79.4 2 . 67 49 . 0 2 . 62
1984 78.8 2 . 68 48.9 2 . 77
1985 78.1 2 .59 48 .7 2.66
1986 77 .8 2 . 73 48 . 6 2.80
Source: Kurosaka (1988) p 27, Table 1.2 and p 28, Table 1.3.
Notes: The unemployment rate here corresponds to the kanzen
shitsugyoritsu and gives the macro unemployment rate 
calculated by dividing the number of unemployed by the 
number in the labour force, including the self-employed 
and family employees.
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The figures might, however, show that the fall in participation 
rates have helped to mitigate the rise in unemployment. It is 
necessary to look at disaggregated labour force statistics to gain 
any insight into the reasons for a falling participation rate and 
a rising unemployment rate over time. First, I will examine the 
impact of ageing and changing labour force participation rates for 
different age groups. I will confine the examination to the male 
labour force only, since that is the object of study in this thesis.
c) Male labour force participation rates disaggregated by age 
groups
It is possible to estimate to an approximate degree the role of 
demographic change and the role of changing labour force 
participation behaviour in determining the aggregate labour force 
participation rate. In the following analysis, the role of 
demographic change on unemployment is meant in a narrow sense: it 
means the effect of the changing proportions of age groups with 
differing specific labour force participation rates. For example, 
if participation rates for all age groups remain the same over time, 
an increasing proportion of the very young or the very old in the 
working age population will reduce the aggregate labour force 
participation rate, since these groups have a low labour force 
participation rate compared with other age groups. If the working 
age population age structure remains the same, but all age-specific 
labour force participation rates fall, then the fall in the 
aggregate labour force participation will be explained totally by 
the changing labour force participation rates. Thus, it is possible 
to calculate the contribution of the two trends to explaining 
changes in the aggregate labour force participation rate.
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More formally, the aggregate labour force participation rate, A,, is 
given by:
X=J2wili ( 7 * 1 0 )
i
where: n = the number of age groups; 1± = the age-specific labour 
force participation rate for the ith age group; and wi = the 
proportion of the total working-age population accounted for by the 
ith age group.
The change in A resulting from a change in I or w in any age group 
will be given by the following total differential
dX = dw + 4 4  dl (7.11)
0 W 01
and hence, a change in A resulting from changes in 1 and w in all 
age groups will be given by
AA = ^  iiA w 1 + wiA i i (7.12)
1
For the total differential to give accurate values, the changes in 
1 and w need to be small and these variables should be independent 
of each other. It is not clear that the first of these two 
conditions hold in the following examination, since the years of 
comparison are ten years apart, leading to large potential changes 
in the variables. The second may not hold since a changing working 
age population structure may lead to changing labour market 
conditions, as a result of which, the labour force participation 
rate also changes, as explained above. Despite these problems, I 
feel that it is a useful exercise to attempt to disentangle the 
population effects and labour force participation rate effects on 
the aggregate labour force participation rate.
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Two periods were taken for comparison. The first period was 19 65 to 
1975 and the second, 1975 to 1985. First, the population structure 
of the earlier year was held constant and multiplied by the age- 
specific labour force participation rates for the second year of 
comparison. The differenc^between the actual values for the second 
year and these calculated values were then summed to give a figure 
for the total effect on X brought about by changing labour force 
participation rates. The labour force participation rates were then 
held constant at those for the starting year of the comparison and 
multiplied by the age structure obtaining in the last year of the 
period. The difference between the actual values for the final year 
and these calculated values were then summed to give a figure for 
the total effect on X brought about by a change in the working-age 
population age structure. The two effects can then be compared to 
ascertain their role in changing the aggregate labour force 
participation rate. Tables 7.4 and 7,5 show the results.
282
Table 7.4 showing results of analysis to find the cause of changes
in the aggregate labour force participation rate
Age range For the period from 1965 to 1975
diff in 
popn. (%)
diff in 
LFP (%)
diff in X 
if 1965 
popn.
diff in X 
if 1965 
LFP rates
15 to 19 -5.75 -15 .3 -2.38 -2 .22
20 to 24 -1.55 -8.0 -1.02 -1.35
25 to 29 1.42 -0.1 -0.01 1.39
30 to 34 -0.46 0.3 0.04 -0 .45
35 to 39 -0.30 0.3 0.30 -0.30
40 to 44 2 .43 0.1 0.01 2.39
45 to 49 2.58 0.1 0.01 2 .53
50 to 54 0 .17 0.3 0.02 0 .10
55 to 59 -0.36 0.9 0 .05 -0 .33
60 to 64 0.06 0.2 0 .01 0.05
65 plus 1.76 -5.4 -0 .41 0.97
Total - - -3 . 66 2 . 84
Age range For the period from 1975 to 1985
(2) 
diff in 
popn. (%)
(3) 
diff in 
lab. 
force 
part. (%)
(4)
diff in X 
if 1975 
popn.
(5)
diff in X 
if 1975 
LFP rates
15 to 19 0.17 -4.1 -0 .40 0 .04
20 to 24 -2 .12 -4.4 -0 .49 -1. 68
25 to 29 -4.60 -0 . 8 -0 .11 -4 .50
30 to 34 -1.39 -0 . 6 -0 . 07 -1.37
35 to 39 1.50 -0.3 -0.03 1.48
40 to 44 -0.21 0 0 . 00 -0.20
45 to 49 0.01 -0.1 -0 . 01 0 . 01
50 to 54 2.19 -0.4 -0.03 2 .13
55 to 59 2.30 -1.6 -0 .08 2 .17
60 to 64 0.47 -7.1 -0 .33 0 .40
65 plus 1.70 -8.1 -0.76 0 .84
Total - - -2.30 -0 . 68
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Table 7.4 (cont.)
Source: Population age structure figures for the years 19 65 and
1975 from Sorifu Tokeikyoku (1983a) pp 88-93, and for 
1985 from Koseisho Jinko Mondai Kenkyujo (19 91) p 32. 
Labour force participation rates also from Koseisho 
Jinko Mondai Kenkyujo (1991) p 89.
Notes: The term population in the table refers to the working
age population, which is assumed to be the population 
above and including the age of 15. Column (2) gives the 
differences between the percentage of the working age 
population of the first year and the last year of the 
period - the proportion of the total working age 
population each age group represents in the last year 
minus the same in the starting year. Column (3) shows 
the difference between the labour force participation 
rate (LFP) in the last year of the period and the 
starting year. Column (4) shows the difference in the 
age-specific term which is summed to give the aggregate 
labour force participation rate, X,  if the population 
age structure had not changed over the period. Column 
(5) shows the difference in the age-specific term which 
is summed to give the aggregate labour force 
participation rate, X,  if the age-specific labour force 
participation rates had not changed over the period.
Table 7.5 showing results of analysis to find the cause of changes
in the aggregate labour force participation rate
Item 1965 to 
1975
1975 to 
1985
Actual difference in X 0 . 08 -3 .08
Difference in X if popn. held 
constant
-3 . 66 -2.30
Difference in X if LFP held constant 2 . 84 -0.68
Total estimated difference in X -0 . 82 -2.98
Proportion in estimated difference 
accounted for by LFP changes
-446% -77%
Proportion in estimated difference 
accounted for by changes in the 
population age structure
346% -23%
Sources: Same as for Table 7.4.
Note: For method of calculation see text above.
From 19 65 to 197 5, the change in the working age population age 
structure (ageing) led to a rise in the aggregate labour force 
participation rate (X)  , since the proportion of the working age 
population in the age groups with high age-specific labour force 
participation rates increased greatly. This effect was so great that 
it more or less cancelled out the large negative effect on X caused
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by falling age-specific labour force participation rates amongst the 
very young (15-24) and the old (65+). From 1975 to 1985, however, 
age-specific labour force participation rates fell for all age 
groups. This trend explains roughly 77% of the fall in X.  
Furthermore approximately 50% of the fall in X attributed to falling 
age-specific labour force participation rates is accounted for by 
those above the age of 50, although this age group accounted for 
only 25% of the working age population in 1975 and 32% in 1985. 
Unlike in the 1965-1975 period, this fall in X due to changes in 
labour force participation was not mitigated by an ageing working 
age population. The population effect also had a negative effect, 
caused by a large fall in the proportion of the under-40 age groups 
in the working age population that wiped out the positive age effect 
caused by the higher proportions of the working age population in 
the older age groups.
In summary, the aggregate labour force participation rate has been 
falling over time and in particular since 1975. Furthermore, the 
analysis above shows that approximately 77% of the change in X since 
197 5 is accounted for by falling age-specific participation rates 
and that much of this effect can be attributed to the falling 
participation rates of the older age groups.
d) Male unemployment rates disaggregated by age
A similar analysis was performed to gauge the role of different age 
groups in producing the rise in the aggregate male unemployment 
rate. Tables 7.6 and 7.7 summarise the results.
285
Table 7.6 showing results of the analysis to find the causes of the
secular rise in the unemployment rate.___________________________
1965 to 
1975
1975 to 
1985
Actual difference in unemployment 
rate
1.4 0.6
Difference if labour force structure 
held constant
1.6 0.6
Difference if unemployment rate held 
constant
-0.03 -0 . 02
Total estimated difference in 
unemployment rate
1.57 0.58
Percent of change accounted for by 
change in unemployment rates
102% 103.4%
Percent of change accounted for by 
change in age structure of labour 
force
-2% -3.4%
Source: The figures used were taken from the Rodoryoku Chosa. for
the relevant years. See Sorifu Tokeikyoku (19 66), (197 6)
and Somucho Tokeikyoku (1986).
Note: The figures for 19 65 are yearly averages of monthly
figures. Yearly figures were not published until the 
1968 survey (see Sorifu Tokeikyoku 1977 p 173) . The 
figures are for men.
From Table 7.6 it can be seen that over the whole period of 1965-
1985 the trend rise in the unemployment rate is explained by rises
in the unemployment rates for all age groups. In fact, the impact
of a changing labour force age structure was very slightly negative,
caused mainly by the large falls of men below the age of 2 5 entering
the labour force, and falling labour force participation rates in
the older age groups. Table 7.7 shows the proportion of men above
55 in the male labour force; the percentage of unemployed men above
55 out of all male unemployment; and the contribution men above 55
made to the rise in the aggregate male unemployment rate, calculated
from the results of this analysis.
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Table 7.7 showing results of the analysis to find the causes of the
secular rise in the unemployment rate.
1965 1975 1985
Percentage of men above 55 
in labour force (A)
15.9% 15.5% 18 .5%
Percentage of men above 55 
in total male unemployment 
(B)
11.1% 21.2% 30.1%
Difference between rows A 
and B (C)
-4.8% 5.7% 11.7
Percentage of change in 
unemployment rate accounted 
for men above 55 (D)
- 21% 52%
Percentage of D accounted 
for by changing 
unemployment rates
- 100% 70%
Source: The figures used were taken from the Rodoryoku Chosa for
the relevant years. See Sorifu Tokeikyoku (1966), (1976) 
and Somucho Tokeikyoku (1986).
Note: The figures are for men. The last row shows the
contribution of the above 55 age group to the rise in 
the unemployment over the preceding ten years to the 
date given in the respective column.
Table 7.7 above shows that the older age groups accounted for a
lower proportion of total unemployment than of the aggregate labour
force in 1965. The situation reversed itself by 1975 and the
divergence continued to increase up to 1985. Moreover the percentage
of the total rise in the unemployment rate accounted for by the
older age groups increased from 21% to 52%. The proportion of these
two figures accounted for by changes in the unemployment rates was
100% and 70% for the two periods.
These results combined with the results of the analysis for the 
labour force participation rates indicate that although labour force 
participation rates were falling for the older age groups, causing 
much of the fall in the aggregate labour force participation rate, 
the rise in the unemployment rate came to be explained to a greater 
and greater extent by the increase in unemployment experience of the 
older age groups.
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e) Other labour market indicators disaggregated by age
Another useful measure of labour market conditions for each age 
group is given by the vacancy-job search ratio (yuko kyujin 
bairitsu). The statistics are collected by public labour exchanges 
(kokyo shokugyo anteisho) throughout Japan and the ratio shows the 
number of vacancies recorded by the offices divided by the number 
of job searchers making an application to the offices. Additional 
vacancy and job search information gleaned from newspapers and 
private agencies is not included. Furthermore, vacancies for school 
leavers are not included (Rdddsho 1992) . Table 7.8 below shows the 
vacancy-job search ratio for years spanning 1973 to 1985 for each 
age group. The ratio given shows the ratio of the number of 
vacancies to job searchers over a three month period.
Table 7.8 showing male vacancy-job search ratios from 1973 to 1985.
Year All 15-29 30-44 45-54 55-59 60-64 65+
1973 2.26 2 .54 2.98 1 . 91 0 . 75 0 . 51 0 . 16
1975 0.65 0.91 0 .92 0 . 40 0 . 15 0 . 08 0. 03
1980 0 .77 1.19 0.94 0 .58 0 .26 0 .16 0. 06
1981 0.72 1. 14 0 . 89 0 .50 0 .21 0 .13 0.05
1982 0.59 0 .92 0 .79 0 .40 0 .16 0 .10 0.04
1983 0 . 61 0. 98 0.86 0 .42 0 .14 0. 09 0 .04
1984 0 . 66 1. 03 0 . 92 0.47 0 .16 0. 10 0 .04
1985 0.67 0.91 0 .97 0 .49 0 .16 0.10 0.15
A (%) 70.35 64 . 17 67.45 74 .34 78 .67 80 .39 6.25
Source: Romu Gyosei Kenkyujo (19 86). Originally from Rodosho
Shokugyo Antei Gyomu Tokei, for the years given.
Notes: The last row labelled A shows the percentage fall in the
ratio between 1973 and 1985 and is calculated using the 
following formula:
((1973 rate - 1985 rate)/1973 rate) x 100.
It is clear from Table 7.8 that the ratio deteriorated over the 
period for all age groups. Even in 1973, the ratio for the older age 
groups (55+) was much lower than for the younger age groups and by
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1985 fell to extremely low levels. The last row of Table 7.8 shows 
the percentage fall in the ratio for each age group that was 
calculated to give a crude measure of the severity of the 
deterioration in the labour market for each age group. Over this 
period, the older groups faced a much sharper deterioration in the 
labour market conditions, since the fall in ratio is between 10 and 
16 percent greater for the older age groups than for the youngest 
age group. Furthermore, the 1992 Labour White Paper (Rodosho 1992 
p 25, and Appendix p 20) notes that although the ratio improved 
dramatically from 19 89 onwards for all age groups, the ratio for the 
55-64 age group still remained low, in spite of the increase in 
aggregate demand in the economy during the years following
1988.
Sakurai and Suzuki (no date) analyse the trends in various types of 
mismatch that have occurred in the period 1971 to 19 85 using U-V 
analysis in an attempt to explain the secular rise in the macro 
unemployment rate in Japan. One form of mismatch that they analyse 
is the mismatch between age groups. For male labour force 
participants they found that mismatch increased over the period 
largely because of an increasing surplus demand for labour amongst 
the 20-24 and 25-29 year old age groups and an increasing excess 
supply of labour in the 55-64 year old age group. The indicator of 
mismatch that was used did display a procyclical nature. In other 
words when aggregate demand was high, the amount of mismatch 
declined, since some of the excess supply of older workers was 
eliminated. Nonetheless, the secular increase in mismatch across the 
business cycle in the period 1971-1985 does indicate that the 
natural rate of unemployment has increased because of growing age 
mismatch concurrent with population ageing.
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f) Conclusion from detailed analysis of the labour market by 
disaggregation
The results of the component analysis undertaken above show that it 
is the rising unemployment of older age groups that is responsible 
for much of increase in the male aggregate unemployment rate in 
Japan. The increasing proportion? of the older age groups in the 
labour force have contributed slightly to this rise in unemployment. 
The section showed that the rise in unemployment of older men has 
occurred while their labour force participation rates have been 
falling rapidly. It is possible that a discouraged worker effect has 
led to the fall in labour force participation rates, or other 
factors, such as fuller pension coverage, may be responsible. It is 
clear, however, that unemployment of older men has increased despite 
the fall in labour force participation rates. This fact appears to 
confirm the implications of the efficiency age structure hypothesis 
that was discussed in Chapter Five.
Section 5 An examination of the future trends in labour market 
transition rates of older men 
Sub-section 5.1 Further discussion of transition rate
To be able to gauge the future effect of ageing on the aggregate 
male unemployment rate, I shall use the unemployment flows framework 
developed in Section Three above. In this sub-section, I shall 
examine the possible behaviour of labour market and employment 
transition rates of older men. Ideally I tvovi/4 I\l<Z'h>US& the
transition rates of different age groups estimated from survey data. 
Unfortunately, only flow data for the whole of the working-age 
population and not disaggregated by age groupQKO. available (Mizuno 
1982 p 14). Hence the following examination will go no further than 
suggesting the future trends in the transition rates. Although there
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are six transition rates that explain the unemployment rate, the 
headings for the sections below only refer to two main transition 
rates. This is because the factors which affect these transition 
rates also affect the other transition rates: to avoid repetition, 
the other transition rates are mentioned briefly under the two main 
headings. The discussion of the ue transition rate also pertains to 
the eu and ne transition rates and the discussion of the un 
transition rate is also pertinent for the un, en and nu transition 
rates, as will be explained in the following two sub-sections.
Sub-section 5.2 The ue transition rate
The emphasis of this sub-section is placed on the ue transition 
rate, but first, I will briefly summarise the arguments given in 
this and past chapters that relate to the eu transition rate, since 
the reasons for a rising eu transition rate are also relevant for 
a falling ue transition rate. It is expected that with the ageing 
of the population, firms will attempt to maintain an efficiency age 
structure, for reasons explained in Chapter Five. Thus, with a 
rising proportion of the labour supply occupied by men over the age 
of 55, the proportion of that age group expected to leave the 
company either upon retirement or earlier or shortly after 
retirement, will rise. This rise will in turn result in a rise in 
the eu rate.
The ue transition rate will be affected by the likelihood of being 
hired by a company or setting up one's own business. For people in 
the .older age groups, hiring by the larger companies is very 
unlikely since it is precisely these companies 4'hcv4" V'ViS’h 4o rid 
themselves of older workers. It is often believed that employment 
in smaller companies and self-employment are the main means of 
avoiding unemployment for older people in Japan. I will try here to
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examine the likelihood of the future absorption of older people into 
these two types of employment separately.
a) Employment in smaller companies
Here, the term smaller companies refers to companies with less than 
100 employees. There seems to be much evidence showing that older 
workers are absorbed by smaller companies. Most evidence is less 
than perfect, however. Smaller companies have a much older employee 
age structure than larger companies, as shown in Chapter Three. Such 
a fact is taken to imply that the age structure is older because 
smaller companies take on the older workers that other companies do 
not want. It is equally possible, however, that the age structure 
is older because smaller companies tend to keep on their older 
workers. Also, as discussed in Chapter Four, older workers from 
larger companies may be transferred to smaller companies that have 
contractual relations with the larger company, either upon 
retirement or a few years before reaching retirement age. Such 
transfers have probably been beneficial to the smaller companies in 
the past and they have been able to absorb the low number of older 
workers that were pushed their way. Chapter Four also presents 
figures relating to the movement between companies following 
retirement. A more indirect piece of evidence is provided by 
following a retirement age cohort in the labour force. The number 
in that age group employed in each size of company falls as they 
age, except for the number employed in companies with fewer than 100 
employees, which, conversely, actually increases. This is discussed 
in more depth in Chapter Four. From these observations, it seems 
that the claim that smaller companies are absorbers of older workers 
is to some extent correct, but that also their absorption role might 
not be as large as is thought. It is also possible that smaller 
companies will not be able to absorb ever increasing numbers of
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retirees. Unfortunately, there is very little survey material 
relating to employment of older people in smaller companies and the 
e x t a n t afC relatively old. Two surveys carried out by the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Council (Tokyo Toritsu Rodo Kenkyujo 197 9 and 1984) do 
throw some light on the possibilities presented above. The sample 
numbers are small, but the surveys are better than no material at 
all.
i) General survey comments
The survey carried out by Tokyo Metropolitan Council in 1978 (Tokyo 
Toritsu Rodo Kenkyujo 1979) covered firms with between 1 and 29 
workers in the Tokyo area. The survey was split into three parts. 
One part of the survey was sent to the company, another part 
consisted of interviews with the owners of the businesses and the 
third part consisted of interviews with employees. The results of 
the second part will be presented later, when the possibility of 
becoming self-employed is examined. The questions were all related 
to the nature and views of workers aged over 50 years of age. Only 
the results relating to men will be presented, unless it is 
impossible to disaggregate the data by gender. Table 7.9 below shows 
some general figures showing the nature of employment and the ratio 
of older workers in each size of establishment.
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Table 7.9 showing the proportion of employees and the self-employed
who are over the age of 50. __ _____________________
No. of 
employ 
-ees
Self-employed Employees All
A B A B A B
1-4 59.3 35.4 5.7 12 .1 27 .7 28.7
5-9 19.8 36 . 0 13 .3 13 .4 16.0 19 . 6
10-19 9.0 34.7 16.2 15.0 13 . 2 17 . 8
20-29 3.3 36.9 9 . 6 15 .2 7 . 0 17 .1
30-99 5.6 40.0 24.5 13 .4 16.8 14.7
100 + 3.0 50.0 30.6 9.5 19 .3 10.1
All 100 36.0 100 13 .7 100 16.7
Source: Tokyo Toritsu Rodo Kenkyujo (1979) p 9.
Notes: The self-employed here consist of the owners of
individual businesses/ family members working for the 
family business and paid directors. The employees here 
consist of normal employees, temporary and day workers. 
Column A shows the percentage of all older workers in 
each size of establishment. Column B shows the
proportion of workers in each category accounted for by 
older workers (50 years of age and above). The figures
presented here are not the results of the survey, but
are figures calculated by the authors of the survey for 
general illustration purposes. The proportion of older 
workers (50 years of age and above) in each category 
(see column B) are proportions for the whole of Japan, 
whereas the structure of establishments by size is that 
for Tokyo only.
Table 7.9 shows that the proportion of workers who are above 50 does 
indeed rise the smaller the company. The rise however, is largely 
explained by the proportion of workers who are self-employed in 
smaller companies. This high proportion compensates for the smaller 
percentage of all self-employed who are above the age of 50.
ii) Are older workers more likely to stay with smaller companies?
Establishments were also asked whether they had a mandatory 
retirement age or guidelines for retirement. Of the 2-4 employee 
establishments, 9 6.7% had no retirement policy. The figure fell as 
the size of the establishment increased and for companies of between 
20 and 29 employees, the figure was 53.2%. Out of the 53.2% of 20
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to 29 employee companies that did have a retirement policy, however, 
62.7% of companies only enforced retirement on a discretionary basis 
(Tokyo Toritsu Rodo Kenkyujo 1979 p 306). In other words, small 
companies are much less likely to have a strict retirement policy. 
This fact is also borne out by the long length of service that their 
employees had: 33% of men over 50 had a length of service of over 
2 0 years. In the Tokyo Metropolitan Council 19 82 survey, 15 of the 
18 manufacturing companies had a retirement policy of which 8 had 
a retirement age of 60 and the others had retirement ages below 60 
(Tokyo Toritsu Rodo Kenkyujo 19 84 p 38) . Thirteen of these companies 
had some form of re-employment system with one year renewable 
contracts for retirees, so that some firms have employees well into 
their seventies. It should be noted, however, that those companies 
which re-employed a large number of their retirees also had a 
relatively young workforce age structure.
iii) Evidence of movement across company scale
The establishment survey enquired into the previous workplace in 
which employees had worked for the longest period. The present 
workplace accounted for 41.5% of previous workplaces, another 
establishment (as employee) for 35.1% and self-employment for 11.2% 
(the rest were unknown) (Tokyo Toritsu Rodb Kenkyujo 1979 p 41) . The 
figure for the present workplace tends to fall as the age of the 
employee rises, from 52.6% for the 50 to 54 age group to 24.1% for 
the 75+ age group (Tokyo Toritsu Rodo Kenkyujo 1979 p 147), which 
would tend to imply that many of the older workers have moved from 
other companies with the coming of retirement age.
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Table 7.10 below shows the size of the company in which those 
questioned worked longest, previous to the present small company. 
Table 7.10 showing workplace of longest service.
Age Publi 
c CO  .
1-9 10-29 30-99 100-
299
300 + NK
50-54 7.9 29.4 17 . 5 11.9 7.9 20.6 4.8
55-59 4.9 29.2 20.8 14.6 4.2 20.8 5 . 6
60-64 9.4 18.0 12 . 8 14.5 9.4 30.8 5.1
65-69 7 . 9 15.8 12 .9 9 . 9 9.9 36.6 6.9
70-74 5.6 22 .2 13 .9 5 . 6 11.1 27 . 8 13 . 9
754- 6.3 25.0 0.0 6.3 18 . 8 37.5 6.3
All 7.2 23 .7 15.7 12 .2 8.2 26.9 6.1
Source: Tokyo Toritsu Rodo Kenkyujo (1979) p 160.
Notes: NK denotes not known. Public co. are public
corporations. The headings to each column show the size 
of the workplace in terms of employee numbers.
Moreover, the percentage of those replying that they moved because
they reached retirement age rises with age from virtually zero for
those in the 50-54 age group to 20.1% in the 55 to 59 age group,
37.6% in the 60 to 64 age group and 46.5% in the 64 to 69 age group
(Tokyo Toritsu Rodo Kenkyujo 197 9 p 163).
Roughly a quarter of all older workers come from companies with more 
than 3 00 employees and the proportion tends to rise with age. It 
seems that the role of these smaller companies in absorbing retirees 
and older workers from larger firms is confirmed, but it should also
be noted that approximately 40% of older workers that moved
transferred from small company to small company. Unfortunately, 
Table 7.10 above only gives the provenance of all transferees and 
it is not possible to give accurate figures for the provenance of 
retirees (rather than transferees) from the available data. Table 
7.11 below summarises the reasons for transfer and shows that 
roughly 25% of those who have moved, moved when they reached
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retirement age in their previous company. In the light of the data 
presented above, the percentage of such workers would be higher in 
the higher age groups.
Table 7.11 showing reason for moving of older employees.
Continuing and long length of 
service
41.5
Moved after collapse of own 
business
11.2
Was a helper in the family 
business, previously
0.3
Found work after retiring from 
previous company
14.3
Found work after employment 
adjustment in previous firm
9.3
Moved because of 
dissatisfaction
4.5
Moved for mental, physical or 
family reasons
7.1
Not known 11.9
Source: Tokyo Toritsu Rodo Kenkyujo (197 9) p 51.
The results of the Tokyo Metropolitan Council 1982 (Tokyo Toritsu 
Rodo Kenkyujo 19 84) survey seem to support strongly the hypothesis 
that smaller companies, particularly in the service sector hire 
older workers who have been retired from other companies. The 
average age of older workers is about 60 years of age and the
average length of service lies between 5 and 7 years. Thus, it
would appear that these older workers transferred to their present 
position at the age of 55, the most common retirement age for that 
age group (Tokyo Toritsu Rodo Kenkyujo 1984 pp 49, 53).
iv) Absorption capacity of smaller firms
The Tokyo Metropolitan Council 197 8 survey also asked the companies 
whether they intended to hire workers above the age of 50 in the 
future or not. Approximately 16% responded that they would hire 
older workers, whilst the remainder, 81% excluding non-response,
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replied that they had no such intention (Tokyo Toritsu Rod5 Kenkyujo 
1979 p 107) . It was felt by the surveyors that many of the companies 
had no intention of hiring, regardless of the age of prospective 
employees. Therefore, another measure was computed to reflect more 
closely the willingness of companies to hire older workers. This 
measure was obtained by deducting the number of firms not intending 
to hire any workers at all from the number not intending to hire 
older workers and adding this number to the number of firms willing 
to hire generally. The number of firms giving a positive response 
to the hiring of older workers question was then divided by this new 
denominator to give a measure of willingness. The results of these 
calculations are presented below in Table 7.12, disaggregated by 
size of establishment.
Table 7.12 showing willingness of small companies to hire new 
workers.
Size of firm 
(No. of workers)
Willingness to hire older 
workers (%)
1 worker 11. 8
2 to 4 19 .9
5 to 9 33 . 7
10 to 19 47 . 9
20 to 29 50.0
3 0 plus 33 . 6
All sizes 29.4
Source: Tokyo Toritsu Rodo Kenkyujo (1979) p 107, Table 1-31.
Notes: See above for derivation of the willingness to hire
measure.
The results show that on average only 3 0% of the firms intended to 
hire older workers in future. There are noticeable differences in 
the willingness to hire across size of company, with the companies 
with between 10 and 29 workers most willing to hire. The firms that 
responded positively to the hiring question were also asked the
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reason for their positive attitude. The most popular reason given 
was that they wished to hire younger workers, but were unable to do 
so (33.8%) . The next two most popular reasons were: a) older workers 
have superior skills (17.3%); and b) they are meticulous (10.9%). 
The most prevalent reason for hiring older workers and the 
willingness to hire figures combined do not indicate a large future 
capacity of smaller firms for absorbing older workers.
The Tokyo Metropolitan Council 1982 survey also was concerned with 
the future hiring intentions of the companies that were questioned. 
Eleven out of eighteen manufacturing firms responded that they had 
no desire to hire older workers (Tokyo Toritsu Rodo Kenkyusho 1984 
p 29) . Three of the eleven companies said that they needed to create 
a younger workforce, one firm was concerned that in the future it 
would have many retirees that it would be expected to keep on, one 
firm felt that its present age structure was ideal. These replies 
indicate that a large proportion of the firms showed concern for the 
age structure of their workforce and moreover did not want an older 
age structure. Two of the firms that said they would hire older 
people said they would do so only because it was difficult to hire 
younger people. The results for the same question posed to service 
companies show that only two out of twelve firms were interested in 
hiring older workers in future (Tokyo Toritsu Rodo Kenkyujo 1984 p 
86). Moreover, all of the firms that did not intend to hire older 
workers expressed a desire to either concentrate on hiring younger 
workers or to maintain their present age structure. It should be 
borne in mind that, on average, the proportion of workers above the 
age of 55 in the service companies was 35% compared with 23% in the 
manufacturing companies. These results were supported by the fact 
that in all companies but two, the number of older people retiring 
was much higher than the number of older people being hired over a
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one year period, in spite of the fact that 3/4 of the firms did hire 
new staff. This trend was also believed to have been occurring for 
2 to 3 years previous to the survey (Tokyo Toritsu Rodo Kenkyujo 
1984 p 59).
b) The self-employed
A high proportion of older workers have been, and still are, self- 
employed (including those working for the head of a family business) 
and owners of businesses. For example, in 1980, 42.8% of male
workers in the 60 to 64 age group were employees, 10.6% were company 
directors and 46.5% belonged to the self-employed and owners of 
businesses. These proportions compare with 75%, 5.5% and 19.5%
respectively for the 35 to 39 age group (Sorifu Tokeikyoku 1983b p 
102). There are two main problems with this interpretation of the 
data. Firstly, the presence of a cohort effect, rather than a flow 
effect, may be more important in explaining the high proportion of 
older workers in some form of self-employment. In other words, the 
people who are currently above 55 years of age started work when the 
industrial structure and employment structure in Japan was rather 
different. For example, some of the present older workers who are 
self-employed work in the agricultural sector. These workers would 
have started agricultural work when the primary sector accounted for 
a much larger part of the Japanese economy and they have become 
"locked in" to this type of work. The self-employment rate amongst 
younger cohorts is not expected to be as high when they reach the 
same age as the present cohort, since they started work in different 
sectors of the economy that have a lower prevalence of self- 
employment. This cohort effect may be particularly large in Japan 
because of her rapid economic development since the Second World 
War. The second problem is that it is not at all clear that the 
proportion of older workers who are self-employed is high because
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of an inflow of ex-employees. These two problems are examined below. 
Finally, however, I would like to add that the proportion of older 
workers who are self-employed may be higher than in other age groups 
purely because it is these older workers who are able to continue 
working at an older age, since they decide their own retirement age.
The table below shows the distribution of the workers in each age 
group across three categories of employment, which are employees, 
directors and self-employed. The self-employed category includes the 
individual self-employed, owners of businesses that employ other 
people and people who work for the family business.
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Table 7.13 showing the work status of different age groups.
Age
group
Employ­
ees
Directors Self-
employed
(1)
Self-
employed
(2)
Family
workers
All 70.8 5.6 4.8 15.1 3 . 6
15-19 90.7 0.4 0.5 0.8 7 . 6
20-24 90.1 0.7 0.7 1.7 6.9
25-29 86.4 1.7 1.7 4.1 6.0
30-34 80.2 3.6 3.9 7.7 4.6
35-39 75 . 0 5.5 5.9 10 .9 2.7
40-44 69 .9 6.6 6.7 14.8 2.0
45-49 65 .9 7.3 6.9 18.7 1.3
50-54 64 . 0 7.7 6.2 21.3 0.8
55-59 56.5 9.5 6.2 26.9 0.9
60-64 42 . 8 10. 6 6.4 37.2 2.9
65-69 33 .4 10.9 6.8 44.7 4.4
70-74 23 .4 11.7 6.8 49 . 6 8 . 5
75-79 16.0 13 .8 6.6 49 . 6 14.1
80-84 11.3 16.0 6.9 48.2 17 .5
85 + 10.4 16.9 7.6 43 .9 18.2
65 + 27 .4 11.7 6.8 46.8 7.3
Source: Sorifu Tokeikyoku (1983b) p 102, Table 5-10.
Notes: Self-employed (1) employ other workers as well, whereas
self-employed (2) do not employ any other workers.
Table 7.13 above shows very clearly that as age increases, the
percentage of the working population who are employees falls very
noticeably and the percentage who are self-employed and without
employees rises the most dramatically. In order to examine whether
a cohort effect is one of the major causes of this trend across age
groups, it is necessary to have the data shown in the table above,
but for earlier years. It would then be possible to see if the
proportion of older workers in self-employment is falling over time,
indicating that the changing industrial structure of the Japanese
economy is responsible for the seemingly high propensity of older
workers to become self-employed. Unfortunately, data for the
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percentage of the working population in each form of employment and 
also disaggregated by age group (as shown in Table 7.13 above) is 
only available from published census data since the publication of 
the 1980 population census. It is possible, however, to examine the 
cohort effect indirectly by using the data presented in earlier 
population censuses relating to the form of employment in each 
industry and also using data from the same censuses giving the 
number of people in each socio-economic group for five year age 
groups. The first step in the procedure is to identify the 
industrial classification categories in which the prevalence of 
self-employment is high. The second step is to then identify which 
socio-economic groups defined in the census survey correspond to the 
industrial classifications with high self-employment rates. The 
third and final task is to calculate the proportion of each age 
group that belong to the different forms of employment (employee, 
self-employed etc) . The following describes the results of following 
this procedure using data from the 19 65 and 197 5 population 
censuses.
Table 7.14 below shows the broad industrial classifications which 
contain the highest proportion of self-employed people for the whole 
of the male working population. The shares of the number of self- 
employed in each industry out of the total number of self-employed 
are shown, as is the cumulative distribution of the self-employed 
across the industries with large shares. The table shows that nearly 
all of male self-employment occurs in five major industrial 
classifications, with much more than half of the self-employed 
working in agriculture and the wholesale and retail trade.
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Table 7.14 showing the ranking of broad industrial classifications 
with the largest share of self-employed and the corresponding 
cumulative distribution.
Ran­
king
IC
let­
ter
Industrial
classification
(IC)
Share of total 
self-employed 
(%)
Cumulative 
distribution 
of self- 
employed (%)
1 A Agriculture 37 . 63 37 . 63
2 G Wholesale & 
retail
23 .41 61.04
3 E Construction 11.45 72 . 49
4 F Manufacturing 11.14 83 .63
5 L Services 10.47 94.1
Sources: Sorifu Tokeikyoku (1978) pp 214 - 223, Table 6.
Notes: The survey was undertaken in 1975. The figures are for
the male population. Here, self-employed workers are 
those belonging to the following categories (the 
proportion of the total number of self-employed 
accounted for by each category is shown in brackets): a) 
owners of businesses who employ other people (17.15%),
b) owners of businesses with no employees (66.13%), c) 
family workers (people who work for a business whose 
head is a member of the family) (16.47%) and d) out­
workers (0.25%). The industrial classification letter 
corresponds to the letter used in the population census. 
There are 14 classification categories in total.
In the 1970 and 1975 population censuses there are 22 socio-economic
classifications. Here the following socio-economic classifications
are believed to correspond most closely to the self-employed in the
industries identified above: a) agricultural workers (agricultural
employees not included), b) shop proprietors, c) factory proprietors
and d) service shop and other proprietors. Other socio-economic
categories also include the self-employed as well as employees, but
are excluded from this list since they do not seem to correspond
closely to the relevant industrial classification and the
requirement that the majority of the people included in such a
classification are self-employed. For example, the category "sales
workers" does correspond to the industrial classification of the
wholesale and retail trade, but it includes employees as well as the
self-employed and moreover, the majority of the self-employed in
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this industrial category is probably already counted in the socio­
economic groups "shop proprietors" and "service shop and other 
proprietors". Hence, the male working population is divided into two 
groups, one being the self-employed belonging to the socio-economic 
groups listed above and the other being those workers belonging to 
all other socio-economic groups. The working age population is also 
split into two age groups: a) those below the age of 55 and b) those 
above the age of 55. Table 7.15 below shows the proportion of the 
people in the two age groups in the self-employed and non-self- 
employed categories for the years 1970 and 1975.
Table 7.15 showing the proportion the two forms of work accounted 
for by the above and below 55 year old age groups.
Age group Year Self-employed
(%)
Other (%)
Above 5 5
1970 43 .69 56.31
1975 38.30 61.70
Below 55
1970 16.16 83 .84
1975 13 .58 86 .54
Sources: For 1970: Sorifu Tokeikyoku (1974) pp 728 -259, Table
24; and for 197 5: Sorifu Tokeikyoku (1978) pp 978 -
1009, Table 14.
Notes: The figures do not include people who are out-workers,
since they account for such a small proportion of the 
male self-employed. Here, column 4, the self-employed, 
corresponds to those in socio-economic groups 1, 4, 5
and 6 as defined in the population censuses. Column 5,
other, represents those in all other socio-economic
groups, excluding number 18 (out-workers).
It appears from Table 7.15, that there is a very strong cohort
effect. In only five years, the percentage of the self-employed in
the 55 plus age group has fallen by nearly 5%, indicating that as
present younger generations become older, the rate of self-
employment will fall. The population below 55 has an extremely low
self-employment rate, suggesting that as these lower age groups
become older, the self-employment rate will also drop sharply. If
the trend in the self-employment rate is examined for five year age
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groups, it is clear that the rate almost always increases with age 
(see Table 7.16 below). Thus, the low self-employment rate for 
workers below the age of 55 does not necessarily mean the rate will 
remain low as they become older.
Although Table 7.15 above does show a cohort effect, a more detailed 
attempt to assess the size of the cohort effect was undertaken. The 
change in the self-employment rate was calculated for each age group 
as they aged by five years from 1970 to 1975. These rates were 
subsequently used to calculate the self-employment rate that would 
have obtained in 1975 if there had not been any cohort effect. In 
other words, the changes in SE rates were calculated by following 
a single generation over time and so these changes are the changes 
that could be expected if there were no cohort or generational 
effects that are present in any cross-sectional data. If the changes 
in the SE rate that occur over the life-time of one cohort are 
assumed to remain constant, the self-employment rate of a particular 
age group in 1975 can be multiplied by the changes in the SE rate 
for the same cohort to obtain the SE rate that would occur in the 
next age group above, if there were no cohort effect. The 
hypothetical SE rate calculated to show the rate when no cohort 
effect is present can be subtracted from the rate actually obtaining 
in 197 5 (ie including the cohort effect) to isolate the cohort 
effect. The cohort effect can then be divided by the total change 
in the SE rate that occurred in each age group between 197 0 and 
1975 .
The results of this exercise and figures for the SE rates in each 
age group obtained from the 197 0 and 1975 population censuses are 
given in Table 7.16 below. The table shows that a large percentage 
of the change in the SE rates for each age group is explained by the
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cohort effect, which accounts for between just over 50% and 140% of 
the change in SE rates, depending on the age group. Thus, the cohort 
effect is extremely important in explaining the high self-employment 
rate amongst older workers. Hence, the proportion of older workers 
who are self-employed will fall in the future, since the cohorts who 
will form the older part of the workforce will be occupied in jobs 
in industries which are unlikely to have a high self-employment 
rate.
307
Ta
bl
e 
7.
16
 
sh
ow
in
g 
th
e 
re
su
lt
s 
of
 
an
al
ys
is
 
us
ed
 
to
 
de
te
rm
in
e 
th
e 
ma
gn
it
ud
e 
of
 
th
e 
co
ho
rt
 
ef
fe
ct
.
CM
CO i>IQ 00co
00roo inoo
o
o
ro
in
ro ?—Io
o
rH 00
00 00
OO
00
O
00
OCO CM o
rH
O
OO
in
r-~
cn
inoo in rH *—I
oo
ro
cn
CM
CM
CTio
bi M  in b to Q) r- in nro co o in
moo oro
i—Iin
rH
00 LO
mrooo in
oo
CMP  -P Ln in
O (D Q *—I in inco
H OP ffl
in
rH
CM
00
CM
00
O
in
ooo cnP  P o in
oo o •=31
rH
ro o
CM
LO
CM
O
•5J*
CM
ro
oo
ro
oo—  p! 4H in 
p  m  0  mh i>
o
oo
oo
oo *>FCM
CMOO CM00
COroI—ICM
in
ro
CM in oo o in o in
CM
ro
bit/) 0 U 
as P  >icj * I\ 
o\o -rH a) n
oo
ro
T—ICO o oOD inoCOroo oo
ino o
ro
oo
ro
rH
in
00CM
CM
in
in
ro
inu m
in
rH
CO
O
rH
in
00
oro
in
inro ro ro
o oo
o
CM
co -5#
oo
o
ro
ro
CM
r-
CM
i>
uo
ro
uoin
0 0 £  o  a U) 0 o
0 abi p n 00CO
in 
\—I
o
CM
in
CM
o
ro
uo
ro
o uo o
LO
o
ID
o
o
LO o
oo
LO
CO
30
8
—  g i rd t3 <?\
oo g  CD CL) CM
O  2  CQ 4_) -H I
cr> h  ^  U H i n
rH  o  CD P i CM
—  U «) a-H>1 X -U Q)p ' , Q) H i
u) \y ™
^ [x] Cn Pj
^  ° 3 CD * .
g t! o -y
P ^  ' 1 fli rP ^' 0 ° Q ft0 ° i n o g Q, □ o 
*H CD c< .I 4j (D O I Cj-I £
rH sh co o OrPto
P  Ch r j  Q) &  4-J
O U (U 0) ,Cl 4J CD
O  O f t ^  4-) -H >| tn
In a ^ U  £ ,P «5
CD
rH
1> CO
CD
CD U CO
rH U CD
P  4J 
rd O O
t-< m S
30
9
Above, the cohort effect was examined and shown to be large, 
therefore bringing in to question the ability of the self-employment 
sector to absorb the increasing number (and proportion) of older 
workers in the future. As was discussed in the introduction to this 
section it is also not clear that a large number of retired 
employers and older employees do become self-employed. Again data 
which can be used to refute or support this proposition is scanty. 
The Tokyo Metropolitan Council 1978 survey (Tokyo Toritsu Rodo 
Kenkyujo 1979) used in the earlier part of this section does provide 
some usable data, although it is somewhat dated and the sample 
number is small (25 people interviewed). The general characteristics 
of the self-employed are similar to the results from the population 
censuses given above, in spite of the small sample size. Table 7.17 
shows the percentage of the owners of small businesses and family 
business workers who are above the age of 5 0 for different sizes of 
small companies.
Table 7.17 showing the percentage of owners of small businesses and 
family business workers who are above 50 for different sizes of 
businesses
Number of workers Owners of 
businesses
Family workers
1 person 60.2 -
2-4 47 . 5 22.2
5-9 57 .4 24.5
10-19 59 .3 22 . 6
20-29 69 .1 22 .5
30 + 44 .0 12 .2
All 53 .1 22 .9
Source: Tokyo Toritsu Rodo Kenkyujo (1979) p 20, Table 1-13.
Notes: Figures are for men and women.
These figures are not sufficient, however, to show whether self- 
employment provides a chance for ex-employees to earn a living. The 
owners of businesses interviewed for the 197 8 survey were asked when
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the business was started and whether they were responsible for the 
founding of the business. For those who started the business 
themselves, it is possible to calculate what age they were at the 
time. Sixteen out of twenty-five owners started their own business 
and the average age at that time was 34 years of age. In fact only 
3 of the 16 were over the age of 40 at start of business and none 
were over 50.
c) Conclusion to the examination of factors influencing the ue 
transition rate
Small companies do appear to have taken older people from other 
companies, but their older age structure can also be explained by 
the fact that their employees tend to stay at the company in to old 
age. The surveys showed that smaller companies were unwilling to 
hire more older people, particularly if they had a relatively old 
age structure. Thus, the future absorption capacity of smaller firms 
is unlikely to increase.
The cohort analysis indicated that the high proportion of older men 
in self-employment is a generational phenomenon. As younger people 
become older, the proportions of the older age groups in self- 
employment will fall. This is supported by the Tokyo Metropolitan 
197 8 survey showing that most self-employed people started their 
self-employment in their 3 0s. Thus, the role of self-employment in 
providing an exit from unemployment for older men has been over­
estimated in the past, because cohort effects have been ignored.
Sub-section 5.3 The un transition rate
For older participants of the labour market, one of the principle 
factors influencing the decision to continue or relinquish 
participation in the labour market is the availability and
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purchasing power of an old age pension. The other main determinant 
of labour force participation is the availability of jobs. Rises in 
the level of pension benefits can be expected to reduce 
participation for a given level of wages, whereas a lower level of 
wages or a more menial job will lower participation, given the level 
of pension benefits.
a) Pension provision
An examination of the effect of the level of pension benefits on 
labour force participation is limited by the data available. Only 
the change with the real level of benefits in the employment rate 
and not the participation rate can be examined properly. Table 7.18 
shows the employment rate for men above 60 and the level of pension 
they are receiving across time. The pension bands have been 
converted to 1980 values and the employment rate figures were 
estimated for each pension band for 1983 and 1988 so that a direct 
comparison could be made. The notes to the table describe the method 
used.
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Table 7.18 showing the employment rate of pensioners according to 
the level of pension they receive.
Pension
level
1980 1983 1988
60 to 
64
65 to 
69
60 to 
64
65 to 
69
60 to 
64
65 to 
69
22500 80.4 69 .3 81.6 69 .3 83 .3 69 .2
70000 66.2 59 .5 68 .9 61.1 66.0 60.2
120000 51.1 47 . 6 52 .0 49 .8 47 . 4 57 .3
>120000 57 .0 42 .2 (49 .8) (44.6) (40.7) (39.3)
Average 67 .2 60 .2 64.2 57 . 8 58.9 53 .2
Sources: The data for employment rates came from government
surveys on the characteristics of older people and their 
work (Konenreisha Shugyo Jittai Chosa Hokoku) for the 
corresponding years. For more detail, see Rodo Daijin 
Kanb5 Tokei Joho-bu Johokaiseki-ka (1981), Rodo Daijin 
Kanb5 Seisaku Chosa-bu Tokei Chosa Dai-Ikka (1985) and 
Rodo Daijin KanbS Seisaku Chosa-bu (1990) for the 1980, 
19 83 and 19 88 data, respectively. The consumer price 
indexes used for deflating the pension levels to 1980 
values came from Statistics Bureau, Management and Co­
ordination Agency (1984) and (1990).
Notes: Different pension bands are used for each survey year.
The employment rates that correspond to the real pension 
bands used in the 1980 survey are estimated in the
following manner. Once the pension ranges have been 
converted to 1980 values by deflating by the consumer 
price index, the middle value of each range in
calculated. The given employment rates are assumed to
correspond to this mid-point, rather than being an
average value for a particular range. It is also assumed 
that the employment rate values for each mid-value can 
be joined by a line. The employment rate corresponding 
to 1980 limits is calculated by taking the employment 
rate corresponding to the mid-value of the range nearest 
to the mid-value of the 1980 range and adding to it the
change in the value of the employment rate that occurs
with movement along the line-segment to the actual mid­
value of the 1980 pension band. This method cannot be 
used for the upmost band which has no upper limit. 
Therefore the untreated employment rate for this band is 
given in brackets, but these rates are not directly 
comparable.
Table 7.18 shows that there has been little discern ble change in 
the employment rate for people belonging to each pension band, 
except for possibly the upmost band. The average employment rate,
however^has been declining over time. This trend suggests that as
the various pension systems mature, the percentage of pensioners 
belonging to the high pension bands is increasing, thus reducing the
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average employment rate. In other words, a greater proportion of 
pensioners will have contributed for the full contribution period. 
The trend indicates that in future, with further maturing of the 
pensions system and an increasing proportion of pensioners receiving 
the more generous kosei nenkin (welfare pension), . the
probability of leaving the labour force and unemployment pool (that 
is, the transition rates en and un) will increase, exerting a 
downward influence on the number of older workers remaining 
unemployed. The pension systems are expected to impose an ever 
increasing burden on the Japanese fiscal system, leading to the 
possibility of a reduction in benefit levels. Moves to lower the 
level of future contributions have already taken place and further 
changes to the pensions systems can be expected in the future to 
reduce the generosity of benefits. These policy changes are 
discussed in more depth in Chapter Nine. It is thus possible to 
conclude that prediction of the un and en transition rates is 
impossible, but the noticeable trend in the rising level of real 
pension benefits is not likely to continue and therefore continuing 
rises in these transition rates are also unlikely.
The second important factor mentioned above was the effect of the 
conditions in the labour market for older workers on their 
withdrawal from the labour force. If demand for workers is weak, 
workers will tend to leave the labour force, including those in the 
unemployment pool due to the discouraged worker effect. One 
indicator of such behaviour is a correlation between the labour 
force participation rates and estimates of the degree of slack in 
the labour market. Both women and older male workers in Japan show 
a strong tendency to become discouraged from remaining in the labour 
force when there is a cyclical downturn (Ono 19 81). It is not clear, 
however, how labour force participation rates of older males would
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respond to a permanent deterioration the labour market they face. 
It is probable that the discouraged worker effect is strongly 
correlated with the level of pension benefits that are receivable. 
Thus, this discouraged worker effect can be viewed as being 
secondary to the effect of the level of pension benefits on the en 
and un transition rates.
b) Unemployment benefit
Another factor that may have an effect on the un transition rate is 
the availability of unemployment benefit. The impact of unemployment 
benefit could reduce the un transition rate by encouraging people 
to stay in the unemployment pool. The ue transition rate may also 
be similarly affected. According to job search theory (Elliott 
1991), one factor that is deemed to be important in determining the 
duration and level of unemployment is the level and duration of 
unemployment benefits provided by the social insurance system. 
People searching for jobs will continue to search for a worthy job 
so long as the expected benefits of search (higher wages or a more 
amenable job) outweigh the cost of being unemployed. The main cost 
of being unemployed is the wage foregone. If the job searcher 
receives social security benefits, the cost of job search is reduced 
and the searcher will raise the standards of acceptability for job 
offers and thus will search- . for longer, raising the stock of the 
unemployed in the aggregate. I shall not attempt here to gauge the 
effect of the unemployment insurance scheme (koyo hoken seido) 
myself, for it is not the aim of this chapter. A brief account of 
Shinotsuya's (1977, 1982) work is sufficient for the purposes of
this chapter. Shinotsuya attempted to show that the unemployment 
insurance scheme in Japan would lead to higher unemployment and a 
lower employment rate. Her first results showed only that there was 
a negative correlation between the employment rate and the total
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expenditure of the government allotted to unemployment benefit 
(Shinotsuya 1977). In a later paper (Shinotsuya 1982) Shinotsuya 
attempted to show that unemployment would tend to last while the 
unemployed person was eligible to receive benefits and that as soon 
as the unemployment benefits were stopped the unemployed would take 
a job. She found that 45.2% of unemployed men took a job in the 
month after unemployment benefits were stopped. The proportion of 
men taking jobs after termination of benefits was lower for the 
higher age groups and was particularly low for men above the age of 
55. One interpretation is that such results show that older males 
are not affected by unemployment benefit, since they tend to 
continue to be unemployed even when benefits are terminated. 
Shinotsuya prefers to interpret the results as indicating that 
unemployment benefit is treated by the older unemployed as a 
retirement bonus, while it lasts. Finally, Shinotsuya notes that 
only one in four unemployed are eligible for unemployment benefit. 
One important point emerges in relation to the high unemployment 
rate of older workers. Shinotsuya notes that the proportion of all 
male unemployment benefit receivers who are above 55 is greater than 
the proportion of men enrolled on the unemployment benefit scheme 
above the age of 55. Given that older people receive benefit for a 
longer period than younger people, the nature of the unemployment 
scheme may be responsible for increasing the duration of 
unemployment amongst older people and hence their weighting in the 
aggregate stock of unemployed, as was noted earlier in this chapter. 
It should also be borne in mind, however, that the expected benefits 
of job search for older workers are relatively low, since they have 
a shorter time than younger workers in which to recoup the cost of 
their investment (job search). Thus, the usefulness of job search 
theory in explaining unemployment of older workers is limited.
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Although it is possible that the longer duration of unemployment of 
older men is caused by the longer availability of unemployment 
benefit for this age group, the effect is unlikely to be large, 
particularly when it is considered that roughly 25% of the 
unemployed receive any benefit. Secondly, if there is no change to 
the benefit system or the level of benefits, any effect that the 
unemployment scheme has on older men is likely to remain constant.
The en transition rate is affected by pensions in a similar way to 
the un transition rate. The availability of pensions and their level 
will also encourage older men to leave the labour force upon 
retirement, so that they by-pass the unemployment pool altogether. 
In the past, there has been a five year gap between the mandatory 
age of retirement set by companies and the eligibility age for old 
age pension benefits. This gap lowered the t-f% transition rate. In 
recent years, the eligibility age and retirement age have converged 
as the retirement age was raised by most companies (see Chapter Four 
and Chapter Nine). In the future, however, the government intends 
to raise the eligibility age further and thus recreating the gap. 
This measure is discussed in more depth in Chapter Nine. So, 
depending on the government's success in implementing the policy, 
the en rate can be expected to remain the same as at present or to 
rise.
If the un level increases because of rising pension levels, it is 
likely that the nu level will decrease, given the level of aggregate 
demand in the economy.
c) Conclusion to the factors influencing the un transition rate
The evidence suggests that labour force participation rates of older 
men are influenced by the level of old age pension benefits and that
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participation rates have been falling because a proportion of older 
people are receiving higher levels of benefit. Thus the un 
transition rate will be sensitive to changes in the public pension 
schemes. The changes in pension schemes are difficult to predict, 
but Chapter Nine shows that the government wishes to reduce the 
generosity of public old age pension benefits.
Section 6 Conclusion to this chapter
In this chapter I have attempted to give some insights into the
future trends in the unemployment rates of older men and, by 
extension, trends in the future macro unemployment rate. The 
inspiration for the chapter came from a number of projections with 
respect to the labour market that have appeared recently. These 
projections point to a future excess labour demand under the 
assumption that unemployment rates will remain constant. Given the 
employment practices of Japanese companies and the ageing of the 
population, I feel that this important assumption cannot be 
overlooked and that such projections fail to come terms with the
true nature of the labour market problems that will be caused by
population ageing.
In Section Two, the most common macro labour market approaches were 
discussed and a more appropriate framework for analysis was 
described. With this framework it is not yet possible to estimate 
number series for future trends in unemployment, given the data that 
is available in Japan, but a quantitative and qualitative 
examination of important factors was given in Section Five. Section 
Four consisted of an analysis of unemployment during 1965 to 1985 
that showed that much of the rise in the macro unemployment rate can 
be explained by the rising unemployment rates of the older age 
groups that occurred as the population aged over this period, in
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spite of falling labour force participation rates amongst older men. 
Section Five examined the factors that would influence the labour 
market transition rates (and hence unemployment) of the older age 
groups and concluded that the trends in all the factors indicate 
an increase in unemployment given increasing flows out of employment 
in large f irms: 'HxrSappears to be a limit to the absorption capacity 
of smaller firms; and the incidence of self-employment amongst older 
men will fall as the younger generations become older. Appendix 7B 
compares the trends in unemployment and labour force participation 
rates of men in OECD countries. As the populations of OECD countries 
have aged, the unemployment experience of older men has worsened. 
It seems, however, that unemployment and job-loss of older men has 
been noticeably high.
Changes in employment practices and changes to the pension systems 
could decrease the unemployment rate among older people, but these 
two factors are difficult to predict. If larger Japanese companies 
do not wish to change their employment practices substantially, the 
only means of decreasing unemployment would be to maintain a low 
pension eligibility age. With an ageing population however, such a 
policy would lead to rapidly growing government expenditure and 
higher taxes. A substantial change in employment practices is likely 
to result in lower productivity growth within firms, since the 
efficiency of existing practices will disappear. The next chapter 
describes and assesses government attempts to reduce unemployment 
amongst older workers; and Chapter Nine examines old age pension 
coverage and recent public pension policy.
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APPENDIX 7A IS THE LOW JAPANESE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE A STATISTICAL
ARTEFACT?
There has been some active debate over the question of whether the 
macro unemployment rate in Japan is really much lower than in other 
countries or not (Taira 1983, Shiraishi 1982, Nagayama 1984 and 
Sorrentino 1984) . The results of the debate to date suggest that 
unemployment is lower in Japan because of differences in the 
behaviour of potential labour market participants. The debate is 
discussed in more detail below.
Unemployment rates for OECD countries used for international 
comparisons are generally Standardised Unemployment Rates (SURs). 
SURs are calculated using data from labour force surveys that are 
based on a Resolution of the Eighth International Conference of 
Labour Statisticians which was convened by the ILO in Geneva in 
1954. The recommendations of the resolution are commonly referred 
to as the "ILO Guidelines" (OECD 1987 p 125) . The basis for the 
international standard is the classification of each individual 
above a minimum age into one of three categories. The categories 
are: employed; unemployed; and those not in the labour force. Some 
important points which are used to survey and classify people are 
the following (OECD 1987 p 125-127):
a) A specified brief period should be used for classifying 
people. In other words, the labour market status of 
people as recorded in the survey is determined by their 
status during a fixed short period, usually one week. 
The particular week is normally called the "reference 
week".
b) Anyone who worked for pay or in a business for as little 
as one hour in the reference week is classified as
320
employed.
c) Those deemed to be unemployed must meet the following 
criteria:
i) they are without work
ii) they are currently available for work and
iii) they must have taken specific steps in a specified
recent period to seek paid employment or self-
employment .
Much of the debate regarding Japanese unemployment rates centres 
around small differences in survey methodology and definitions. I 
will discuss the attempts that have been made to adjust for such 
differences below, but examples of the differences include the 
following: countries choose different reference weeks, so that
seasonal factors will complicate comparisons, and the recent period 
over which people must have actively sought work to be classified 
as unemployed differs between countries. The results of adjustment 
in Japanese unemployment numbers to eliminate differences in survey 
methods and definitions do not show conclusively that low Japanese 
unemployment rates are a statistical artefact. Consequently, 
explanations of the low unemployment rate have centred around 
arguments based on the concept of "hidden unemployment". The ILO 
guidelines attempt to set clear conceptual boundaries between the 
three classifications used, but practical considerations lead to a 
blurring of the classifications. I quote from OECD Employment 
Outlook (OECD 1987 p 127):
'One of the main criticisms of the "activity" definition of 
unemployment is indeed that it does not include certain 
"hidden unemployed" who, while not actively searching for paid 
work, would begin to search were more jobs available. [Table 
5.2 shows that] there are many people who say they want a job 
and are available for work, but who are not officially
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categorised as unemployed. For Australian and Japanese women, 
in particular, their numbers exceed the official unemployment 
count'
and;
'Eventually, many may stop looking altogether - in which case, 
under the 1982 ILO Guidelines, they will cease to be counted 
as "unemployed". This tendency for some of the jobless whose 
prospects are poorest to "fall out" of the definition of 
unemployment is one important reason for taking care not to 
rely solely on measures based on the 19 82 Guidelines for 
unemployment to assess distress caused by the paucity of job 
openings'.
Kurosaka {1988 pp 49-63) provides a useful summary of the attempts 
to adjust Japanese unemployment data so that international 
comparisons (mainly with the USA) can be made. My account here draws 
heavily from Kurosaka's account and is not exhaustive. I will give 
a detailed description of Taira's 1983 paper (Taira 1983) to 
exemplify the nature of the debate. Taira adjusted the Japanese 
labour force survey figures so that they corresponded more closely 
(in his view) to America's BLS figures. Both the surveys are based 
on the ILO Guidelines described above. Taira concluded that if 
Japanese unemployment statistics were adjusted to correspond to US 
definitions, the official unemployment rate would be higher. The 
main adjustments that Taira made were the following:
a) In the US, people working for less than 15 hours per 
week in a family business are categorised as not being 
in the labour force, whereas in Japan they are included 
in the labour force. Taira excluded these people from 
the labour force, therefore reducing the denominator 
used in calculating the unemployment rate. The effect of
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this exclusion was to raise the unemployment rate.
b) In the US, lay-offs are counted as unemployed, whereas 
the Japanese equivalent (according to Taira), ichiji 
kikyu and kyugyo, were not included in the unemployed 
category in Japan. These people were added to the 
numerator of the unemployment rate.
c) In the US, people are only deemed to be unemployed if 
they are without work and have carried out active job 
search in the last 4 weeks. If they have not actively 
sought jobs during that period, they belong to the non­
labour force category. In Japan, people who were not 
active in job search during the 4 weeks previous to the 
survey date, but who were active more than 4 weeks 
previously and are waiting for the results of their 
activity are categorised as unemployed. Taira removed 
such people from the unemployment figures, thus 
decreasing the unemployment rate.
d) In Japan, people who are planning to take up a job 
during the next month are categorised as belonging to 
the non-labour force, whereas in the US they are counted 
as unemployed. These people were added to the Japanese 
unemployment figures, raising the unemployment rate.
e) Taira also removed the following people from the non­
labour force and added them to the unemployed: people 
who were mainly occupied in housework and study, but who 
were actively seeking a job that month and moreover were 
able to take up a job during that month. This adjustment 
also raised the unemployment rate.
Taira's results showed that the above adjustments led to 
unemployment rates [kanzen shitsugyoritsu) for the years 1977-1980
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that were between 1.04% and 1.86% higher than the official figures. 
Separate adjusted unemployment rates (AURs) for men and women were 
also calculated. For men, the adjusted unemployment rate was between 
0.51 and 0.83% higher than the official figure; for women, it was 
between 2.8 8% and 6.46% higher. The greater effect on the 
unemployment rate for women is unsurprising, given adjustments a) 
and e) described above, since the people falling into these 
categories are more likely to be women. I shall return to this issue 
below.
Shiraishi (19 82) also calculated adjusted unemployment rates based 
on US definitions. The principle differences between his study and 
Taira'a are: a) he excluded people "who actively sought a job more 
than 5 weeks previous to the survey date and are 
waiting for the results" from the unemployed and
b) he excluded school leavers from those who "intended to take up 
a job within 30 days" from the unemployment figures. Taira had 
included school leavers.
c) He did not include Japanese "lay-offs" (ichiji kikyu and 
kyugyo) in the unemployment figures, claiming that a lay-off 
system did not exist in Japan.
The adjustment was performed for 1980 and 1984-86. For 1980, the 
macro adjusted unemployment rate is 0.2% higher than the official 
figure, the mens' AUR is 0.6% lower and the women's AUR is 1.3% 
higher. For the period 1984-86, the difference between overall AUR 
and the official figure ranges between -0.2% and 0.2%, for men the 
same ranges between -0.6 and -0.5% and for women it ranges between 
0.3 and 1.3%. The principle reason for the difference in the 
adjusted figures of Shiraishi when compared with Taira is 
Shiraishi's exclusion of school leavers from the unemployed category 
(Kurosaka 1988 p 55).
324
Nagayama's article (Nagayama 19 84) on the problems of standardising 
unemployment rates focused on Taira's assumption that ichiji kyugyo 
corresponded to lay-offs in the USA and hence should be categorised 
as unemployed; and on the problem of school leavers described above. 
Nagayama claimed that unlike American lay-offs, ichiji kyugyo people 
received pay and so were not the same as lay-offs. With respect to 
school leavers, he pointed out that the Rodoryoku Chosa Tokubetsu 
Chosa Hokoku survey was carried out in March each year and because 
school leavers also graduated in March and traditionally started a 
new job on the first of April, many school leavers would be included 
in the category of those who intended to take up a new job within 
30 days and which Taira classified as unemployed. Nagayama viewed 
the inclusion of school leavers in this category as atypical and a 
result of the fact that the survey fell at the end of the Japanese 
academic year. Nagayama's view was that even though there was a 
spell between graduation and taking up work, such a spell could not 
be considered a spell of unemployment (ie the spell was really a 
holiday). Nagayama estimated that exclusion of school leavers from 
Taira's adjusted unemployment figures would reduce Taira's AUR by 
approximately 1% (Kurosaka 1988 p 52, Table 2.1). Nagayama accepted 
Taira's decision to include those who had "searched for a job 
between 2 and 4 weeks ago and did not look during the survey week" 
in the unemployment count, but felt that many of these people should 
not be included since they are only looking for a part-time job (ie 
they are being fussy) . Nagayama seems to have strayed from the point 
of Taira's study. Taira is attempting to provide figures that can 
be compared with American figures with confidence, whereas Nagayama 
appears to be more concerned with the problems of defining 
unemployment. Nagayama is clearly assuming that American people in 
that category are always looking for full-time work, which is 
unlikely. He certainly believes that this aspect shows the
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difference between the US and Japanese labour markets, since he 
assumes implicitly that this category will contain many discouraged 
job seekers and that discouraged job seekers are more prevalent in 
Japan (see below for further discussion of this issue). Finally, 
Nagayama criticises Taira for including those who looked for work 
more than 5 weeks previously and are awaiting the results as 
unemployed, since the American survey makes it clear that people 
must have been actively looking for work during the four weeks 
previous to the survey date.
Sorrentino (19 84) also attempted a comparison of US and Japanese 
unemployment rates. Unlike Taira, he excluded those working for less 
than 15 hours in the family business from the labour force. Job 
searchers in Japan whose main method of searching for a job was to 
look at advertisements and to apply through friends also were 
excluded from the labour force^ as were those mainly
doing house work or studying, but able to take up work immediately. 
Like Shiraishi and Nagayama, Sorrentino is wary of using a survey 
that is carried out in the month that corresponds with the end of 
the academic year, since he believes that it does not reflect 
average unemployment conditions. Sorrentino's adjusted unemployment 
rate for Japan is between 0.2 and 0.4% higher than the official 
figure. When disaggregated by gender, Sorrentino's figures indicate 
an unemployment rate for men that is lower than the official figures 
(by between 0.4 and 0.6%) and an unemployment rate for women that 
is higher than the official figures (by between 1 and 2%).
Taira's adjustment to the unemployment figures led to the highest 
upward revision. The debate over the comparison of Japanese and USA 
unemployment rates has centred around two main aspects: the timing 
of the labour survey in Japan and the definition and concept of lay­
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offs. The inclusion of those who searched for a job between two and 
four weeks previous to the survey week in the unemployed is less 
controversial and is recognised in the OECD report (OECD 1987 p 
135) :
'Virtually all countries included in the list of SURs (OECD 
standardised unemployment rates) are able to provide data 
meeting the job search criterion with a four week reference 
period. Japan uses a one week reference period for job search 
and Norway uses two months. The evidence quoted above for the 
UK and Australia indicates that this type of difference can 
have significant consequences for estimates of the numbers of 
unemployed - of the order of 10 percent for the two countries 
quoted. However this does not necessarily imply that the OECD 
SUR for Japan is understated by comparison with other 
countries because of other factors involved'
It is not clear from the studies described above that the lower 
unemployment rate in Japan is a statistical artefact. Thus, the 
studies' authors have tended to look for other reasons for Japan's 
low unemployment rate. Nagayama's view is that Japanese employment 
practices explain the low values. He claims that in an economic 
downturn, firms tend to adjust labour input by reducing the number 
of hours worked, rather than reducing the number of people employed. 
The firing of workers is also lessened by practice of re-posting. 
On the labour supply side, there is a strong tendency for 
discouraged workers to leave the labour force. Shiraishi (1987) is 
also of this view. Both Sorrentino and Taira stress the discouraged 
worker effect and their view is supported by the fact that it is 
women who tend to leave the labour force in a recession and it is 
the adjusted unemployment rate for women that are adjusted upwards 
in their studies.
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Ono (1981 p 27) investigates the discouraged worker effect in Japan 
for the period 1974-75 following the oil shock. He calculates the 
divergence of the labour force participation rate from the trend 
labour force participation rate for both men and women together and 
separately. Out of seven countries, Japan's overall labour force 
participation rate shows the largest fall in that period. When the 
figures are disaggregated by gender, the fall in the male labour 
force participation rate from trend is in the middle of the range 
for all countries, whereas the fall in the female labour force 
participation rate from trend is comparatively large (Japan -1.88%; 
Canada -0.64%; USA 0.23%; France NA; West Germany -0.07%; Sweden - 
0.34% and UK 0.84%) . In other words, the fall in the overall labour 
force participation rate from trend is largely explained by the 
tendency for women to leave the labour force rather than for them 
to push up the number of unemployed. After further investigation, 
Ono concludes that the behaviour of women during an economic 
downturn is explained by the "pre-modern" employment structure 
(zenkindaiteki na shugyo kozo) of Japan (Ono 1981 p 62) . More 
specifically, the proportion of people who are self-employed or work 
for family businesses is high and in a downturn, with the family 
business facing a drop in demand, the family worker will turn to 
concentrate on housework rather than actively look for a new job 
outside the family business. In a later study (Ono 1989 p 272), Ono 
states that another important factor explaining the tendency for 
women to drop out of the labour force during an economic downturn 
is the relative job-security of the main income earner of the 
household (her husband). The relative security of the husband is 
explained by the Japanese employment practice of 'lifetime 
employment'. If the husband's employment were not secure, there 
would be greater pressures on the wife to enter the labour market 
during economic downturn in order to compensate for the lost income
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of the husband. Indeed, the figures quoted from Ono (1981) above 
show that the labour force participation rates of women increased 
above trend in the UK and USA, where employment practices are very 
different.
Eguchi (1988) analyses the links between the macro performance of 
the Japanese economy and its macro labour market. One aspect of the 
macro performance of the economy is the change in unemployment that 
occurs following a demand or supply shock. Eguchi is particularly 
concerned with the behaviour of unemployment following supply shocks 
and the speed of adjustment of real wages. He surveys various 
attempts to calculate the difference between the actual real wage 
and the real wage required to ensure full employment. The results 
of these attempts show that real wages are relatively rigid in Japan 
and that the excess level of real wages in Japan is similar to that 
in European countries for the period 1965 to 1985. Given these 
results, Japan would be expected to experience a large rise in 
unemployment. Although unemployment did rise, it remained much lower 
than in the European countries compared. To explain this phenomenon, 
Eguchi uses Japan's Labour force Survey {Rodoryoku Chosa Nenpo) data 
to examine how labour input (number employed multiplied by hours 
worked) is adjusted.
He finds that, for the period 1968-86, changes in male labour input 
tend to be met by changes in hours worked rather than numbers 
employed. For women, however, changes in labour input are more 
likely to be met through changes in numbers employed, rather than 
changes in hours worked. The labour force participation rate for 
women is more sensitive to changes in labour input, so that even 
though the changes in female labour input are met through changes 
in numbers employed, the unemployment rate for women remains low
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because women leave the labour force. In other words, with a 
reduction in labour input that occurs during a macroeconomic
downturn, women lose their jobs, but leave the labour force and 
hence do not add to the unemployment figures. Men, on the other 
hand, do not lose their jobs and so tend not to add to the 
unemployment figures. The effect of changing male labour input on 
the male labour force participation rate is small, so that the 
effect of changing male labour input on male unemployment is greater 
than in the case of women. The table below summarises these results. 
It shows Eguchi's elasticities of the rate of change of hours per 
person, numbers employed and labour force with respect to changes 
in labour input, for both sexes and for men and women separately.
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Table 7A.1 showing the elasticity of the rates of change of hours 
worked, number employed, number in labour force and the change in 
the unemployment rate with respect to changes in labour input 
(number of people working multiplied by hours worked)
hours number
employed
labour
force
unemployment
men and women 0.580 0.420 0 .367 0.054
men 0.891 0 .109 0 .035 0 . 074
women 0.224 0 .776 0 .762 0 . 015
Source: Eguchi (1988) p 68.
Notes: The figures are calculated using labour force data for
the period 1968-1986. The table shows that if rate of
change of labour input falls by one percent, for
example, the rate of change of hours worked by men falls 
by 0.891%.
The studies described above seem to show that Japan's low 
unemployment rates are not a statistical artefact - rather they are 
the product of the nature of the labour market in Japan. Nagayama's 
claim that the existence of lifetime employment leads to a low level 
of unemployment is confirmed by Eguchi's figures that show that 
changes in male labour input are met through changes in hours 
worked. The claim of Sorrentino, Taira and Ono that the low 
unemployment rates are caused by the procyclical nature of the 
female labour force participation rate is also confirmed and Ono's 
view that the procyclical nature is explained by women's husbands 
having stable jobs is particularly apt. Finally, I would like to add 
one further comment. If the behaviour of the Japanese labour market 
does not change (ie employment practices remain the same as do 
labour supply decisions), a rise in the unemployment rate will be 
caused by a rise in the number of men, rather than women, losing 
their jobs.
In summary, Japan's relatively low unemployment rate does not appear 
to be a statistical artefact. The authors of comparative studies 
emphasize the labour supply and demand characteristics peculiar to
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Japan to explain the low unemployment rate.
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APPENDIX 7B A BRIEF INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF POPULATION
AGEING, LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
IN OECD COUNTRIES
The purpose of this appendix is to describe the unemployment and 
labour force participation experience of older men in other 
industrialised countries that are experiencing population ageing. 
This description places the Japanese trends analysed in Chapter 
Seven in a comparative context. As bayard et al (1991) note: 
"Unemployment is, of course, almost everywhere more common among 
young people than among adults. Very often the difference results 
from higher inflow rates - and certainly not from unusual duration. 
The youth unemployment problem was accentuated in the 198 0s by a big 
rise in the relative number of youths, reflecting the baby boom of 
the late 1950s and 1960s. In consequence much more attention has 
been devoted to youth unemployment than to any other aspect of 
unemployment". As a consequence of this focus of attention, material 
on the relationship between population ageing and the increase in 
aggregate unemployment rates is scarce. A cursory look at the 
contents of the OECD Employment Outlook for the 1980s will confirm 
this phenomenon: it is only in 1988 that these volumes turn to
employment aspects of the older age groups, rather than 
concentrating on youth unemployment problems. The data and 
information used in this appendix are drawn mainly from OECD 
publications published in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The survey 
presented here is necessarily broad and covers a short time span, 
since a more substantial study would deflect from the main purpose 
of this dissertation. Thus, a detailed discussion of the factors 
which may explain the trends is not given, because each country has 
its own set of social security policies and labour market 
institutions that will influence participation rates and
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unemployment. A short discussion of important factors common to most 
countries that affect the unemployment experience of older men is 
given towards the end of the appendix.
First, it is necessary to show that most of the OECD countries have 
experienced population ageing. Table 7B.1 below shows the proportion 
of people over 65 in 24 OECD countries for the years 1950 and 1990 
and shows the percentage point change over the decade.
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Table 7B.1 showing the proportion of the population over the age of 
65 for the years 1950 and 1990; and the percentage point change over 
the three decades.
Country 1950
A
1990
B
Percentage 
point change 
<B -A)
Australia 8.1 11.1 3
Austria 10.4 14. 6 4.2
Belgium 11. 0 14.2 3.2
Canada 7 . 6 11.4 3 . 8
Denmark 9.1 15 .3 6.2
Finland 6.6 13 .1 6 . 5
France 11.3 13 . 8 2 . 5
Germany 9.3 15.5 6 . 2
Greece 6.7 12 .3 5.6
Iceland 7.6 10.3 2.7
Ireland 10.6 11.3 0.7
Italy 8.0 13 . 8 5.8
Japan 5.2 11.4 6.2
Luxembourg 9.8 14. 6 4.8
Netherlands 7.7 12 .7 5
New Zealand 8.9 10 .8 1.9
Norway 9.5 16 .2 6.7
Portugal 6.9 11.8 4.9
Spain 7.3 12 .7 5.4
Sweden 10.2 17 .7 7.5
Switzerland 9 . 6 14. 8 5.2
Turkey 3.3 4 0.7
United
Kingdom
10 .7 15.1 4.4
United States 8.1 12 .2 4.1
Average 8.5 13 4 . 5
Source: OECD (1988) pp 80-81, Table A.2.
Notes: The 1950 figures are actual figures, whereas the 1990
figures are projected. The projection used is the medium 
fertility variant given in the OECD Demographic Data 
File. The OECD average is an unweighted average.
Table 7B.1 above shows that all countries have experienced
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population ageing between 1950 and 1990. Japan has experienced the 
fourth largest percentage point change and this change is 1.7 points 
above the average for all 24 OECD countries.
Table 7B.2 below gives the overall aggregate labour force 
participation rates, and the aggregate labour force participation 
rates for each sex in 1965 and 1984, for most of the OECD countries. 
The majority of countries, including Japan, show an increase in the 
aggregate labour force participation rate. All but one country, 
however, show a decrease in the male labour force participation 
rate; and all but one country show an increase in the female labour 
force participation rate. Thus, it is clear that in most countries, 
the fall in the male labour force participation rate has been offset 
by an increasing proportion of women entering the labour force. To 
ensure consistency with the rest of the thesis, further analysis 
will cover trends in the male labour force only.
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Table 7B.2 showing aggregate labour force participation rates
(percentages) for the years 1965 and 1984
Country Total Male Female
1965 1984 1965 1984 1965 1984
Australia 67 .7 69.9 + 94.1 85.6 - 40.0 52.7 +
Austria 67 .7 67.3 - 87 .2 79.9 - 50 .1 55.2 +
Belgium 63 .0 63.9 + 88.2 77.8 - 38 . 0 49.6 +
Canada 63 .9 72.8 + 88.0 84.5 - 39.7 61.2 +
Denmark 73 . 0 81.7 + 96.8 87.6 - 49 .3 74.2 +
Finland 74.7 78.3 + 87 .6 82.7 - 62 . 6 74.0 +
France 67 .2 66.0 - 89 .7 77.4 - 45 .7 54.7 +
Germany 70.5 64.3 - 94 .1 79.3 - 49 . 0 49.4 +
Ireland 67 .3 62.6 - 98.7 87.1 - 35.2 37.9 +
Italy 61.8 60.1 - 90.5 79.7 - 34. 6 41.1 +
Japan 71.9 72.7 + 88.6 88.3 - 55 . 8 57.2 +
Netherlands 59 .3 59 .5 + 76.0 80.1 + 25.8 39.8 +
New Zealand 63 .7 65.2 + 92 .5 84.6 - 34.2 45.8 +
Norway 63 .5 76.3 + 89 .9 86.3 - 36.9 66.1 +
Portugal 61.2 65.6 + 103 .3 84.0 - 23 .6 53.2 +
Spain 61.5 55.5 - 96.4 78.6 - 29 .2 32.7 +
Sweden 72 .9 81.5 + 91.4 85.5 - 54.1 77.4 +
Switzerland 78 . 6 68.7 - 106.5 89.9 - 51. 6 48.8 -
UK 72 . 8 73.3 + 97.1 87.6 - 49 . 0 59.0 +
US 66.2 73.4 + 88.7 84.9 - 44 .3 62.8 +
Source: OECD (19 88) p 55, Table 26.
Notes: The participation rate is found by dividing the number
in the labour force by the population aged 15 to 64. 
Data for some countries are for dates that are 
different, but close to, the dates shown in the column
headings - for more detail see data source.
Participation rates greater than 100% occur when labour 
force data include people not included in population 
data. For example, in the case of Switzerland, foreign 
and seasonal workers who are included in the labour 
force figures are not included in the population
figures. The - and + signs in the 1984 columns show 
whether the rate has fallen or risen.
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Table 7B.3 shows the male labour force participation rates for 
specific age groups. With the exception of Canada and the United 
States, male labour force participation rates for the 15-24 age 
group have shown a decline between 1965 and 1985. This falling 
labour force participation rate can be largely explained by an 
increasing participation in post-compulsory education (OECD 1988 p 
58). Participation rates for the 25-54 age group (called the prime 
age group in OECD publications) have fallen slightly, but there have 
been noticeable declines for the 55-64 and 65 plus age groups, with 
Japan showing the smallest change for both of these age groups. 
Given that all of these countries have ageing populations, the 
majority of the fall in the male aggregate participation rate can 
probably be explained by the fall in the participation rates of 
older men.
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Table 7B.3 showing male labour force participation rates of four age
groups for the years 1965 and 1985
Country Date 15-24 25-64 55-64 65 +
Australia
1965 78.9 97 .3 85 . 8 23 .3
1985 73 .7 93 .5 60 .4 8.9
Canada
1965 57 .2 97 .1 86.4 26.3
1985 70.1 93 . 8 70.2 12 .3
Finland
1965 65 . 8 94. 8 81. 5 18 .0
1985 62 . 6 93 .5 57 . 8 10.6
France
1965 65 .3 96.1 76.0 28.3
1985 49.0 95.9 50.1 5.3
Germany
1965 78 .1 96.6 84 . 6 24 .0
1985 60.5 91.4 57 .5 5.2
Italy
1965 60.9 94.7 54.8 18 .4
1985 48.1 92 .1 38.2 8.9
Japan
1965 59 .0 96.7 86 .7 56.3
1985 42 . 6 96.7 83 .0 37 .0
Netherlands
1970 64 .8 96.4 80 . 8 11.4
1985 48 . 6 93 .3 53 . 8 4.0
Spain
1970 70 . 6 96.5 84.2 25.9
1985 64.4 94.1 66 .3 5.9
Sweden
1965 71.7 96.2 88 .3 37.7
1985 65 . 7 95.2 76.0 11.0
United
Kingdom
1965 77.4 98.4 92 .7 23 .7
1985 71.6 95.2 66 .4 7 . 6
United
States
1965 70.9 95.7 82 .9 26.6
1985 75.3 90.8 59 .7 10.3
Source: OECD (1988) pp 56-57, Table 27.
Notes: The participation rate for a given age group is the
ratio of the total civilian labour force to the 
population for that age group. Data for some countries 
are for dates that are different, but close to, the 
dates shown; also the age groups differ for some 
countries slightly: for more detail see data source.
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The OECD Employment Outlook 1992 contains a study of the 
relationship between labour market participation of older workers 
and the increasing prevalence of early retirement. The study 
concentrates on an analysis of the supply side decisions of older 
workers and concludes that the fall in participation rates has been 
caused mainly by the increasing generosity of social security 
systems towards older people. The factors leading to such a 
conclusion will be examined in more depth below. First, a 
description, using data provided in the study, of the trends in 
unemployment of older workers is given. Such a description is 
important, since those in the labour force are either working or 
unemployed and the number of unemployed might be reduced by the 
existence of social security benefits that ease the withdrawal from 
the labour force.
Table 7B.4 shows male unemployment as a percentage of the labour 
force for older and prime-age groups; and Table 7B.5 shows the 
change in percentages between 1980 and 1990, for 16 OECD countries. 
It is difficult to establish a common pattern for the unemployment 
percentages and change in those percentages, but some general 
comments can be made: first, the unemployment rate for either the 
55-59 age group or the 60-64 age group is higher than for the prime- 
age group in 1990 in the majority of countries; second, in the 
majority of countries, the increase in the unemployment rate of the 
older age groups was greater than for the prime-age group; and 
thirdly, but less significantly, the increase in unemployment rates 
for men aged 60-64 was less marked than for the other age groups.
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Surprisingly, Japan is the only country that shows a fall in the 
unemployment rate of the 55-59 age group over the ten years, but 
this is probably explained by the rise in the mandatory company 
retirement age that occurred during the same period {see Chapter 
Four). More generally, it is clear that over the 1980s, the 
unemployment experience of the older groups worsened.
The difficulty in establishing a general trend in the change in 
unemployment rates amongst older age groups can partly be explained 
by early retirement schemes and similar schemes introduced by the 
governments of each country. For example, it is believed that the 
fall in the unemployment rate of the 60-64 age group in the UK is 
explained by the introduction of the Job Release Scheme 197 6 and a 
relaxation of the scheme regulations in 1983 (OECD 1992 p 216 and 
White 19 83 p 26). Originally, the Job Release Scheme allowed older 
workers to retire early if the employer replaced the retiree with 
a person under the age of 30. Frori 1983, the retiree could be 
replaced with any other worker.
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Table 7B.4 showing male unemployment rates of different age groups
for the years 1980 and 1990.
1980 1990
55-59 60-64 25-54 55-59 I
O
25-54
Australia 3.2 3.2 6.3 4.9
Canada 4.2 4.9 6.2 7.1
Finland 3 . 8 2.7 3.9 3 .9 na 3.4
France 4.3 5 . 6 2 . 8 7.0 3 . 0 6.2
Germany 3 . 8 5 . 8 1.8 9 . 0 6.4 5.5
Ireland 8.8 10.5 15 .2 16.8
Japan 3.1 4.6 1.5 2.3 5.1 1.4
Netherland
s
2 . 6 5.2 3.4 5 . 6 3.8 4.5
Portugal 0.0 0.7 2.0 2 . 6 3.2 2.1
Spain 6.5 5.3 7.7 9 . 0 7.2 9.3
Sweden 1.0 2.3 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.1
UK 6.0 14.9 5.0 8.9 3.5 6.7
US 3.3 3.5 5.0 3.9 3.5 4.4
Source: OECD (1992) p 207 Table 5.9.
Notes: Data for some countries are for dates that are
different, but close to, the dates shown; also the age 
groups differ for some countries slightly: for more
detail see data source.
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Table 7B.5 showing the percentage point change in the male
unemployment rates of different age groups between 1980 and 1990
Country 55-59 60-64 25-54
Australia 3.1 1.7
Canada 2 . 0 2.1
Finland 0.1 -2.7 -0 . 6
France 2.7 -2.6 3.5
Germany 5.2 0.6 3.7
Ireland 6.4 6.3
Japan -0.8 0.5 -0.1
Netherlands 3 . 0 -1.4 1.1
Portugal 2 . 6 2.4 0.1
Spain 2.5 1.9 1.6
Sweden 0.1 -0.9 0 . 0
United Kingdom 3 . 0 -11.4 1.7
United States 0.7 0 . 0 -0 . 6
Source: OECD (1992) p 207, Table 5.9.
Notes: Data for some countries are for dates that are
different, but close to, the dates shown; also the age 
groups differ for some countries slightly: for more
detail see data source.
Another potent indicator of the worsening unemployment experience 
of older workers is the percentage of the unemployed accounted for 
by the long-term unemployed for each age group. Table 7B.6 shows 
these percentages for men for the two years 1983 and 1989, and the 
change in the percentage between these years. In virtually all the 
countries, a larger percentage of older men experience long-term 
unemployment than prime-age men. Moreover, in virtually all 
countries, the percentage point change in the percentage of long­
term unemployed has increased more than the same percentage point 
change for prime age workers.
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Table 7B.6 showing the proportion of male unemployed who are long­
term unemployed and the percentage point change over the years 19 83- 
1989
Country
1983 1989 Percentage 
point change 
'83-'89
55-64 25-54 55-64 25-54 55-64 25-54
Australia 3 6.2 32 . 6 48 .7 30 . 6 12 .5 -2.0
Belgium 81.7 66.4 74.8 82 .5 -6.9 16.1
Canada 15.0 12 .9 16.7 8.2 1.7 -4.7
Denmark 36.5 32 .3 37.5 26.0 1.0 -6.2
France 66.5 38.5 67 .1 43 .2 0.6 4.7
Germany 47 .2 45 . 0 73 .4 55 . 5 26.1 10 .5
Greece 25.6 27 .2 49 .3 46.5 23 .7 19 .3
Ireland 57 . 8 49 .7 82 .7 76.1 24 .9 26.4
Italy 45 .4 53 .5 59 .4 66.3 14 . 0 12 . 8
Japan 24 . 0 13 .3 33 .3 22 .5 9.3 9.2
Netherlands 64 .7 55 .5 80.9 69.3 16.3 13 . 8
Spain 41.5 49 .7 58.8 53 .1 17 .3 3.4
Sweden 30.3 8.4 25.7 6.9 -4.6 -1.4
UK 58 .7 56.7 69.7 55 .1 11. 0 -1.6
US 22 .4 19 .5 12 .0 9.9 -10.4 -9.6
Source: OECD (19 92) p 2 08, Table 5.10.
Note: Long-term unemployment is defined as unemployed for
twelve months of more.
An examination of unemployed job losers and withdrawal from the 
labour force also contributes to the understanding of the 
unemployment of older age groups. Job-losers account for a large 
proportion of all (men and women) unemployed in most OECD
countries: the proportion ranges from a low of 28.7% for Italy 
(followed by 2 8.9% for Japan) and a high of 68.4% for Denmark OECD 
1990) . Unfortunately, data for the percentage of the unemployed 
accounted for by job-losers that are disaggregated by sex and age 
group are not available. The OECD Employment Outlook 1990 (OECD 1990 
p 49) does, however, provide a series of statistics for 14 countries 
showing the relative risk of becoming an unemployed job-loser for
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men and women in different age groups. The relative rate of risk is
calculated by dividing the percentage of total unemployed job-losers
accounted for by that particular group by the percentage of total
labour force accounted for by the same group. If the rate of risk
is one, then that group has an average risk; if the rate is above
one, the group faces an above-average risk of becoming an unemployed
job-loser. Table 7B.7 shows the rate of risk of job loss for men in
different age groups in 1987 (some figures are for 1986).
Table 7B.7 showing the relative risk of becoming a male unemployed 
job-loser for different age groups.
Country Total under 25 
years
25 to 44 
years
45 years 
plus
Australia 1.0 2.3 0.7 0.8
Belgium 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.6
Denmark 0.9 1.1 0.8 0.9
France 0.9 1.9 0.7 0.8
Germany 1.0 1.1 0.9 1.0
Greece 0.9 1.5 0.9 0 . 8
Ireland 1.2 1.6 1.2 0.9
Italy 0.7 1.8 0.7 0.4
Japan 1.2 0 . 6 0 . 6 2.2
Portugal 0.7 1.5 0.6 0.4
Spain 0.9 1.9 0 . 8 0.6
Sweden 1.1 2 . 0 0.8 0.9
United Kingdom 1.3 1.9 1.1 1.2
United States 1.2 1.7 1.3 0.9
Source: OECD (1990) p 49, Table 2.2.
Notes: The rates of risk for Denmark, Greece and the UK are for
1987. The rate of risk for Sweden is for 1986. The total
rate of risk shows the risk of becoming an unemployed
job-loser for men relative to the risk for women. Thus, 
it is possible for the risk rates for every age group of 
a given country to be greater than one.
For virtually all the countries, the age group most at risk is the 
under 25 age group. The exceptions to this finding are Japan and 
Germany: for Germany, the rate of risk of the over 45s is equal to
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that of the under 2 5s; whereas for Japan, the rate for the over 45s 
is nearly three times that of the rate for the under 25s. It should 
be stressed that this data cannot be used to show which age groups 
are more likely to lose their job: rather, it shows the risk of
losing a job and then remaining unemployed. Thus, if those in a 
particular age group have the same risk of losing a job as those in 
another age group, but tend to leave the labour force upon job loss, 
the rate of risk of becoming an unemployed job-loser will be lower 
for that group than for the other group. Due to the existence of 
early retirement benefits (both private and public), the older job- 
losers are more likely to leave the labour force than remain 
unemployed. Table 7B.8 shows the ratio of job-losers not in the 
labour force to job-losers remaining unemployed, for men belonging 
to different age groups.
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Table 7B.8 showing the ratio of the number of job-losers who left 
the labour force to the number of job-losers who remained 
unemployed.
Age
group
Aus­
tralia
1988
Belgium
1988
Canada
1988
Denmark
1987
France
1988
Ger­
many
1988
All men 0.5 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.9
under 2 5 0.7 0 .1 1.3 1.6 0.4 0.3
25-44 0.6 0.1 0.8 0 . 5 0.2 0.2
45 + 2.3 4.3 1.0 1.2 3.6 2.3
Age
group
Greece
1987
Ireland
1988
Italy
1988
Japan
1981
Nether­
lands
1983
Por­
tugal
1988
All men 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.3
under 2 5 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.3 1.2
25-44 0.7 0.3 0.3 0 0.2 0.4
45 + 1.3 2 . 8 2.7 1.5 4.5 1.9
Age
group
Spain
1988
UK
1987
US
1988
All men 0.2 0.4 0.7
under 2 5 0.7 0.3 1.8
25-44 0.2 0.2 0.3
45 + 2.9 2.9 1.75
Source: Calculated from data in OECD (1990) pp 45-47.
Notes: Disaggregated data for Japan later than 1981 is not
available. Age groups for Canada are: under 25, 25-54
and 55+. See OECD (1990 pp 73-75) for country-specific 
definitions.
Table 7B.8 above shows quite clearly that, for all countries, older 
men are more likely to leave the labour force than younger men 
following job-loss. There are two important implications arising 
from these results: the first is that the low rate of risk of
becoming an unemployed job-loser is probably explained by the high 
propensity to leave the labour force, rather than a low risk of job 
loss; and the second is that despite the high propensity of older
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male job-losers to leave the labour force, the older male unemployed 
experience a longer duration of unemployment.
It is feasible that the rise in unemployment amongst older men 
during the 1980s is partly explained by a fall in the in the 
propensity to leave the labour force. For some of the countries 
listed in Table 7B.8 above, it is possible to calculate the labour 
force leaver ratio for an earlier year in the 1980s (usually 1983) . 
My calculations show that for 5 countries the ratio remained 
unchanged or rose, whereas for 5 countries that ratio fell. Thus, 
there is no clear trend in the propensity of the older job-losers 
to leave the labour force. Furthermore, the change in ratios may be 
misleading, since 1983 was a year of sluggish output growth for most 
countries, whereas 1988 was a year of relatively high growth.
In the chapter on labour force participation and early retirement 
in the OECD Employment Outlook 1992 it is suggested that the high 
propensity of the 60-64 and 65+ age group to leave the labour force 
is the result of expanding early retirement programmes during the 
1980s; and that many of the programmes were expanded to deal with 
rising unemployment in the early 1980s (OECD 1992 p 222) . This 
suggestion is supported by figures for the 1980s showing the 
percentage of older age groups receiving some form of early 
retirement benefit (OECD 1992 p 214) . Out of seventeen schemes, all 
but four show a rise in this percentage between 1980 and 1990. One 
of the most striking examples is the early retirement pay scheme in 
Denmark: in 1980, 15.9% of the 60-66 age group were receiving early 
retirement pay; by 199 0 the percentage had risen to 2 8.5%. More 
generally the percentage point increases range from a low of 0.6 to 
a high of 14.8. It is difficult to establish the direction of 
causality between the expansion of up-take in early retirement
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benefits and propensity to leave the labour force: the schemes were 
expanded in period when unemployment was rising and the high 
propensity to leave the labour force may merely be a reflection of 
the increasing difficulty in finding jobs, leading to a discouraged 
worker effect. Data on discouraged older workers is scanty, but the 
same chapter provides data that suggest that discouragement is much 
higher amongst older workers (55-64) than amongst other age groups 
(OECD 1992 p 211, Table 5.13). Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to 
assume that the relative ease of access to income support for older 
workers has contributed to the high propensity to leave the labour 
force. In other words, the unemployed are more likely to become 
discouraged if there are sources of income support other than 
employment.
It has not been possible to provide data that cover the same time- 
span for each aspect discussed above, but in conclusion, it is clear 
that the population of all OECD countries has aged in the last 
thirty years. The male labour force participation rates have fallen 
and the most dramatic falls can be seen in the older age groups. 
While the labour force participation rates of older men have fallen, 
the likelihood of experiencing unemployment has increased; and 
moreover, the unemployment is more likely to be of a long-term 
nature. This rise in unemployment has occurred in spite of the high 
propensity for older people to leave the labour force upon job-loss; 
and in spite of the introduction and high up-take of early 
retirement provisions in maty countries. Although the risk of job- 
loss followed by unemployment for older males tends to be lower than 
for prime age men, the high propensity to leave the labour force of 
older men suggests that the risk of job-loss for this age group is 
substantially higher than for prime age men; but this hypothesis 
cannot be confirmed. In general, it can be concluded from this short
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appendix that unemployment amongst older men would be much more 
severe without the existence of early retirement schemes.
Japan was one of the countries experiencing relatively rapid ageing 
in the past 3 0 years. The unemployment rates of older men in Japan 
are relatively high compared with the unemployment rates of prime- 
age men (when compared with other countries). Japan has a strikingly 
high relative risk of unemployed job-loss for older males. This high 
risk rate can in part be explained by the relatively low propensity 
leave the labour force of older Japanese men (when compared with 
older men in other countries). Nonetheless, given that the 
propensity to leave the labour force is lower for prime-age Japanese 
men than for older men, the high risk rate suggests that older men 
are far more likely to experience job-loss than prime-age men. 
Although most countries have displayed a worsening unemployment 
problem for older men, Japan appears to have been one of the worst. 
The lack of early retirement provisions and short contribution span 
of Japanese workers to pension funds must be important in explaining 
the low propensity to leave the labour force. On the other hand, 
Japanese older males appear to face a higher relative risk of job- 
loss than older men in other countries.
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CHAPTER 8 THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNMENT LABOUR MARKET POLICIES IN 
RESPONSE TO THE AGEING OF THE LABOUR FORCE AND AN 
ASSESSMENT OF THEIR SUCCESS 
Section 1 Significance of this chapter.
In the previous chapter, the likely behaviour of unemployment as the 
population ages was examined. It was argued that the employment 
practices of firms will lead to an increasing macro unemployment 
rate as employment opportunities for older people become more 
difficult to find and that other factors which could soften this 
rise in unemployment were unlikely to have a significant effect. One 
of the main factors that was not discussed in Chapter Seven was that 
of the government policies that have been initiated to deal with the 
growing problem of unemployment amongst older people. The Japanese 
government, particularly during the 1980s, has become increasingly 
aware of the growth in unemployment caused by the increasing number 
of older people seeking unsuccessfully for employment. The main 
response of the government has been to try and enhance the 
functioning of the labour market through encouraging employers to 
change their employment practices and to increase the amount of 
information available to both job-seekers and prospective employers. 
Most of the policies have been the result of piecemeal revision to 
the existing laws that were introduced to deal with the general 
problem of unemployment that occurred after the second world war. 
Section 2 describes briefly the main elements of post-war labour 
market intervention, to provide an understanding of the policy 
framework in which older person employment policies were made. In 
Section 3 are described the main elements of the policies introduced 
to alleviate the unemployment problem of older people. There is also 
an attempt in Section 3 to assess the performance of the policies, 
although it should be stressed that there seems to be little
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available government material that reports on the effects of the 
policies that have been introduced. Hence, it is only possible to 
attempt a partial assessment.
Section 2 The Post-war Framework of Government Labour Market 
Policy.
Before describing the policies that have been formulated to 
alleviate unemployment amongst older workers, it is necessary to 
give a brief introduction to the general framework of labour market 
policy which was developed after the Second World War. It is within 
the framework set out below that these policies have been developed. 
There are five main strands to government intervention in the labour 
market in Japan. These five strands are a) the establishment of 
public labour exchanges, b) the provision of a state unemployment 
insurance scheme, c) the implementation of public works programmes 
to alleviate unemployment, d) special temporary measures to deal 
with specific short-term unemployment problems and e) an 
occupational training system. These five aspects and their 
conception are described in more detail below.
a) The Job Introduction Scheme (Shokuovo Shokai Taisei) .
The Job Introduction Law (Shokugyo Shokai~ho) was established in 
1922. Job introduction services were undertaken by local government, 
but with a revision to the law in 193 8, the central state took over 
their duties (Shimizu 1991 p 37). Between 1941 and 1944, the names 
of the job exchanges changed. Particularly important were the Labour 
Offices (kinrocho) which were used to place workers within the 
planned war-time economy. In 1945, with the end of the war, two 
central bureaux were set up - the roseikyoku and the new Labour 
Bureau (kinrokyoku), which replaced the war-time kinrokyoku. The new 
kinrokyoku oversaw to job introduction services and the assignment
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of disbanded service men and job-losers to new work, through the 
kinrocho (Shimuzu 1991 p 37). In 1947, the Rodbsho was established, 
the kinrokyoku became the Bureau for Labour Stability (shokugyo 
antei-kyoku) and the kinrocho became the Local Public Labour 
Exchange (kokyo shokugyo antei-shoj. The local public labour 
exchanges were to provide a free job introduction service and non­
state agencies were banned from such work. The guiding principles, 
set out in the new Labour Stability Law {shokugyo antei-ho) of the 
labour exchanges were as follows (Shimizu 1991 p 38):
i) The exchange must deal with any new requests from employers
for workers, regardless of the number of applications for
workers the exchange already has on its books. The prospective 
employer must give details of the nature of the work on offer 
and details of wages and working conditions.
ii) The exchange cannot refuse job applicants.
iii) The exchange will introduce the job applicant to work that 
complements his skills and ability and introduce workers who 
are fit for the nature and conditions of the work on offer to 
employers.
iv) The exchange must make all efforts to introduce work to the
job searcher that would not require the worker to relocate,
v) The job introduction must make the terms of the job on offer 
clear.
vi) The exchange must adopt a neutral stance towards labour 
disputes.
vii) The exchange must not divulge any confidential information it 
possesses regarding either job applicants or employers.
A committee, called the Labour Stability Council (Shokugyo Antei 
Shingikai) was established to debate the role of the labour 
exchanges. Also a revision to the Law in 1949 allowed schools and 
labour exchanges to co-ope*rate with each other and also permitted
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schools to undertake free job introduction services.
During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the main purpose of the 
labour exchanges was to smooth the path of disbanded military 
personnel into civilian jobs and to meet the requirements of 
prospective employers in certain industries that were vital to the 
recovery of the Japanese economy (eg coal mining) (Shimizu 1991 p 
39) .
b) The Unemployment Insurance Scheme (Shitsugyo Hoken Seido) . 
The Unemployment Insurance Law (Shitsugyo Hoken-ho) was established 
in 1947 in response to the large surplus labour supply that existed 
following the end of the war. The law made way for the establishment 
of a compulsory state-run unemployment insurance scheme. In 1949 an 
unemployment insurance scheme was also established for day workers 
(Shimizu 1991 p 40).
c) Unemployment Countermeasure Works (Shitsucrvo Taisaku Jigyo) - 
In 1946 the government passed a resolution on a Framework for 
Emergency Measures to Increase Employment (kinkyu shuro taisaku 
yoko) which aimed to lessen unemployment by implementing public 
construction works (doboku jigyo) and public works for those with 
special knowledge (chishiki kaikyu shitsugyo okyu jigyo) (Shimizu 
1991 p 40) . With the deflation caused by the Dodge Line in 1949, 
unemployment rose and an emergency law to deal wrHrfKeproblem, the 
Kinkyu Shitsugyo Taisaku-ho, was passed in the same year. This law 
not only allowed for the establishment of a comprehensive public 
works programme, but it also required that the percentage of people 
hired for public works projects who were unemployed should reach a 
target level (Shimizu 1991 p 40) . Thus, projects had to be 
formulated on the basis of their unemployment absorption capacity
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as well as their effects on the economy as a whole. During this 
period, the number of day workers who were unemployed was 
particularly high. The public works projects managed to absorb 70% 
of these people searching for day work (Shimizu 1991 p 40).
d) Special Measures to Deal with Unemployment arising from 
Structural Change.
It was felt that it was not possible to avoid the unemployment of 
large numbers of workers who were made redundant from certain 
declining industries through the usual measures of public works and 
registration at a local public labour exchange. Therefore laws were 
passed in the late 1950s to allow special measures to be taken for 
designated declining industries. More concretely, the Coal Mining 
Industry Redundancy Temporary Measures Law (Tanko Rishokusha Rinji 
Sochi-ho) was passed in 1959 (Shimizu 1991 p 41) . Based on this law, 
a new, far-reaching labour exchange scheme was introduced, special 
public works were instigated to absorb redundant workers and 
provisions for re-training were established. Following a revision 
to the law in 19 62, allowances for re-training were established, 
financial aid was given for relocation, subsidies were paid to 
employers who took on the redundant workers and special housing was 
provided for their use (Shimizu 1991 p 42).
Another similar law was passed in 1958 for workers made redundant 
from jobs connected with the occupying forces (Churyugun Kankei 
Rishokusha-to Rinji Sochi-ho), following the start of the withdrawal 
of the occupying forces in 1957. Similar measures to those described 
above were implemented (Shimizu 1991 p 42).
e) The Occupational Training System.
The Occupational Training Law (Shokugyo Kunren-ho) was passed in
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1958 {Shimizu 1991 p 42). The aim of the law was to contribute to 
the economic development of Japan by raising the level of skills in 
the labour force and encouraging job stability. Three main measures 
were introduced to these ends: public training institutions were 
established; a skills qualification scheme was introduced; and 
employers received public assistance for developing the skills of 
their workers at the workplace (Shimizu 1991 p 43).
Section 3 Old Age Unemployment Policies
This section describes the development of policies instigated to 
alleviate the unemployment of older people and an assessment of 
their effectiveness is attempted. In order to increase the 
employment of older people, the government gradually developed an 
older worker employment ratio scheme, which required employers to 
strive to ensure that a given percentage of their employees was 
above a certain age. The government also encouraged companies to 
raise the mandatory retirement age and to help retirees find new 
jobs. These policies I have termed administrative guidance measures 
and they are examined first. To bolster these administrative 
guidance methods, changes were made at local labour exchanges, a 
range of grants and subsidies were started and a number of quasi­
public institutes were opened.
Sub-section 3.1 Administrative Guidance Measures 
a Older worker employment ratios
The policy of using older worker employment ratio targets evolved 
gradually from the early 19 60s to form one of the main policies for 
dealing with the unemployment problem of older people. In 19 60, the 
Ministry of Labour started a survey that showed the number of job 
vacancies, job searchers and hirings for each age group. This survey 
provided the basic data for devising measures to encourage the
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employment of middle-aged and older workers (Shimizu 1991 p 45) . In 
response to the results of the first survey, the Ministry of Labour 
notified the heads of the local public labour exchanges in 19 61 that 
the introduction of older workers to prospective employers needed 
to be improved. The Ministry of Labour made concrete provisions to 
support this policy. During 19 60 and 19 61, it set up a discussion 
panel with the Nikkeiren to identify the types of work for which 
older workers were particularly suitable and also to generally 
improve the understanding of the business world of the labour market 
problems that older workers faced. The Ministry of Labour made a 
list of the types of work that were judged to be suitable and the 
local labour exchanges were expected to encourage employers to hire 
older people with reference to this list. Moreover, if employers 
with vacancies for school leavers were to find that the vacancies 
could not be filled, the labour exchange was expected to urge them 
to hire older workers (Shimizu 1991 p 45).
It was also felt that government-related institutions should give 
an example to private employers by hiring older workers. To this 
end, Council for the Promotion of the Employment of the Aged and 
Middle-aged {Chukonenreisha Koyo Sokushin Kyogikai) and consisting 
of the heads such institutions as the public road works groups (doro 
kodan) was founded to discuss the problems of hiring older workers 
and to define the types of jobs that were suitable for older people 
(Shimizu 1991 p 47).
In 19 64, a cabinet resolution was passed which required central, 
local government and government-related institutions to set the 
private sector an example by hiring older workers (Shimizu 1991 p 
65) . Subsequently, in 1965, 33 types of work were designated by the 
Ministry of Labour as suitable for older workers. Targets were set
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for the proportion of people above the age of 3 5 employed in these 
types of work in the public sector. The targets were to be fulfilled 
within 3 years (Shimizu 1991 p 65). Also a list of 7 6 types of work 
suitable for older workers was created for use by the private sector 
as a guideline (Shimizu 19 91 p 65).
In 19 66 these types of work and older worker ratio targets were 
codified in law with the passing of the Employment Measures Law 
(Koyo Taisaku-ho) . The following describes the setting of the
middle-aged worker employment ratio and measures used to encourage 
the employers to respect and honour the duty assigned to them
(Shimizu 1991 p 75).
i) The older worker employment ratio.
The middle-aged worker employment ratio was set according to
the type of work in question, depending on the suitability of
the job for older workers and also the feasibility of
employing older workers in such a job. For example, the ratio 
for jobs such as office cleaning and supervision of delivery 
drivers was set at 95%, whereas for jobs such as the 
collection of fees and ticket payments (eg in museum ticket 
booths) and driving passenger cars and small vehicles, the 
ratio was set at 65%. It is also important to note that these 
ratios were only applied to jobs in the public and state- 
related sector.
ii) Encouraging employers to meet the older worker employment 
ratio targets.
Employers could be requested by the Minister for Labour to 
undertake measures to meet the older worker employment ratios. 
Such a request might be made when the labour exchanges found
that they were receiving a large number of older job
searchers, but their employment prospects were diminishing.
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The request could only be made to places of employment with 
more than 100 employees, since there would be little division 
of labour in establishments with fewer than this number of 
employees. Finally, the request could only be made when it was 
recognised that it was not particularly difficult for the 
employer to meet the target ratio. The request would consist 
of a demand for the employer to draw up a plan for achieving 
the ratio and to register with the local labour exchange when 
a need for new employees arose (Shimizu 1991 p 78).
In 1971 the older worker ratio scheme was revised so that private 
sector employers were also expected to meet the target ratios. The 
government set 2 9 types of work that were deemed to be suitable for 
middle-aged and older workers (above the age of 45) . These types of 
work were published and private employers were expected to make all 
due effort to ensure that the older worker employment ratio was met 
for any one of the set types of work (Shimizu 1991 pp 106-112).
It was decided not to establish a set of legal punishments for those 
employers who did not meet the required ratio, since such a system 
would force employers to hire older workers regardless of whether 
the older people were suitable for the job or whether the necessary 
adjustments to the terms and conditions of the job had been made or 
not. Some form of coercion was felt to be necessary, however, so a 
scheme of bureaucratic intervention was devised. The two main forms 
of intervention were the following.
i) If an employer approached a labour exchange in search of a new 
employee and the employer had not by that time attained the 
older worker employment ratio, the labour exchange was 
entitled to refuse to deal with any application from that 
employer. This was a new exception to article 16 of the
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Shokugyo Antei-ho, that stated that labour exchanges had to 
deal with any such application (see Section 2 above) . The 
labour exchange had to encourage the employer to employ an 
older worker by giving advice and guidance on the efficient 
placement of older workers and the necessary work environment. 
Only when the employer remained stubbornly disinclined to hire 
an older worker would the labour exchange refuse to deal with 
the application.
ii) The Minister for Labour could also request employers who had 
not reached the older worker employment ratios to adopt 
measures to employ older workers. Such measures might include 
the preparation of a formal plan for increasing the proportion 
of older workers or to seek for older workers through the 
public labour exchange (Shimizu 1991 pp 106-112).
The older worker ratio scheme was further revised in 1976. The 
different ratios for each worker type were replaced by a single 
ratio for the proportion of older workers in the total number 
employed. Older workers were now defined as those above the age of 
55 and the ratio was set at 6%. This ratio applied to all employees 
belonging to one company, rather than to employees belonging to one 
particular place of employment, since some companies would wish to 
concentrate the employment of older workers in particular workplaces 
belonging to the company (eg old people companies - see Chapter 
Six). In other words, the ratio applied to consolidated employee 
numbers (Shimizu 1991 pp 159-161). There was still no legal scheme 
of punishments for employers who did not meet the target ratio, but 
the degree of possible bureaucratic intervention was strengthened. 
In times when the labour market for older people was particularly 
bad, the labour exchange could demand that employers who had not 
reached the ratio should hire older workers or should adopt other 
measures to ensure the security of employment for older workers. For
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example, if such an employer came to a public labour exchange in 
search of new workers, it was possible to demand that the employer 
should adopt some type of re-employment scheme (kinmu encho or 
saikoyo) or improve their personnel management so that retirement 
could be set at a higher age (Shimizu 1991 p 162-165). Labour 
exchanges could also demand a report from employers regarding the 
state of older worker employment in their workplaces.
b Raising of mandatory retirement age and encouragement for 
companies to find retirees other jobs
The unemployment problem for older people was felt to be partly 
caused by the employment practices of companies and in particular, 
the practice of mandatory severance from the company at a relatively 
early age (see Chapter Four) . Therefore, it seemed that it was 
necessary to promote a higher mandatory retirement age in companies. 
From the early 197 0s onwards, a protracted debate continued between 
the business world, employees, bureaucracy and members of parliament 
regarding the desirability of using the law to force employers to 
raise their company's retirement age (Shimizu 1991 pp 116-17 0). The 
ultimate outcome of such debate did not result in a recommendation 
to use legal enforcement, since such a measure was viewed as an 
infringement of employers' liberty. In 1973, however, the Employment 
Measures Law was revised so that the state could use various 
measures to promote and encourage the adoption of a later mandatory 
retirement age through administrative guidance. The target 
retirement age was set at 60 years of age. Employers were also 
encouraged to help retirees find new work after retirement. The 
state was to supply information and other assistance with respect 
to raising the mandatory retirement age to employers. A main example 
of such assistance is the Retirement Age Raiser's Grant (teinen 
encho shoreikin) payable to small and medium-size employers who
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raised their mandatory retirement age (Shimizu 1991 p 143). The 
state would also provide occupational training before the advent of 
retirement and pay a grant to people undergoing such occupational 
training.
The head of a public labour exchange could demand that an employer 
present a plan for assisting retirees to find another job after 
retirement, if the mandatory retirement age was below 60 and if the 
number of employees facing mandatory retirement was over 100 in 
number. The plan had to include the number of people the employer 
intended to retire in two years time. It was expected to indicate 
the various approaches that the employer was taking to find the 
retirees another job, and to state the number of retirees being 
dealt with under each approach. Moreover, the employer was asked to 
describe the steps taken to assist in the re-employment of retirees 
who it was felt would need to make use of the public labour 
exchanges and public training institutes, together with their name, 
sex, age, work-type and date of retirement. Finally, the employer 
was obliged to listen to the opinions of the retirees and any union 
to which they belonged, when preparing the plan (Shimizu 1991 pp 
143-146) .
An employer who was requested to make a plan was also required to 
appoint a supervisor for assisting retirees to find another job 
(saishushoku enjo tantosha, called a retiree supervisor hereafter). 
The retiree supervisor had to find and cultivate new employers for 
retirees, provide possible new employers information regarding the 
retiree and, likewise, furnish the retiree with information about 
the new employer. The supervisor was expected to give any advice to 
the retiree that would facilitate re-employment and make contact 
with the public labour exchange and public training institutes when
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necessary (Shimizu 1991 pp 143-146).
In 197 6, further administrative powers were granted to the labour 
exchanges. In times when the labour market for older people was 
particularly bad, the labour exchange had the right to demand that 
employers who had not reached the 6% older worker ratio should hire 
older workers or should adopt other measures to ensure the security 
of employment for older workers. For example, if such an employer 
should come to a public labour exchange in search of new workers, 
employers could be demanded to adopt some type of re-employment 
scheme (kinmu encho or saikoyo), or improve their personnel 
management so that retirement could be set at a higher age.
In 19 86 the administrative guidance to encourage raising the 
mandatory retirement age and promote continual employment past the 
age of 60 was strengthened further. Now, the authorities could 
demand an employer to raise the retirement age to 60. The employer 
would have to complete a report on the progress in raising the 
retirement age within three months. If the report were not completed 
on time and the employer had paid no heed to advice, the employer 
would be ordered to prepare a plan for raising the retirement age. 
If the plan were judged to be unsatisfactory, the employer would be 
told to change it. Such an order would be. given if the timescale of the 
plan were over 3 years, the retirement age were still below 60 on 
completion, and improvements and changes needed to raise the 
retirement age were not included in the plan. Once the plan had been 
accepted, the employer could be ordered to keep to the timetable of 
the original plan if procrastinating. Employers who failed to 
respond would have their names made public (Shimizu 1991 pp 2 9 6- 
301) .
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Further demands were placed on the employer to ensure continued 
employment up to the age of 65 . The employer was expected to appoint 
an officer (konenreisha koyo suishinsha) who would supervise the 
introduction of changes in the working environment and equipment 
that would be necessary to employ people to the age of 65. Local 
Employment Centres for the Elderly (todofuken konenreisha koyo antei 
senta) were set up to instruct and advise employers in the continued 
employment of people beyond the age of 60 (Shokugycho p 73) . Advice 
was given on a wide-range of issues relating to the employment of 
older workers, such as changes in the wage and promotion systems, 
development of skills and improvements to the workplace. On the 
request of the employer, specialists were loaned to the employer to 
undertake a survey, for which the employer paid some of the costs. 
The centres collated and presented data and information relating to 
the employment of older people (through the establishment of "Labour 
Information Corners"). Awareness of the employers was to be 
developed by holding Work Redesign Contests (shokumu saisekkei 
kontesuto) and using other promotion methods (Amakasu 1987 p 74). 
Finally, the payment of government subsidies and grants for 
encouraging the continued employment of older people (specifically, 
the Older Workers Employment Rate Grant and the Older Persons 
Employment Maintenance Subsidy, see Part 3) . A similar Central 
Employment Centre for the Elderly (chuo konenreisha koyo antei 
senta) was established to perform similar duties at a national level 
and to co-ordinate and oversee the development of the local 
employment centres for the elderly.
Employers were also expected to act like private labour exchanges 
to help retirees find new work (Shimizu 1991 p 303). In particular 
circumstances, the local labour exchange could demand the employer 
to prepare a plan for helping retirees to find another job (Shimizu
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1991 p 3 04). There would have to be a person appointed to oversee 
the help given for re-employment (saishushoku enjo tantosha) 
(Shimizu 1991 p 305). If the employer planned to make redundant a 
large number of older workers, the public Employment Office for the 
Elderly would have to be informed.
An employer was also expected to make due efforts to educate and 
prepare the retiree for retired life (here, retirement refers to 
permanent withdrawal from the labour force). Consequently, the 
employer had to create a Retirement Preparations Programme (taishoku 
junbi puroguramu) which included the provision of information 
relating to life cycle planning, the maintenance of mental and 
physical health and the economic aspects of retired life, such as 
severance pay and pensions. Financial assistance should be provided 
for education relating to retired life and paid leave should be 
given for such purposes as taking qualificational examinations and 
developing hobbies and interests (Shimizu 1991 p 307). Employers 
were required to provide an annual report on the state of employment 
of older workers at their establishment. Previously, such a report 
would only have to be provided upon specific request from the local 
labour exchange (Shimizu 1991 p 314).
During the period following the enactment of the Employment 
Stability of Older Persons Law and the revision discussed here, 
attempts were made to raise the official starting age of state 
pensions to 65. A timetable for the upward revision of the starting 
age was included in the 1985 revision to the public pension laws, 
but approval for the timetable to be activated could not be 
obtained, because of the fierce opposition of the business world and 
labour organisations (see Chapter Nine for full details) . It was 
feared by the business world that the raising of the pension
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eligibility age to 65 would ultimately lead to a rise in the 
mandatory retirement age to the same age and hence, the business 
world were against such a high retirement age. Labour organisations 
feared that the security of people between the age of 60 and 65 
would be compromised, as it had been in the days when the mandatory 
retirement age was generally set at 55 and the pension eligibility 
age at 60. As a result of the failure to enact the upward revision 
of the pension starting age, it was decided that further measures 
should be introduced to promote the continuous employment of workers 
up to the age of 65.
The main purpose of the 1991 revision was to establish a basic set 
of policies (konenreisha.-to shokugyo antei taisaku kihon hoshin) to 
be used by employers for fostering a suitable environment for labour 
organisations and employers to co-operate in maintaining stable 
employment opportunities up to the age of 65, In more concrete 
terms, employers were obliged to make all due efforts to provide re­
employment opportunities for those employees reaching mandatory 
retirement age. Also a concerted effort was planned for ensuring 
that all firms had a retirement age of 60 or above by 1994 (Shimizu 
1991 p 414). Rather than establishing a set of penalties and orders 
from the authorities for employers who did not make all due efforts 
to provide re-employment opportunities, the local labour exchange 
would make recommendations that would encourage the adjustments that 
were felt to be necessary for the employment of older people. 
Financial assistance was to be given to employers who managed to 
introduce the measures set down in the basic plan.
c) Performance of policies used to raise the mandatory retirement 
age and encourage employers to help retirees
Data presented in Chapter Four shows that there has been a continual
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rise in the percentage of firms with a mandatory retirement age of 
60 or above: in 197 8, the percentage was 3 8.5; by 1988 it was 58.5. 
Thus, it seems that the government's attempt since 1973 to raise the 
retirement age through the policies described above has been largely 
successful. It should be remembered, however, that labour unions and 
other pressure groups will also have had some impact on the 
decisions of personnel managers. There seems to be no direct method 
of ascertaining the extent to which government policy itself has 
been responsible for the raising of the retirement age.
It is extremely difficult to measure the effects of measures such 
as encouraging employers to find new employment for their retirees. 
It is possible to attempt an indirect assessment of the 
effectiveness of some of these measures, however. One of the surveys 
of the Ministry of Labour (Rodo Daijin Kanbo Seisaku Chosabu Sangyo 
Rodo Chosaka, 1985 and 19 88) gives the percentage of firms which 
have some scheme for preparing employees about to retire for post­
retirement life. These schemes include sending the retiree to work 
in another company, re-training and other schemes. Table 8.1 below 
shows the change in the percentage of companies that had any of the 
schemes between the years 1985 and 1988. As can be seen, the 
percentage of firms having each scheme has decreased across nearly 
all schemes for nearly all sizes of company. Unfortunately, it is 
not possible to surmise from the data why such a fall in the use of 
these various schemes had occurred, but government encouragement 
does not seem to have been successful. The fall in the use of these 
schemes may be explained in part by the raising of the retirement 
age in companies. Such a trend will reduce the pressures the 
companies feel for them to make efforts to ensure the future 
employment security of their older workers.
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Sub-section 3.2 Special measures in labour exchanges
The fulfilment of government obligations to facilitate older people 
in finding work could be seen in the appointment of specialist staff 
in the local labour exchanges. This policy started in 19 63 and by 
1964 there were 570 such case workers (Shimizu 1991 p 64). In 1973, 
this policy was strengthened with the appointment of advisors for 
the promotion of employment (shushoku sokushin shidokan) and 
employment advisors (koyo shidokan), who were responsible for
promoting continuous employment, advising on raising the company 
retirement age and helping companies to formulate Re-employment 
Assistance Plans (saishushoku enjo keikaku) . A video introduction 
service (jiko shokai bideo) for older workers was started at local 
public labour exchanges in 1984. A video tape with information of 
the job-searcher was made and circulated to employers (Amakasu 1987 
p 79). In the same year, post-retirement employment programmes
(saishushoku junbi puroguramu) were also initiated. These programmes 
consisted of lectures, advice and the presentation of information 
on looking for work. With the passing of the 19 8 6 Employment 
Stability of Older Persons Law these programmes were also made 
available to older employees who were about to leave their job 
following a spell of working under a work-extension or re-employment
(saikoyo). From 1986 staff were designated to visit employers and
instruct and encourage them to employ older people (konenreisha koyo 
sokushinin). Others were designated to collect information of 
employers with vacancies {konenreisha koyo kyoryokuin). Also 198 6 
saw the commencement of publication of magazines with information 
of employers with vacancies for older people and older job searchers 
(Amakasu 1987 p 81).
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a) The Performance of the Local Labour Exchanges.
The Somucho (1988) surveyed 43 local labour exchanges in order to 
assess the degree to which the duties recorded in the 19 8 6 
Employment Stability of Older Persons Law were being fulfilled. Some 
of the results of the survey are described in the following.
It was asked whether the local exchanges had managed to collect 
information on the work-type and sex of job-searchers and the work- 
skills and sex of the employee required by the employer for each of 
the older age groups. Out of the 43 exchanges surveyed, 30.2% had 
not managed to undertake such work at all, 30.2% had only managed 
to find the work-type and sex of the job-searchers according to age 
and did not have information relating to prospective employers 
(Sbmucho 1988 p 8). Only 39.5% had managed to meet the remit laid 
down in the 19 8 6 Law.
Twenty exchanges (those with more than 3,000 employers and 60,000 
insured under the unemployment insurance scheme in their district) 
were also asked how many employers they had visited over a period 
of one year in order to promote the hiring of older people. The 
median number was less than 100 employers (9 exchanges), two 
exchanges had not undertaken any visits, two had managed more than 
300 visits and 6 had visited between 100 and 300 employers (Somucho 
1988 p 12) . If promotion of hiring of older people that was 
undertaken by telephone is also included in the figures, each of the 
20 exchanges had, on average, contacted 0.109 employers for each 
newly registered older job-seeker and 14.2 employers for each member 
of staff working in the relevant section of the labour exchange over 
the year (Sbmucho 19 88 p 10).
The survey also included questions relating to work undertaken by
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labour exchange staff to encourage employers to relax their age 
restriction when applying to the labour exchange for a person. In 
the 43 labour exchanges, there were 1,22 8 cases of employers who had 
expressed a wish for a person below the age of 55, who had not been 
able to fill the vacancy after 3 months and whose vacancy was for 
a job designated as one suitable for older workers under the 1971 
Law. In just under 60% of these cases the labour exchange had 
attempted to make the employer relax the age restriction (although, 
unfortunately, it is not possible to know in how many cases the 
attempt was successful in finding a job for an older person). 
Reasons for not giving guidance to the employer were i) the labour 
exchange would only give guidance if an older job-seeker so wished 
(14.8%), ii) the desire of the employer for a young worker was very 
strong (8.6%), iii) the number of older job-seekers with the 
relevant qualifications and experience was low (2%) , iv) the actual 
contents of the job were difficult for an older person (8%) and v) 
other reasons,
One means of gauging the success of the policies enacted to improve 
the ease of finding employment -for unemployed older people is a 
comparison of the number and proportion of the older unemployed 
finding a job through the labour exchange over time. Table 8.2 shows 
such data for the period 1971 to 1986. It shows clearly that the 
number of older job-seekers registering at the local labour 
exchanges has risen approximately three-fold over the 15 years 
between 1971 and 1986. The success of the labour exchanges in 
finding work for these unemployed has remained roughly constant over 
a period in which many policies have been introduced to the labour 
exchanges in order to enhance their performance. It is particularly 
striking that the ratio of those introduced who manage to be hired 
remains at about the 40 percent level. It seems that the new
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measures have allowed the labour exchanges to maintain a consistent 
performance in the face a rapidly rising number of older job­
seekers, but have not been sufficient to improve their performance.
In more general terms, from amongst the total number of older people 
who found work, the proportion who did so through the introduction 
of a local labour exchange fell from 24.1% to 20.1% from 1983 to 
1986, while, over the same period, the percentage who found work 
through replying to advertisements rose from 14.2% to 17.6% {Sbmucho 
1988 p 29) . This trend indicates a decreasing reliance on the labour 
exchanges and hence a reduction in the effectiveness of many of the 
policies introduced by the government that are designed to 
ameliorate the unemployment problem of older people by strengthening 
the functions of the labour exchanges.
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3
The two most common examples of the answers given when employers 
were asked why they tended to use advertisements rather than
register at the labour exchange are as follows: a) we wanted a wide
selection of applications, b) when we are looking for a new person, 
we need to find someone as quickly as possible, but if we register 
at the labour exchange, a long time can pass without an application 
or even any contact, so because of the uncertainty we cannot use the 
labour exchange (Somucho 1988 p 28-29}. When people above the age 
of 45 were asked in 19 84 why they did not view using labour
exchanges as a favourable means of finding a job, the two most 
popular answers were: a) vacancies at the labour exchanges do not 
correspond to my wishes (45 -59 years old: 50.5%, 60 years old:
54.4%) and b) it is only possible to know superficial details of the 
prospective employer (45 -59 years old: 19.8%, 60 years old:
14.6%)(Somucho 1988 p 32).
Sub-section 3.3 Subsidies and Grants
A range of subsidies and grants were established in response to the 
policies described in Sub-section 3.1 above. (Shimizu 1991 p 112). 
In 1971, with the passing of the first law for dealing specifically 
with the employment problems of middle-aged and older workers 
(chukonenreisha-to no koyo no sokushin ni kansuru tokubetsu sochi- 
ho) , central and local government were expected to subsidise the 
costs of training incurred by employers that hired older workers and 
retrained them so that they could adapt to their present job and 
environment. Such a system of consideration payments was introduced 
to improve the adaptability of older workers. Furthermore, special 
consideration would be given to applications for loans to public 
bodies if the loan was to be used for providing training facilities, 
housing, health facilities and other facilities for older employees 
employed in the work types that had been designated as suitable for
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older workers (Shimizu 1991 p 112) . In the same year the Retirement 
Age Raiser's Grant (teinen encho shoreikinj was paid to small and 
medium-size companies that raised the mandatory retirement age. 
Larger companies were also eligible for the grant from 1976. The 
Older Persons Employment Grant {konenreisha koyo shoreikin) was 
started in 197 5. In 197 6, another grant became available to 
employers with a retirement age of 60 and above who implemented re­
employment schemes, called the Continuing Employment Grant (keizoku 
koyo shoreikin). In 1977, further payments were introduced. For 
employers who managed to increase the proportion of older employees 
within a certain period designated by the Ministry of Labour, an 
Older Persons Employment Security Payment (konenreisha koyo antei 
kyufukin) was made available (Shimizu 1991 p 171). These mid-1970s 
grants were all established alongside the introduction of the new 
older worker employment ratio that required 6% of employees to be 
above the age of 55.
In 1981 a subsidised loan scheme (konenreisha shokuba kaizen shikin 
yushi seido) was established in order to lessen the costs faced by 
employers who were trying to improve the working environment and 
equipment to facilitate the employment of older workers (Amakasu 
1987 pp 74-78) . Loans were made available to employers who were i) 
raising the retirement age to 60 and above or abandoning the custom 
of mandatory retirement and ii) expecting to increase the number of 
older employees by 2 or more (4 or more in the case of employers 
with more than 3 00 employees) . Loans were made available to 
corporate employers who i) made provisions for re-employment for a 
period over 3 years or more after retirement or abolished mandatory 
retirement; ii) were expecting to increase the number of older 
employees by 10 or more (or expecting the proportion of older 
employees to rise above 40%) ; and iii) received more than 50% of
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equity from a parent company or had a close relationship with a 
parent company. Although I have not been able to find explicit 
references, it seems that these loans were meant to encourage shukko 
and the establishment of old age companies (discussed in Chapter 
Six) . A loan of up to 100,002,000 yen would be made for the building 
of new work facilities, the acquisition of land or the purchase of 
new plant for accommodating older workers. The interest rate was set 
at 5.2% per annum for small and medium-sized enterprises and 5.45% 
per annum for large enterprises (these rates were revised downwards 
as of April 1988 to 4.2% and 4.45% respectively) . The repayment 
period was between 15 and 20 years for buildings and 5 years for new 
plant and equipment.
Another two subsidies were started in 19 81 to promote the rapid 
hiring of older workers following separation from their original 
employer because of retirement (Amakasu 1987 pp 88-89) . The first 
was the Subsidy for the Promotion of the Employment of Particular 
Job-searchers (tokutei kyushokusha koyo kaihatsu joseikin). This 
subsidy paid half of the employee's wages to the employer for the 
first year following hiring, provided that the employee had been 
hired through the local labour exchange and was between the ages of 
55 and 65. It was also a condition that the new employer was not 
related to the original employer (ie it is not a subsidiary) . In the 
case of small and medium-sized employers, the subsidy rate was set 
at two-thirds of wages paid. The second subsidy was the Subsidy for 
the Part-time Employment of Older People (konenreisha tanjikan koyo 
joseikin) (Amakasu 1987 pp 88-89; Somucho 1988 p 70). Under this 
scheme, a subsidy would be paid to an employer who employed a person 
between the age of 60 and 65 as a part-time worker, provided that 
the employee was introduced by the local labour exchange.
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The Older Persons Employment Maintenance Subsidy (konenreisha koyo 
kakuho joseikin) was established in January 1982 (Amakasu 1987 pp 
77-78) . This subsidy was to be paid to employers who were 
establishing schemes to provide continual employment for workers up 
to and beyond the age of 60, either through raising the retirement 
age or through the use of re-employment schemes (saikoyo and kinmu 
encho) and out-placement (shukko) . The subsidy was based on the 
number of workers who benefited when the schemes to continue their 
employment were established and who were between the ages of 60 and 
65. The subsidy amounts were set as follows; a) for each full time 
worker 450,000 yen (600,000 yen for small- and medium-sized 
employers) and b) for each part-time worker 225,000 yen (300,00 yen 
for small- and medium-sized employers).
In 1984, the Subsidy for Retirees (teinen taishokusha~to joseikin) 
was started. Under this subsidy scheme, employers who hire an older 
employee before mandatory retirement age through agreement (assen) 
with the original employer may receive a subsidy for each person. 
As in the case of the Subsidy for the Development of the Employment 
of Particular Job-searchers, the new employer could not be connected 
in any way to the original employer. Initially, the person hired had 
to be between the ages of 55 and 65, but following the enactment of 
the 19 8 6 Employment Stability of Older Persons Law the lower age 
limit was raised to 60. After 1986, the subsidy amount was set at
450,000 yen for a full-time appointment (600,000 yen for small and 
medium-sized enterprises) and 150,000 yen for a part-time 
appointment (225,000 yen for small and medium-sized enterprises) 
(Somucho 19 88 p 76).
A grant was to be made available in October 19 8 6 to employers who 
managed to reach the ratio of older employees to all employees of
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6% {konenreisha tasu koyo hoshokin - the Older Worker Ratio Grant). 
For each person over the age of 60 and below the age of 65 (Amakasu 
19 87 p 76), 20,000 yen would be paid to the employer.
a) Performance of the grants and subsidies
It is difficult to obtain data on the up-take of specific subsidies 
without intimate connections with the Ministry of Labour. The little 
evidence that exists of more recent grants suggests that subsidies 
have played an insignificant role in encouraging the employment of 
older workers. Neither the Subsidy for Retirees and Others (teinen 
taishokusha-to joseikin) nor the Subsidy for the Part-time 
Employment of Older People (konenreisha tanjikan koyo joseikin) has 
proved to be successful. In the case of the Subsidy for Retirees and 
Others, the budget was set to cater for 993 people in 1984, but 
there was only one claimant. In 1985 the budget was large enough for 
6,7 02 claims and the number of actual claims rose to 24. The 
equivalent figures for 1986 were 7,351 and 27 respectively (Somucho 
1988 p 78) . According to the local labour exchanges, the most common 
reason for lack of claimants was that most companies do not find new 
jobs for their workers in firms with which they do not have any 
connection: therefore, they will not be able to claim the subsidy 
(Somucho 1988 p 79). Another reason, from the point of view of the 
employed person, was that the person must not be eligible for 
unemployment benefit. There is also the problem of the existence of 
overlapping subsidies. The Subsidy for the Development of the 
Employment of Particular Job-searchers (tokutei kyushokusha koyo 
kaihatsu joseikin) is more generous (Somucho 1988 p 82).
There was also little use of the Subsidy for the Part-time 
Employment of Older People. In 19 85, 336,800,000 yen was budgeted 
for the this subsidy, but only 600,000 yen was claimed in three
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cases. In 1986 there were only 2 claimants (Somucho 1988 p 68). The 
main reasons given for the disappointing figures are: a) the wages 
received for part-time work are often lower than unemployment 
benefit and therefore people do not wish to work part-time and b) 
companies have not adjusted to hiring part-time workers above the 
age of 60 and as a result the number of employers registering with 
the labour exchanges in search of part-time older workers has been 
extremely low (Somucho 1988 pp 68-69).
Sub-section 3.4 Public Works
The use of Public works in absorbing older workers who were 
unemployed has been limited since 1963. In the early 1960s it became 
clear that, in spite of general labour shortage conditions, the 
number of people employed in public works programmes was continually 
increasing. Moreover, the average age of those employed in such 
programmes was gradually rising, such that by 19 62 the average age 
was nearly 50. Also, by this date, the average number of years of 
work on public works programmes for these employees was over six 
years (Shimizu 1991 p 51). These trends were particularly alarming 
because the public works programmes had originally been devised to 
provide temporary employment security. Moreover, the above trends 
showed that older workers who found it difficult to find employment 
in the private sector were being left to find long-term employment 
in the public works programmes. The placement in local labour 
exchanges of advisers specifically for the purpose of advising older 
workers was started in 1963. Allowances were also paid to older 
workers who were re-training whilst unemployed. If these measures 
failed after a certain period to result in employment, the person 
was employed in public works programmes. In other words, an 
unemployed older person could not request to be employed in public 
works programmes immediately and be accepted (Shimizu 1991 p 64).
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In 1971 further changes led to a lessening of the role of public 
works in reducing older age unemployment: public works would only 
be used to absorb unemployed older people under special 
circumstances. These circumstances are described next. Before 1971, 
special measures for unemployment black spots had already been 
introduced, but these measures had concentrated primarily on 
relocating the unemployed to other regions. In the case of middle- 
aged and older workers it was thought that relocation was not a 
feasible option and that therefore, new measures to facilitate 
employment in these particular areas were necessary. One of the 
measures was the unemployed absorption rate scheme (shitsugyosha 
kyushuritsu seido). Under this scheme, the number of older workers 
employed by public works projects had to reach a target percentage 
of the total employed on the project. The percentage was set 
according to the type of work being undertaken and the special area, 
and was known as the unemployed absorption rate. In the case of 
unskilled workers, for example, the rate was set at 40% (Shimizu 
1991 p 114).
Sub-section 3.5 Other Policies and Measures used to Improve the 
Employment of Older Workers
It was recognised relatively early in the process of formulating 
policies to improve the functioning of the older labour market that 
older people were less mobile than younger people and could not be 
expected to migrate. With this characteristic of older workers in 
mind, Older Persons Work Consultancies (konenreisha shokugyo 
sodanshitsu) were established in local government buildings of all 
major towns. The consultancies were permitted to undertake job 
introduction work as part of their general role of giving advice on 
welfare issues for the elderly (Amakasu 1987 pp 79-80) . These 
consultancies were started in 1973 and by 1988 numbered 281
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employing 3,983 advisors. Another work introduction scheme was the 
Talent Bank (jinzai ginko) {Amakasu 1987 p 80) . These banks were 
established in major towns and cities between 1967 and 1980 and 
their primary purpose was to modernise and improve the efficiency 
of small and medium-sized enterprises by giving advice and 
introducing middle-aged and older workers who possessed special 
knowledge, managerial expertise or particular skills. Other 
institutions {konenreisha muryo shokugyo shdkaisho) were also 
permitted by the Ministry of Labour to undertake gratis job 
introduction services for the elderly (above the age of 65) as part 
of the elderly welfare services overseen by the Ministry of Welfare 
(Amakasu 1987 p 80).
Silver Talent Centres (shiruba jinzai senta) were first established 
in 1980, following the example of centres established earlier by the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Government. The function of the centres at that 
time was, in principle, to provide temporary or short-time work 
opportunities for people above the age of 60 in order to maintain 
their health and allow them to participate in the local community. 
It was not the primary aim of the centres to provide a source of 
income and job security. The centres were managed by the older 
people themselves as a type of club or co-operative. Employers asked 
the centre for a worker and pa'cl-fhccentre. The centre in turn paid the 
member remuneration according to the type of work undertaken 
(Amakasu 19 87 p 92). The government would pay half of any expenses 
incurred by the local councils in assisting the running of the 
centres (Amakasu 1987 p 91) . In 1986, the Silver Centres were 
permitted to undertake gratis job introduction work and the state 
became responsible for expanding the number of centres. To encourage 
expansion, the state paid part of the expenses of councils
that gave council work to members of Silver Centres. By 1988 there
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were 340 such centres (Amakasu 1987 pp 93-94).
a) The Performance of Other Centres.
The Older Persons Work Consultancies were expected to introduce work 
to people over 55, but in 1985, 38.2% of people making use of the 
consultancies were under 55. Thus,-Vine, rp|e, these consultancies 
played in ameliorating the unemployment of the older age groups 
appears to be limited. Conversely, the percentage of members of the 
Silver Centres over 65 was approximately 69% (Somucho 198 8 p 56). 
The Silver Centres also seem to have been successful (compared with 
the local public labour exchanges) in finding work for-l4\ej*r members. 
In 1985, the centres had managed to provide 63.5% of their members 
with a job, on average. It should be remembered, however, that the 
Silver Centres are not intended to fulfil the same role as other job 
introduction centres. Indeed, the average length of a job was 58 
days for management jobs and between 5 and 20 days for other types 
of jobs (Amakasu 1987 p 172). The main problem encountered by the 
centres was that the types of jobs offered to them tended to be 
menial and did not allow members to use their skills and abilities 
to the full (Amakasu 1987 p 174).
Section 4 Conclusion to this chapter
The main body of the chapter is a description of the development of 
government policy in the labour market that was initiated to deal 
with the unemployment problems of older workers; and there is also 
an attempt to assess the effectiveness of the policies, despite the 
lack of information and data that seems to exist on this particular 
aspect of the ageing population in Japan. As the description of 
policy development shows, the present-day policies are direct 
descendants of the policies introduced to deal with the unemployment 
problems that followed the Second World War. The policies
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immediately following the war tended to be designed either to deal 
with very specific problems or to improve the mobility of labour 
(both in a geographical and occupational sense); or were devised to 
improve the general functioning of the labour market through the use 
of labour exchanges. The policies related directly to older people 
are similar and differ only in the extent to which coercion, 
administrative guidance and re-education of employers has been 
incorporated. Although these policies were probably appropriate for 
the immediate post-war period, they seem to be inappropriate for 
dealing with the ageing of the workforce, which is not a phenomenon 
which affects only a few sectors of the economy. The need for a more 
macro-oriented policy will be discussed in the conclusion to the 
thesis. The assessment of the policies, however incomplete it may 
be, points to a significant failure of the policies adopted to date.
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CHAPTER 9 POPULATION AGEING, THE JAPANESE PENSION SYSTEM AND
REFORM
Section 1 The Significance of this Chapter
In Chapter Seven, I concluded that the availability of adequate 
pensions was an important factor affecting the future unemployment 
rate of older men. Chapter Eight described the labour market 
intervention policies of the government carried out to reduce old 
age unemployment, and contained an attempt to measure the 
effectiveness of such policies. Although data of the performance of 
government labour policy scarce, it seemed that the policies were 
not particularly successful. The findings of Chapter Seven indicate 
the importance of pension provision in determining the unemployment 
rate of older men in Japan. In this chapter, I will describe the 
development of the public and occupational pension schemes in Japan 
and the recent reforms that have been made to the pension systems 
in Japan in preparation for the rising demands on public expenditure 
that will accompany population ageing. The chapter also includes an 
examination of pension benefit levels. These aspects will provide 
some insight into the future affect of public and private pensions 
on the labour market participation of older men.
Section 2 The Development of Public Pension Schemes in Japan
Before the Second World War, a public pension scheme, known as
onkyu, had been established for military forces personnel and
government officials; civil servants were also enrolled in a
friendly society scheme, the kangyo kyosai kumiai seido. Pension
schemes were not provided for the majority of workers, however 
(Yamasaki 1985 p 174) . The Seamen's Pension (senin hoken yoro 
nenkin), the first public pension scheme to cover employees in the 
private sector, was established in 1940 (Campbell 1992, appendix).
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A contribution period of 15 years was required, entitlement age was 
60, contributions were split between employer and employee and the 
government treasury was responsible for covering 20% of benefit 
payments (Yamasaki 1985 p 175) . In 1941, the Workers Pension 
Insurance scheme (rodosha nenkin hoken) was introduced, partly as 
an element of deflationary policy. The scheme covered men employed 
in establishments with more than 10 workers and working in 
manufacturing, mining and transportation industries. Enrolees had 
to contribute for over 2 0 years to receive benefits, entitlement age 
was set at 55, contributions were split 50:50 between employer and 
employee and the treasury was to meet 10% of benefit payments 
(regulations for miners were different) . A bonus was added for every 
ten years worked in the same establishment (Yamasaki 19 85 p 175). 
In 1944, coverage of the workers' pension was extended to women, 
non-manual staff and those employed in establishments with more than 
5 employees. The scheme's name was changed to the Welfare Pension 
Insurance Scheme (kosei nenkin hoken) and benefit rates were raised, 
as were contribution rates. After the end of the Second World War, 
the welfare pension scheme suffered from the high inflation rates. 
The value of funds was continually falling and attempts to raise the 
upper income bracket failed to raise contribution revenue 
significantly. Demands on the scheme were also low, since claims for 
old-age benefits would not start until 1954. With the fall in 
inflation by the early 1950s and the forecast start of benefit 
payments in 19 54, the scheme was heavily revised in the same year 
(Yamasaki 1985 p 178).
The 1954 reform of the welfare pension laid the foundations of the 
welfare pension scheme that exists today. To receive a pension, 
enrolees had to make contributions for a minimum of 20 years, the 
benefit entitlement age was set at 60 for men not working in mines
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and 55 for women and miners. The Monthly benefit payments comprised 
two parts: a fixed amount and an earnings-related amount. The
earnings-related amount was calculated by multiplying the average 
monthly earnings by the contribution period and multiplying this 
multiple by 5/1000. Average monthly earnings were calculated by 
dividing the sum of monthly earnings for every month of the 
contribution period by the contribution period (measured in months) . 
Contributions were earnings-related, set at 3% for all workers 
except miners, whose contribution rate was 3.5%. Benefits were not 
only met from enrolees' contributions: the treasury was to pay 15% 
of all non-miner benefits and 20% of miners' benefits. The treasury 
was also responsible for administration costs. The pension scheme 
was to be managed on a 'modified funded basis' (shusei tsumitate 
hoshiki) (Yamasaki 1985 pp 179-180). In practice, the 'modified 
funded basis' meant that the scheme was a predominantly pay-as-you- 
go scheme with an accumulated fund used by the Fiscal Investment and 
Loan Programme (see for example Koseisho Nenkinkyoku 19 85).
Public sector employees were covered by friendly society (kyosai 
kumiai) pension schemes. The central government civil servants 
friendly society pensions were first established in 1948 and revised 
in 1958. These pension schemes provided retirees with benefits 
calculated purely on an earnings-related basis. Calculation on a 
flat rate plus earnings-related benefit basis was introduced in 
1974, but the method that gave the highest benefit was used (Shakai 
Hosho Kenkyujo 1982 p 58) . The treasury was responsible for 
providing part of the funds and entitlement age was set at 55. 
Again, the scheme was predominantly pay-as-you-go, with a small 
accumulated fund (Koseisho Daijin Kanbo Tokei 1991 p 262) . Regional 
civil servants were covered by the same scheme until 19 62, when new 
and separate friendly society schemes were established (chiho komuin
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kyosai kumiai nenkin). Other groups of employees were enrolled in 
friendly society schemes that were managed on a similar basis to the 
civil servants' schemes. Public corporation employees were also 
covered by the central government civil servant pension scheme, 
until 195 6, when friendly society pensions (kokigyotai shokuin 
kyosai kumiai) were established for each corporation. Teachers in 
private schools were also opted out of the welfare pension and 
enrolled in their own friendly society pension scheme {shiritsu 
gakko kyoshokuin kyosai kumiai nenkin) in 1954. In 1959 clerical 
staff and officials working for agriculture and fishery co­
operatives were opted out of the welfare pension and joined their 
own friendly society pension scheme {noringyogyo dantai shokuin 
kyosai kumiai nenkin) (Sorifu Shakai Hosho Seido Shingikai 1989 pp 
76-77) .
In 19 55, 3 8.9% of the work force were involved in agriculture,
another 12.3% were self employed, 8.7% were employed in the family 
business, the remaining 40% were employees (Koseisho Nenkinkyoku 
1985 p 49). Many of the employees were employed in establishments 
of fewer than 5 employees, so in 1955, public pension schemes 
covered less than 40% of the work force. It was not until 19 61 that 
an attempt was made to provide universal public pension insurance. 
In that year, the public national pension scheme (kokumin nenkin) 
was established. The national pension scheme covered those not 
insured by the other public pension schemes: this meant effectively 
that it was for agricultural workers, the self-employed, family 
workers and the jobless. Enrolment was compulsory for these people, 
but other people, such as the spouses of employees enrolled in the 
welfare pension or a friendly society could enrol on a voluntary 
basis. In principle, enrolees had to contribute for 25 years for 
eligibility. Entitlement age was 65 and benefits were calculated by
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multiplying a flat rate by the contribution period: benefits were 
not earnings-related, nor were contributions. Transitional measures 
were established to cover people who could not complete 2 5 years of 
contributions before reaching the age of 60. For those above the age 
of 50, a non-contributory national pension (fukushi nenkin) was 
provided, albeit at reduced benefit levels. For those between the 
age of 50 and 55, the ten-year pension (junen nenkin) was provided: 
enrolment was voluntary; ten years of contributions were required 
for eligibility and benefits were enhanced to ensure comparability 
with the national pension. A pension transfer scheme (tsusan rorei 
nenkin) was created to ensure that people moving between public 
pension schemes would not lose their eligibility. Without such a 
scheme, it would have been possible for a worker to contribute for 
long periods to two separate pension schemes without attaining a 
long enough contribution period to qualify for a pension from either 
scheme. The pension transfer scheme allowed contribution years in 
all public schemes to be summed together - a benefit level would 
then be calculated accordingly (Koseisho Nenkinkyoku 1985 pp 9-13).
19 61 was the year of universal public pension scheme coverage 
(kokumin kon nenkin). The schemes described above remain to this day 
the basis of public pension provision. In 1985 there was a major 
revision of the schemes: these revisions will be described in detail 
below. Three new developments occurred between 1961 and 19 85 that 
should be mentioned. First, was the creation of private occupational 
pension schemes that received tax incentives, in 1962 and 1965. 
Occupational pensions are described below in Section 5 below. The 
second is the payment of welfare pension benefits (zaishoku rorei 
nenkin) to people above entitlement age who are still working. The 
benefits were reduced according to the level of labour earnings. The 
third is the large increases in the generosity of benefits and in
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the level of contributions. I will describe this third development 
in more detail, for the welfare and national pensions.
In 19 65, the welfare pension was reformed, with the aim of meeting 
ILO guidelines on pension levels. More specifically, ILO clause 102 
stated that the minimum level of a public pension should provide 40% 
of previous earnings for an insured person who had made 
contributions for 3 0 years. The reform was undertaken to provide a 
40% replacement level after 20 years of contributions (Yamasaki 1985 
p 189). In order to achieve such a level, the flat rate benefit was 
raised, the multiplier for calculating the earnings-related benefit 
was raised, the upper labour earnings bracket was raised and 
contribution rates were raised. One more important change in the law 
was the inclusion of an obligation to revise pension benefits when 
circumstances changed dramatically, in order to maintain the living 
standards of pensioners (Yamasaki 1985 p 190). In 1969, the 
generosity of pension benefits was raised further by raising the 
flat rate benefit; excluding earnings before 1957 when calculating 
average earnings; and raising monthly earnings below 10,000 yen to
10,000 yen: contribution rates were also raised. In 1971, raises in 
benefits were introduced to cope with the high inflation and the 
additional expense was met by the treasury. The year 1973 saw more 
substantial changes to the welfare pension. The aim of the changes 
was to provide a pension that replaced 60% of pre-retirement 
earnings for a model retiree (a person making contributions for 27 
years). Again, flat rate benefits were raised and the upper average 
earnings limit was raised. The significant change leading to more 
generous benefits came with an upward adjustment of earnings that 
had been received before 1971 {heikin hyojun hoshu no saihyoka).
This measure ensured that average earnings of retirees would 
approach the average earnings of present workers, in spite of the
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large rises in wages that had occurred during the high growth 
period. An automatic benefit adjustment was introduced to raise 
benefits when inflation rose above 5% in any year (bukka suraido). 
Contribution rates were again raised to pay for these changes 
(Yamasaki 1985 p 196). From 1973 to 1982, benefit levels were 
adjusted to meet the 60% rule by raising flat rate benefits, 
revising previous earnings levels and applying inflation-indexation. 
In 19 85, a reversal was undertaken: measures were introduced to 
reduce the generosity of the welfare pension. These measures and the 
reasons for their adoption are described in the Section 3 below. A 
summary of the revisions to the welfare pension is given in Table 
9.1.
The national pension underwent a development of increasing benefit 
levels, similar to the welfare pension. Table 9.2 below shows the 
rise in flat rate benefits and contributions. Until the 1973 
reforms, benefit levels were raised to maintain parity with the 
welfare pension, but since then, there has been a relative decline. 
In 1973 the model national pension for a couple was 82.7% of the 
model welfare pension (103.4% if a voluntary additional contribution 
pension is included); by 1980 it had declined to 74.1% of the model 
welfare pension (82.9% if a voluntary additional contribution 
pension is included) (Shakai Hosho Kenkyujo 19 82 p 46).
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Table 9.1 showing major changes to welfare pension scheme 1954-1979
Year Flat 
rate 
benefit 
(CP = 
contri­
bution 
period 
(months)
(figures 
= yen)
Earnings related benefit 
information con-
tri-
bu-
tion
rate4multi­
plier
lower
earn­
ings
limit
(1000
yen)
upper
earn­
ings
limit
(1000
yen)
revisions
of
previous
monthly
earnings
(yen)
1954 Fixed
benefit1
0.5% na na 3
1965 250 x CP2 1.0% 7 60 5.5
1969 400 x CP T 10 100 below 
10,00 = 
10,000
6.2
1971 460 x CP T! 10 134 6.4
1973 1000 x 
CP
IT 20 200 below 
20,000 
=2 0,000
7.6
1976 1650 x 
CP3
I 30 320 before
1975
earnings
revised,
below
30.000 =
30.000
9.1
1980 2050 x 
CP
I 45 410 before
1979
earnings
revised,
below
45.000 =
45.000
10 . 6
Source: Yamasaki 19 85, Table 2, p 2 03.
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Table 9.1 (cont):
Notes: Notes to superscript numbers are as follows:
1) Originally, the flat rate benefit amount was not 
dependent on the length of the contribution period.
2) lower contribution period = 240 months, upper
contribution period = 3 60 months
3} lower contribution period = 240 months, upper
contribution period = 42 0 months
4} the contribution rates are for men who are not 
miners. Women pay lower rates and miners pay higher 
rates.
General note: Contributions are based on 'standard
remuneration' (hyojun hoshu) classes. Standard
remuneration is calculated by taking remuneration for 
labour services received in May, June and July and 
dividing by three. The amount is assigned one of the 
classes ranging between the lower and upper limits shown 
in the table above. Standard remuneration does not 
include half-yearly bonus payments, since they are 
payments that cover a period of greater than three 
months (see Ariizumi and Takano 19 82 and Koseisho Tokei 
Kyokai 1989 p 368).
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Table 9.2 showing changes in the national pension contributions, 
percentage change on previous level and change in consumer prices.
Year Monthly
contribu­
tions
Percent 
change on 
previous 
amount
Model
benefit
payment
(monthly)
Percent
change
in
benefit
levels
Consumer
price
change
(%)
1961 100 - 2, 000 - -
1966 200 100 5, 000 150 33.8
1968 250 25 5, 000 0 9.5
1970 450 80 8, 000 60 13 .3
1972 550 22.2 8,000 0 10 .9
1973 900 63 .6 20,000 150 11.7
1974 1,100 22 .2 23,220 16 .1 24.5
1976 1,400 27.3 32,500 40 22 .2
1977 2,200 57 .1 35,558 9.4 8.1
1978 2, 730 24.1 37,925 6.6 3.8
1979 3, 300 20.9 39,225 3.4 3.6
1980 3,770 14.2 42,000 7.1 8.0
1981 4, 500 19 .3 45,276 7.8 4.9
1982 5, 220 16.0 47,124 4.1 2.7
1983 5, 830 11.7 47,124 0 1.9
1984 6, 220 6.7 48,048 2 2.2
1985 6,740 8.4 49,686 3.4 2.0
Source: Contribution and benefit amounts from Koseisho
Nenkinkyoku (19 85) p 12, consumer price changes
calculated from Kurosaka (1988).
Note: The monthly benefit payment shown is the amount received
by people with 25 years of contributions.
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Section 3 Reform of the Public Pension Schemes 
Sub-section 3.1 Reasons for the 1985 reform
In 1985, both the national and welfare pensions were reformed 
noticeably. The main aim of the reform was to reduce the generosity 
of benefits so that future contribution rates could be kept at a 
lower level than that implied by the existing benefit calculation 
formulae. The 1980 reforms were originally intended to address the 
problem of rapidly rising contribution rates by raising the pension 
eligibility age to 65, but this part of the reform did not survive 
the amendments made to the original bill by the lower house of the 
Diet. Indeed, consideration of raising the eligibility age was 
postponed until the next review of public finance accounts (zaisei 
saikeisan) to be held in 1985. Moreover, while benefits were 
increased, the rise in contribution rates was held below the level 
suggested in the original bill*, the amendments were made shortly 
after the government had collapsed and had been re-elected. 
(Koseisho Tokei Kyokai 1989 p 34) . Table 9.3 below shows the 
estimates of future contribution rates for the welfare pension 
calculated in successive reviews of the public finance accounts.
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Table 9.3 showing the estimates of welfare pension contribution 
rates made in the reviews of the public finance accounts in 1973, 
1976, 1980 and 1984.
Year 1973 1976 1980 1984
1973 6 .4 - _ -
1976 7 . 6 9.1 - -
1980 9.1 9.1 10.6 -
1985 10 . 6 10 .9 12 .4 -
1986 10 . 6 12 .4 12 .4
1990 12.4 12 .7 14 .2 12 .4
1995 14.2 14.7 16.0 14 .2
2000 16. 0 16, 7 17 . 8 16.0
2005 17 . 8 18 .7 19 . 6 18 . 0
2010 19 . 6 20.7 30.4 24.9
2015 - - 33 .9 30.3
2020 - - 34 . 8 33 .6
2025 - - 34 . 8 35.9
2030 - - - 38.8
Source: Yamasaki (1988) p 149, Table 13.
Notes: The figures 1984 show the contribution rate estimates
based on the welfare pension scheme unchanged by the 
1985 reforms. Post-reform rates are shown in Table 7.5 
below. The finances of the pension schemes are reviewed 
during the general review of public finances (zaisei 
saikeisan) that takes place every five years in
principle. Often reviews are made earlier than every
five years in periods of rapid change, however.
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The estimates for 1973 and 197 6 do not diverge noticeably, but there 
is a large increase in the estimates for each year in the 1980 
review, compared with the 197 6 review. The principal reason for thd 
discrepancy was that the Ministry of Welfare had underestimated the 
rapid increase in life expectancy that started during the mid-1970s. 
The rise in life expectancy would lead to a greater number of 
pension beneficiaries than had been expected in 1976: hence in a 
pay-as-you-go scheme a rising beneficiary to contributor ratio would 
lead to a rise in contribution rates (Yamasaki 1988 pp 154-155) . The 
review of the pension scheme in 19 84 again showed an increase in 
contribution rate estimates over the 1980 estimates. In this case, 
the large increases were caused by an underestimation, in the 1980’ 
review, of the rapid decline in fertility that occurred after 1973 
(Koseisho Nenkinkyoku 1985 pp 119-121; and Yamasaki 1988 pp 155- 
156) . The decline in fertility would lead to a reduction in 
contributors and again, a rise in the contribution rates necessary 
to maintain pension benefits at their existing levels. The ffects 
of these demographic changes on contributor and beneficiary numbers 
are shown in Table 9.4 below.
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From Table 9.4 it is clear that the principal cause of the increase 
in estimated maturity of the scheme between 197 6 and 1980 was the 
increase in beneficiaries, whereas the increase in estimated 
maturity between 1980 and 1984 is largely explained by a decrease 
in contributors. As a result of these two demographic changes, the 
estimate of maturity in the year 2025 had risen by over 13% 
percentage points.
It was not only the unexpected speed of the increase in the ratio 
of beneficiaries to contributors in the welfare pension scheme that 
concerned the Ministry of Welfare: it was also felt that future
pensions would become over-generous and lead to an unequitable 
distribution of income between generations (Koseisho Nenkinkyoku 
1985 pp 53-55) . The average contribution period for newly qualifying 
beneficiaries had risen steadily since the scheme's inception. In 
1969, the average contribution period was approximately 24 years and 
it had risen to 30 years by 1980. It was expected that this trend 
would continue and that when the scheme reached full maturity, the 
average contribution period would be 40. Given a contribution period 
of 40 years, the average pension benefits would have given a 
replacement ratio of 83% and when voluntary enrolment of a spouse 
for 40 years in the national pension scheme was included, the 
replacement ratio rose to 109%. Unfortunately the source of these 
estimates does not indicate when average maturity will reach 40 
years (Koseisho Nenkinkyoku 1985 pp 53-55).
The national pension scheme suffered similar problems caused by the 
more rapid ageing of the population than had been expected. These 
problems were exacerbated by the nature of the national pension 
scheme's contributor base. The national pension scheme was 
established to provide pensions in the main for the self-employed
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and jobless women, but because of the decline in self-employment 
(including farmers) brought about by structural change in the 
economy, and because of the increasing employment of women, the 
schemefe contributor base was shrinking even faster than a decline 
in the birth rate would imply (Koseisho Nenkinkyoku 1985 pp 16-19, 
49) .The need to change benefit levels was made more urgent by 
problems faced in the 1970s and early 1980s: in 1976, 1977 and 1981, 
benefit expenditure was greater than contributions (excluding 
Treasury contribution) and in 19 83 the national pension funds were 
reduced (Koseisho Nenkinkyoku 1985 p 25).
Sub-section 3.2 The 1985 pension reform
According to explanations provided by the Ministry of Welfare 
(Koseisho Nenkinkyoku 1985 pp 56-57) the purposes of the reforms were 
fourfold:
a) Unification of the pension systems.
b) The establishment of a basic pension for married women that
was independent of her husband's pension. Until 19 85, married
men enrolled in the welfare pension scheme received an 
additional payment for their spouses. If the couple became 
separated, the wife would not receive a pension.
c) A reduction in future contribution rates and future benefit 
levels
d) Ensuring adequate invalidity pension benefits.
According to Yamasaki (1988) one further aim was to reduce the 
dependence of the welfare pension scheme on transfers from the 
Treasury. I will describe the reforms enacted to meet aims a) and 
c) .
The first step towards unification of the schemes was to establish 
a basic pension scheme (kiso nenkin) that would receive
400
contributions from everybody and would pay out a non-earnings 
related pension on eligibility. In other words, the national pension 
scheme was converted into a scheme that covered not only the self- 
employed, but also private-sector and public-sector employees. For 
employees, this meant that the non-earnings related component of the 
pension was converted into a basic pension that was to be paid by 
the national pension scheme and only the earnings-related pension 
was to be paid by the welfare pension scheme and friendly society 
pension schemes. The latter two schemes were to transfer 
contributions into the basic pension scheme. Treasury contributions 
were re-directed to the basic pension (1/3 of contributions), except 
for transitory payments to the other public pension schemes 
(Koseisho Nenkinkyoku 1985 pp 66-67).
To reduce the generosity of benefits, three devices were proposed: 
a gradual reduction in the unit amount used for calculating the 
basic (non-earnings related) pension over 25 years for welfare 
pension contributors (for national pensions the period necessary to 
obtain a full pension was extended, having the same effect) ; a 
graduated reduction in the multiplier used for calculating the 
earnings-related welfare pension from 1% to 0.7 5%, over 25 years; 
and a raising of the men's pension eligibility age to 65 and women's 
pension eligibility age to 60. The first two alterations were passed 
by the Diet, as was the raising of the women's eligibility age; but 
yet again, the raising of the men's pensionable age to 65 was 
deleted from the bill and added to the agenda for consideration in 
the next review of public finance due in 1989. The reduction of 
benefits was calculated so that, with 40 years of contributions, a 
couple would receive roughly 69% of average labour earnings. This 
percentage was nearly the same as the percentage before the reforms 
received by a pensioner who had contributed to the welfare pension
401
for 3 0 years (the average contribution period of eligible 
contributors in 1985)(Koseisho Nenkinkyoku 1985 pp 62, 71-73; and 
Koseisho Tokei Kyokai 1989 pp 40-48) : the enrolee now had to
contribute a further ten years, however. The net effect of these 
changes was to reduce substantially the contributions that would 
become necessary in the future. Table 9.5 below shows the Ministry 
of Welfare's estimates of future contributions under pre-reform and 
post-reform conditions, together with estimates of the contributions 
for a men's pension eligibility age of 65.
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Table 9.5 showing the effect of the 1985 reforms on future 
contribution rates and amounts for the welfare pension and national 
pension.
Year Welfare pension National pension
Pre­
reform
(%)
Post­
reform
(%)
Post­
reform 
(65)(%)1
Pre­
reform 
(yen)2
Post­
reform
(yen)
1986 12 . 4 12 .4 12.4 6, 800 6, 800
1990 12 .4 12 .4 12.4 10,400 8,000
1995 14.2 14.2 14.2 13,250 9,500
2000 16.0 16.0 16.0 15,000 11,000
2005 18.0 18.7 17.8 16,750 12,500
2010 24.9 23 .4 19.6 18,500 13,000
2015 30.3 26.3 21.4 19,500 13,000
2020 33 . 6 28.4 23 .2 19,500 13,000
2025 35.9 28.9 23 .9 19,500 13,000
2030 38 . 8 28.9 23 .9 19,500 13,000
2035 38.8 28.9 23 .9 19,500 13,000
2040 38 . 8 28.9 23 .9 19,500 13,000
2045 38.8 28.9 23 .9 19,500 13,000
2050 38.8 28.9 23 .9 19,500 13,000
Source: Koseisho Nenkinkyoku (1985) pp 154-165, Tables 7-3, 7-4,
7-5 and 7-7.
Notes: Notes to superscript numbers: 1) this column shows the
estimated contribution rates for a pension starting age 
of 65, 2) the contribution amounts are given in 1984
yen.
General notes: the welfare pension contribution rates
are for male employees, not including miners; and the 
contributions are split 50:50 between employer and 
employee.
403
Sub-section 3.3 The 1989 reforms
The 1989 reforms were not so comprehensive as the 1985 reforms. The 
main elements were: introduction of completely automatic inflation- 
indexation of benefits, raising of income limits for calculation of 
the working pension (zaishoku rorei nenkin), compulsory enrolment 
of students (to ensure a contributions period of 40 years) , an 
upward revision of contribution rates and an attempt to raise the 
pension age to 65, for both men and women (Koseisho Nenkinkyoku 19 9 0 
p 24) . The increase in contribution rates was greater than that 
envisaged in the 1985 reforms - the men's welfare pension 
contribution rate was raised to 14.6 (instead of 14.2 by 1991) . This 
raise in contributions implied that the 1985 re-estimation had again 
been an under-estimation of the speed with which the welfare pension 
scheme was maturing. This implication is backed by the new estimated 
contribution rate corresponding to the highest contribution rate 
which reached 31.5% (as opposed to 28.9%) (Kosei Tokei Kyokai 1989 
pp 50-53). The original reform bill not only proposed the rise in 
the pensionable age for men to 65 again, but also proposed the 
raising of the women's pensionable age to 65. To improve the 
acceptability of this policy, the reform bill also introduced an 
early retirement option: a person could choose to claim pension
benefits at any age between 60 and 65, and the pension amount would 
be reduced according to the number of years before reaching 65, 
using a formula that would avoid making early receipt of benefits 
more expensive than receipt at the normal age (65). Despite this 
early payment option, this part of the reform was again rejected by 
the lower house in the Diet. As a result, the reform act only showed 
the plans for graduated introduction of the higher pensionable age 
and actual implementation was left to a "separate revision of the 
law at another time" (Kosei Tokei Kyokai 19 89 p 52).
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Section 4 The Payment and Level of Pensions
The sections above described the old age pension schemes and the 
reforms that have been undertaken recently. There was no attempt to 
assess which pensions a pensioner is likely to be receiving and nor 
at which level the pension is set. Indeed, the pension levels 
mentioned above were model pension levels and it is certainly not 
the case that all pensioners will be receiving the model pension. 
The aim of this section is to is to fill the lacuna, given available 
data.
Table 9.6 below shows the percentage of people receiving a pension 
from each pension scheme over time.
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Throughout the period 1970-1987, the majority of pensioners have 
been receiving a national or non-contributory national pension and 
since 1980 the welfare pension beneficiaries have accounted for 
approximately 3 0% of all pensioners. The figures after 1985 are 
slightly mis-leading since new welfare pension beneficiaries will 
receive both a national pension (kiso nenkin) and a welfare pension 
(the earnings-related pension): thus the rise in the proportion of 
welfare pension beneficiaries will appear smaller than when compared 
with the pre-1985 figures. It is clear, however, that the proportion 
of old age pension beneficiaries receiving the more generous welfare 
pension has been increasing. As a result, the average level of old 
age pensions will have been rising.
The percentage of pensioners receiving a welfare pension in future 
will increase, mainly due to the changing work structure of the 
Japanese economy that has occurred during the post-war period and 
that has resulted in a decreasing proportion of self-employed 
workers. Table 9.7 below shows the proportion of contributors 
enrolled in each pension scheme since 197 0. It is likely that, given 
the distribution of contributors, the proportion receiving a welfare 
pension in future will rise. Again, caution must be exercised with 
the post-1985 figures because of the effect of the 1985 reforms on 
welfare pension contributors: such contributors pay into both the 
national pension scheme and the welfare pension scheme after 1985, 
thus (artificially) depressing the rise in the proportion of welfare 
pension scheme contributors.
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Table 9.7 showing the proportion of contributors in each scheme
1970-1987.
Year welfare 
pension (%)
national 
pension (%)
seamen's 
pension (%)
friendly 
society 
pension (%)
1970 47.5 51.9 0 . 6 -
1975 47.5 52 . 0 0.5 -
1980 47.6 52.0 0.4 -
1985 51.8 (46.8) 47.8 (43.2) 0.3 (0.3) (9.7)
1987 47.5 (43.3) 52.3 (47.7) 0.3 (0.2) (8.7)
Source: Welfare pension figures from Koseisho Daijin Kanbo Tokei
(1989) p 258, Table 259; national pension figures for 
1970, 1975 and 1980 from Sorifu Shakai Hosho Seido
Shingikai (1971, 1978, 1983), national pension figures 
for 1985 and 1987 from Koseisho Dai j in Kanbo Tokei 
(1989); seamen's pension figures from Koseisho Daijin 
Kanbo Tokei (1989), p 260, Table 266. Friendly society 
figures from Sorifu Shakai Hosho Seido Shingikai (1989), 
Tables 109 (p 174), 121 (p 186), 133 (p 199), 144 (p
210) and 157 (p 220).
Notes: 1) I do not have data for the number of contributors
in the friendly society pension schemes for the 
years prior to 1985. The figures not in brackets 
show the proportion of contributors with a
denominator that does not include those enrolled in 
friendly societies, whereas the figures in brackets 
indicate the proportions in each scheme when
friendly society contributors are included in the 
denominator.
2) Figures for 1987 are misleading, since those
enrolled in the welfare pension also became
enrolled in the national pension scheme, with the 
creation of a basic pension common to all schemes 
in the 1985 reforms.
As shown in Table 9.8 below, the value of average contributory 
national pensions is far lower than that of welfare pensions; and 
in turn, the value of non-contributory pensions is lower than 
contributory national pensions. Furthermore, those who receive a 
transfer (tsusan) pension from either scheme receive far lower 
benefits than ordinary pensions, implying that there is a high 
penalty imposed for those moving between schemes. The replacement 
ratio for the welfare pension is consistently below the level of the 
model welfare pension. The welfare pension level is lower than the 
model pension, because the model pension is calculated using the
408
average contribution period of newly qualifying pensioners, while 
the actual average pension received will be for existing pensioners 
whose average contribution period was shorter than of new 
qualifiers.
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The preponderance of pensioners receiving a national pension and the 
low tsusan pension levels combine to lead to an average pension for 
the whole pensioner population lower than implied by the model 
pension levels. Table 9.9 below shows the distribution of pensions 
for men and women in the 60-65 and 65-69 age groups. The median for 
60-65 year old men in 1988 was 143,000 yen per month and the mean 
was 133,000 per month. For men in the 65-69 age group the median was 
17,000 yen lower and the mean was 5,000 yen lower. For women, the 
mean and median pensions are less than half the men's mean and 
median pensions. Even over the short period of five years between 
1983 and 1988, the pension levels for men have become less skewed 
(positively), while women's pension levels have remained highly 
skewed towards the lower levels. The rise over the period in the 
proportion of men receiving high pension levels is
particularly noticeable and IS perhaps a reflection of longer 
contribution periods. The average level a pensioner received is 
higher than that implied by the levels of benefit paid by each 
scheme and the proportion of beneficiaries receiving each type of 
old age pension shown above. The survey from which this distribution 
of pension benefits was taken (see table) had an unusually high 
proportion of friendly society pension beneficiaries, despite the 
very large sample size: about 3 0% compared with 11% shown in Table 
9.9 above. Other data (Sorifu Shakai Hosho Seido Shingikai 1986 pp 
126-128) show that the average monthly amount was 49,850 yen per 
month in 1983. The amount for regional civil servants was 113,301 
yen. Thus these figures must be treated with caution, but they do 
indicate the trends in pension levels and distribution.
Over the years, pensions have come to account for a larger and 
larger proportion of the income received by old age couples: in 197 6 
pensions accounted for 34% of income; by 1985, they accounted for
412
47% of income. Also, by 1985, pensions provided between 80 and 100% 
of household income for just over 50% of all elderly households 
(Eijingu Sogo Kenkyu Senta 1990 pp 87-88).
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Section 5 Company and Occupational Pensions
Until 1989, there were two well-established types of company pension 
schemes that received favourable tax treatment: the Qualified
Retirement Pension Scheme {tekikaku taishoku nenkin, hereafter, 
tekikaku nenkin) and the Welfare Pension Funded Scheme (kosei nenkin 
kikin, hereafter, kosei kikin). Companies were also allowed to 
establish their own pension scheme that did not receive favourable 
tax treatment, but also did not face strict bureaucratic 
intervention. I shall describe the development of these two types 
of scheme before describing recent developments and their role in 
old age income support. There were also two occupational pension 
schemes for miners and farmers which I shall describe briefly.
Sub-section 5.1 The development of company and occupational pension 
schemes 
a The Qualified Retirement Pension Scheme
Until 1962, the main form of retirement income support provided by 
firms was the severance lump-sum payment (taishokukin) . If the 
company recorded transfers to a special severance payment account, 
in preparation for future severance payments, 40% of the amount of 
the transfer was treated as a necessary expense by the tax 
authorities (taishoku kyuyo hikiatekin seido) (Rodosho Rodokijunkyoku 
1990 p 5) . The transfer did not mean that the future liabilities 
were funded, however (Rodosho Rodokijunkyoku 199 0 p 20). The lump­
sum payment was also taxed at a lower rate than normal earnings 
(Miyajima 1988 p 36).
In 1957 and again in 19 61, with the rising costs of meeting lump-sum 
severance payments, the Nikkeiren, trust banks and life insurance 
companies called for favourable tax treatment for company pensions 
(Miyajima 198 8 p 36; Rodosho Rodoki j inkyoku 1990 p 6). As a
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consequence, tax incentives for company pensions that met specific 
criteria (tekikaku nenkin) were introduced in 1962. The main 
requirements were: the pension had to be funded outside the company 
through a contract with a trust bank or life insurance company which 
would manage the fundsj and to set up a pension fund with a trust 
bank, there needed to be more than 100 enrolees, whilst to set up 
a pension with a life insurance company, the minimum number of 
enrolees was 15 (Rodosho Rodokijinkyoku 1990 p 32) . The tax 
incentives for the tekikaku pension seem more favourable than for 
the lump-sum severance payment: all payments into the pension fund 
are treated as losses under the corporation tax laws, as opposed to 
40% for the lump-sum severance payment. The accumulated funds are 
taxed at 1% (Rodosho Rodoki j inkyoku 199 0 p 36) . The employer can 
agree to pay all the contributions or the employees can also agree 
to pay part of the contributions. The pension benefits are taxed as 
income on receipt, but an allowance is made for cases when enrolees, 
as well as employers, have made contribution payments. The company 
pension benefits are paid in addition to public pension benefits 
(Rodosho Rodokijinkyoku 1990 p 59). The level of pension benefits, 
contribution payments, period of pension payment are not strictly 
regulated, but the pension scheme must be managed on a sound 
actuarial basis. Schemes can offer pension benefits alone, or can 
offer a lump-sum severance payment and a pension in tandem. In fact, 
the majority of schemes pay both a lump-sum and a pension: in 1975, 
60% of firms with a pension scheme paid in this way and by 1985, the 
proportion had reached 70% (Rodosho Rodokijinkyoku 1990 p 9) . In 
most cases, beneficiaries may opt to receive a lump-sum severance 
payment instead of a pension upon retirement from the company, and 
the majority of retirees choose for a substantial part of the 
payment to be a lump-sum payment. In 1987, 58% chose to receive over 
80% of benefits in the form of a lump-sum payment (Chuo Rodo Iinkai
416
1988 p 18) , although the trend is decreasing; in 19 83 the proportion 
choosing such a lump-sum payment was 63% (Chuo Rodo Iinkai 1984 p 
17) . The reason for this choice is that it is perceived that tax 
treatment of the lump-sum payment is more generous than of the 
pension. Most pensions have a limited payment period: in 1985, only 
11% of schemes paid benefits until death, and the most common period 
of payment was 10 years (92%) (Rodosho Rodokijinkyoku 1990 p 55).
b The Funded Welfare Pension Scheme
In 19 65, with the rise in contribution payments necessary for the 
public welfare pension scheme, the business world proposed that 
there should be a means of using the company severance payments to 
reduce the contributions paid into the public pension scheme and 
that in return the firms would provide some of the benefit payments 
paid by the public pension scheme upon pension eligibility (Miyajima 
1988 p 37). The legal framework for such schemes was established in 
1966. The schemes were formally known as Welfare Pension Funds 
(kosei nenkin kikin) and more commonly known as Adjusted Pensions 
(chosei nenkin). In a similar fashion to the tekikaku pension 
schemes, firms received favourable tax treatment. Unlike the 
tekikaku pension schemes, however, the regulation of the schemes is 
more restrictive. The payments made by the firm into a fund are 
regarded as losses under corporate taxation laws and both employer 
and employee are exempted from a portion of contributions payable 
into the public welfare pension scheme {32/1000s split 50:50, for 
men) . Funds above a certain level are taxed at a rate of 1% (Rodosho 
Rodokijinkyoku 1990 pp 3 6-37). Pension benefits are taxed as income. 
The schemes must pay the earnings related part of the public welfare 
pension, in the place of the public welfare pension scheme - it is 
for this reason that regulations are restrictive. The company 
schemes are not responsible for inflation index-linking of the
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earnings-related benefit or the increase in earnings-related benefit 
that occurs as a result of the revisions of average earnings used 
to calculate benefits that have occurred since 1973: the public
welfare pension scheme is responsible for meeting additional costs 
that result from such changes (Yokoda 1985 p 14). The Treasury also 
paid (until 1985) 17.5% of earnings-related benefits (Yokada 1985 
p 16) . Not only must the schemes pay the earnings-related part, they 
must also pay at least 30% above the public pension scheme level. 
The 30% excess is called the pura.su arufa (plus a) . In fact, many 
schemes pay an additional amount far in excess of the 3 0% level,
Table 9.10 showing distribution of funded welfare pension schemes 
by size of planned plus alpha payment in 1983 and 19 88.
Plus alpha payment 
as percentage of 
earnings-related 
pension amount
1983 1988
30-40% 31.1 16.2
40-50% 20 . 6 15 .7
50-100% 25.8 35.8
100-200% 18 .1 24.2
200-300% 3.9 6.7
300% + 0.4 1.2
Source: Data calculated from Kosei Tokei Kyokai (1989) p 181,
Table 25.
Note: The percentages do not add up to exactly 100% because of
rounding up and rounding down.
as is shown in Table 9.10. Table 9.10 also shows that the plus alpha
payments have been expanding rapidly during the 1980s, but this
expansion may be the effect of rapid money growth in that period,
leading to asset price inflation. Like the public pension scheme,
the pension must be payable until death. Until recently,
contributions had to be paid to schemes managed by trust banks and
life insurance companies (see section on recent reforms below). The
minimum number of enrolees required to establish a scheme is far
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larger than for the tekikaku pension and depends on the type of 
scheme. There are three types of scheme:
1 the tandoku (stand alone) scheme is one established by a
single company and requires a minimum of 500 enrolees,
2 the rengo (allied) scheme is one established by a group of
companies that have common links (eg cross shareholdings) and 
requires a minimum of 1000 enrolees
3 the sogo (composite) scheme is one established by a group of
companies belonging to the same industry that have a central 
organisation with leadership capability and needs a minimum of 
3000 enrolees (Rodosho Rodokijinkyoku 1990 pp 37-38).
c The miners' pension fund
Miners' pension funds (sekitan kogyo nenkin kikin) were started in 
1967 to encourage miners to continue working in the mines during a 
period of labour shortage in other sectors and following a 
succession of mining disasters. The funds were to provide pension 
benefits on top of welfare pension benefits to miners and their 
survivors. The employers made all contribution payments, the amount 
of the contributions depending on the output of coal in the previous 
year. Benefit levels differ between funds. In 1989 there were 11,868 
enrolees and 17,791 beneficiaries (Kosei Tokei Kyokai 1989 pp 196- 
197) .
d The farmers' pension fund
The farmers' pension fund (nogyosha nenkin kikin) was established 
in 197 0 to keep good farmers in farming, to encourage the 
consolidation of landholdings and provide security for farmers in 
their old age. The fund provides pensions for some elderly self- 
employed and self-employed with small businesses, as well as to 
farmers. It also helps to finance the buying of agricultural land
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and acts as an agent in buying and selling agricultural land. The 
contributors are generally farmers with more than 1/2 an hectare of 
land (although farmers with less land who are 'real farmers' can 
also enrol) . The normal pension is payable at 65 and is based on the 
contribution period (not earnings-related). If a farmer retires 
before 65 and passes the land on to another farmer, pension benefits 
start at 60, and if the land is passed on to another farmers' 
pension fund enrolee the benefit is increased. The fund receives 
transfers from the Treasury (Kosei Tokei Kyokai 1989 pp 196-197).
Sub-section 5.2 The 1988 and 1989 Reforms to Company Pensions
In 198 6, the Diet passed a policy outline document relating to the 
advent of a population with long life longevity (choju shakai 
taisaku taiko). The document stressed the need for private pension 
schemes to supplement public pension benefits and called for 
policies to increase the use of private pension schemes. In response 
to these demands, the Ministry of Welfare established a group to 
research company pension issues (Kosei Tokei Kyokai 1989 p 49) . The 
research group was composed of an academic, someone involved in the 
umbrella organisation of the funded welfare pension schemes, a 
journalist, a representative life insurance business and so on
(Kigyo Nenkin-nado Kenkyukai 1987 p 1) . In 1987, the research group 
published an interim report and recommended the following main 
points:
1) The regulations facing companies wishing to establish a funded
welfare pension scheme should be relaxed to encourage the use
of funded welfare pension schemes
2) Favourable tax incentives should be used to encourage the
spread of pension benefits paid until death
3) Pension benefit payments should be made more flexible and
company pensions should become greater sources of future well-
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being (Kigyo Nenkin-nado Kenkyukai 1987 p 2).
In more concrete terms, in relation to point 1, the report 
recommended that the minimum number of enrolees required could be
reduced and that at the same time, consideration would have to be
given to reducing the running costs of the schemes (it was initial
consideration of this matter that had led to the requirement of
large numbers of enrolees so that the running costs would be spread 
over a large number). Suggestions for reducing running costs were: 
to allow joint administration of pension schemes, and|dallow 
specialist outside institutions to perform the necessary- 
administrative tasks.
The recommendations concerning tax policy are the least 
perspicacious statements in the document, but it seems that a lesser 
degree of taxation of funds was deemed favourable, in future, if not 
at the time of publication.
It was felt that the present provisions for transfer between schemes 
resulted in low final benefit levels, since it was only the funds 
used as a substitution for the public earnings-related pension 
benefits that could be transferred (ie the funds used for payment 
of plus alpha amount could not be transferred) - the additional 
portion was paid as a severance lump-sum - so a mechanism allowing 
transfer of the additional portion was recommended. To increase the 
returns on pension funds, it was recommended that regulations 
limiting the type of financial instruments pension fund managers 
could buy should be relaxed, and that the number of types of 
financial institutions that were permitted to manage pension funds 
should be increased to engender greater levels of competition. This 
latter recommendation went as far as including the possibility of
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some in-house control of pension funds. An insurance scheme for 
paying benefits when companies ceased to operate was also advocated.
One further recommendation was that the funded welfare pension 
schemes should fulfil their role of being a substitute for the 
earnings-related public pension benefits. It was felt that, since 
the public welfare pension scheme was still responsible for paying 
for inflation index-linking and increments in benefit levels brought 
about by rising real wages, this role had atrophied substantially, 
and therefore the issue had to be examined carefully. Finally, the 
report called for an investigation into the possibility of providing 
the framework of a funded pension scheme for those enrolled in the 
national pension scheme alone. In other words, it was felt that a 
funded pension scheme for the self-employed was also desirable 
(Kigyo Nenkin-nado Kenkyukai 1987).
The 1988 revisions to the welfare pension law included changes 
related to these recommendations: pension benefit levels which
pension schemes were expected to reach were established; the joint- 
management of smaller welfare pension funds was allowed; and a 
benefit insurance scheme was established for cases when the company 
ceased to operate (Kosei Tokei Kyokai 1989 p 50) . Further fulfilment 
of the recommendations came with the revisions in 1989. It became 
possible for financial investment consultants (toshi komon gyosha) 
to manage up to 1/3 of the funds belonging to a funded welfare 
pension scheme. Funded welfare pension schemes with particularly 
large accumulated funds (50,000 million yen) who had agreed to 
management of funds by a financial investment consultant were also 
permitted to manage a part of the funds themselves, under strict 
regulations regarding the investment instruments.
The proportion of funds managed by consultants and managed in-house
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could not surpass 1/3 of total accumulated funds (Koseisho 
Nenkinkyoku 199 0 pp 46, 47).
In 1989, a new type of funded national pension {kokumin nenkin 
kikin) was established and regulations for occupational funded 
national pension schemes were relaxed (to my knowledge, the only 
such scheme that existed until then was the farmers funded pension 
scheme described briefly above). The funded national pension scheme 
framework was established so that the self-employed were able to 
increase the benefit levels they would receive by making voluntary 
contributions to a private funded scheme, whilst receiving 
favourable tax treatment. Furthermore, these funded schemes were 
intended to substitute for the additional voluntary contribution 
national pension (fuka kokumin nenkin) and pay a. further amount 
(plus alpha). The new type of funded national pension scheme is one 
that is based on contributors from a given geographical region 
{chiiki-gata kikin). The minimum number of enrolees in a given area 
required to start a scheme is 1000. In the case of an occupational 
scheme, the minimum number of enrolees belonging to a given type of 
trade or business is 3000. There can only be one fund for one type 
of business or trade in the whole of Japan (Kosei Tokei Kyokai 1989 
p 51) . The funds can be managed by trust banks, life insurance 
companies, the nationwide umbrella organisation for farming co­
operatives (zenkoku kyosai nogyo kyodo kumiai rengokai) and the 
similar umbrella organisation for fishery co-operatives (zenkoku 
kyosai suisangyo kyodo kumiai rengokai) . An umbrella organisation 
(kokumin nenkin kikin rengokai) for ensuring the transfer of pension 
rights between schemes was also established (Koseisho Nenkinkyoku 
1990 pp 42-45).
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Sub-section 5.3 Enrolment numbers and benefit levels
Table 9.11 below shows the numbers enrolled in each type of company 
pension scheme and the percentage of the public welfare pension 
scheme contributors accounted for by the schemes.
Table 9.11 showing the number and proportion of the public welfare 
pension scheme enrolled in each type of company pension scheme 197 6- 
1989 .
Year Funded Welfare Pension Tekikaku pension
number
(1000s)
percentage number
(1000s)
percentage
1976 5348 22 .4 4593 19.2
1980 5769 22 .9 5327 21.1
1985 6731 24.9 7236 26.8
1989 8180 - 8460 -
Source: Data calculated from public welfare pension contributor
figures from various years of Sorifu Shakai Hosho Seido 
Shingikai (ed) Shakai Hosho Tokei Nenpo; number of 
enrolees for company pension schemes from Rodosho 
Rodokijunkyoku (1990) p 40.
Notes: percentages shown in columns 3 and 5 show the proportion
of those enrolled in the public welfare pension scheme 
that are enrolled in one or other of company pension 
scheme types.
The numbers enrolled have increased steadily since 197 6, although 
the increase has been greater in the case of tekikaku pension 
schemes, probably because the minimum number of enrolees needed to 
start a scheme is much lower. Also the proportion enrolled in the 
two types of scheme has risen. These figures imply that in 19 85 
nearly 27% of the public welfare pension contributors could expect 
a further pension benefit above the public pension benefits, if they 
opted for a company pension rather than a lump-sum payment upon 
retirement. In the case of the funded welfare pension schemes, those 
enrolled in 1985 (nearly 25% of the public welfare pension 
contributors) could expect a retirement pension that was greater 
than the public welfare pension benefits by a proportion of plus 
alpha. In total, approximately 52% of public welfare pension
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contributors could expect a total pension payment greater than that 
provided by the public welfare pension alone.
It has not been easy to obtain data on the levels of company pension 
benefits. In the case of the funded welfare pension scheme, the 
average monthly amount received by pensioners in 1986 was 15,109 yen 
(Sorifu Shakai Hosho Seido Shingikai 1989 p 165) . The funded welfare 
pension schemes are supposed to provide the earnings-related portion 
of the public welfare pension scheme plus a large increment (+ a). 
The earnings-related portion of the welfare public pension amounted 
to 101,181 yen per month on average (or approx. 52% of average 
monthly pre-retirement earnings) (Sorifu Shakai Hosho Seido 
Shingikai 1989 p 165). The low level of the funded welfare pension 
benefits is explained by the immaturity of the system, the short 
contribution periods of existing beneficiaries and the reduction in 
benefits incurred by changing job. It is believed that the level 
will increase in future (Kosei Tokei Kyokai 1989 p 182).
Data for tekikaku pensions has been particularly difficult to 
obtain. Figures for the present value of company pensions in 1985 
are given in RodSsho Rodokijunkyoku 1990 (p 13). The value ranges 
from 17,310,000 yen to 6,910,000 yen on average, depending on the 
schooling and type of work (these figures are for companies that 
only provide a pension, rather than a lump-sum, on retirement; also, 
figures are for those with 2 0 and above years of service) . Given 
that most pensions have a limited benefit period and that the most 
common period is ten years (in 82% of cases: Rodosho Rodokijunkyoku 
1990 p 55), dividing by 120 gives a monthly pension amount in 1985 
current prices: the monthly pension ranges from 144,250 yen to
57,583 yen. These amounts are equivalent to 62% and 25% of average 
earnings (average monthly earnings of the public welfare pension
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scheme contributors amounted to 231,566 in 1985: Sorifu Shakai Hosho 
Seido Shingikai 19 89 p 160). Other data suggest that the average 
monthly company pension for recipients in 1985 was 106,000 yen (940 
recipients) , although it is not clear that this figure is for 
tekikaku pension recipients alone (RSdosho Rodokijunkyoku 1990 p 
15) . This data is also supported by figures given in the Labour 
White Paper (Rbdoshb 1984 appendix p 115) which show that in 1981 
the tekikaku pension paid by companies that paicl pensions1 cm4 not lump 
sums ranged between 27,000 and 93,000 yen per month. Tekikaku 
pensions paid by firms that paid both pensions and lump sums ranged 
between 3 9,000 and 79,000 yen per month.
The figures given above are only rough estimates, but in conclusion, 
over 50% of public welfare pension scheme contributors can expect 
a substantial addition to public pension benefits in the future. 
The majority of those enrolled in tekikaku pension schemes take 
benefits in the form of a lump-sum payment, rather in the form of 
a pension for a limited number of years. The benefit levels accruing 
from the funded welfare pension schemes are still low, amounting to 
approximately 6% of average monthly earnings. Finally, the role of 
severance pay (see Chapter Three) in supporting retirees should not 
be overlooked.
Section 6 Conclusion to this chapter
The development of the public pension schemes in Japan was a 
piecemeal one, leading to a highly complex coverage system. During 
the 19 60s, each pension scheme was made more generous and the level 
of benefits increased, particularly after 1973 with the introduction 
of inflation index-linking and revisions to benefit levels to 
account for growth in real wages. Even by the mid-19 8 0s, however, 
the majority of pensioners were not receiving a pension equal to 60%
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of pre-retirement average earnings, which was the stated goal of the 
Ministry of Welfare. This was in part because many pensioners were 
eligible for only a national pension, which had far lower benefit 
levels than the public welfare pension scheme. Others who were 
eligible for welfare pension benefits received lower benefit levels 
than the target because they had not contributed for a long enough 
period or because they were receiving transfer pension benefits, 
which were lower than normal benefits because of moving between 
schemes during the total contribution period. The proportion of 
those receiving welfare pensions is likely to rise in future, given 
the present proportion of public pension contributors enrolled in 
the welfare pension scheme and therefore pension levels will rise 
on average.
By the mid-1980s, the Ministry of Welfare became fearful of the 
necessity of rapidly rising contributions rates, caused by rapid 
population ageing. Such a fear led to the reduction in benefit 
levels payable in the future, by reducing the earnings-related 
multiplier and raising the pension eligibility age. The raising 
of the pension eligibility age has still not been passed by the 
Diet, despite several submissions to the lower house committees. The 
main reason for the failure to pass this revision is that the 
business world fear that companies would have to support the income 
levels of those above the age of 60, should the revision come into 
effect (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 2 6 December 1989).
In the late 19 80s, the government laid greater emphasis on the 
provision of pension benefits through private and, moreover, funded 
pension schemes as it reduces its responsibility for income support 
of the elderly in the face of burgeoning welfare costs. Regulations 
for existing schemes have been relaxed, competition between fund-
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managers has been encouraged and new funded pension scheme 
frameworks have been introduced.
Important for the impact of these policy reforms on the level of 
unemployment amongst the older work force are the following:
1) If the eligibility age is eventually raised to 65, a gap of 5 
years between the most common age of company retirement and 
pension payments. As a result, those finding themselves 
unemployed at the age of 60 will be more likely than at 
present to remain unemployed rather than leave the labour 
force. Alternatively, policies could be used that would raise 
the company retirement age to 65, but should this be 
successful, it is likely that the rise in retirement age would 
be purely nominal and not actual. This likelihood is based on 
the introduction of early retirement schemes that were 
introduced with the raising of the mandatory retirement age to 
60 (see Chapters Four and Six).
2) If the policy of using private funded schemes to bolster 
public pension levels is not successful, low levels of public 
pensions will reduce the flow of unemployed older people into 
non-labour force participation. Although the levels of 
tekikaku pension are relatively high, the pension is normally 
paid for only ten years. The levels of funded welfare pensions 
are still very low and it is not clear that they will rise, 
despite optimistic claims in government-related literature.
3) The predicted future level of public pension scheme 
contributions remains above 20% in the first half of the 21st 
century. When consideration is given to payments for health 
care insurance and other government spending, and the 
government's aim to maintain the overall taxation level below 
50%, the level of 20% is still high. Moreover, the Ministry of
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Welfare has consistently underestimated the rapidity of public 
pension scheme maturation in the past, so the present low 
level of predicted contribution rates is likely to be 
optimistic in the light of future population changes.
Finally, it should be added that, even if the pension eligibility 
age is kept at 60, the 19 85 and 19 89 pension reforms have put a stop 
to the rise in average pension benefits and hence in future, the 
public pension schemes cannot be expected to reduce the aggregate 
unemployment rate of older men by raising benefit levels, leading 
to withdrawal from the labour force.
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CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSION TO THE THESIS
Section 1 The findings of the research
The discussion undertaken in Chapter Two of the existing analysis 
of the effects of population ageing showed that the effects are 
generally indeterminate. Moreover, empirical analysis has failed to 
eliminate the controversy surrounding the effects of reduced child 
dependency on savings and economic growth. An analysis of 
demographic change in Japan since 1950 and growth indicators 
suggested that the increasing proportion of the population employed 
not only increased output because of growth in the size of the 
labour force, but because of increases in saving and a shift in 
consumption patterns to non-agricultural products brought about by 
higher incomes per capita. The implication of this analysis was that 
the impact of further population ageing could be lessened if the 
proportion of the economically active population could be maintained 
at its current level, or at least be prevented from declining 
greatly. Given this implication, it became necessary to analyse the 
prospects of employment of older people in Japan, and this in turn 
required an analysis of Japanese employment practices to throw light 
on the workings of the labour market. From this point, analysis was 
focused on the labour market for men, since women face different 
employment practices and it can be assumed that the labour market 
for women will function differently as a result.
The analysis of employment practices showed that there was a general 
pattern of rising wage curves over time, although the pattern was 
less consistent for those employed in large firms. It also became 
clear that the age structure of male employees was ageing, but more 
so in smaller companies and with a less consistent pattern in large 
companies. These findings suggested that larger companies tended to
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regulate their workforce age structure and wage curves. In turn, 
such regulation implied that large companies operated an internal 
labour market. The examination of other employment practices ind 
Chapters Three and Four also pointed to the creation of internal 
labour markets in larger companies. Severance pay is calculated in 
way that encourages workers not to leave the company. Large firms 
prefer to hire inexperienced, young people, but figures show that 
mobility in the economy is high, suggesting that smaller firms are 
more ready to hire mid-termers. Mandatory retirement is prevalent 
in all sizes of company, but particularly in large ones. Internal 
promotion is extremely common and, again, particularly in large 
companies. Mobility between large companies is low, whereas mobility 
between small companies is much higher. Mobility from large to small 
companies rises in the older age groups and particularly at around 
retirement age.
An analysis of the reasons for the employment practices described 
in Chapters Three and Four and their relevance for the functioning 
of the labour market was given in Chapter Five. It was hypothesised 
that the nenko element of wages together with steep average wage 
curves engendered labour efficiency, particularly from a dynamic 
perspective in which technology and industrial structure are 
continually changing. A new approach, the efficiency age structure 
model, was devised to improve the understanding of large firms' 
hiring and redundancy decisions. This approach rejects the 
hypothesis that younger workers are paid less than their 
productivity and older workers more. Rather, it is assumed that 
workers are paid a wage equal to their marginal product. Older 
people and younger people are complementary inputs and therefore the 
productivity of an older worker will depend on the number of younger 
people combined with the older person in the workplace. When the
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company has a young internal age structure, the productivity of 
older workers will be high on average. Thus wage curves will be 
steep. This complementarrhj has been recognised often, but the 
implications of complementarity when combined with employment 
practices that are supposed to motivate workers have been ignored. 
If the internal age structure ages, the relative productivities of 
the younger and older people will change such that the wage curve 
flattens. A different view of the same process is that the wage 
curve flattens because fewer older people are promoted: this means 
that the probability of promotion is lowered and hence efficiency 
of promotion as an incentive is impaired. Flattening wage curves and 
reduced promotion probability reduces the dynamic efficiency of the 
whole workforce. Hence firms will attempt to maintain an optimum age 
structure. When the intake of young people is reduced, older workers 
must be cast off to maintain the structure. In an ageing population 
structure, the proportion of young people available for work is 
reduced, irrespective of the rate of growth in the economy and 
therefore older men will find themselves more prone to redundancy. 
They are pushed into a non-internal labour market, which in turn 
leads to less job security and higher risk of unemployment. The 
model implies that the wage curves and age structures of large 
companies should remain invariant to economic cycles, whereas those 
of smaller companies should change. This implication is borne out 
to a certain extent by the wage curves and age structures shown in 
Chapter Three.
Chapter Six examined the plausibility of the efficiency age 
structure model by studying the ways in which firms have responded 
to ageing of the male labour force. It was found that firms have 
responded by changing employment practices to cope with an ageing 
workforce and have also devised means of regulating the age
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structure by casting off older workers. An example of the former is 
the. creation of non-managerial promotion schemes and an example of 
the latter is the introduction of early retirement schemes. Thus the 
high degree of age structure rigidity implied by the efficiency age 
structure model is not fully supported, but its implication of age 
structure regulation is visible. There may be exogenous factors such 
as government policy and changes in technology that have altered the 
relationship between age structure and the dynamic efficiency of 
employment practices. Certainly, the attempts of government to raise 
the mandatory retirement age of firms as described in Chapter Eight 
seem to have been successful. Chapter Seven analysed the labour 
force participation rates and unemployment rates of men, both in the 
aggregate and disaggregated. It was found that much of the rise in 
the aggregate unemployment rate for men was explained by the rising 
unemployment rate of older men and by the increasing proportion of 
the labour force accounted for by older men, particularly compared 
with the proportion of the labour force accounted for by older men. 
This rising unemployment occurred in spite of the falling labour 
force participation rates of older men. The second part of the 
chapter analysed the nature of future exit routes from the 
unemployment pool for older men. It was shown using cohort analysis 
that the route from large company to self-employment and employment 
in smaller companies has been over-emphasized because cohort effects 
have been ignored. The flow out of unemployment encouraged by the 
provision of public pension is difficult to predict, since future 
government policy is not certain. If the government succeeds in 
raising the pension eligibility age and reduces the generosity of 
benefits, the flow out of the labour force of older unemployed men 
will be reduced: unemployment will rise.
Government intervention cannot be ignored. Chapter Eight described
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how government labour market policy to deal with unemployment of 
older men has developed. An assessment of the effectiveness of 
policy was attempted, but relevant data rare and fragmented, 
leading to a less than full assessment. Available figures suggest 
that most of the policies have not been successful. The one 
successful policy seems to be the administrative guidance undertaken 
to raise the mandatory retirement age in the private sector. Chapter 
Nine described the reform of the public pension schemes that have 
been undertaken to reduce the burden of high contribution rates. The 
reforms suggest that pensions will become less generous in future. 
The government has not succeeded in raising the pension eligibility 
age of the welfare pension scheme after two attempts. It remains to 
be seen whether such a move is possible.
This research implies that as the Japanese population ages, 
unemployment of older men will rise and this rise will be 
exacerbated by planned reform of the pension system. The rise in 
unemployment can only be avoided by change of employment practices. 
Unless new forms of incentive can be devised, changes in employment 
practices will lead to lower dynamic labour efficiency in large 
firms and therefore the changes will have to be enforced. If the 
proportion of people employed in large companies rises in future, 
the problem of unemployment will also worsen.
Section 2 Suggestions for future research
This thesis has been concerned purely with the effects of population 
ageing on the future unemployment and dependency of older men. The 
appendix to Chapter Seven (Appendix 7B) showed that in many OECD 
countries a decline in the labour force participation of men has 
been countered by a rise in the labour force participation of women. 
A rising labour force participation of women will lessen the
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increase in dependency caused by population ageing, so long as 
unemployment of women can be stopped from rising. If more women are 
employed under the same employment practices as men, they will face 
the same risk of unemployment. The importance of the employment of 
women in an economy undergoing population ageing requires further 
detailed research of the labour market in which women participate.
The efficiency age structure model is clearly not perfect in 
describing the demand for labour of different age groups and the 
shape of wage curves. It remains difficult to explain why there was 
some steepening of the wage curve for people employed in large 
companies, even if there was not a consistent pattern. It is 
possible that while wage increases in the young labour market fell 
with slower economic growth, wage increases of men already employed 
displayed a degree of inertia, at least until the older work force 
was adjusted. On the other hand, with older men being pushed out of 
long term jobs with the economic shock of the 197 0s, the older men 
who remained in employment were those who had survived a weeding out 
process: the survivors would be better quality workers with higher 
productivity. The efficiency age structure model can accommodate the 
explanation of steepening wage curves that is based on an increasing 
average length of service, since it does allow for a proportion of 
wages to be determined by personal factors (nenko wages) . It was 
noted in Chapter Five that one of the dynamic efficiency gains was 
the acceptance of newly-introduced technology engendered by wages 
that were not determined by functional factors. It is possible that 
an increasing emphasis placed on the creation of technology rather 
than absorption may alter the incentives of existing employment 
practices, but more detailed research is necessary to understand 
such a development.
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The use of flows of men between employment, unemployment and non­
labour force participation that were disaggregated by age would have 
produced a more detailed picture of the causes of unemployment 
amongst older men than was possible. It is hoped that such 
information will become available in the future.
It was found in Chapter Seven that smaller firms also had limits to 
the proportion of older people they were willing to hire. The 
efficiency wage structure cannot be used to explain this phenomenon, 
since it requires the operation of an internal labour market. Thus, 
other explanations will need to be found.
Finally, since many countries are experiencing population ageing, 
a comparison of labour market policies and their effectiveness would 
be extremely useful for policy makers. In the case of Japan a more 
detailed study of the effects of labour market policies would be 
useful, but such a study would only be possible if more information 
were made available. A close relationship with the Ministry of 
Labour might help in obtaining better information.
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